

Out My Fishing Rod! Radical Uses of David B. Allison's *Reading the New Nietzsche*

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Out, out my fishing rod! Down, down, bait of my happiness! Drip your sweetest dew, honey of my heart! Bite, my fishing rod, into the belly of all black melancholy!
Out there, out there, my eye! Oh, how many seas surround me, what dawning human futures! And over me—what rose-red stillness! What unclouded silence! (*Z*, p. 352).

My *Zarathustra* ... is an *unintelligible* book, because it is based on experiences which I share with nobody (*Nietzsche, Selected Letters*; cited in Allison, xiii).

Queerest Fish

For those philosophers who love him, reading Nietzsche makes us wet.¹ Is not *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche* one wet dream in which Luce Irigaray writes of her homage to Nietzsche that "in wetness the seed of living beings finds a fertile element"? One wonders why she must add "[n]ot in phallic erection, its mask," except to say "[t]he phallus masks." What does it "mask"? Dionysus, transgendered god of the Zarathustrian swamp of queerness.

For him [writes Irigaray], isn't it all a show? His plenitude is not there. At least not yet. And hidden, preserved there, frozen in the permanence of a hard wood, are his incursions out of the fluid element thanks to which he is reborn endlessly. His phallic procession accompanies his coming.... And the fluid is more of a support and medium for his power than the phallus. Well, river, sea, milk, blood—these are privileged forces in his birthing.²

In Sandor Ferenczi's oceanic theory of genitality, the symbols of the phallus and vagina are expanded into cosmic symbols not by reference to myths but by the idea of a shared "thalassal regression" to fluid existence in the sea: "The genital secretion of the female among the higher animals *and in man* ... possesses a distinctly fishy odor (odor of herring brine), according to the description of all physiologists; this odor of the vagina comes from the same substance (trimethylamene) as the decomposition of fish gives

rise to"?³

As if in anticipation of this regression, Zarathustra's golden "bait" moves the "queer, sullen, evil" and "fishes for men" of all sorts in "the human sea." "Open up and cast up to me your fish and glittering crabs! With my best bait I shall today bait the queerest human fish," cries Zarathustra in "The Honey Sacrifice." Hooked, we are electrified by the shock of recognition. Are we not also shocked to discover the presence of another in that queerest, most sacrosanct and secure space which "subsists prior to and beyond every distinguishing of I from Thou, of I/Thou from the 'We,' and of the individual from the community"—our ownmost "loneliest loneliness"?⁴

Nietzsche spills his seed into the thalassal body with his "secret" of the eternal return, and David Allison's *Reading the New Nietzsche* sticks to this fishy line, baiting us with his announcement at the outset when he writes: "Perhaps more than any other philosopher who readily comes to mind, Nietzsche writes exclusively for *you*. Not at you, but for you. For you, the reader. Only you" (Allison, vii).

Feminism "Reads" Nietzsche

"Reading," in trans speak, has a politics of its own. According to transsexual and radical activist Patrick Califia, it occasions "being outed as transgendered or cross-dressing by a person who will not accept you as a member of your preferred gender."⁵ In the academy, however, "reading" is a style of interpretation that circulates around "uses," without too much invested activism or radicalism. Thus, for example, although feminists classically "read" Nietzsche's remarks on women as misogynist, feminist interpretations of Nietzsche have shown that his writings also contain possibly helpful ideas and methods for feminism. The "uses" of Nietzsche for feminists—attacking certain dualisms in philosophy, the perspectival nature of truth—free women from the parameters set by men and, as Debra Bergoffen argues, invite women to speak in their own voices.⁶

However, sexual values have often been the silencers of voices.⁷ Except where sexual issues are seen as devolving from gender inequality, feminism has no position on sex. Thus,

... feminism finds no shortage of gender-linked problems with sex—rape, spousal abuse and abortion rights are three examples that have spurred much feminist organizing and action—though ... it is possible to cast this net too widely, seeing gender as the primary issue where matters are more complex, as in lesbian oppression, S/M, pornography, and prostitution (just a few issues that have challenged mainstream feminism).

"Sex-radical thought departs from both right- and most left-wing ideologies by honoring sex and desire and by positing as important the power relations of sexual orientation and behavior vis-à-vis the culture's traditional sexual mores." Although feminism has greatly influenced the intellectual development of sex radicalism, many of whose early theorists—Gayle Rubin, Pat Califia, and Carole Vance, to name a few—were (and are) outspoken feminist women, feminism itself does not embrace sex radicalism entirely.⁸ Feminist political analysis remains untouched by sex radicalism; instead it addresses the politics of gender, leaving the politics of sex to sex radicals.

I wish to engage with Nietzsche's "uses" in reevaluating sexual values by way of what David Allison, in *Reading the New Nietzsche*, calls Nietzsche's "inverted phallogentrism" (Allison, 167). I will argue that Nietzsche's profound impact does not lie only in reevaluating values concerning women. My reading of Allison's *Reading the New Nietzsche* thus focuses on Nietzsche's contribution to the ongoing struggle and activism against oppression sourced in what sexual anthropologist Gayle Rubin calls "the stigma of erotic dissidence."⁹ Read through this lens, Allison's book brings Nietzsche's relevance to the struggles over sexuality past the campy "move for a sexy thematics of ripeness, fructification, mess, ecstatic rupture, penetration, between men" that has been important to what Sedgwick calls "a male erotic-centered anarchist tradition ... that has a principled resistance to any minoritizing model of homosexual identity." Read with Allison, Nietzsche's "placable resistance to giving stable figuration to even the possibility of a minoritizing sexual identity" cannot be divorced from either Nietzsche's own personal trajectory and biography (*bios*) or his writing and key concepts.¹⁰ It is precisely this reciprocity that Allison's work brings into new relief as he encounters several of Nietzsche's major works.

Of Closets and Gay Sciences

In the gay science of sexuality studies, one's "loneliest loneliness" is "the closet." With its contradictory and constraining rules about privacy and disclosure, public and private, knowledge and ignorance, the closet has served to shape the ways in which many questions of value and epistemology have been conceived and addressed in modern Western society. "What can you do—alone? The answer is obvious. You're *not* alone, and you can't afford to try to be. That closet door—never very secure as protection—is even more dangerous now. You must come out, for your own sake and for the sake of all of us."¹¹ If "the closet" is "the defining structure for gay oppression in this century," it also regularly interfaces with and is perpetuated by its twin, that of "the open secret."¹² But where does this rhetoric of

forced extroversion lead?

