Preface for All Volumes

This volume is one of five that altogether contain 140 articles and approach a total of 4,000 pages. It has been developed from the second meeting, in Lima, of the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations (O.P.O.) (see www.o-p-o.net) and shows the current state of development and vitality of the world-wide, multidisciplinary, multilingual, and century-old tradition of phenomenology. Before some remarks about the organization of this massive publication, something further about the magnitude, complexity, and development of this tradition can be grasped through some counts that have been made of publications, organizations, individuals, countries, and disciplines. Thus, for example, the earlier set of 53 essays published on the O.P.O. website from the 2002 founding of the O.P.O. in Prague has been visited well over 9,000 times by October 2007.

Not individual phenomenologists, but organizations belong to the O.P.O. Thus far, over 160 such organizations have been identified (see www.phenomenologycenter.org), the latest being in Siberia, but more have been heard of. Some organizations are as small as 12 members and meet in private homes and one, in Japan, that numbers 500 members. At this point, 27 exist in the Asia-Pacific area, 22 in Central and Eastern Europe, 56 in Western Europe, 19 in Latin America, and 37 in North America. Organizations that pay the modest annual dues are formal members of the O.P.O. (The next planetary meeting of the O.P.O. will be in Hong Kong in December 2008.
As for the number of individual phenomenologists, the electronic *Newsletter of Phenomenology* that is supported with the dues paid by organizations to the O.P.O. now has over 3,000 subscribers (see [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/newsletter_of_phenomenology](http://groups.yahoo.com/group/newsletter_of_phenomenology)). These individuals come from at least 53 nations and belong to at least 36 disciplines.

The nations in which there known to be phenomenologists are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Venezuela. With eight out of a population of 300,000, Iceland has the highest proportion, which is roughly equivalent to 25 per million (at that rate there would be 7,500 phenomenologists in the United States, which is not—yet—the case!).

As for disciplines containing phenomenologists, Architecture, Cognitive Science, Communicology, Counseling, Ecology, Economics, Education, English, Ethnic Studies, Ethnography, Ethnology, Ethnomethodology, Film Studies, French, Geography (Behavioral), Geography (Social), Hermeneutics, History, Linguistics, Law, Literature, Medical Anthropology, Medicine, Musicology, Nursing, Philosophy, Political Science, Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychopathology, Religious Education, Social Work, and Theology have been identified thus far. Philosophy and nursing seem the largest. Social Work is the most recently identified. The ongoing increase in multidisciplinary research could well produce more colleagues in disciplines beyond philosophy.
The 140 essays in the present publication could have been arranged alphabetically into one enormous electronic file, but for the sake of libraries and also readers not interested in all regions of the planet, it has been divided into five volumes. It was decided at O.P.O. II to replace the obsolete division between Eastern and Western Europe with one between the Northern European and the Euro-Mediterranean regions. Whether this is more than an editorial convenience must remain to be seen, although the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean regional phenomenological organization was also supported there and has since taken place. Divisions into regions may change for the O.P.O. in the future and this division should not be taken to signify that there are not already extensive and increasing communication and cooperation between groups and individuals from different regions or that phenomenologists have not been reflecting on differences and relations between civilizations, societies, ethnicities, and other cultural groups for some time.

The Executive Committee of the O.P.O. has provided two editors for each of five geographic regions of the planet. The laborious process of judging essays has been avoided by welcoming two essays decided upon by each participating formal member organization of the O.P.O., which fits the “bottom-up” character of this umbrella organization.

What the title “phenomenology” signifies varies somewhat with the discipline and tendency within the tradition and is itself a theme of reflection rather like “philosophy” is for philosophers. Some essays here are historical, some are interpretive of classical work, and yet others are not on but in phenomenology and confront relatively new issues, such as communication between members of different species. Readers will certainly find unfamiliar names among the authors, in part because these others come from other disciplines and
nations, but also because many younger colleagues are included. And over a quarter of the contributors are women. Email addresses of authors are included with their essays so that they can be contacted by colleagues when there appear to be common interests.

