

Teilhard. Haught also shows how Teilhard's view is both Christian and compatible with Darwinian science, looking toward the future from which God is calling us forward. Haught expresses this future-oriented outlook in this entirely optimistic final sentence: "Even though Darwin himself seemed oblivious to the potential his discoveries have to stimulate theological, spiritual, and ethical renewal, his theory of evolution is a great gift to Christian theology and spirituality as they seek to interpret Jesus' revolutionary understanding of God for our own age and future generations" (148).

Making Sense of Evolution distills the essence of previous books by John Haught into a clear exposition of the compatibility between theology and evolutionary science. It discerns different levels on which questions can be answered, and demonstrates the error in assuming that an either/or outcome is required. It reverses the old notion of God's role as a clock maker, offering instead the

more open (and optimistic and hopeful) concept of God calling forth an evolving universe from the future.

Who should read this book? It is not specialized at all. Professor Haught teaches undergraduates, and this text is entirely accessible at the undergraduate level. Church book-discussion groups will find it easy to move through one chapter a week. Brevity makes it easy to digest and comprehend each chapter before going on to the next. I highly recommend it to any scientist open to the idea that science might not encompass *all* possible knowledge and to any Christian open to the idea that evolution might actually be God's method of creating.

THOMAS P. SHEAHEN

Thomas Sheahen, PhD, is the director of ITEST, the Institute for Theological Encounter with Science and Technology, in St. Louis, Missouri. A different version of this review appeared in the Spring 2011 ITEST Bulletin.

***Ethical Imperialism:
Institutional Review Boards and the Social Sciences, 1965–2009***

by Zachary M. Schrag

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, hardcover, \$45.00
264 pages, bibliographic notes and index, ISBN 978-0-8018-9490-9

Institutional review boards (IRBs) are such a part of everyday university life that it can be difficult to imagine that they have a history of their own. In this brief and engaging book, Zachary Schrag, an associate professor of history at George Mason University, brings the history of the ordinary IRB to life. At slightly over two hundred pages of narrative text, the book is quite short. Given Schrag's engaging, though at times polemic, writing style, the book can easily be read in a single sitting, like a good piece of historical fiction.

The history of the IRB may not seem an obvious matter of concern for readers of the *NCBQ*, but the book speaks in a lively voice about the concerns of any scholar who wishes to do ethical research involving human sub-

jects. Although preoccupied primarily with the role that social sciences and social scientists did *not* play in the establishment of the IRB system, Schrag's work will speak to bioethicists whose work is subject to IRB review as well as those who serve on IRBs. Specifically, Schrag's treatment of the history of the fight for a more nuanced form of ethical review for social scientists and humanities scholars will resonate for ethicists. The history of a secular-sacred institution like the IRB is also likely to resonate with historians of theological debates and those interested in the evolution of distinct ethical positions in the Church. In short, Schrag's work will speak at some level to any scholar interested in the history of institutions, the ethics of

scholarly disciplines, the in-fighting between the “hard” and “soft” sciences, and the quest to create a safe environment for human participants in research.

Like any work, *Ethical Imperialism* is not without problems. The first is Schrag’s tendency to argue in a polemical way. This manifests in his tendency to speak as if social scientists were somehow martyred during the history of IRB evolution and review. Although Schrag sets out clearly in the introduction that his book is partly of personal import, his tone periodically loses the measured clip of the professional historian and descends to the shrill insistence of a devoted journalist-advocate. Second, this slip of tone sometimes causes him to overstate the case. At the beginning, for example, he asserts that “while scholars seeking publication or accused of research misconduct can generally hope to be judged by experts in their fields, IRBs are never composed of researchers in a single discipline in the social sciences or humanities, and they may not have any members familiar with the ethics and methods of the scholars who come before them” (2). He offers no factual support for the dubious claim that publication or misconduct review is confined to scholars from one discipline or for his assertion that IRBs do not include, even on an advisory basis, members from specialized disciplines.

