Volume 9/10, 2011/2012
L’âme et ses Discours de l’Antiquité au Moyen Âge
L’âme logos de l’intellect et le logismos de l’âme. À propos des Ennéades V, 1  et IV, 3 
The paper raises the question of the relationship between the description of the soul as logos and the description of its cognitive activities as logismos in Plotinus’ Enneads V, 1  et IV, 3 . It first offers an interpretation of the definition of the soul as a logos of the intellect in V, 1 . Then it scrutinises the use of the terms logismos and logizesthai in the same treatise and compares it to a similar use of these terms in IV, 3 . In both treatises, these terms refer to two distinct cognitive activities of the soul, one of which is the activity of a soul remaining in the intelligible realm and contemplating the cognitive contents of the divine intellect, while the other one denotes the defective cognitive activity of an embodied soul. In its concluding section the paper deals with Plotinus’ explanation, in IV, 3 , 30, of how the accomplished cognitive activity atthe level of the soul as logos of the intellect becomes a defective logismos at the level of an embodied soul. The author stresses the role of the embodied soul’s faculty of representation.