Besides this shared Preface, each volume in this work has its own Introduction by its editors and then Notes on Authors, a Chronicle about each region’s phenomenological organizations, and the Tables of Contents of all five volumes are appended to each volume. There are no indices because names and words are easily searched electronically on pdf files. Abstracts in English are included and most essays are in English, but not a few essays are in other languages. (Phenomenology began of course in German, but soon also began to be written in French, Japanese, and Russian before World War I and is now expressed in possibly forty languages, a “multilinguality” certain to continue not only in teaching and research but also as insights and inspirations are gained from the study of more and more of the pasts of humanity.)

The same photograph of most of the colleagues at the Lima meeting immediately follows this Preface in all five volumes (some were away visiting the Inca archaeological sites). There is an additional photograph of some colleagues from its particular area somewhere in the midst of each volume and the volume for Latin America has a third photograph of Jacques Taminiaux, who gave the keynote address, together with Rosemary Rizo-Patron, who hosted O.P.O. II in Lima, and her husband Solomon.

Finally, while the contents of each volume have been developed by the various pairs of editors, the whole of this five-volume publication has been assembled by Lester Embree with the able assistance of Daniel Marcelle.

The Editors
Introduction

From Phenomenology in East Asia to East Asian Phenomenology: An Intercultural Reflection

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Introduction

In seeking to gain an overview of the Asian contributions to *Phenomenology 2005*, two distinctions have proven useful: “Western/intercultural” and “pure theory/applied theory.” The first one is concerned either with (1) the purely “Western style” problems or with (2) the intercultural issues. The second one is concerned with either (1) philosophical phenomenology or (2) disciplines beyond philosophy, such as, sociology, psychiatry, and photography. Overlapping them, we see four categories occur as a result:

A. Western and philosophical
B. Western and applied
C. intercultural and philosophical

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D. intercultural and applied

I will firstly comment on these essays according to these four compound categories. After that, some reflections will be offered with special attention to the intercultural aspect in relation to the PEACE (Phenomenology East Asian CirclE) Mission Statement of CHO Kah Kyung and to the intercultural philosophy of F. M. WIMMER.

I. Description of these articles

A. Western and Philosophical

In “Husserl and Kant on Intuition,” CHO Kah Kyung the author compares the concepts of intuition held by Husserl and Kant. In contrast to Bergson, both Husserl and Kant speak for the compatibility of intuition and intellect, but the author also shows how intuition for Kant is related to sensibility and for Husserl it is connected with essence and the emptiness or fulfillment of concept. A deeper analysis is also made concerning the common ground of the two, for example, the intuitive experience as well as analogy used both in Husserl and Kant which extends to the etymological problem.

In “Ich, Leben und Trieb: Das Problem des Ich und des Bewusstseinsstroms bei Husserl,” INAGAKI Satoshi aims to unfold the problematic of “I” in Husserl’s phenomenology. Acknowledging the possibility of misunderstanding Husserl, who posits the concept of transcendental ego as the ultimate source of constitution, Inagaki hopes to do away with such mischief by bringing up the analysis of the manifold levels of the “I,” ranging from the transcendental consciousness through the stream of consciousness to the “life of drives” (Triebleben), the last of which is closely connected with passive synthesis.
In “Natural Ethics: Legitimate Naturalism in Ethics” HOLENSTEIN Elmar questions the legitimacy of the anti-naturalistic position in ethics and proposes a model that involves natural dispositions towards such things as happiness and utility. He first confirms that it is possible to infer from “is” to “ought” when ability and evaluation are taken into account. He then proceeds to show that it belongs to human right to use one’s natural ability. In the end he suspects the foundation of morality on its own ground, taking Kantian moral theory as example. In his attempt to go beyond the limitation of ethical thought in the modern age, he recognizes “the naturalistic properties as ethical properties,” even though these naturalistic properties are insufficient to justify ethical judgment.

In “Heidegger’s Da and Hegel’s Diese: A Destructive Reading of Hegel’s ‘Sense Certainty,’” KE Xiaogang follows the path of the Heideggerian phenomenological-hermeneutical analysis of Hegel’s Introduction to *Phenomenology of Spirit* to take up the problem of experience as well as sense certainty, with special attention to the terms such as “Da” as well as “Diese.”