Commenting on Nietzsche's resilience to appropriation by the gay movement, Eve Sedgwick, author of the influential *Epistemology of the Closet*, suggests that it is perhaps to Nietzsche's enormous credit that his popularity and appeal lie precisely with the disturbance of this "salvational epistemologic certainty [erected] against the very equivocal privacy afforded by the closet."¹³ Sedgwick makes the case for Nietzsche's implacable resistance to giving stable figuration to even the possibility of a minoritizing homosexual identity, even where one might look for it either in Germany's burgeoning homosexual culture¹⁴ or in his own insistent vocabulary of terms like "inversion," "contrary instincts," the "*contra naturam*," "the decadent," the "hard," the "sick," not to mention the "gay" and "queer." While, according to Sedgwick, Nietzsche offers writing of an "open Whitmanlike seductiveness, some of the loveliest there is, about the joining of men with men ... he does so in the stubborn, perhaps even studied absence of any explicit generalizations, celebrations, analyses, reifications of these bonds as specifically same-sex ones." She argues that "Nietzsche's writing never makes these very differently valued, often contradictory, signifiers coextensive with any totality of male-male desire; in many usages they seem to have nothing to do with it at all. This is because, to repeat, he never posits same-sex desire or sexuality as one subject."¹⁵ Sedgwick does not dwell on Nietzsche's reasons, nor on the fact that he, like the Greek Baubo, may have wished us to broach the question of reasons for not telling his reasons.¹⁶

Nietzsche's Habit¹⁷

There was, of course, a "secret" about Nietzsche, a secret about his "loneliest loneliness" that was, most painfully for him, in the order of an "open secret."

My whole life has crumbled under my gaze [writes Nietzsche in a letter to Overbeck in 1883], this whole eerie, deliberately secluded secret life, which *takes one step* every six years, and actually wants nothing but the taking of this step, while everything else, *all my human relationships, have to do with a mask of me* and I must perpetually be the victim of living a completely hidden life. I have always been exposed to the cruellest coincidences—or rather, it is I who have always turned all coincidence into cruelty.¹⁸

But what is the burden? What is this plaintive load? Although, for Nietzsche, "to seek power is to seek obstacles to overcome, and this in effect is to

pursue pain," the "pain" is generally read as misfortune in relations with women.¹⁹ "Given all the thought recently devoted to the position of women in Nietzsche's writing, it is striking how difficult it seems to have been to focus on the often far more cathected position of men there."²⁰ Whether it be the position of men or that of women in his writing, these accounts fail to recognize Nietzsche's struggle with the *socius*. Was that struggle not also the reflection of an eternal recurrence of the same?

On a somewhat deeper personal level, and building on Deleuze's work, Klossowski comments that for Nietzsche it was the pain of "his virility divested ... from its socially and humanly communicable forms" that was so cruel, and to which his own legacy responded. "Thrown into a total effective isolation," writes Klossowski, "the new Nietzsche [that under the mask of Zarathustra] was sustained by a boundless cynicism in which his mind, purified of all cloudy sentiments, consented to a final afflux of animal impulses. Nietzsche adhered fully to this, which he termed *Dionysus* and affirmed with all the more energy now that his health was deteriorating anew."²¹ Consider afresh the question of what the "demon" is that steals up to coax him into relieving his greatest burden by appealing to the eternal return of the same? What is "the eternal hourglass of existence?" What is the repetition in his life to which he might cry: "You are a god; never have I heard of anything more godly!"

At just the time of "the eruption into print of the speaking pervert, the individual marked, or marred, by his (or her) sexual impulses," Nietzsche had already gained a reputation as one privy to an enduring form of "self-abuse."²² Like eighty percent of American men in 1953, *Zarathustra's* Nietzsche was a wanker. However, it was not until Alfred Kinsey's *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* in 1948, or Betty Dobson's classic *Liberating Masturbation: A Meditation on Self-Love* in 1974—reprinted as *Sex For One*—that auto-eroticism, or masturbation, came into proper perspective, following a period in which it was held to be the cause of mental and physical degeneracy of the sort Nietzsche experienced onto death.

Sedgwick's work takes on the question "why the category of 'the masturbator' lost its potential for specifying a particular kind of person, an identity, at the same time as now a species." Sedgwick's answer opens *The Epistemology of the Closet* which, using Nietzsche, "proposes that many of the major modes of thought and knowledge in twentieth-century Western culture as a whole are structured—indeed fractured—by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/hetero definition [instead], indicatively male, dating from the end of the nineteenth century."²³ But what happens to Nietzsche, the flesh-and-blood Nietzsche, in the unfolding of this "crisis"? How is this tied to the changes in "the major modes of thought and knowledge in twentieth-century culture"? What forms of dislocation and danger are at

stake? How does one negotiate with this "indicatively male" horizon?

Also known as the "aristocratic vice," used synonymously in the past with "sodomy" and its predecessor "pederasty," *manustrupratione* (masturbation) had emerged in the medical literature of the nineteenth century as a solitary offense and gateway to all manners of hell—social, personal, and corporeal. My thesis here is that Allison's *Reading the New Nietzsche* enables a unique use of Nietzsche's modes of thought: a thought that at once reflects and frustrates the tendency of scientific and medical writers to position the stigmatized individual "as a mute surface to be interpreted by those with professional authority."²⁴

Lesson in Subjugation

Public disclosure regarding Nietzsche's onanism, Allison explains in a lengthy note (note 191) in his chapter on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which digs into the details of Nietzsche's personal life, involved a letter Wagner wrote to Nietzsche's physician, Dr. Otto Eiser, commenting on the "malady" he thought to be the cause of Nietzsche's eye troubles and migraines: "I have been thinking for some time, in connection with Nietzsche's malady, of similar cases I have observed among talented young intellectuals. I watched these young men go to rack and ruin, and realized only too painfully that such symptoms were the result of masturbation," wrote Wagner on April 4, 1878, thereby precipitating one of *the* "cruellest coincidences" Nietzsche had to endure in his entire lifetime. After an initial outburst, in which he "practically exploded," Nietzsche "fell silent. He had no alternative, for as the law of denunciation works, by defending himself, a man makes a rod for his own back. Yet if he fails to produce arguments in his defence, he loses everything."²⁵

Allison's carefully annotated reconstruction of this, Nietzsche's most famous, work draws its inspiration from a dialogue with Nietzsche's life, and in particular the inspiration it draws from his break with Wagner when:

Quite simply, Nietzsche's world completely fell apart ... by the spring of 1878, when Wagner accused him of suffering from an excessive preoccupation with onanism, and this was revealed to Nietzsche by his physician, Dr. Otto Eiser, who, as President of the Frankfurt Wagner Circle, also circulated Wagner's charge about Nietzsche's onanism to the assembled festival celebrants at Beyreuth. Nietzsche was humiliated, and forcibly had to remove himself from perhaps the single group of educated and cultivated figures with whom he would have enjoyed public contact and recognition.

