

nity, Media, and Government Relations; chapter 10, Employee Relations; chapter 11, Clinical Ethics, Medical Research, and Compliance Programs; and chapter 12, The Development of an Organizational Ethics Program follow with references to the philosophical models presented throughout.

Persons working in Catholic health care ministry, for example, could engage this book through the virtue ethic and organizational goals approach (although the human-community character of Catholic entities would not entirely exclude the stakeholder consideration).

Religion and religious health care sponsors are not frequently addressed directly. Two particular references stand out. In the first, in the section referred to above on virtue ethics (the presence of which is a happy surprise), religion is seen as a perspective on the good or ideal life. However, the description that “Believers who hold that the pattern of the good life is specifically laid out in religious teachings or commandments often characterize themselves as fundamentalists” is condescending. The second instance is a more positive engagement of religion. In the diversity chapter, a case study is presented of a Catholic hospital that, for reasons of conscience, structures its clinical protocol for the treatment of female victims of sexual assault in a manner that excludes provision of an oral contraceptive intervention at a particular point of the ovulatory cycle. Hall largely defends the religious conscience of the hospital, although his conclusions are not always consistent with his principles and lacks awareness of the actual course taken by the Catholic hospital in his case study. The facts related in the case study were supplied by the opponent of the Catholic protocol.

This book is always engaging; case studies abound. The author applies his theoretic framework throughout. He challenges health care entities to live their mission statements. Finally, he peppers the chapters with down-to-earth expressions (“Although we may well carry our morality in our minds and hearts, in our organizational lives, if it isn’t on the

agenda, it won’t get the attention it deserves”[p.10]), which demonstrate his involvement in the ethical lives of our institutions and organizations.

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**Lauritzen, Paul, ed. *Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 291 pp.**

At the time of this writing, two anticloning bills pending in the U.S. Congress are controversial as some scientists raise the concern that the new laws may impede medical progress by also restricting human embryo research. To appreciate the many complex issues involved in this public policy debate, a reader would be hard pressed to find a better book than this one edited by Paul Lauritzen. The book has an introduction and twelve chapters, each written by a respected scholar in the field, and closes with two helpful appendices which contain the executive summaries of the reports of the Human Embryo Research Panel (HERP) and the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Both reports serve as foils for the discussion in much of the text.

Lauritzen’s introduction sets the stage for the rest of the book. After a concise overview of the scientific advances that led to the cloning of Dolly, he focuses on the key question of the debate, the moral status of the human embryo. However, he also suggests that this debate be discussed within the context of reproductive technology. Seen in this light, cloning is the logical outcome of the research that led to IVF. It is simply another method of assisted reproduction.

The first five chapters revolve around the moral status of the preimplantation embryo. As Bonnie Steinbock points out in the essay

which opens part 1, there are two general perspectives operative here. First, there is the proposal that membership in the human species is a sufficient characteristic for membership in the moral community. In contrast, there are those who challenge this alleged speciesism, suggesting that a theory of personhood is necessary to specifically define a person of moral worth. An advocate of the latter position, Steinbock outlines her influential interests proposal which concludes that embryos are not persons because they do not have interests, though they may still have value.

In chapter Two, Courtney Campbell agrees that embryos have value and should be treated as a "life source." She asserts that the biomedical research community is so permeated by a reductionist and utilitarian ideology that it does not have the moral resources to give human embryos even the serious moral consideration or moral respect called for by the HERP. Maura Ryan would concur. In her essay, she is skeptical that appeals to respect for the embryo will protect the moral values at stake. She proposes instead that we must consider the integrity of human procreation with a clear understanding that the goal of reproductive intervention should be "bringing forth of new life in loving and nurturing relationships." Next, Jesuit priest James Keenan argues in chapter 4 that the supporters of embryo research have not provided a positive argument to justify their activities and the "respect" which they invoke has no meaning. He suggests that casuistry is one approach that may improve the nature of the moral debate surrounding embryo research. Finally, R. Alta Charo rounds out part 1 in an essay which proposes that cloning has undermined the traditional argument of the personhood of the embryo, its potential to become an adult, since every cell now has this same potential if cloned.