In “Living in the Risk World: Ulrich Beck in the Shadow of Husserl and Heidegger,” KIM Hongwoo discusses the “risk discourse” of Ulrich Beck that is based on the thesis that human beings are unprepared to live in the world. At the end he brings up the crisis discourse of Husserl and Dasein-analysis to cope with this risk discourse.

In “From Intimacy to Familiarity: on the Political Constitution of the Life-World,” KIMURA Masato aims to make clear the political constitution of the life-world against the background of the debate between Schutz and Voegelin. He argues that in the familiar surrounding of the daily lifeworld the political implication is
already obvious due to the normative evaluation of one’s own life-world setting.

In “Grundwort ‘Gerechtigkeit’: Heideggers Nietzsche-Interpretation,” KODAMA Hakaru inquires into the meaning of justice in Nietzsche, which Heidegger takes up as one of the five key concepts in his interpretation of that figure. Kodama regrets that this concept has been more or less neglected among Nietzsche interpreters. Acknowledging the significance of justice as “the sincerity for oneself” as well as “true knowing,” the author deals with Heidegger’s understanding of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician.

In “Non-Familiarity and Otherness: Derrida’s Hermeneutics of Friendship and its Political Implications,” LAU Kwok-ying clarifies the notion of friendship in Derrida. In distinction from brotherhood, friendship signifies a kind of interpersonal relationship not at all based on kinship. It denotes openness to the unpredictability of encountering strangers of whatever kind. The political dimension in international relationships is also explored due to the fruitfulness of this concept.

In “Husserl’s view of Metaphysics: The Role of Genuine Metaphysics in Phenomenological Philosophy,” LEE Nam-in studies the problem of whether Husserl’s phenomenology can be viewed as metaphysics. In line with the positions of Landgrebe, Kern, and Zahavi, he interprets Husserl’s thought as begetting metaphysical implications by distinguishing the “genuine” metaphysics from the traditional, the former being founded on the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl.

In “From Miscarried Phenomenology to Intuitive Ontology: Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Bergson,” MATSUBA Shoichi examines Merleau-Ponty’s critique as well as appreciation of Bergson, emphasizing that he maintained an ambivalence toward Bergson. In the early period, Merleau-Ponty evaluates Bergson’s ideas of per-
ception and body in the framework of phenomenology, in which Bergson fails to recognizes the intentionality of consciousness and commits naturalism. In his middle period, Merleau-Ponty focuses on Bergson’s theory of history and language and in the late period on intuition. Even though the author emphatically says that Merleau-Ponty’s attitude toward Bergson never changes dramatically from positive to negative or vice versa, he hopes for a revival of Neo-Bergsonism based on the concept of intuition, which is crucial for the ontology in Merleau-Ponty’s late period.

In “The Sublime of Judgment: Kant’s Aesthetics in Deconstruction,” MIYAZAKI Yusuke analyses the Kantian concept of the sublime with reference to the idea of deconstruction in Derrida as well as to contemporary French philosophy. The point of departure is the so-called aporetic structure of judgment: any judgment must be made simultaneously following a law and without following any law. The author traces this problematic back to Kant with emphasis on the notion of the sublime.

In “Habitualität und Zeitlichkeit,” MURATA Norio treats habituality along two dimensions: temporality and activity. Compared to event or fact, habituality has longer duration and has great impact on the subject. It is acquired as time goes by. For this reason, is habituality is not timeless like the ideal concept. Habituality is on the other hand based on repeated activity, such that it is not equivalent to an inherent ability. The author puts forth the concept of instinct to indicate that the habituality is ultimately grounded on instinct, which is understood by Husserl as pure impulse.

In “Retrait à traduire (vers une confrontation entre Heidegger et Derrida),”

NISHIYAMA Tatsuya discusses whether the French word “retrait” is capable of being translated. The problem concerns the different ideas of translation between Derrida and Heidegger. Putting
forth the strategy of re-translating and counter-translating upheld by Derrida, the author talks about the movement of the “trait” itself, which “opens up a space for the general transformability in language and in the history of metaphysics.”

