CREATIVITY AND AUTHORITY

The term “creativity” is used in a great many different ways. Some might call a spider weaving its web creative, and its web the spider’s creation. Others would not. A young child might paint a picture which his mother — and no one else — takes to prove his creativity. For some creativity is a personal characteristic, potentiality, power, or disposition. For others creativity is a process. For still others creativity is found only in an original product.

Though in a sense the spider weaving its web can be called creative, it will always weave the same basic pattern, as will all other spiders of the same kind. No spider, when compared with other spiders, is particularly original, distinctive, or different in weaving its web in such a way as to influence other spiders to follow and imitate it. This aspect of creativity pertains most appropriately to human experience, and it is to the realm of the human that I shall limit my discussion of creativity in this paper. A child might show originality in a painting or drawing, where this means that he produces something that he has never before seen, or reproduces what he has seen in a different way. But unless what he produces is strikingly different from what other children of a comparable age produce, his originality is based on a comparison with what he himself has previously done, not on a comparison either with his peers or with other members of his society, much less with the products of all of mankind.

Creativity is thus not only a term used to designate originality in a productive process, but originality in comparison to some base. And within that comparison we can distinguish degrees of creativity. The originality of genius is measured against the base of general human activity, or at least of human activity in a given historical and cultural setting.

Creativity can be expressed in a variety of ways in any field of human endeavor. For the sake of simplicity we can consider in a rough way four pertinent areas of human endeavor: the area of everyday life, the area of artistic expression, the area of science and technology, and the area of intellectual activity generally designated as the humanities. The four areas are not clearly distinguishable in all cases. But they represent rough divisions that are commonly used for a variety of purposes. Within these areas I shall restrict my discussion of creativity to those acts and products which are strikingly original in the context of any given culture.

Paradigms in the artistic and scientific realms are the clearest and easiest to exemplify. In the artistic realm a painter who starts a new movement or school and whose work and style are imitated
demonstrates creative genius. Lesser artists who follow in his foot­
steps and produce good works of art are creative and demonstrate
creativity to a significant but lesser degree. Similarly in the realm of
science a Newton or an Einstein sets the model of creative activity.
Their new conceptions of the world of physics open up new possibilities
and set new parameters in terms of which those of lesser, though still
significant, creative ability fill in the pieces and flesh out the details.
In the realm of other intellectual activity philosophers, for instance,
have functioned similarly. Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel,
Marx, and Wittgenstein have all forged new ways of philosophizing
and have drawn followers who have adopted their methods and con­
tinued their work.

Though in a sense everyone can be creative in his own way and
to some degree — even if it be the forming of sentences he has never
heard before — not everyone can be or is a Newton or an Einstein,
an Aristotle or a Marx, a Michelangelo or a Picasso. A host of psycho­
logical and sociological theories attempt to explain genius and crea­
tivity. For present purposes it suffices that for the production of
a work of exceptional creativity the producer must have more than
ordinary ability, perception, intelligence, imagination, or whatever
else is necessary for a production of such originality. It is not obvious
that in the realm of everyday life he needs special training for such
creative expression; and it may be questioned how much training is
needed in some of the arts for great originality to express itself. But
it is beyond doubt that for originality in the realm of modern science
one must be a scientist, just as in mathematics he must know mathe­
matics. There are thus some realms in which training is necessary for
genuine originality and creativity to express itself, and it is with
these areas and cases that I shall be primarily concerned.

If native ability of some sort is a prerequisite for genuine creative
activity of a significant degree, then obviously it cannot be commanded.
It makes no sense to command someone without the requisite ability
to be original or creative. Though training and education may have
as one of their purposes the enabling of individuals to give maximum
expression to the creative potential within them, no one can effectively
be commanded to do more than he is capable of.

Secondly, it is impossible to command the person with creative
talent to produce a new paradigm or a new style or a new vogue, if
by this we mean telling him not simply to produce a new paradigm
but what paradigm to produce. The reason, obviously, is that to com­
mand the new product in any detail is to produce it. And if the one
giving the command had already produced it in sufficient detail to
command it, then the creative talents of the one commanded would
not be required. Only the less creative talents of the competent crafts­
man, imitator, or follower would be necessary.