Part 2 deals with the distinctive moral issues raised by cloning. In chapter 6, Dan Brock provides an excellent survey of the moral considerations for and against cloning. He concludes that there is no urgent need for cloning but also argues that it does not inherently violate any human rights. In

contrast, Ronald Green in his essay explicitly endorses cloning arguing, as Lauritzen did, that it is the logical outcome of IVF. He claims that the critics of cloning have also exaggerated the risks involved and goes on to dismiss religious critics alleging that they are typically ill-equipped to respond quickly to complex technical innovation. Laurie Zoloth would disagree. For her, religious reflection often brings wisdom. Writing from within the Jewish tradition, she proposes in chapter 8 that the urge to clone stems from an individual's fear of death. As such, religions in particular may be best suited for this debate given their traditional dealings with questions of human mortality.

The final part of this book includes four chapters which address the specific public policy issues surrounding cloning and human embryo research. Carol Tauer argues that any law that bans human embryo research would lead to an incoherent public policy. She states that if our society accepts IVF, which arose from embryo research, then it should also embrace the licitness of this research. Next, Moreno and London in their essay focus on the formulation of bioethics public policy in the U.S. They argue that bioethics panels should not deliberate ethics but aim at formulating public policy. These panels would do this by building consensus both within the committee and in society in general. Brian Stiltner would strongly disagree. In his opinion, ethics panels must first provide substantive moral arguments to support their conclusions. To defend their positions, this and the previous chapter examine the experience of the HERP and the NBAC. Finally, Heidi Forster and Emily Ramsey discuss efforts to ban cloning in legislatures around the world. Revised from an article published in the Valparaiso University Law Review, their essay is comprehensive and raises the intriguing question which will eventually have to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court: Would any law banning human cloning violate the U.S. Constitution by denying an individual the right to reproduce?

Though this book is recommended for its comprehensive account of the contemporary secular debate surrounding cloning, the bio-

ethicist working from within the Catholic tradition would have much to criticize here. Two matters stand out. First, there is the metaphysical question. In part 1, the authors attempt to articulate universally acceptable criteria for personhood. They illustrate the radical pluralism which characterizes the ethical landscape of our so-called postmetaphysical age. If postmodernity has taught us anything, however, it is that different metaphysical starting points will give rise to different accounts of the embryo, where personhood becomes arbitrary. In fact, I would assert that the search for nonarbitrary criteria for personhood not subject to the tyranny of the majority, if done in the absence of a realist metaphysics that accepts the classical definition of a person as rational substance, will necessarily fail. Second, several of the essays lacked philosophical sophistication. R. Alta Charo, for example, neglects the distinction between active and passive potential in her discussion of the embryo. This would have gone far to respond to her challenge because the embryo has an active potential for adulthood while the somatic cell, even with cloning, does not.

Finally, despite its philosophical shortcomings, this book should be commended for emphasizing the link between cloning and reproductive technologies. However, this link does not simply arise from the common scientific research program which they share, as some of the book's authors would have us believe. Rather, as Pope John Paul II has correctly pointed out, bio- and sexual ethics are intimately related because they both ultimately deal with the dignity of the human person. This would be the starting point for any Catholic discussion of the ethics of cloning.

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**Schroedel, Jean Reith.** *Is the Fetus a Person? A Comparison of Policies across the Fifty States.*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000. 223 pp.

“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” We do well to remember these words of Ralph Waldo Emerson as we read a volume which, as Alta Charo has pointed out in the December 7, 2000 issue of the *New England Journal of Medicine*, attempts nothing less than a deconstruction of the rhetoric of the pro-life movement. What explains the fact that states which claim to be pro-life spend far less money on social programs for children than states which are pro-choice? How explain the crazy quilt pattern of laws on abortion, prenatal drug exposure and third-party acts of violence against women and the fetuses they are carrying? Without saying that the words and the thought are her own, author Jean Reith Schroedel answers in this way: “Women’s rights proponents believe they have the answer: pro-life rhetoric about the need to protect unborn babies is simply a smoke screen to cover up a broad-based attack on women’s rights” (p. 149). Truth be told, this sentence is the heart of this volume.

Political scientist Jean Reith Schroedel, an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Policy at Claremont Graduate University, spent eight years researching this volume. By means of Lexis/Nexis searches, the author along with seven of her students obtained information about the welter of abortion and abortion-related policies in each of the fifty states. She considers the data amassed to be as accurate as it can be through January 1998. (The last chapter has material purported to be accurate up to November 1, 1999). Since state laws change so rapidly, Schroedel is wise to point out the obvious: “Everything written on the topic is out of date before it is even published” (p. xiv).

*Is the Fetus a Person? A Comparison of Policies Across the Fifty States* is, in essence, a feel-good book for proponents of abortion.