In “Der junge Heidegger und das Problem der Kategorie,” WATANABE Kozinori aims to make clear that Heidegger’s conception of category not only stems from his discussion of Aristotle’s teaching, but is also under the influence of Dilthey’s Lebenskategorie. For Watanabe the question of category is as significant as the question of Being (Seinsfrage) in Heidegger’s thought. According to the author’s interpretation of category, a two-sided movement between language and world is unfolded insofar as the category indicates that not only the world is spoken by us but also speaks to us. The author thus sees a parallel between category and Being in Heidegger’s philosophy.

In “On Schutz’s Way of Doing Phenomenology: The Phenomenological Psychology of Husserl as a Clue,” YU Chung-Chi inquires into the problem as to how Schutz can be understood as a phenomenologist. He suggests that the connection between Schutz and Husserl can be worked out in the framework of phenomenological psychology in Husserl and the question answered accordingly.

**B. Western and Applied**

In “Phenomenology and Photography: On Seeing Photographs and Photographic Seeing,” CHEUNG Chan-Fai explores the nature of photographic seeing by way of phenomenological reflection, with the aim to sketch out the ontological status of photography.

In “The Social Formation of Psychic Systems,” HUANG Shinn-Young inquires into the relationship between the realm of the psychic and that of the social. Based on the social theory of Luhmann he suspects that the psychic system can be established on its own without referring to other systems, especially the social system.
In “Reductionism in the Synthetic Approach of Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: Rethinking Dreyfus’s Critique of AI,” ISHIHARA Kohji reexamines Dreyfus’ criticism on AI in the 1970s in order to cope with the new development of AI, which he finds unsatisfactory. His arguments are based on the conceptions of Husserl as well as Heidegger.

In “The Social Structure as Otherness,” LUI Ping-keung tells the difference between the social structure defined by the actor himself and that defined by other actors. It is the second meaning of social structure that the author ventures to work out thoroughly.

C. Intercultural and Philosophical

In “只要是人，就会有对Being的理解？—对海德格尔说法的质疑,” JIN Xiping asks whether the Heideggerian questioning of being is universal and occurs in all cultures. If it is nothing but the result of European language, it can be hardly treated as universal at all. Or else, the questioning of being is inherent in all cultures despite the absence of the copula of being? The author tends to favor the first position.

In “Ki und Du: Versuch einer Interkulturellen Phänomenologie,” YAMAGUCHI Ichiro takes up the issue of intercultural philosophy: how can the philosophical positions from different cultures be brought together to make a meaningful dialogue? He sees the possibility in the epochē of Husserl’s phenomenology and meditation in Zen Buddhism. Both of them seek to undermine the traditional dualism, which is revealed most obviously in the mind-body dichotomy.

D. Intercultural and Applied

In “Sauntering through Hiroshima,” HIDEO Hama describes the mood and thought aroused by the destroyed sight of
Hiroshima. He also discusses the problem of nationalism as well as its opposite.

In “The Over-dominance of English in Global Education: The Contemporary Relevance of Leibniz’s Notion of ‘Language Care,’” KWAN Tze-wan is concerned with the phenomenon of over-dominance of English in the age of globalization. To save people from the estrangement of their own cultures, he pleads care for the respective mother tongue.

In “The Geophilosophy of WATSUIJI Tetsuro and Cultural Plurality,” LEE Sung-Tae aims to illuminate the concepts of Fudo and Nin-Gen as well as Ie in the framework of WATSUIJI in order to discuss the problem of globalization and cultural plurality. The author holds that these Japanese concepts cast light on the current debate on ethnicity, nationality, and ethics.

In “Contacting and Enacting ‘Self for being Ethical’: A Model for Psychotherapy in Taiwan,” LEE Wei-Lun is concerned with the ethical dimension of dealing with patients suffering from mental problems. The cultural difference is taken into account concerning the practice of psychotherapy. The author is aware of the contrast between professional knowledge that originates from the West and the indigenous practice of psychotherapy.

In “Phenomenological Psychology in Taiwan: A Genealogical Approach,” TSAI Cheng-yun describes, on the one hand, the results of the researches in the field of phenomenological psychology in Taiwan, and, on the other hand, demonstrates how the so-called “genealogical phenomenology” can proceed on the basis of these researches in order to show a style of phenomenology different from the West.

