Levinas, and Derrida, according to Mensch), or second, as derived from the present taken as the welling up of ever new contents for a pre-egological and pre-temporal consciousness (as in Husserl)? Do we seek the conditions of presence in absence or the conditions of absence in presence? Or, to put the question otherwise, how far down can phenomenology go? Can we answer this question itself phenomenologically? We may or may not be convinced by Mensch’s polemical arguments against the ability of the absence introduced by death (my own for Heidegger, and for the other for Levinas) to bring about the constitution of the responsible self, as we may or may not find convincing the critique of Derrida’s claim that differance underlies the possibility for language, but Mensch does at least give us a Husserl who suggests that the derivation of presence from original absence is not the only coherent philosophical option.

Mensch writes with remarkable clarity and with sufficient repetition to reinforce important points without belaboring them. Husserl scholars will have to judge as to whether the details of exposition and interpretation are accurate, but if one of the goals of this book is to introduce those of us acquainted only with the “standard” Husserl to this later, “other” Husserl, to give us a sense of his depth and potential significance for ongoing philosophical problems in dialogue with philosophers who have in many cases defined their own positions contra the standard Husserl, and to whet our appetite for further investigation, then Mensch succeeds admirably. As this book, among others, makes clear, Mensch is both a scholar and thinker of substance, and whether or not we are convinced by his thesis that it is the Husserl of the Nachlaß who provides the better way through the postmodern problematics, the challenge this book poses to a post-Husserlian, postphenomenological “orthodoxy” is worthy of long and concerted attention.

JEFFREY DUDIAK, The King’s University College

Between Suspicion and Sympathy: Paul Ricoeur’s Unstable Equilibrium
ANDRZEJ WIERCIŃSKI, Ed.

The objective of this collection of no less than fifty essays, written by prominent North American and European scholars in hermeneutics, is not to reveal how a plurality of interpretations merges into a unified claim regarding Ricoeur’s writings. Rather, the purpose of Between Suspicion and Sympathy, the third volume in the Hermeneutic Series of the International Institute for Hermeneutics, is to offer a variety of conflicting and complementary interpretations. A Festschrift in honor of today’s most important representative of philosophical hermeneutics, this volume offers a variety of approaches toward Ricoeur’s work, allowing differences to emerge so that they may give rise to new interpretations of his multifaceted œuvre.

The volume presents a number of perspectives on specific aspects of Ricoeur’s philosophy and builds bridges between his thought and several traditions. Since a
detailed presentation of each essay, or even an exposé of the most provocative arguments, by far exceeds the scope of this review, I shall single out a few essays and comment on the general architecture of the volume.

The essays are organized into five sections which address the influences on Ricoeur’s thought, the hermeneutics of selfhood, Ricoeur’s writings on religion, his confrontation with structuralists and poststructuralists, as well as his socio-political philosophy. The Postscript offers an overview of Ricoeur’s work and four interviews with Ricoeur, conducted by Tamás Tóth and Yvanka Raynova.

Philosophy and theology in Ricoeur’s writings coexist as two disciplines separated by a rigorous methodological division. In order to understand Ricoeur’s view of their relation, Andrzej Wierciński addresses five themes: (1) Ricoeur’s appreciation of philosophy’s limits is brought forth by situating him within the hermeneutics of finitude. The latter, however, is inseparable from the human orientation toward infinity, which shows itself in language as the unsaid which belongs to what is said. Hence the possibility to think finitude in relation to Divine infinity: Verbum mediates the human and the divine. (2) While addressing the three-stage hermeneutic arc (naive understanding, objective explanation, appropriation), Wierciński pays central attention to the second, explanatory, stage. The latter signifies Ricoeur’s distance from relativism; no interpretation may do violence to the text as it is structured. While there are many ways to construe a text, all interpretations are not equal, for the field of constructions of meaning is limited by the structure of the text. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics supports a pluralism of interpretations, but it does not relativize them. (3) Wierciński examines Ricoeur’s construal of philosophy as a modest endeavor—a philosophy that acknowledges its finitude and assumes a stance of agnosticism. While philosophy should suspend the question of God, theology should refuse the temptation of a cryptophilosophical foundation. (4) The agnostic stance secures the autonomy of philosophy. (5) Finally, the primacy of reason that Ricoeur grants to philosophy is what prevents him from taking up the mantle of a theologian.

The first section, “Influences and Retrievals,” brings Ricoeur into confrontation with some of the thinkers who have most profoundly influenced his work. It addresses themes in Kant, Bergson, Marcel, Jaspers, Náběrt, and Gadamer that have been most significant to the development of Ricoeur’s thought. This section also deals with some general issues in hermeneutics: its relation to phenomenology as well as its ontological and ethical implications.