Thirdly, in those areas where training is necessary for creative
achievement, native ability is not enough. Creative talent must in
these cases be fostered and can be kept from flourishing. But promise
early in life is not a necessary condition for creativity later. Nor can
anyone predict in any case who will make a significant breakthrough
in any area. By its very nature creativity of a high order frequently
breaks with past patterns and so is the contribution of someone out­
side the mainstream of accepted and acceptable practice.
Fourthly, creativity is not necessarily productive of human welfare. Not all innovation is progressive and not all change is for the best. Unless prevented by stipulation, we can have a creative genius in the realm of what is evil as well as in the realm of what fosters human well-being.

Now if creativity as I have characterized it thus far does not consist simply of adding new pieces to an established view or theory, position or trend, then truth is not something which is discovered once and for all to which we simply add new pieces. A building block theory of knowledge tends to suggest this view of truth. Yet this is clearly not the case in some areas, and we can question whether it is the case in any area.

The realm of art provides us with the clearest example. One mode of artistic expression, one kind of painting or one genre of writing does not preclude other kinds of painting or other genres. One style is no more or less true than another, though it may well be more or less representative of nature, closer to a mirror image, and so on. Creative genius may inspire or may repel; but styles and techniques are not true or false.

This may seem less applicable to the realm of science. Yet here too there is good reason to hold that Einstein did not show that Newton was wrong, that Newton’s theory was false while Einstein’s was true. The terms true and false do not seem to be the appropriate ones to apply to this case. Many recent philosophers have argued persuasively that scientific hypotheses, laws, and claims are theory laden. Obviously some scientific theories are more useful, account for more of the data, have fewer difficulties than others. But hardly anyone expects that we have reached the last stage of scientific knowledge, that all we have to do from now on is fill in the gaps in our knowledge, that there is no more room for another Copernicus or Newton or Einstein. That we cannot see what a new creative breakthrough in science would look like is no surprise. For, as I have already noted, before the creative step is taken it cannot be foreseen. We can know what a new theoretical breakthrough might do in the sense of knowing what problems it might solve; but to know how it would solve them is to know the theory. In science, as in art, there is no reason to think that our theories are true in the sense that we know the universe as it is in itself. We have no reason to believe that we have reached the limits of our creative representations of nature, or that there will be no more conceptual breakthroughs, or that no creative, original, revolutionary theories will replace our present ones.

If we turn to the realm of the humanities, and of philosophy in particular, I believe we can say the same thing. There is little reason to think that several hundred years hence philosophy will be done as it is done today, with the same methods or techniques. If the history of philosophy is any indication of what might happen in the future, there will probably still be Platonists and Aristotelians. These lines of thought have withstood the changes of fashion and time for over two thousand years, and will probably still have some advocates some years hence. It is more difficult to predict that there will still be Kantians, or Hegelians, or Marxists, or Wittgensteinians, though there would be nothing surprising if there were. What would be surprising would be the absence of any new, different, original phi-
Iosophy developing over the next several hundred years. Now if this is the case, philosophical systems and approaches, like art and scientific theories, are neither true or false. They involve interpretation, insight, new ways of looking at reality, new ways of participating in it. To know and to theorize is to interact with reality. What is presupposed in this view is that reality is not simply objectively somewhere outside of us waiting to be found. In finding it we in part interpret it. Lenin noted this in his Philosophical Notebooks, and he was led to claim that an intelligent idealist was closer to seeing this correctly than a non-so-intelligent materialist. The insight is not restricted to Hegel or to Lenin, and it is in fact one that is shared by many philosophers from many different persuasions including both Marxists and phenomenologists.

Having noted this much about creativity, let me now briefly turn to authority. For these few remarks and elementary observations are already sufficient for drawing some conclusions concerning the relation between the two, once we have distinguished and clarified a number of different, pertinent kinds of authority.