The "outing" of Nietzsche by Wagner, a "reading" historically inaugurating the "open secret" about Nietzsche among his fellows, together with his failed love affair with Lou Salomé in 1882, "cast [him] completely alone, bereft of any emotional or intellectual companionship whatsoever," to write his enigmatic and phenomenally successful book, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. A book that grossed no more than 500 copies during his own lifetime, it was to become "the most widely read, admired, and commented upon of all Nietzsche's works—in practically every language from Ural-Altaiic to Urdu."²⁶ But Zarathustra's self-disclosure, his own heuristically encoded "coming out," his very speech, is mute.

However, when Allison reads Nietzsche he asks not (as Heidegger did) "Who is Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*?" but "Who is Zarathustra's Nietzsche?" He reads the work as a passage to the life that passes through the work: "I know perfectly well that there is no one alive who could write anything like *Zarathustra*"; and "[i]t is incredibly full of detail which, because it is drawn from what I've seen and suffered, only I can understand. Some pages seem to be almost *bleeding*." These are Nietzsche's words in a letter to friend Peter Gast.²⁷ But it is Allison's words that make sense of this confession, albeit via the help of a stylistically unique epistemology of the closet-endnote.

Rather than dispute the allegation of onanism, Allison interprets its centrality; in other words, Allison reads "The Honey Sacrifice," the "sweet mucus and mucilage"²⁸ that Nietzsche, "squanderer with a thousand hands," craved, as the semiotic sowing of *Zarathustra's* purchase on the contemporary world (Allison, 165–7). Like Dionysus, Nietzsche saw himself as having died and been reborn, only this time he was to be his own mother. According to Klossowski, "to want to explain the creation of Zarathustra as compensation for his [Nietzsche's] desire to 'have a son' is literally insane."²⁹ This is not Allison's explanation. Rather, we must look for Nietzsche's god in "the liquid principle" that characterizes the association of Dionysus with water, milk, blood, sap, honey, and wine.

With his joyous Dionysian seed of meaning, Zarathustra's Nietzsche was to appeal to an altogether new signifying order. Allison weaves the interface between author and text, bringing social history to Nietzsche's "own self-awareness, a turn, based on his own auto-critique—that basically works as a form of self-therapy—enabling him to grasp the really binding purchase the social symbolic has on the individual."³⁰

Radical Uses of "Reading"

While books and essays proving a famed figure's homosexuality constitute the project of visibilizing a gay history that also involves "reading," my

object is not merely to use *Reading the New Nietzsche* to entertain hypotheses about Nietzsche's transgenderism or alleged homosexuality. (For the latter, one may consult Joachim Köhler's recent *Zarathustra's Secret: The Interior Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*.) But while speculation about "gay history" (the "minoritarian" hypothesis), with or without Nietzsche, may serve to dismantle the idea of a sexual majority, it fails to interrogate the very variegations of its historical constructions. In the case of Nietzsche's alleged homosexuality and its relation to his work, such an account fails to read the very uses of that work, both for Nietzsche and for us.³¹

One of the radical uses of "stigma" is to activate an implicit "reading." Stigma, like its etymological kin, the Greek *stigmata*, refers to a mark on the body, like a brand or a tattoo or a severed ear, identifying a person permanently with his or her disgrace. Marking the person, not the deed, it evokes a kind of "spoiled identity." According to Erving Goffman's *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, stigma is a powerful force that serves not only to control but to dislocate and destroy, leaving the newly isolated individual to whom it is attached in a greatly compromised state. He writes:

An individual who might have been received easily into ordinary social intercourse, possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have upon us; he possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated.... [W]e believe the person with a stigma is not quite human; on this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances. We construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority.... [W]e tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one.... [F]urther, we may perceive his defensive response to his situation as a direct expression of his defect.³²

In the new Nietzsche studies that have appeared since Allison's *The New Nietzsche*, the project of "reading" illustrates a hermeneutical project that moves from Nietzsche's uses in feminism, poststructuralism, and French philosophy to the very heart of contemporary studies in sexuality and beyond. The stigma that Nietzsche bore as the mark of his work lay in an "erotic dissidence" that was in no way hypothetical, or undisclosed, yet it was never named either.

Nietzsche [Allison writes,] seems to have held, even to the end, that

Zarathustra was entirely personal, bred from his own experience and suffering, and that it was a beginning at self-disclosure.... [Nietzsche writes] of his desperate sense of rejection, humiliation, and shame ... the memories of his lonely isolation, despair, impotence, and frustration....³³

Beyond identity politics, what follows from its "uses" will reveal itself to be restorative of the life chances of those at once marked and invisibilized by erotic choices and erotic identities or personas.

Reading *The New Nietzsche*

In every teacher and preacher of what is *new* we encounter the same 'wickedness' that makes conquerors notorious, even if its expression is subtler.... What is new, however, is always *evil*, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and old pieties; only what is old is good (*GS*, sec. 4).

In one of his extensive notes, Allison supplements this remarkable observation in *The Gay Science* with that of Machiavelli in *The Prince*:

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit from the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness partly arising from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favor; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend him half-heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger (cited in Allison, 300 n. 37).

Sensitive to Nietzsche's experience of dislocation and danger in his search for an audience as a teacher and preacher, Allison treats us to the details of a review by Joseph Widmann in the liberal Basel newspaper *Der Bund*, in which Nietzsche's then recently released *Beyond Good and Evil* was compared to "stocks of dynamite," posing a "mortal danger" that should be "marked by a black flag." Widmann, one of the rare "Good Europeans" who took Nietzsche's work seriously, goes on to write: "intellectual explosives, like the material sort, can serve very useful purposes.... Only one does well

to say clearly, where such explosive is stored, "There is dynamite here!"; as well: "Nietzsche is the first man to find a way out, but it is such a terrifying way that one is really frightened to see him walking the lonely and till now untrodden path" (cited in Allison, 185).³⁴ The magnitude of what Nietzsche felt to be his "task," first glimpsed by this intrepid reviewer, is contextualized experientially at the outset of Allison's Preface when he takes a look at "what motivated Nietzsche to assiduously pursue such a [task]." In Allison's disquieting perception, and in a prose that rings with the sublimity of Nietzsche's own, it was Nietzsche's

... deep conviction that he, perhaps more than anyone else at the time, was in possession of a newly emergent truth—one he experienced and internalized as a veritable trauma—namely, that the world was on the brink of a completely unfathomable disruption and dislocation. It was his recognition that the very foundations of Western culture were being withdrawn: the god of the West, who for millennia on end had served humanity as the font of traditional faith, as the creative source of all being, truth, and moral value, was no longer credible to the scientifically educated classes of late nineteenth-century Europe (Allison, viii).

One hundred years after Nietzsche's madman proclaimed the death of God, it is David Allison who, perhaps more cogently than any of our contemporaries, explains what the effects of this "greatest event" mean for the postmodern academy. So radical was Nietzsche's critique of the traditional philosophical account of knowledge, "especially his elevation of perspectivism," notes Allison, that it would "irrevocably alter the totalizing claims of reason's universalizing agency and unbiased intellectual autonomy" (Allison, 184–5).