Addressing the question of unity in Ricoeur’s work, Domenico Jervolino points to the notion of homme capable which Ricoeur himself had identified as a thread that binds his works together, where all of his work is configured as a philosophical anthropology, an exegesis of the capabilities that make people human. Jervolino identifies a thematic unity in this expression, which points further toward the stylistic and methodological unity illustrated by Ricoeur’s famous metaphors of “the grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology” and of the “long route” of reflection. Jervolino identifies a spiralling pattern in the development of Ricoeur’s thought where the latest works signify a return to the investigation of the will which had inspired his early writings. Certainly, a spiral is not a circle: “there is no coincidence between beginning and end, but rather an enriched juxtaposition” (5).
The early hermeneutics of symbols and the more mature hermeneutics of texts are the generally acknowledged stages in the development of Ricoeur's thought. His more recent texts, Jervolino suggests, indicate the existence of a new hermeneutic phase, which can be characterized under the sign of translation. The paradigm of translation does not displace but completes the other two. The progression of the three paradigms is governed by the expansion in language areas addressed—the linguistic sign, discourse, and languages within their historical diversity. Translation is a model for all human diversities, for while revealing plurality it points to the imperfect, yet always perfectible, unification of humanity based on an ethics of hospitality and conviviality.

Olivier Abel's essay stages a fourfold orientation of hermeneutics: critical, ontological, poetic, and ethical. Critical hermeneutics attempts to uncover the implicit question that underlies the text; it therefore addresses the linguistic and historical contexts of the text. Ontological hermeneutics is directed toward the most originary, fundamental question to which all answers belong. Poetic hermeneutics grants autonomy to the text and explores the possible worlds proposed by the poetic structure of the text. Finally, hermeneutics possesses an ethical orientation where the text outlines a form of life which the interpreter grasps because the text refers to her existence. While the first two orientations are marked by the attempt to decipher meaning "behind" the text (meaning is a function of the question to which the text responds), it is characteristic of the other two to seek meaning "in front of" the text (the text does not respond to the same question as the one the text opens up to and to which it refers). According to Abel, the latter two orientations in this general topology keep Ricoeur apart from the hermeneutic school. Ricoeur redirects hermeneutics toward a poetics of meaning: "Here there is something like a post-hermeneutics and post-critical philosophy" (19), which holds more affinities with Gaston Bachelard than with Heidegger and Gadamer. We are to see circularity within this topology of hermeneutics, where an infinite and vital (rather than a vicious) circle never allows one to return to the same point.

Paul Fairfield's essay addresses the underdeveloped theme of the attitudinal posture of practical judgment. The problem can be best stated in the words of Thomas W. Bush: "Gadamer has a notion of 'good will' but not of 'bad faith,' and yet ... his hermeneutics calls for something like the latter." Perhaps the same critique can be addressed to both philosophers with whose names the entire tradition of philosophical hermeneutics has become virtually synonymous: Gadamer and Ricoeur. Although Ricoeur's distinction between the "hermeneutics of recovery" and the "hermeneutics of suspicion" does not constitute a complete answer, it offers a significant contribution to the issue at hand: "bad faith," or, at any rate, an attitude of suspicion, is to be incorporated within hermeneutics. Practical judgment, no less than any other variety of interpretation, should be capable of both affirmation and the identification of deception. Although Gadamer and Ricoeur succeed, partly at least, in describing the constitution of suspicious interpretation, they are silent as to when the latter is called for. Fairfield gestures toward an answer that holds true to the spirit of Ricoeur's dialectical thought. One may conceive of the ground of suspicion in communicative terms. While "good will" presupposes the coherence of the content of what is said
and the style of its saying, suspicion is evoked by the breakdown of this coherence; where the “what is” is not as it appears. If interpretation is to remain oriented toward the disclosure of meaning, we must reconcile the style and the content of the object of interpretation, so that “what is” stands in the open.

The second section, “The Hermeneutics of Selfhood,” reveals the specificity of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic stance, especially in contrast to other French thinkers such as Derrida and Levinas, by paying central attention to the monumental *Oneself as Another*. Addressing the issues of alterity and ipseity, this section reveals a real transformation from text to action by thematizing the ethical stance of Ricoeur’s diacritical hermeneutics. Today’s challenge, writes Richard Kearney, is to acknowledge a difference between self and other and, at the same time, avoid a schismatic division that would not allow any relation between them. In contrast to the mainstream metaphysical tradition which largely ignores the question of the Other, and in contrast to some postmodern thinkers who externalize alterity to the point that there can be no communication between self and other, the central hermeneutic task is that of “building paths between the worlds of autos and heteros.” Hermeneutics discovers the other in the self and the self in the other; it supplements the critique of the self with the critique of the other. It distinguishes between different kinds of selves and others, such that “Not all ‘selves’ are evil and not all ‘others’ are angelic” (150).

