Balkan Journal of Philosophy

Volume 5, Issue 2, 2013

The role of rationality in the formulation of and compliance with the principles of justice

The function of rationality in A Theory of Justice (1971), which is of paramount importance for John Rawls’ (1921–2002) project, is often criticised as ambiguous. David Gauthier, for example, claims that Rawls develops principles for recipients who essentially share his intuitions of morality, without managing to prove their validity. In Political Liberalism (1993), Justice as Fairness (2001) and other writings Rawls himself embarks upon the task to throw more light on this issue, making the Kantian distinction between ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’. I intend to demonstrate that in A Theory of Justice the formulation and the compliance with the principles of justice are based on the interaction between the rationality, represented in the idea of the good, and the sense of justice of individuals.