In “Art as a Way of the Recovery from Technē to Ethos: Phenomenological Approach to Indigenous Mental Healing in Taiwan,” WANG Wen-Shen discusses how technē can be trans-
formed to *ethos* by way of art within the framework of Husserl’s as well as Heidegger’s philosophy. He also tested the validity of his research in a medical institution in northern Taiwan and with a satisfactory result.

II. Reflection

After the first PEACE (Phenomenology East Asia CirclE) meeting, held in Hong Kong 2004, the Korean-American phenomenologist CHO Kah-Kyung says in “the PEACE mission statement,” (http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/peace/mission.html) that “…it is a propitious time for Asian scholars to rethink their hitherto one-sided reception of phenomenology. Symbolically, a bridge is a meeting point of two-way traffic. More than ever, we were nudged to set our sight on productive East-West intellectual conversation.” In order to realize the mission of PEACE, he suggests four issues for the ongoing discussions:

1. *Methodology*: “Justify and demonstrate that phenomenology as method is uniquely cohesive to the self-expressive potential of traditional Asian thought.”

2. *East-West Intercultural Dialogue*: “Drawing from the resources of phenomenological investigations on intersubjectivity, other person, alien world and pluralistic traditions, the PEACE proposes to develop ongoing productive East-West intercultural dialogues based on the mutual respect of the principle of alterity.”

3. *Inter-Asian Cooperation*: “A further inter-Asian cooperation bringing each distinct type of thought in the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean traditions to a lively contrast.”

4. *Universal Reason and Unity of the World*: “The PEACE renews its firm commitment to the universal reason as the teleology of humanity in progress. In real terms, however, the transversality and
multiversality of reason are the indispensable pathways to the ideal unity of reason.”

This mission statement and related suggestions disclose clearly what a phenomenologist of East Asian background has in mind in the phenomenological tradition of global scale. Undoubtedly, the phenomenologists in and from East Asia have made remarkable contributions to the development in phenomenology. They have worked hard to get the major works translated to their own languages, they have made interpretations of them, introduced phenomenology into their culture, and some of them have become well known in the West as well with publications in Western languages. Our collection this time helps to reveal this fact only modestly. What is worthy of attention is that besides the excellent interpretations to the major works in phenomenology, they show great interests in intercultural problems, and deal with phenomenology with accent on their own cultures.

As East Asian phenomenologists regard it, phenomenology is more than an academic school of thought that originates in the West. For this reason, besides performing the same tasks as their Western colleagues, they aim to work out more significant results in relation to cultural issues. With this in mind, two different ways are often encountered. “Using the phenomenology as a method to interpret and dig out traditional thought” is one and “considering the phenomenological problems from the East Asian angle” is the other. Both of these possibilities concern intercultural dialogues, but the first way seems to confirm first the universality of the phenomenological method and then to apply this method to the specific area of research. The second way concentrates on the core issues of phenomenology and remains sensitive to cultural differences. Focusing on the difference in respect of language or thought, they reexamine the issues in phenomenology from their own perspective.
For example, the colleague from Peking University, JIN Xiping, raises the question in his contribution to our collection of whether the questioning of Being is indeed universal. By posing this question, he is not presupposing in advance the universality of such a question, nor is he denying its universal validity. Instead, he reflects on this question, assumed by Heidegger to be universal. With his culture as background, he brings it into discussion. Doing so, he asks whether the question raised by Heidegger can be echoed in his own culture. This case exemplifies how one can rethink all the questions in phenomenology (such as “essence,” “thing,” “nature,” “body,” “ego,” “intersubjectivity,” and “social relationship”) on one’s own cultural basis. Agreeing with or disagreeing with what the great masters in the phenomenological tradition say is out of the question. What is at stake is that people start from their own culture and confront the issues in phenomenology and make clear their own perspectives accordingly.

As a result, in line with Cho in his mission statement of PEACE, “universal reason” and “the one world” should be viewed as “the teleology of humanity in progress,” i.e., as ideas that have to be pursued via cultural multiplicity rather than treated as presuppositions or accepted as unquestioned truths. Based on this principle, the scholars from East Asia may work out a kind of phenomenology that is undoubtedly their own. If this is realized, East Asian Phenomenology would no longer be “Phenomenological Essays from East Asia,” but would be genuine “East Asian Phenomenology.”