Ricoeur’s hermeneutics has become indispensable to the study of religion. The third section, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony: Hearing the Message,” addresses issues of empathy, affective knowledge, and understanding in theological discourse by situating Ricoeur within the Christian tradition. Central attention is granted to the relation between theology and philosophy, to Ricoeur’s interpretation of revelation, and to his contribution to new approaches in Christian ethics.

It has become quite common in North America to distinguish between two central strains of postmodern thought, the first stemming from Nietzsche through Heidegger to Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida, and the second from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to Gadamer and Ricoeur. The relation between hermeneutics and deconstruction constitutes the central theme of the fourth section, “Critical Openness to Sign, Symbol, Metaphor, and Narrative.” The topics include Ricoeur’s conception of metaphor, his understanding of textuality and of self-narrative, as well as the significance of hermeneutics in the interpretation of the visual arts.

Shaun Gallagher brings Ricoeur’s hermeneutics into dialogue with cognitive neuroscience while addressing three issues: (1) Can an account of the narrative self remain non-reductive and be consistent with discoveries in neuroscience? (2) How would such an account relate to an embodied-enactive approach to questions of self-identity? (3) Does such an account involve dimensions of intersubjectivity? According to Gallagher, a Ricoeurian notion of the narrative self remains consistent with a neuroscientifically informed materialist account. To defend this claim, Gallagher explicates four internal conditions for self-narrative which are reflected in the proper functioning of a variety of cognitive capacities necessary for the generation of self-narrative: temporal integration of information; minimal self-reference; episodic memory; and reflective metacognition. These conditions, while necessary, are not sufficient,
and should be complemented with external conditions (e.g., the embodied sense of self-agency and self-ownership as well as the social context of action).

Ricoeur's social and political philosophy, his critique of psychoanalysis, philosophy of law, as well as hermeneutics in dialogue with Confucianism and feminism are the central themes of the volume's final section. The task of philosophy today, writes Gary B. Madison, is to reveal how cultures can enter into dialogue with each other while attempting to discover values common to all. Hermeneutics assumes this task by asking how to reconcile universality with particularity. This question is central to Ricoeur's social philosophy, which can be characterized as an attempt to reveal how national cultures can preserve their own heritage while participating in the progression of globalization. The hermeneutic task of reconciling the idea of a single humanity with the notion of cultural difference demands that we acknowledge that certain norms possess transcultural validity. A global ethic suited to our age requires a deconstruction of the opposition between dogmatic ethnocentrism and relativistic culturalism. This is achieved with Ricoeur's notion of "contextual universals," a notion that reconciles universality with particularity by means of a "dialogue of civilizations." By seeking to bring Ricoeur's hermeneutics into dialogue with Confucianism, Madison himself contributes to this dialogue. Madison's essay also criticizes Ricoeur on two issues: the distinction between ethics and morality, as drawn in Oneself as Another, and Ricoeur's early views on economics.

Much remains to be said about this voluminous collection of essays. Considering the astonishing range of themes, Between Suspicion and Sympathy cannot be entirely accounted for in a brief review. As Wieremski points out, this volume is a true "celebration of the confusion of voices and the fusion of horizons." This multiplicity of voices is indeed a major strength of a volume dedicated to a philosopher who, in some seventy creative years, has left behind more than 1300 articles. Undoubtedly, this collection of essays, representing the reception of Ricoeur's work in eleven countries, contributes enormously to contemporary hermeneutic scholarship.

SAULIUS GENIUSAS, New School University

Edith Stein: Patrona d’Europa [Edith Stein: Patron Saint of Europe]
ANGELA ALES BELLO
Edizioni Piemme (Religione), Casale Monferrato (AL), 2000.

On the occasion of Edith Stein's canonization by Pope John Paul II on 21 November 2000, Angela Ales Bello wrote: "[T]he themes that I have treated briefly in this book are intended as mere openings on the vast ocean of her thought, and an exemplification of her analyses, which I hope to be of help in knowing her works in a deeper way" (9). No better description of her Edith Stein: Patron Saint of Europe could be given. This book is a synthetic, clear, careful selection of issues excerpted from Stein's rich collection of writings, the originality of which Ales Bello highlights. In this sense, her intellectual biography of Stein (1891–1942) represents a critical anthology of