Just as there are disputes about creativity, so there are many about authority. But there is no doubt that what can be characterized as authority relations are found in society. Hence I shall start with a de facto authority and define him as follows: In general, X (the bearer of authority) is a de facto authority for Y (the subject of authority) if they stand in a relation of superior to inferior with respect to some realm (R), and if Y acts or reacts in certain appropriate and designatable ways with respect to X in R. The appropriate ways of acting or reacting are necessary to specify any particular kind of authority, of which there are many. But in general they can be divided into two kinds, executive and non-executive. X is a de facto executive authority for Y if, simply as a result of X's having given an order in R, Y does what X has commanded. The context will further differentiate the kinds of executive authority. Within a legal system or a government, the offices of authority may be defined and the conditions and extent of obedience spelled out. In an organization the position and relations may similarly be defined. In addition to a de facto authority we can also speak of a de jure authority (according to some system), a legitimate and illegitimate authority (i.e. whether the authority is externally justified), and the extent, scope, ground, and intensity of each kind of an authority. We can make the relevant changes to speak of the authority which an authority exercises.¹

Non-executive authority involves no right to command on the part of the bearer and no duty to obey on the part of the subject of authority. Thus X might be an epistemic authority for Y, where the proper response on Y's part is that he believes or tends to believe some proposition in field R uttered by X because X has uttered it.

There are conditions for legitimacy and so on which we can develop. But even if authority were never legitimate, we find de facto authority relations in society. It is a commonplace that people differ in the amount they know, that different people know different things, and that we can each learn a great deal by believing what others tell us when they speak or write in some field in which they are competent, have no reason for deceiving us, and so on. Many of us also follow the example of others. They are sole or exemplary authorities for us. But though we choose to imitate them or their style, this gives them no right to command us, nor does it impose any obligation on our part to obey them.

Now given this sketch of authority, what can we say of the relation of creativity and authority?

Since I have defined one type of creativity — that of the genius — as setting a tone, starting a trend, serving as a model for others, it is clear that he serves as an authority for them. This is the case whether we are concerned with the arts, with science, with the humanities or with everyday life. A Leonardo in art, a Newton in physics, a Plato in philosophy, a Gandhi in the realm of morality each draw about them followers, imitators, and others who continue their work. But in none of these cases does the authority relationship entail the right to command or any obligation of obedience on the part of the followers. They may decide to do as the authority says, but not because of any obligation coming from position, contract, or formal organizational relations.

How a creative genius becomes an authority differs in each of the four realms. The scientist addresses himself primarily to his fellow scientists and proposes a theory which he must demonstrate. The demonstration must be logically persuasive, not simply the utterance of the propounder of the theory. Only after some degree of confirmation is what he says accepted by those competent to judge. Their acceptance certifies him as an authority for others, for those not competent to judge on their own but who have some reason to believe the endorsement of those in the field. Where there is great division in the field, then those outside the field do not know whom to believe. Historically those in the field have tended to organize, to become officially recognized by government or other parts of society, and so have established themselves as the ones to be believed in that field. Because of their competence they are given positions in which they may exercise not only epistemic or exemplary authority, but executive authority as well. They are given the power of office, positions of importance in organizing the field, writing and publishing the authoritative works, advising those in public life to whom such knowledge is useful, and so on. In short, they tend to become institutionalized. And when this happens the next genius, the creative individual who arises to challenge the accepted ideas and views finds that he must battle those who hold the entrenched position. It is not unusual for the creative individual in any field to be ignored or not accepted by his peers in his own time. For the truly creative individual in any field threatens those

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2 For some of these see my article "The Nature and Function of Epistemic Authority", in Authority: A Philosophical Analysis (ed. R. B. Harris), University, Ala.: Alabama University Press, 1976, pp. 76—93.
who have spent their lives and built their careers developing, pro-
moting, and defending the previous views. The authority of the re-
cognized experts outweighs the authority of the innovator, who must
prove his new views and their worth to sceptical peers. It is likely that
the more he threatens the established beliefs and ways of doing things,
the more he will be resisted. He can expect a better reception from
those newer in the field who have less authority or position to lose
by recognizing and following his achievements.

In the realm of art the same is frequently true as well. The artist
receives his authority not only from other artists, but more often from
critics. If he is hailed as a creative genius by the critics, and so ac-
cepted by them, he wields more authority among the general populace
than otherwise. It is not unusual, however, for the truly creative
artistic talent to be roundly criticized or ignored by the critics who
fail to appreciate him, only to be discovered later by others. Whether
an artist in an authority in his own lifetime or not makes little dif-
ference as far as those who imitate him and work in his style are
concerned. For it is the creative genius in his works of art that inspires
them, not his discussion about his art. But just as the scientific com-

The creative genius tends not to be immediately accepted by his
society. It is of course not impossible that he be; nor is it necessary
that he be accepted later. Undoubtedly some creative geniuses appear
at the wrong time and are simply ignored and forgotten. Some are
pernicious and are rightly ignored. The general trend I have described,
however, is one that is fairly common. It serves to point out the dif-
ficulty of the creative genius vis-a-vis his peers.