III. Further Reflection

In order to clarify the points mentioned above, further attention may be drawn to some viewpoints upheld by philosophers who have been concerned with intercultural issues in the last decade. Let me bring up, for example, some insights of Franz W. Wimmer of Vienna. He points out in his article, “Is Intercultural
Philosophy a New Branch or a New Orientation in Philosophy?” (http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer/fwpubl-en.html), that the philosophers from the non-Western countries face a dilemma: either they behave like Western colleagues, or they behave indigenously. In the first case they are treated seriously, but not considered representative of their own culture. In the second case, though viewed as representative of their cultures, they are not taken seriously in the sense that their enterprise is not considered philosophical enough.

The implicit idea that constitutes this dilemma is that philosophy here is equivalent to occidental philosophy. This thought has been seldom challenged not only among professional philosophers in the West, but also, he contends, it has been accepted without question in Africa, Japan, and Latin America. As Wimmer indicates, when people talk about philosophy, particularly contemporary philosophy, only names from the West are taken into account.

How has such a situation come about? Why is the history of philosophy written in this way? Why are the non-Western elements excluded from the core of philosophy and treated as “alien,” “pagan,” or “barbarian?” Wimmer asks whether philosophy should not reflect on itself so that all different “philosophies” have equal status and dialogue with each other? He knows that this is no easy task. He suggests that one should at least not allow books from Indian Philosophy to be categorized as part of “Indology.” That is to say, the philosophy in India should not be understood as just an instrument for the West to conceptualize what the “Indian soul” looks like.

According to Wimmer, philosophy itself has to cope with its own paradox: If philosophical thinking has to be done only in a certain language and language is unavoidably connected with culture, then no philosophy is free from its cultural background. In spite of this fact, almost all philosophers pursue universal truth, searching for claims that are valid for all people and all times.
Briefly, this is the paradox: how can universal truth be revealed in a particular language?

Two typical solutions to this paradox are suggested in traditional philosophy: Hegel and Heidegger claim that the German language is the perfect language for philosophy. This is an ethnocentric position that no one will take seriously today. The second one is the way through strict method. Both Descartes and Husserl share this opinion. But this way is very much criticized today. Nowadays we see many people hold a third alternative: the so-called Ethnophilosophy. This position takes the popular thought in myths and sayings seriously. The typical Ethnophilosophy is the négritude movement in Africa, supported by Senghor, the former president of Senegal. Wimmer questions the validity of this alternative as a way out of the paradox, asking, ironically, if we can accept that the tales collected by Grim brothers during the heyday of Romanticism in the early 19th century are useful to refute the moral philosophy of Kant. If so, then we may well accept the Ethnophilosophical idea. But how can one proceed seriously in philosophy? As Wimmer regards it, philosophy has to be argumentative. If a philosopher wants to claim that his thesis is universally valid, he cannot but use argument. And the reason why a true proposition is different from a false one has to be based on certain criteria.

By the way, Wimmer sees another weakness in Ethnophilosophy, which is highly welcomed in this postmodern age, namely relativism. If we hold firmly to this relativism, then we give up the original spirit of philosophy: the search for universally valid truth. The last deficiency of Ethnophilosophy lies in its self-contradictory position against Western philosophy. Those who speak for Ethnophilosophy on the one hand criticize sharply the self-centeredness of occidental philosophy, yet on the other hand they in general hold that the concepts from the West are helpful to illuminate their own traditional ideas.
All in all, Wimmer cannot agree with Ethnophilosophy. It cannot be a good solution to the paradox mentioned above. He is highly concerned with the original spirit of philosophy, the self-understanding of philosophy as well as the spirit of the European Enlightenment, even though he strongly believes that the ideal of this spirit can be fulfilled only through culture and language. But he is also opposed to the idea that we should look for the answer back in history. Instead, we should look forward to the future, and the proper way is no other than that through interculturality, particularly through “polylogue,” an expression coined by Wimmer. In this way, on the one hand, we pay enough attention to cultural multiplicity and, on the other hand, we avoid the errors resulting from relativism.