Allison asks us to consider what reason, agency, and autonomy consist in, "when disburdened of the pretense of closure," by appealing to Nietzsche's ownmost historical, biographical, and existential experience of this emergent truth.³⁵ Allison writes: "It was the existential effect of having to think through the prospect of a world with no moral absolutes, no transcendent authority, no higher purpose than the conservation of energy, and to come to some resolution of all this in one's person that Nietzsche sought to achieve" (Allison, xi). Resisting "the ancestral demand of rationality which the relativism of the thinking of difference too easily invited [them] to renounce," and which typifies the adversaries of the "'new' French Nietzscheans," at the same time as the traps of postmodern theorizing that plague Nietzsche's reformers and interpreters, Allison's *Reading the New Nietzsche* inaugurates a reading of Nietzsche's own

experience of identity that brings into relief a panoply of values and sexual values hidden from immediate philosophical view.³⁶

The Uses of *The New Nietzsche* in Recent French Thought

Prior to the publication of Allison's *The New Nietzsche*, works on existentialism typically excluded Nietzsche from their roster. The dominance of the religious existentials of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Marcel, or the atheistic existentials of Sartre, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty seemed to leave little room in the Anglo-American tradition for the works of Friedrich Nietzsche—one in whom the religious and atheistic universes do not find their apotheosis in the three aitches.³⁷ Allison's *New Nietzsche* changed all that. With the influential 1977 collection, the first time that English translations appeared of works by important French philosophers on the significance and value of Nietzsche's thought, as well as articles by prominent American philosophers in the Continental tradition, Allison's groundbreaking text has served as the first introduction to the new styles of interpreting Nietzsche's works that were taking place in France and would become associated with the writings of such authors as Derrida, Deleuze, Kofman, Blanchot, Klossowski, and others.

The New Nietzsche, largely responsible for bringing French, poststructuralist readings of Nietzsche to the attention of an English-speaking audience, also brought Nietzsche's work to the new poststructuralist thought that was to take hold of the modern academy and eventually displace the old existentialism, with a newly dissolved postmodern "subject." A collection inspired by Heidegger's pioneering attempt to take Nietzsche seriously as a thinker, Allison notes that Nietzsche now appears "as one of the underlying figures of our own intellectual epoch." Allison suggests that it is the importance of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche that is responsible for showing us that "what remains to be considered within Nietzsche's own thought somehow stands as a model for the tasks and decisions of the present generation," decisions concerning "the very validity of our contemporary forms of intelligibility."³⁸

Following the appearance of *The New Nietzsche*, many view our epoch as one close to that for which Nietzsche wrote.³⁹ For contemporary Nietzscheans in North America, his writing is concerned with "the long-term effects of the crisis of modern cultural identity that [Nietzsche] diagnosed under the name of nihilism." For Patton, Schrift, and others, Nietzsche's philosophy has now become timely in charting some of the directions that "postmodern ethical and political thought might follow."⁴⁰ Thus, we see today the proliferation of anthologies that project Nietzsche studies into the future of academic theorizing, for "whether at the aesthetic, cultural,

psychological, or political level, there are important perspectives to draw from Nietzsche as we struggle to frame these critical issues for a new millennium.¹⁴¹

It would appear that what has changed fundamentally since Allison's 1977 publication is, above all, the abandonment of the need to separate Nietzsche's thought from his biography, a need expressed in Robert C. Solomon's early *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, which "attempted to portray Nietzsche as a philosopher, a thinker occupied with philosophical problems of justification, value, science, and knowledge, truth and God."¹⁴²

Reading the New Nietzsche contains a wealth of knowledge and information, presented straightforwardly and with passion. It fleshes out the main body of Nietzsche's work to give substance not only to a poststructuralist and postmodern reading of Nietzsche's work, but also to a Nietzschean reading of postmodernism itself. Although postmodern theory takes the important step of considering identity as a social construction, still, according to contemporary queer theorists, it "often shows very little concern for real-life experiences." Thus, according to Beemyn and Eliason, editors of the anthology *Queer Studies*:

It is perhaps no coincidence that postmodern theory, which denies the reality of identity markers like gender, race, and sexuality, should emerge at the historic moment when the voices of previously marginalized groups are beginning to have some impact on the academy. Could postmodernism simply be a backlash against the rising tide of scholarship by people of color, feminists, and LesBiGay-Trans people?⁴³

Read through Allison's lens, the Nietzschean corpus that speaks to us today presents the possibility of getting beyond the traps of academic theorizing, setting a new horizon for living and a philosophy of living that is Nietzsche's own. In the motifs created by Allison's reading of him, Nietzsche's thought emerges as a valuable instrument for theorizing marginal and stigmatized identities in the contemporary academy in terms other than "a backlash"—and, perhaps most of all, a reading of Nietzsche's "habit" that, though tucked away, secreted in the fine print of the notes section, nevertheless places it at the center of Nietzsche's value as a thinker.

Refraining from general expositions on the basic themes in Nietzsche's philosophy, this work stands in stark contrast to what, as Alan Schrift recently observed, "has been the norm in Nietzsche studies ... where Nietzsche's philosophy is explicated by drawing passages rather randomly from the corpus as a whole in order to articulate the metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical themes that 'Nietzsche's philosophy' supposedly

expressed.⁴⁴ Rather than following the new French Nietzscheans in their severing of Nietzsche from his text, Allison's reading provides an altogether new and unexpected style of scholarly writing and interpretation.

Reading the New Nietzsche brings to bear the details of Nietzsche's life and times on his reading of four of Nietzsche's major texts and on the philosophical views Nietzsche puts forward in his writings. What results is a situational reading of Nietzsche that not only leaves behind much of the secondary literature, but also inaugurates a beyond to Nietzsche's "French moment."⁴⁵ If Allison's *The New Nietzsche* placed "contemporary styles of interpretation" on the map, his equally radical *Reading the New Nietzsche* departs from them. As one author in the French anthology *Why We Are Not Nietzscheans*, Alain Boyer, has stated: "We have to stop interpreting Nietzsche and start taking him at his word."⁴⁶ This is precisely where Allison's very new reading of the new Nietzsche comes in.

Working with Nietzsche's own moment and momentum, this new book, I now argue, represents Allison's own reeling in of the eternal recurrence of the "new" in the "new French Nietzscheans" and their detractors. Allison draws on the very "blood" that Nietzsche gave to his works in order to bring to life Nietzsche's ownmost experience of the "new." However, this life is not in order to return us to the old "haemorrhage of subjectivity," which, according to Jean Beaufret's 1947 article, befalls the subject of philosophy: "So long as philosophy maintains the interiority of the being subject, in whatever form, at the root of its own certainties, it is condemned to organise only the invasion of the world by a haemorrhage of subjectivity."