Consider next the relation of creativity to the executive authority
which is found in governments. First, creativity in government (which I
include in my category of everyday life) may be of several types.
If the creative ruler is bound by the laws and traditions of his country,
the scope for originality and creative rule is restricted. Historically
it has often been purposively restricted for fear of what an absolute
ruler might do. The rules which restrict the harm that a poor ruler
can do also restrict the good that the creative ruler can achieve. The
kind of creativity in government that corresponds to the revolutions
in art, literature, music, philosophy, physics, and so on, is possible
under conditions of political revolution. Otherwise the entrenched po-
wers of the established authority brake radical, new and possibly
threatening changes. And we have noted that the more creative the
changes, the more they differ from what has been previously accepted.

Secondly, a government is in a difficult position with respect to
non-political creativity. We have seen that creativity cannot be com-
manded. If a government wishes to foster creativity in all areas of
life in the belief that this is the way mankind develops and the
society prospers, it will find that it is frequently unable to know
who is the creative individual or group deserving of support. Those
in government are not usually the experts in the areas of the arts,
the sciences, and the humanities. If they wish to foster these areas,
they must rely on those who are the acknowledged authorities in these fields. But we have seen that if they do, they may empower those who will be most threatened by true creative advances. Yet paradoxically those are the best qualified to judge truly creative advances.

The situation is only exacerbated when a government turns not to those in a field to evaluate the contributions in the various areas, but instead identifies itself with or adopts a particular art style, philosophy, scientific view, and so on. It is one thing for a government to attempt to foster creativity in all realms. It is another for leaders of a government to consider themselves authorities in all realms of human endeavor. In general, the more closely a government identifies itself with any of the non-governmental realms, the more likely it will squash, prevent, and preclude the growth of creative, innovative development in those areas. For if the governmental leaders are not expert in those areas, they will tend to see creative innovation as poor science, art, philosophy, and so on, or as a threat to their own power.

Earlier in this paper I alluded to the building block theory of knowledge and argued that it did not sit well with the view of creativity I had described. The building block view of any field is the one that those outside the field frequently have of it. Where that view is held by those with power to enforce the accepted position and to preclude the development or dissemination of alternatives, either we can expect the suppression of creativity or we can expect that it will go unrecognized or unappreciated. In either case the society can be only poorer than it would be if the creativity had been allowed to flourish.

I have claimed that the relation of creativity and authority is multifaceted. Sometimes one's creativity makes him a non-executive authority for others, and sometimes such an authority is given executive authority as well. I have argued, however, that those in authority are frequently threatened by innovation, and that where a government adopts or identifies itself with some area of the arts or sciences or humanities it is likely to serve as a brake on the development of creativity in those areas. The connection is not a logical one. But there are good reasons — both historical and conceptual — supporting the assumption of the trend.

The conclusion follows that creativity, if socially desirable, is best fostered by a government if it does not identify itself with any particular position in the arts, sciences, philosophy, or other humanities. This is not to say that it should not support these activities. And it does not make easier the task of deciding which creative innovators are worthy of support and which innovations are worthy of further development. But this is best decided, I have argued, by those in a position to know and judge on the basis of the merits of the case. Though they may fail to appreciate the great creative innovator, they and those in the field who have the least to lose are in a better position than governments to decide what is worth while and what is not in a field.

Only by a society’s being open to change can it hope to reap the advantages of its creative members. Such openness, however, may take its toll in social order and possibly in social harmony. Each society in the last analysis must determine how much creativity it really
wants and how much disruption it is willing to bear for creative advances.

Now a number of objections might be raised to my position. I shall deal with four of them, the answers to which, I hope, will clarify my views.

First, it might be claimed that I have not presented any theory of creativity. I have not analyzed the relation between consciousness and performance, intelligence and emotions, and so on. I acknowledge this. I did not intend to present a theory of creativity. For much empirical psychological and sociological work still has to be done before any theory of creativity can be successfully defended. What I did instead was to base myself both on the most obvious cases and on the concept of creativity in what I took to be the simplest and most unproblematic formulation.