Philosophy used to be treated only as occidental philosophy. No matter how people have been accustomed to that thought, it needs to be overcome, so that we can cope with the contemporary as well as the future situation of all humankind. This situation allows for no “centric” philosophy of any kind. According to Wimmer, “This will be a continuation of the project of European enlightenment with different means: not by relying on a unique method of science, but by creating a polylogue of traditions.” (p. 12) And to realize this goal, some steps are required. First step: reconstruct different traditions of thought in a comprehensive and differentiated way. Second step: consider the preconditions and limitations, as well as expectable results of such a polylogue.

All in all, the basic philosophical problems need to be reconsidered on this basis. For example, the sources of knowledge, the West used to consider two, but in India it has been claimed that they are six. How can we judge which is true? In addition, the issue of the human nature also has to be discussed. The aim is to reach the commonly agreeable ideas, and these ideas are “linguis-
tically and culturally mixed.” Only by this way will we be able to approach true universality. Today only the interculturally-oriented philosophy can help fulfill the old dream of philosophers of transculturally valid claims. Even if we find it very difficult to reach this goal, we may at least follow the first modest rule: “Never accept a philosophical thesis from authors of a single cultural tradition to be well founded.”

We see how Wimmer’s ideas are similar to the PEACE mission statement written by Cho. They both oppose one-sidedness in contemporary philosophy and hope for an intercultural dialogue and for reaching the idea of universal value through such dialogue.

Of course, Wimmer has missed one point. As indicated earlier, he told us that the non-Western scholars encounter a dilemma: either they behave themselves like the Western colleagues, or they behave themselves indigenously. I find this dilemma untenable if we consider that the non-Western scholars are beyond this dilemma when they have good knowledge about the occidental philosophy.

How can we say that a Chinese scholar who is expert in Kant, Hegel, or Heidegger ceases to be Chinese? Does a Western scholar who is expert on Buddhism cease to be Western? A Chinese of today is no longer the Chinese of thousand years ago. Even the Chinese scholar who studies Taoism is a “modern” Chinese. How indigenous can he be is as questionable as how he can interpret the classical texts of Taoism in the purely traditional way without referring to any “Western” notions. A modern Chinese can no longer choose between the “indigenous” and “modern” (automatically interpreted as “Western” in the eyes of many Chinese people). Instead he has to struggle to put the two essential elements together. This situation holds true, so I believe, for the whole East Asian world.
Back to our context, as far as phenomenology is concerned, when we see that phenomenologists in East Asia are learning, interpreting, and spreading this approach, they are cultivating, on the one hand, their own culture and, on the other hand, contributing to the century-old tradition. That is to say, they are not just doing what their colleagues in the occident are doing, rather, they are proceeding creatively for the benefit of their own culture as well as for the general phenomenological movement.

The dilemma mentioned by Wimmer does not exist, when phenomenology in East Asia is not just phenomenological research in the Western style, but the Eastern Asian phenomenology (more specifically, Chinese phenomenology, Japanese phenomenology, Korean phenomenology, Taiwan phenomenology, Hong Kong phenomenology) in genuine ways. I truthfully believe that this can happen just like the Chinese Buddhism and its spread to Korea and Japan led to specific characteristics. In this case, how should the contributions of the Asian phenomenologists be evaluated? And what specific role do they play? Although this question can be answered only very vaguely now, it will become clear if this is carried out, even with only partial realization.

If East Asian researchers are prepared in this way, then they are ready enough to take part in the honorable forum of “polylogue.” Without this preparation, the dialogue can be hardly conducted in a significant way, because the occidental actors retain their major role on the stage, probably continuing their monologue as usual. Our collection this time shows the fact that many of the East Asian phenomenologists are highly interested in intercultural dialogue. In this way they are more than ready to join the many-sided dialogue.
Endnotes

1 Not until I finished this article have I got a copy of the book Essays on Intercultural Philosophy (F. M. Wimmer, Satya Nilayam Publications, Chennai, India, 2002), in which the paper “Is Intercultural Philosophy a New Branch or a New Orientation in Philosophy?” is contained. I retain the page number on the website, considering that this is more accessible than the printed version for many people.