The question of a "transcendental field without subjects," or conversely, one without objects, has figured greatly in recent French philosophy and derives, according to Descombes, from a radical break with Sartre's "La transcendance de l'ego." It also constitutes the ground for philosophy's break with certain French existential-phenomenological themes pertaining to questions of representation, identity, the negative, and the subject—the very break into which the French "uses" of Nietzsche have principally been cast.

Alan Schrift, whose book *Nietzsche's French Legacy* traces the "genealogy of poststructuralism" through the "uses" of Nietzsche in French thought since 1960, argues, following Descombes, that the "new" French philosophers (Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard—the "French Nietzscheans" of the early 1960s) acted on a profound mistrust of phenomenology and its privileging of subjectivity, rejecting any notion of an autonomous consciousness and focussing their analyses on "the dissolution of the subject as a moment in the structural functioning of social, cultural, and material systems." The structuralist rediscovery of Freud and Marx, along with Heidegger's retrieval of Nietzsche, "set the stage," according to Schrift,

"for the emergence of poststructuralism as a distinctly philosophical response to the privileging of the human sciences that characterized the work of the structuralists (Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, and Althusser)."⁴⁷

It is not clear how Schrift can maintain that Nietzsche addressed questions concerning human existence "without centering his reflections on human consciousness." Short of the slippage between conscience and consciousness achieved by the French "conscience," Nietzsche's contribution to a poststructuralist agenda remains to be discovered. For Schrift, "if one wishes to distinguish what—in the English-speaking world—is called 'poststructuralism' from its structural and existential predecessors, perhaps the most obvious way to do so is precisely in terms of Nietzsche." Schrift draws on the fact that Nietzsche is "an important reference for virtually all those writers who would be characterized as 'poststructuralist' or post-modernist. This, however, is short-hand for a case that needs to be spelled out. Not that is, *via negativa*, by way of interpreting Nietzsche, but by taking him "at his word."⁴⁸

I will now turn to the value of Allison's appropriately dubbed "master-piece of exposition and analysis" (in the words of Arthur Danto) of the works of Nietzsche. His own wicked reading of Nietzsche's four master-pieces lies in showing a way to raise anew questions of sexual freedom and erotic dissidence without succumbing to either "the old existential voluntarism or subjectivism"⁴⁹ or the poststructuralist "French Nietzscheanism [and its] claims to overcome the subject when in fact it [merely] suppresses the object."⁵⁰

"Inverted Phallocentrism" or "Will to Power"?

The whole doctrine of a "joyful wisdom" or "gay science"—which unites a truthful account of existence with an intense human delight and joy with that same human existence—will consist in unblocking or foreclosing this constraint imposed by the Father-Divine (Allison, 166).

For Nietzsche, "the traditional account of being as metaphysically and morally purposeful would be replaced with the nonmetaphysical account of 'Will to Power,'" writes Allison (166). But what is will to power? Linked to intoxication, pleasure, exaltation, this "will" is described as "intelligent sensuality" by Nietzsche thus:

The condition of pleasure called intoxication is precisely an exalted feeling of *power*—the sensation of space and time are altered: tremendous distances are surveyed and, as it were, for the first time,

apprehended; the extension of vision over greater masses and expanses; the refinement of the organs for the apprehension of much that is extremely small and fleeting; *divination*, the power of understanding with only the least assistance, at the slightest suggestion: intelligent *sensuality*—; strength as a feeling of domination in the muscles, as pleasure in the proof of strength, as bravado, adventure, fearlessness, indifference to life or death—all these climactic moments of life mutually stimulate one another; the world of images and ideas of the one suffices as a suggestion for the others—in this way, states finally merge into one another though they might have good reason to remain apart (*WP*, sec. 800).

In the work of Alphonso Lingis, the relationship between sensation as the apprehension of “the sense” (the orientation and meaning) of things and “sensation” as sensual contact with them has given forth notions of “susceptibility” as an ethico-political ground for connection between sentient beings. With Nietzsche in mind, Lingis has argued that new conceptions of sensation enable us to discover a “different intelligibility,” one that “refutes the primacy of perception and the practicable world.”⁵¹

In his 1977 essay “The Will to Power,” Lingis addresses what, according to Allison, is “the most paradoxical element in Nietzsche’s thought: in a world devoid of substantial identities and absolute categories of description, explanation, or value, what can the Will to Power itself conceivably mean, and how are we to understand ourselves or anything else by means of such a doctrine?”⁵² The answer that Lingis proposes is a “semiotic model of interpretation” which “subverts the logic of identity and substance.” But how exactly does this “semiotic model” work to conceive of the individual and the world across the registers of artistic creation, effectivity, and nobility that characterize the Dionysian register so central to Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power?

On Allison’s reading of the will to power, traditional rationality would be supplanted by a broader notion of “semiotics,” that is, by the functional sign-system of language itself (Allison, 166). Allison draws on an entry from one of Nietzsche’s notebooks from 1880 that focuses on the term “semen”:

The reabsorption of semen by the blood is the strongest nourishment and perhaps more than any other factor, it prompts the stimulus of power, the unrest of all forces toward the overcoming of resistances, the thirst for contradiction and resistance. The feeling of power has so far mounted highest in abstinent priests and hermits (cited in Allison, 165).

This feeling of seminal "power" is precisely at the root of the will to power. Thus, from the German (*Samen*), back through the Latin (*semen*), back to the Greek (Σεμεα, *semea*): "sign" or "significance," that is, "meaning." Seed or germ, but also sign or meaning; thus, at the origin, the same root for "seminal," "semiotics," and "semantics" (Allison, 166). Put simply: For Nietzsche, semen, the "seed of the joyful phallus, which is also *seed* of life itself ... is also the *meaning* of life, the natural life of body and nature whose highest expression is ultimately the eternal return, the Dionysian will to embrace the whole of existence—repeatedly, ecstatically, eternally." That Nietzsche wishes to stress "an extremely sensualistic vocabulary and symbolism—so as to celebrate the vitality of human existence, with a liberating respect for its richly sensual and often ecstatic emotional capacity for pleasure, joy" (Allison, 166)—seems particularly apparent in Allison's hermeneutics of "The Honey Sacrifice," where "honey" stands for "seed."

Nevertheless, Allison probes: "where does this somewhat agitated rhetoric—a sort of inverted phallogentrism—lead us?" (Allison, 167). To be sure, Nietzsche has never been completely "onside" as far as feminism was concerned. But then neither, as is the case with Simone de Beauvoir, have been many of its own leading lights.⁵³ Nietzsche's alleged misogyny rests with the precariousness of "male-identification" within feminism and phallogentrism is, after all, the belief that male generative power is, and should be, the driving force of society.