Schrag tells a story that is replete with heroes and villains and reads easily. In chapter 1, he reviews the evolution of ethics concerns in the social sciences and introduces us to the first among many in his cast of villains. The story of Laud Humphreys and the *Tearoom Trade* debate in the mid-1960s, first recounted in this chapter, is emblematic of ethically questionable work in the social sciences.¹ Schrag describes Humphreys’ work in more detail than have many other authors, and provides the reader with a fuller picture of what became, as Schrag implicitly points out, a rallying cry for the regulation of social sciences.

More importantly, Schrag introduces us in this chapter to the origins of policies designed to regulate biomedical and psychological research, casting them as a common

tale of villainy. His discussion of Congressman Cornelius Gallagher’s congressional hearings into psychological testing and invasion of privacy, held in 1965, introduces us to governmental attempts at intervention into research. Although Gallagher’s hearings ultimately did not lead to broad recommendations for review of social sciences, they publicized concerns about psychological testing and research that became part of a broader concern for the regulation of biomedical research. The first item of relevant legislation, in February 1966, was the Public Health Service’s Policy and Procedure Order 129, which set out to regulate research with human beings according to criteria of favorable risk and benefit, prior review, individual rights and welfare, and appropriate methods—criteria that would become part of the standard package of IRB concerns.

Chapter 2 looks at the beginnings of the IRB system in the early 1970s. Political responses to the Tuskegee controversy motivated the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to seek regulation of non-federally-funded, non-health-related research in its effort to extend control over research review, and the National Research Act of 1974 gave the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare the authority to establish regulations for IRBs. In that rush, new wording on the inclusion of “behavioral research” opened the door to regulation of the social sciences. In Schrag’s narrative, Congress and the DHEW were the villains, whose efforts to obtain wide-ranging powers of review provoked the ire of the first heroes of the book—the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley, who attempted to create a system of nuanced review that accounted for disciplinary differences and could be exercised with a “light touch.” The theme of broad federal IRB imposition versus the attempts within individual universities to create nuanced review systems runs through the book, often with a subtle David-and-Goliath subtext.

Chapter 3 invites the reader to think of multiple Davids fighting an indifferent Goliath. Recounting the work of the National Commission for the Protection of Human

Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974–1978), Schrag casts the story as one of a few heroes (commission staffer Bradford Gray and commissioners Karen Lebacqz and Albert Jonsen among them), who fought the encroachment of fuzzy regulations of the social sciences and encouraged more varied perspectives on the needs of social sciences. A maybe-hero, Robert Levine (a consultant to the commission), sometimes represents the biomedical establishment and sometimes serves as an empathetic advocate for the embattled social scientists. Indeed, Levine’s role is characteristic of the IRB system in general—biomedical at heart but periodically sympathetic to the needs of other disciplines. Unfortunately, the heroes appear to have been well-meaning and well-informed but largely ineffectual against the obfuscation and unwavering biomedical focus of the commission. By the end of the chapter, the reader has a strong sense of the extent to which social scientists were excluded from the processes of establishing guidance and regulations.

The theme of universalism and obfuscation versus nuance and rationality is taken up clearly in chapter 4, which discusses the evolution of the *Belmont Report*. In this chapter, Tom Beauchamp and the American Sociological Association on one side, and Karen Lebacqz on the other, are emblematic of the conflict between biomedical dominance and social scientific consideration. The juxtaposition is interesting in itself, but scholars unfamiliar with the history of the *Belmont Report* will find this short chapter an engaging one that explains the history in simple terms.

Chapters 5 through 7 recount the first and second “battles for social science” and the period between them, and confirm Schrag’s talent as a historical storyteller. Chapter 5 is rich with villainous intent on the part of government officials determined to provide IRB review “for every interaction between a researcher and another person” (102)—officials who seemed not only determined to obfuscate social science regulations but also willing to break promises, reject compromises, and ignore the legitimate needs of social science researchers. The heroes of

this chapter—Ithiel de Sola Pool (chaired professor of political science at MIT) and Edward Pattullo (director of the Center for Behavioral Sciences at Harvard)—sought a compromise by which social science research would be only minimally regulated by IRBs. Pattullo in particular proposed a clear list of activities requiring review—specifically, those that involved legally incompetent subjects, deceit, intrusion on the person, or the withholding of resources (107). New regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services, dubbed the “compromise of 1981,” did not include Pattullo’s proposal but did exempt the social sciences from much oversight. The détente lasted about fifteen years, as detailed in chapter 6.