The second objection is a more serious one. It might be asserted that I take creativity to be primarily an individual phenomenon, choosing as my examples Michelangelo and Leonardo, Newton and Einstein, Plato and Marx. I failed to consider either the social dimension of these figures or the possibility of collective creativity. The objection is a complex one, and one which I shall try to answer by dividing it. I have already stated the reason for my choosing the obvious examples I did. The position which holds that the creativity of individuals is to be explained by social complexes, and that the creative process is an ongoing one which simply finds its clear expression in individual figures is a theory of creativity. It is a disputed theory, though one which has a certain strength. But my aim, once again, was neither to present nor to criticize any particular theory.

The stronger implication of the objection is that while I have chosen what I have called the clear cases, they are not in fact clear. And the phenomenon which needs analysis is the social one, not the individual expression. My reply here is that though the social aspect of creativity may, and undoubtedly does, need further explanation and exploration, the fact of individual creativity cannot be denied. Nor can the battles of a Copernicus or of a Galileo with established authority, of a Hobbes and a Hume, and so on, be ignored. That I have chosen to deal with these rather than with the social aspects is, once again, because they seem to me clear and less theory laden than the social view.

But, the objection continues, I have chosen to deal with individual instances of creative individuals and have ignored vast areas of creativity which involve a social dimension. The creative artistic force of the middle ages, for instance, found expression in its magnificent cathedrals. They are not the products of any single individual. They are the creation of many individuals working together, borrowing from each other, refining and simplifying and creating together. They involve workers directed by those in charge, working according to a plan or blueprint, which itself changed as time went on and the original workers and planners died and were replaced in succeeding generations. In such projects we can see the need for operative executive authority, the right of those in charge to give orders to those below and the need to have their orders followed. Those following orders and subordinate to those in authority may or may not themselves be creative.
They may be simple laborers following the directions needed to lift stones and move dirt. They may be creative sculptors creating statues to fill niches according to some overall plan. Such authority is in no way necessarily destructive of creativity, and in fact is an essential part of a cooperative creative endeavor.

My reply is to deny none of this. Clearly the products of creativity may require cooperation and joint enterprises. Large creative works such as a cathedral require the creativity of many individuals which are brought together. There must be some overall design and concept for the whole to form a unity. And many unskilled and relatively uncreative persons may be involved in the joint undertaking. What I affirm, however, is that the example of a cathedral as a creative work is a complex one requiring analysis to sort out the creative elements. Some would choose to put the emphasis on the person or persons who discovered the art of vaulting; others would focus on the architect and his conception of the cathedral as a whole; others would look elsewhere. My point is that since this is a complex example and one which allows for disagreement of analysis, it is not appropriate as a clear example of creativity. Nor does it in any way deny the kinds and examples of creativity I chose to focus upon. Social creativity does not involve the denial of individual creativity, and it is the latter with which I am concerned in this paper.

The third objection is related to the second one. It says that in discussing the relation of creativity and governmental authority I fail to take into account the possibility that a government might itself have a creative image of society, that it might itself be the product of a creative image of society, and that it need not be a brake on creativity. My first reply is similar to that above, namely, that even if such creativity were admitted, it does not preclude the type that I discussed. Further, even if such social creativity were admitted, there would still be the tendency to repress that creativity not in accord with the overall plan; and unless those in the positions of leadership were also experts in the various fields in question, there would still be the tendency to restrict support of and development of any but those products which fit and followed the established and accepted style, mode, and perspective.

I admitted that there could be creativity in government, and that such creativity seemed best exemplified in governments in which the creative leader is unrestricted or in those cases in which a revolution has just occurred. The first type leaves society open to such abuses that historically many societies have chosen to restrict the kinds of activities government could engage in and the violence that it could do to individual citizens in the name of creativity. The second allows for creativity. But creativity here takes on various forms. The Constitutional Convention after the American Revolution produced a constitution which was in many ways a creative product which has been followed by other countries. Setting up structures of government is a kind of creativity which can be isolated and intelligibly discussed. Similarly, the Russian Revolution opened up the possibility of a new form of government and economic system, which also has been followed by other societies which have taken it as a model. This type of creativity, however, is different from the creativity envisaged by a govern-
ment which, as the chief social architect, seeks to mold society as its creative product, even if this is put in terms of leading the society to some new goal.