Allison takes us back to the Greek Σεμελε (*semele*), pointing out that "Semele" (seed, semen) was also the name of Dionysus's mother (Allison, 166). As we prepare to "bite" with *Zarathustra's* Nietzsche into "the belly of all black melancholy," one wonders how much pain these seminal juices may help heal.

Taking Sex in Hand

A famous maxim circulated widely in Nietzsche's time: "The loss of one ounce of it [seminal fluid], enfeebles more than [the loss of] forty ounces of blood." It came into existence with the publication of *L'Onanisme*, a bestselling book as well as the first known medical work devoted solely to the "problem" of masturbation. Swiss physician Samuel Tissot's *Tentamen de morbis ex manustupratione* (1758) appeared as *L'Onanisme, ou Dissertation physique sur les maladies produites par la masturbation* (1760). Translated into English, German, and Italian, it was seldom out of print and was reprinted as late as 1905. Masturbation, in the male, was thought to cause the "unnatural" loss of seminal fluid, leading to a "dissipation" of vital bodily energies and gave rise to the hallucinatory range of somatic and mental debilities that were used to normalize "a set of

ideological assumptions" about the appropriate social behavior of the nineteenth-century middle-class male.⁵⁴

It was this new linkage of sexuality with questions of identity, "character and temperament," rather than with questions of acts, that made the onanism charge so catastrophic for Nietzsche. Onan's "spilling of seed" (Genesis, chapter 38) was a sin like fornication for medieval and early modern clerics. Even though modern theologians may believe it was the hatred of his older brother Er—whose widow Onan was expected to impregnate—that was his capital crime, his act was not initially constituted as "the sign" of an identity. Reading the new Nietzsche with Allison, one can venture that it also gave the impetus for a revolution in thought.

Allison looks to Nietzsche's onanism and to Wagner's reading of Nietzsche as the moment when Nietzsche took Zarathustra in hand, and gave us the highest endowment: "the courage to overcome the ill-will of pity and revenge." However, following the strict rhetoric of a heterosexual imperative, Zarathustra has not quite embraced this seed, this meaning. For this, he would have to "give" the semen, that is, he would have to inseminate and propagate. Would not "phallocentrism" be precisely this endowment of the seed? After all, "phallocentrism" refers to just the belief that male generative power is, and should be, the driving force of society. But Zarathustra, lone prophet that he is, "can only dream and implore. His gift," writes Allison, "appears to be little more than onanism—he spills his seed—even in his sleep!" (Allison, 165, 167).

"Thus it would seem," continues Allison, "that Zarathustra does not have the discipline to prepare himself for the necessary courage to understand and to accept his own teaching." Allison concludes that the plaintive tone of "The Honey Sacrifice" actually resonates throughout the whole of *Zarathustra* and clearly reflects "the series of expectations, frustrations, and disappointments Nietzsche himself underwent throughout the period of its composition, indeed, for a very long time" (Allison, 167, 171). But surely this reflects the enormous stigma that Nietzsche bore as a (non)member of Western phallocentric culture itself!

Created as the *antithesis* of "normal" middle-class male development, the onanist signifies the hidden potential for the short-circuiting of the "natural evolution" that leads to the ascendancy of the middle-class. Aligned with "eunuchs" and the "morally insane," the masturbator is discursively "unmanned": he exists only as a "degenerate being." Much like "the addict,"⁵⁵ "the masturbator" is depicted as "the negation of the highest mental endowment of mankind."⁵⁶ This, I contend, is the meaning of the "inverted" phallocentrism that spills its seed into Allison's reading of Nietzsche's text.

One may suppose that Nietzsche was aware of the developments in

Europe of the newly proclaimed "masturbatory insanity" that was making its way into the medical and scientific vocabulary of the time, and the *stigmata* that were being assigned to it. Famous late-Victorian psychologist Henry Maudsley's paper, "Illustrations of a Variety of Insanity," delivered before the Harveian Society of London on March 5, 1868, and published in *The Journal of Mental Science* in July of the same year, seeks "to illustrate the features of the mental derangement which is produced in men by self-abuse, and thus to sketch the features of *a well-marked group*."⁵⁷

"Self-abuse," "onanism," "the secret vice," "schoolboy immorality," required careful management and control. It occasioned works like James Barker's *A Secret Book for Men Containing Personal and Confidential Light, Instruction, Information, Counsel and Advice for the Physical, Mental, Moral, and Spiritual Wants of Boys, Youths, and Men; Being an Exposé of the Vice of Boyhood, the Blight of Youth, the Curse of Men, the Wreck of Manhood, and the Bane of Posterity* (1891).⁵⁸ The taboo against masturbation (and homosexuality) was deeply rooted in the intertwined Hebraic and Christian traditions, whose claim that sex was for procreation alone gave rise to the concepts of perversion that emerged from the nineteenth century. Directed chiefly against male sexuality, there appears to have been no provisions specifically against lesbian acts in any West European criminal code, according to sex historian Jeffrey Weeks. Weeks points out how

... a Dutch historian has traced this phenomenon to the idea that the procreative capacity lay exclusively in the male semen. There was no concept of the ovum, and so women were seen purely as passive receptacles. For this reason, women could not frustrate nature's procreative ends in the same way as men.... But there was nevertheless a long earlier tradition of linking 'excessive' female sexuality with a challenge to nature, as in the association of witchcraft with sexual lasciviousness.⁵⁹

According to Weeks, by the end of the nineteenth century the "family" had taken over "religion" and "sin" as the central reference point in a distinctly modern hostility toward homosexuality. The roles that men and women were expected to act out in the family have been, in the specific context of the capitalist family, vehicles for the language and terminology of pre-capitalist cultures.

In his work *On Nietzsche*, Bataille comments on the relation between sacrifice and crime.⁶⁰ Following Allison's reading of Nietzsche's conflictual relation to "The Honey Sacrifice," Nietzsche's inverted phallogentrism falls on the side of "broken" codes. It speaks to the idea that sexual subjectivity does not necessarily coincide with the codes of rational consciousness.