With widely publicized reports of biomedical malfeasance in the early 1990s, social scientists again found themselves under severe re-regulation. In his biting review of the post-1993 crackdown by the Office for Protection from Research Risks (under the leadership of a new villain, Gary Ellis), Schrag presents a tale of bureaucratization, entrenchment, and overreach on the part of federal officials. As before, “social scientists found themselves swept along, not because of anything they had done but because regulators preferred to control whole universities rather than make careful distinctions among disciplines” (142). In a trenchant critique of the rise of IRB professionalism, the establishment of the Federalwide Assurance mechanism, and the panicked responses of university administrators to federal enforcement, Schrag sets the stage for his discussion of the “second battle for social science” in the next chapter.

Chapter 7 summarizes the extent to which IRB review came to be accepted as normal in some disciplines but remained the subject of protest in others. Schrag presents in particular the battle of social scientists to exclude oral history from IRB review. He also covers the controversy surrounding the definition of “generalizability.” Scholars who use qualitative methods are especially encouraged to read this chapter, as it describes clearly some of the conflicts between qualitative and quantitative research and elucidates associated review problems. The David-

and-Goliath theme is less dominant here, as Schrag presents a rather complacent David (social science professional organizations) capitulating to an overweening Goliath (IRBs and IRB professional administration).

In chapter 8 the tone of the book changes to one of unhappy resignation to the IRB system. While Schrag recounts some ongoing efforts to resist further IRB encroachment, and gives an entertaining account of recent IRB horror stories, he also presents covert strategies of individual resistance under the appearance of accommodation—strategies for conducting research without review, granting promises in protocols and then breaking them in practice, and—when one’s position is senior enough—resisting IRBs outright. He thus effectively presents a “how to” manual for scholars who want to conduct social science research without capitulating fully to an administrative bureaucracy that is ill-suited to its role and unconcerned with its ignorance but bent upon strident review of research. This change of tone foreshadows Schrag’s message in the short conclusion.

The conclusion neatly summarizes the four phases of review and regulation and recapitulates selected themes—David versus Goliath, heroes versus villains, universal biomedical versus nuanced social scientific review. Schrag proposes that if we know the history of the IRB, we may discover new

ways to challenge and change the system to serve better the needs of social scientists and humanities scholars. The reader is left with the sense that Schrag truly hopes that his work will be another rallying cry to social scientists and others, urging them out of comfortable capitulation to a system that is not hardwired to work as it does today.

The book is well worth reading. Take it with you to the airport, the doctor’s office, or the beach. It is easy enough to read in a casual setting. Scholars of the humanities and theology should read it because, while the focus is confined to the fight of the social sciences for recognition in the IRB system, the history it presents is part of the history that all contemporary scholars share. Regardless of our disciplines, we can all learn something about the regulation of our universities and research from this short and fascinating book.

SARA R. JORDAN

Sara R. Jordan, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration and the Graduate School at the University of Hong Kong.

¹Humphrey’s research for *Tearoom Trade* involved methods considered problematic then and now, such as subject deception (without de-briefing) and misrepresentation of the researcher and research project. Schrag discusses this case thoroughly in chapter 1 of this book.

***A Rat Is a Pig Is a Dog Is a Boy:
The Human Cost of the Animal Rights Movement***

by Wesley J. Smith

Encounter Books, 2010, hardcover, \$25.95

326 pages, bibliographic notes and index, ISBN 978-1-59403-346-9

What motivates one of the world’s top bio-ethical thinkers, a lawyer by trade and an accomplished author of works on euthanasia, assisted suicide, and medical ethics, to write a book about animal rights? Pardon the pun, but aren’t there bigger fish to fry? Isn’t investing the time to address the rights of animals robbing him of precious time and

work he could devote to the service of man?

As it turns out, defending man is exactly what author Wesley J. Smith is doing in *A Rat Is a Pig Is a Dog Is a Boy*. Human life with its inherent dignity faces assault not only from the medical field but also in new and innovative ways, including in this case a powerful animal rights movement. The