Conceptually there is no reason *a priori* to disallow this type of creativity. I have not used it as a paradigm because I do not find consensus on this example. The collective creativity involved in building a cathedral is limited to a particular product. The collective creativity involved in conceiving a whole society as the product of the creative combined energy of all its members working according to some agreed upon blueprint is one for which we can point, to my knowledge, to no particular instance. The difficulty of a government orchestrating all the aspects of social development falls prey to the difficulty of those in government not having the expertise in all realms of endeavor to recognize and properly channel the creative work in each of the realms. We also have counterinstances in which governments have attempted to control all the aspects of society — science, art, philosophy, and so on — the detriment of the creative aspects of those fields in their society. A society is not a particular structure like a cathedral; nor is it clear that a blueprint for social development, even if creative, can be implemented creatively without too great cost to individual freedom and to creative developments which do not fall within the plan, cannot be foreseen, and may not be either fostered or recognized.

The fourth objection claims that the position I have outlined makes truth relative, makes the implementation of any creative discoveries always temporary, without the possibility of developing them fully, and makes it impossible to build on the past and its creations. If the objection were valid, it would be a good reason for rejecting my position. But I do not think the objection holds. It is complex and each of its parts needs an answer.

My view does not hold that truth is relative. It is objective, where this means that it is transindividual, interpersonal, and realistic, i.e. knowledge is of and depends on what exists independently of the knower. But the knower interacts with the object in knowing it; and in any theoretical enterprise, such as science, we have no reason to think that any theory we have yet reached is the last word in our knowledge of the world. Even now there are many puzzles about the nature of the physical universe, the contradictory descriptions of quantum phenomena being only one, which lead us to expect that a better, more comprehensive, stronger theory may one day be put forth that will enable us to handle and understand the world better than we presently can. I have indicated that the term truth is not properly applicable in evaluating different styles of art. This neither means that art and its interpretation are completely relative, where this means subjective, nor that all styles are equally aesthetically pleasing, emotively moving, and so on. To claim that no philosophy is the last word in the history of thought is not to deny that some are more comprehensive, others tighter, still others more adequate for certain purposes, and so on. Philosophies are unified, integrated attempts to make sense of the world of our individual and joint experience. We have no more reason to think that the last word has been said in this area than in any other. Each system of philosophy, moreover, develops its own view of truth, defining what this means
and the criterion or the criteria by which it is determined. To call philosophical systems as a whole true or false, therefore, seems to me as mistaken as calling scientific systems or artistic movements true or false. The terms true and false are more accurately predicated of propositions or declarative sentences, within a framework which sets down the conditions of decidability and the meaning of truth and falsity.

My view does not imply that creative discoveries are temporary, if this means that they are never allowed to develop fully. The whole thrust of my discussion of the followers of the truly great creative geniuses is that the latter provide the frameworks and styles followed by many creative persons who come after them. This is true in the realms of ordinary life, the arts, the sciences, and the humanities. But my view does not suppose that the last original contribution in any field has yet been made. In every field once a new, creative breakthrough has been accepted and its development is in process, it and its exponents take on an authority in the particular field which serves as a barrier to further innovation and creativity outside of the current phase. To say, as I have, that sometimes a creative genius is ahead of his time is to say that he is not recognized, perhaps that others of his time are not prepared to follow and develop where he has led. This is compatible with the notion of entrenched ideas and trends serving as a brake on new ideas and trends.

Finally, my position in no way denies that new creative developments frequently build on the past and its creations. But in underlining the new it emphasises the necessity for openness to what is new. Entrenched political as well as other kinds of executive authority which attempt to dictate the development of the various spheres of activity are less likely to be open to new developments the more closely they have linked themselves with the prevailing art trends, philosophical views, or scientific theories. It is difficult enough, for instance, for the creative genius in science to present and get his views accepted by the scientific community when there is no political or religious or other extraneous authority attempting to pass judgment on it and using its power to silence it. When these forces as well are marshalled against it, the chances of its success are that much more diminished, frequently to the detriment of the society.

I started by saying that creativity was a relative concept, relative to an individual, to groups in which the comparison is made, or to mankind as a whole. Creativity carries with it its own authority of authenticity. The more open and progressive a society and the less a state's authority is used to control non-governmental areas, the more that society is likely to enjoy the fruits not only of its own creative citizens but the fruits of human creativity generally.