Although such an idea represents a major point of disidentification for equality-minded feminists, it goes a long way in subverting the language and terminology of gender-related oppressions.⁶¹

The Radical Uses of *Reading the New Nietzsche*

Nietzsche's work is born of pain, not privilege—hence his immense contribution as perv or "erotic dissident" to the project of a sex-positive at the same time as gender-conscious perspective for feminism and sexuality studies. Men are socialized in our society by being taught that they are not women, and if the penalties against homosexuality were taken primarily against men it is because the male homosexual was seen as a threat to the roles enshrined in the family. The "earlier tradition" of attacking lascivious behavior in women was no longer necessary in the new sexological climate that attempted to deny female sexuality altogether. According to Weeks,

... the massive impact of industrialization and urbanization on family patterns, the gradual exclusion of women from the primary work force in the nineteenth century, the creation of a mass, propertyless working class, whose labour power was reproduced and serviced in the bosom of the family, had profound and still unexplored effects on the socially ascribed gender roles of men and women.⁶²

However, the longstanding idea of "purposive sex" as the only kind of permissible sex found in the Judaeo-Christian formulations made its way into the subsequent legal vocabulary of perversion as a "crime against nature" which found support in the "medical model" of homosexuality. The identity that was emerging as a response to the harsh legal situation was defined in terms of new sanctions: madness, moral insanity, sickness, and disease.⁶³ The gradual differentiation of religious and disease models which we can trace from the eighteenth century was significant in that it was to link intimately homosexuality with masturbation.

For most of the next hundred years or so homosexuality was intimately linked to ideas about masturbation. Just as homosexuality was not legally differentiated from sodomy, so medically it was seen as a continuation of onanism or masturbation, which developed a remarkable reputation from the early eighteenth century as the gateway to all types of hell.

But, as Weeks reminds us, "ideologies do not survive by magic, or even by historical inertia. They survive because they serve a social function, in

rationalizing and articulating certain material needs, and material needs as defined by those who control society." According to historian E. H. Hare, "the masturbatory hypothesis was like Pascal's religious hypothesis. One doubted it at one's peril or at the peril of one's race."⁶⁴ In post-Darwinian ideas of sexual evolution, "manliness and self-reliance were not the qualities of an impotent onanist."⁶⁵ For those deemed "girls," the stakes of crimes against nature were even higher: it was at the peril of the integrity of their bodies. Clitoridectomies were popularized after 1858 by Dr. Isaac Baker Brown, a London surgeon, and the merits of physical prevention against female masturbation were entertained even by such sexual liberals as Freud and Ellis.

The social differences between the sexes sanctified the belief that homosexuality was a deviance. With the belief in inherent differences has come "an overwhelming belief that reason, good sense and proper education are the only sensible roads to reform." An implicit critique of the sexual liberalism that has dominated most reform efforts, Nietzsche's philosophy has the potential to "take into account the varieties and diversity of sexual expression, of the arbitrariness of social labels, of the cultural moulding of gender and sexual identities."⁶⁶

To take gender to mean a belief in the fixed characteristics of men and women, either genetically determined or socially and emotionally structured, is to understand that it has sanctified the social differences between the sexes and defined homosexuality as a deviation. If there has been a marked absence of any real historical sense of the deeply rooted but changing nature of sexual expression, it has been accompanied by the absolute "supremacy of an exclusively heterosexual norm, enshrined in custom and ideology, perpetuated in the family, upheld by Church and state."⁶⁷

Mucus and Mucilage

Sartre proverbially speaks of the mucoïd or slimy, *le visqueux*, as "a moist and feminine sucking," inducing author Camille Paglia to read Dionysus's swamp as "the fleshy muck of the generative matrix."⁶⁸ But the channels that run between blood and seed, haemorrhage and ejaculation, enforce a gender binary collapsed by a typically androgynous (if not hermaphroditic) body. Paglia's discussion of the "beautiful Greek boy" also calls up the masochistic role of the youth in Greek culture, but falls prey to gender stereotypes.

On the one hand, the human sea of sexuality and gender in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* must be understood in the context of the restructuring of the family and sexual relations subsequent to the triumph of urbanization and

industrial capitalism. For the channels of history, temporal though they may be, present their own barriers. Allison reminds us that “in *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche describes the Christian teaching as ‘castratism,’ imposed precisely as the institution of universal law—divine, human, natural, and moral law—in short, the law of the repressive Father” (Allison, 166). On the other hand, we have *Zarathustra’s* Nietzsche lamenting his failure to embody the third metamorphosis: the child. Weeks acknowledges, following Philippe Ariès’s *Centuries of Childhood* and Michel Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, the “modern” invention of childhood, its presence as the ground for the enforcement of the now dated taboo on male masturbation and seed-spilling.

In my reading of Allison’s reading, Zarathustra’s “child” is not from the modern world. S/he is from the world of the ancients, a world in which Dionysian passion was as highly valued as Apollonian detachment. With Socrates came Western philosophy and Western religion enshrining the law of reason and the moral code that would give us “man” as the vanishing point of modernity. We are left to speculate on the “great *Haza*”—the absolute contingency—of the stigma that Nietzsche had to endure, as well as on the virtual absence of any “in-group” alignments, and why perhaps Nietzsche’s philosophy manages to eschew the pitfalls of classic identity politics. “The problems associated with militancy are well known,” writes Goffman. “In short, unless there is some alien culture on which to fall back, the more he [the stigmatized individual] separates himself structurally from the normals, the more like them he may become culturally.”⁶⁹ Thus, we may suppose that the category of “the masturbator,” a solitary offender with no reform movement to call his own, recedes, leaving us no legacy outside of Nietzsche’s own with which to contemplate what the modern metaphor of stigma singles out. Nietzsche lived “the lesson” of a particular subjugation as a “solitary” offender. The joy of solo sex has yet to form the basis of a political reform movement. Invisible, but marked, unmanned at a time when “manning” emerged as a particular form of gender oppression for men, it is Nietzsche’s experience of danger and dislocation that offers the footholds one can use to “scale the wall into the castle of manliness,”⁷⁰ ones that have not only been immediately viable in the past—sexology, the context of reception of reform movements—but that can be used productively in contemporary transgender politics as well.

Allison writes in his Introduction to *The New Nietzsche*:

What is important is not the pretension to seize upon an unchanging truth, an ideal meaning, or fixed being, but rather to uncover the considerations that incline or impel us to follow such conventions. What is in question, then, is the *deciphering* of the code that assigns

a value to certain terms and the rules that govern our use of these terms. What complicates matters is that we are largely unaware of these codes: hence the necessity for grasping these terms as signs, and the need for a theory of interpretation understood as a general semiotics.

The uses of Allison's *Reading* lie beyond a theory of reading and interpretation. The relationship between semiotics and will to power that Nietzsche's "inverted phallogentrism" draws upon discloses the at once open and finite nature of language. The greatest of Greek tragedies, like Nietzsche's own, was it not shaped, as Allison himself shows, by the experience of intoxication, an ecstatic feeling of life and strength? The "secret" in this inversion is that it is the "open" aspect that

... liberates the whole field of signification from its traditional finitude ... [and from the] restrictions ... previously held to be 'binding' on a given society and its entire conceptual order ... thought to be imposed from without, from beyond, and invariably to enjoy some transcendental sanction (God, logos, myth, sacred tradition, or idealized nature).⁷¹

For "Nietzsche's turn, his *Kehre* ... lies in his recognition that he must perform an auto-critique of the values, customs, traditionally sanctioned and sanctified emotions and affects that *constituted his very being*. In short ... the necessity of being able to critique the very social symbolic that governs one's identity in the first place."⁷²

Above all, the "turn" testifies to the importance of a self-reflexive operation: auto-critique as much as self-medication and health. Reaching beyond identity politics, cultivating a perspective on oneself and one's alignments that takes us out of ourselves, out of both phallogentrism and the closet, out, out, out ...

