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**Justifying a Presumption
of Restraint in Animal
Biotechnology Research**

A. Fiester

Articulating the public's widespread unease about animal biotechnology has not been easy, and the first attempts have not been able to provide an effective tool for navigating the moral permissibility of this research. Because these moral intuitions have been difficult to cash out, they have been belittled as representing nothing more than fear or confusion. But there are sound philosophical reasons supporting the public's opposition to animal biotechnology and these arguments justify a default position of resistance the author calls the "Presumption of Restraint." The Presumption of Restraint constitutes a justificatory process that sets out the criteria for permitting or rejecting individual biotechnology projects. This Presumption of Restraint can be overridden by compelling arguments that speak to a project's moral and scientific merit. This strategy creates a middle-of-the-road stance that can embrace particular projects, while rejecting others. The Presumption of Restraint can also serve as a model for assessing moral permissibility in other areas of technological innovation.

Daedalus

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Humans: The Party Animal

M. S. Gazzaniga

By definition, the species *homo sapiens* is unique. Over a time course of approximately seven million years, humans have evolved into quite a different animal from what was the last common ancestor we share with our closest surviving relative, the chimpanzee. Trying to figure out how we came to be what we are, and identifying what aspects, both physical and behavioral, we share with other animals, most especially the chimpanzee, and those that are uniquely human has been of ongoing interest.

Environmental Values

Volume 17, Number 2
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**The Rights of Animals
and the Demands of Nature**

D. Jamieson

This paper discusses two central themes of the work of Alan Holland: the relations between the natural and the normative and how our duties regarding animals cohere with our obligations to respect nature. The author explicates and defends an anti-speciesist argument that entails strong moral demands on how we should live and what we should eat. The author concludes by discussing the implications of anti-speciesism for rewilding and reintroduction programs.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

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The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

L. Gunnarsson

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—where moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—where moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—where moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept *person* is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. The author argues that we can solve the second problem by understanding *person* as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, the author argues that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

Expert Review of Obstetrics & Gynecology

Volume 4, Number 6
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Viability and Abortion: Lessons from Ectogenesis?

A. Alghrani

Ectogenesis is the scientific term for the construction and growth of an artificial uterus that will enable a child to be gestated in vitro. Research into this advancement has been underway since the 1950s, and it has been asserted by some of those working in the field that they will achieve the desired aim of creating an ectogenic incubator within the next twenty years. If, as research indicates, complete ectogenesis will eventually become possible, it will mean an artificial womb could gestate a human baby from embryo to birth and, thus, is technically “viable” from fertilization. As a possible new development in the realm of assisted reproduction, this article revisits the convoluted issue of viability and examines how ectogenesis will have a direct effect on the abortion debate and the legislation that governs this contentious topic.

Journal of Applied Philosophy

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Dependent Companions

T. Milligan

The author’s primary concern is to cast light upon the relation between animal guardians (‘pet owners’) and pets as a deep relation. The author proceeds with a degree of indirectness by explaining why animal guardians can have an epistemically-privileged position when it comes to end-of-life decisions concerning pets. The author’s contention is that they are best placed to grasp the relevant narrative considerations upon which end-of-life deliberation in marginal cases ought to

depend. Such narrative-appreciation is built into the practice of treating animals as pets. By virtue of having such a narrative appreciation, animal guardians can be best placed to grasp the life-role of pain and suffering.

**Journal of the
History of Philosophy**

Volume 47, Number 1
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**Kant's Defense of
Human Moral Status**

P. Kain

The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states. A comprehensive review of recent work on Kant's conception of moral status reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant's biological and psychological theories and their possible relation to his conclusions about moral status. Examination of Kant's "naturalistic" biological and psychological theories reveals his commitment to the view that each human being, in virtue of being generated as a member of the human species, possesses a certain set of "predispositions" from the point of its procreation and throughout its life. Kant's doctrine of radical evil and his practical-metaphysical analysis of the origins of freedom reveal his commitment to a universally possessed practical predisposition ("personality") that is the basis of moral status. These disparate and oft-forgotten elements of Kant's "modest system," taken together, provide a coherent "apology" for Kant's inclusive claim that all human beings possess moral status, a defense more principled than the influential pragmatic decision interpretation suggests. The proposed interpretation clarifies a number of Kant's central commitments in the natural sciences and in ethical theory and sheds new light on one important moment in the history of philosophical reflection on questions of moral status.

**Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy**

Volume 34, Number 5
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**Metaphysical and Ethical Perspectives
on Creating Animal-Human Chimeras**

J. T. Eberl and R. A. Ballard

This paper addresses several questions related to the nature, production, and use of animal-human chimeras. At the heart of the issue is whether certain types of animal-human chimeras should be brought into existence, and, if they are, how we should treat such creatures. In our current research environment, we recognize a dichotomy between research involving nonhuman animal subjects and research involving human subjects, and the classification of a research protocol into one of these categories will trigger different ethical standards as to the moral permissibility of the research in question. Are animal-human chimeras entitled to the more restrictive and protective ethical standards applied to human research subjects? The authors elucidate an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical framework in which to argue how such chimeras ought to be defined ontologically. The authors then examine when the creation of, and experimentation upon, certain types of animal-human chimeras may be morally permissible.

**Journal of
Value Inquiry**

Volume 43, Number 2
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**Animal Rights and
Self-Defense Theory**

J. Hadley

Theorists who afford nonpersons lesser moral status than persons will still fall foul of commonsense intuitions if they nonetheless attribute significant moral status to nonpersons and include animals from other

species in the relevant class of nonpersons. The above dilemma, however, is only a serious problem for species-egalitarians if commonsense intuitions are regarded as indicative of the soundness of an ethical theory. If intuitions are not a reliable guide to theory, then philosophers who extend rights or significant moral status to animals are, theoretically, no more compromised by self-defense theory than philosophers who afford such moral protection to fetuses.

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**Capacities, Hierarchies, and the
Moral Status of Normal
Human Infants and Fetuses**

R. DiSilvestro

Normal human infants have serious moral status, the sort of moral status that normal human adults have. Since this will appear utterly uncontroversial to many people, it may appear somewhat strange that a philosopher is spending time defending it. But not everyone shares the intuition that normal human infants have serious moral status, and even people who share the intuition often disagree among themselves over what reasons, if any, can be offered for accepting the intuition. The authors consider an argument that does not rely on the common intuition that normal human infants have serious moral status. The reason given for accepting the common intuition can be put succinctly and will be further expanded in this article: normal human infants possess a certain set of capacities, and the fact that something possesses this set of capacities is sufficient for it to have serious moral status. Another motivation for giving an account of why normal human infants have serious moral status is that having such an account may be useful when approaching several more disputed questions about moral status, such as whether serious moral status is possessed by abnormal human infants, severely brain-damaged human adults, normal and abnormal human fetuses, and normal and abnormal non-human animals.

Metaphilosophy

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**The Personal Is
Philosophical Is Political:
A Philosopher and Mother of a
Cognitively Disabled Person
Sends Notes from the Battlefield**

E. F. Kittay

Having encountered landmines in offering a critique of philosophy based on her experience as the mother of a cognitively disabled daughter, the author of this article asks, should I continue? The author defends the idea that pursuing this project is of a piece with the invisible care labor that is done by people with disabilities and their families. The value of attempting to influence philosophical conceptions of cognitive disability by virtue of this experience is justified by an inextricable relationship between the personal, the political, and the philosophical. If one grants that the “special relationship” between mother and child requires moral recognition, then the author needs first to make vivid the case that this relationship in the case of a child who lacks some “normal capacities” is indistinguishable from any mother–child relationship. If this is so, then the author believes she can make a case that has as its conclusion that the moral personhood of even the severely cognitively disabled must be granted. Moreover, such recognition, the author argues, necessitates the recognition of others who bear no special relationships to the child.

Speciesism and Moral Status

P. Singer

Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is

the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. The author argues that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans.

Neuroethics

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**Neuroethics and the
Problem of Other Minds:
Implications of Neuroscience for the
Moral Status of Brain-Damaged
Patients and Nonhuman Animals**

M. J. Farah

Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being's capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states are only contingently related. If the other person is acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article the author considers another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind-body problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with the new

analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy. The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely brain-damaged patients who are incapable of intentional communicative behavior and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours and who lack language.

Social Philosophy and Policy

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**Contractarianism and
Interspecies Welfare Conflicts**

A. Cohen

In this essay the author describes how contractarianism might approach interspecies welfare conflicts. He starts by discussing a contractarian account of the moral status of nonhuman animals. The author argues that contractors can agree to norms that would acknowledge the "moral standing" of some animals. He then discusses how the norms emerging from contractarian agreement might constrain any comparison of welfare between humans and animals. Contractarian agreement is likely to express some partiality to humans in a way that discounts the welfare of some or all animals. While the norms emerging from the contract might be silent or inconsistent in some tragic or catastrophic cases, in most ordinary conflicts of welfare, contractors will agree to norms that produce some determinate resolution. What the agreement says can evolve depending on how the contractors or the circumstances change. The author closes with some remarks on contractarian indeterminacy.