Out my fishing rod!

Notes

1. I thank Emily Bitting, in my "Sexuality, Identity, and Politics" class, for bringing to mind the "secret" air of jubilation in Nietzsche fans's alignments with each other.

2. Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 137.
3. Sandor Ferenczi, *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality*, trans. Henry Alden Bunker (New York: Norton, 1968), 57 (my emphasis). Camille Paglia points out that "raw clams have a latently cunnilingual character that many find repugnant. Eating a clam, fresh-killed, barely dead, is a barbarous, amorous plunging into mother nature's cold salt sea." Camille Paglia, *Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson* (New York: Vintage, 1991).
4. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper/Collins, 1991), 24.
5. Patrick Califia, *Speaking Sex to Power: The Politics of Queer Sex* (San Francisco: Cleis Press, 2002), 128.
6. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall, eds. *Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
7. For an account of the "sex wars" in feminism, see Carole S. Vance's "More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade after the Barnard Sexuality Conference" in *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, ed. Carole S. Vance (London: Pandora, 1992), xvi–xxxix. It all began when in the week before the Barnard Sexuality Conference, "anti-pornography feminists made telephone calls to Barnard College officials and trustees, as well as prominent local feminists, complaining that the conference was promoting 'anti-feminist' views and had been taken over by 'sexual perverts'" (xxi).
8. Carol Queen, "Sex-Radical Politics, Sex Positive Feminist Thought, and Whore Stigma," in *Whores and Other Feminists*, ed. Jill Nagle (New York: Routledge, 1997), 125–6, 125, 125.
9. See Gayle Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality" in *Pleasure and Danger*, 293.
10. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 136, 133, 177.
11. *New York Native* 1986; cited in *ibid.*, 71.

12. *Ibid.*, 71.

13. Queer theorist Eve Sedgwick's *Epistemology of the Closet*, whose aim is to specify, without resolving, the mutually contradictory conceptual models which govern modern homosexuality, is more than a little indebted to Nietzsche, if not even more to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, especially Volume III of his four-volume study. See especially her chapter on sexual binarisms, "Wilde, Nietzsche, and the Sentimental Relations of the Male Body."

14. It was Germany that was to experience the most public manifestation of a homosexual consciousness (public debates, reform organization, books, outspoken authorities): see Jeffrey Weeks, *Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (London: Quartet, 1997); and Sedgwick, *Epistemology*, 132–3. Influenced initially by such men as Havelock Ellis and Edward Carpenter, England developed its own "small-scale, but culturally significant" reform movement by the early part of the twentieth century (Weeks, *Coming Out*, 6). For the influence of Nietzsche on Ellis and his wife, novelist Edith Lees Ellis, see Weeks, *Coming Out*, 102, 116. In that book Weeks discusses at length the reactions of homosexuals themselves to hostile labelling, medical stigmatization, as well as legal and social oppression, focusing on "the most coherent form of homosexual resistance, the reform groupings." For more details on Nietzsche, homosexual resistance in the mid to late nineteenth century, and "the distance between a new, openly problematical German national identity and an 'immemorial,' very naturalized English one," see Sedgwick, *Epistemology*, 132–3.

15. Sedgwick, *Epistemology*, 134.

16. At the close of *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Nietzsche writes: "Is it true that God is present *everywhere*?' a little girl asked her mother; 'I think that's indecent'—a hint for philosophers! One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddle and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is—to speak Greek—*Baubo*?" (*Nietzsche Contra Wagner in The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Penguin, 1982], 683).

17. According to the *Random House Dictionary's* definition, one's "customary practice or ... compulsive need, inclination, or use," as well as an individual's "characteristic bodily or physical condition," "the garb of a

particular rank, profession, religious order, etc." and "a dominant or regular disposition or tendency; prevailing character or quality," related to "habitat" and "habitation," "habitus."

18. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 191–2.

19. Arthur C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 225.

20. Sedgwick, *Epistemology*, 133.

21. Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 191.

22. Siobhan Somerville, "Scientific Racism and the Invention of the Homosexual Body" in *The Gender/Sexuality Reader: Culture, History, Political Economy*, eds. Roger Lancaster and Micaela di Leonardo (New York: Routledge, 1997), 46.

23. Sedgwick, *Epistemology*, 9, 1.

24. Somerville, "Scientific Racism and the Invention of the Homosexual Body," 46. This paper provides a discussion of the increasingly central position of the case study in the "invention" of the homosexual body in nineteenth-century scientific literature.

25. Joachim Köhler, *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, trans. Ronald Taylor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); cited in Allison, 292.

26. Allison, "Who is Zarathustra's Nietzsche?" *Symposium* vol. 8, no. 1, 9, 9, 10.

27. *Ibid.*, 9.

28. "What sacrifice? I squander what is given to me, I—a squanderer with a thousand hands; how could I call that sacrificing? And when I desired honey, I merely desired bait and sweet mucus and mucilage, which make even growling bears and queer, sullen, evil birds put out their tongues—the best bait needed by hunters and fishermen" (*Z*, "The Honey Sacrifice," p. 350).

29. Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 185, 190.
30. Allison, "Who is Zarathustra's Nietzsche?" 5.
31. "Lesbian and gay studies" is no longer understood as the history of a marginalized "minority population," as the story of a small percentage of the citizenry and their doings, but is now seen as linked to the study of central historical processes: the production and organization of sexualities. "Queer theory," for its part, is consequently engaged in the critique of identity categories presented as stable, unitary, or "authentic." For a discussion of the tensions between "queer theory" and lesbian/gay studies, see Lisa Duggan's "The Discipline Problem: Queer Theory Meets Lesbian and Gay Studies," *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* vol. 2, no. 3, 100–1.
32. Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 5–6.
33. Allison, "Who is Zarathustra's Nietzsche?" 10.
34. The review appeared in the September 16–17, 1886 issue of *Der Bund*. See "Nietzsche's Dangerous Book," trans. Tim Hyde and Lysanne Fauvel, in *New Nietzsche Studies* vol. 4, nos. 1–2.
35. Allison, "Iconologies: Reading *Simulations* with Plato and Nietzsche," *Recherches Semiotique/ Semiotic Inquiry* vol. 16, nos. 1–2, 1.
36. Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, eds. *Why We Are **Not** Nietzscheans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), vii.
37. "In the recent evolution of philosophy in France we can trace the passage from the generation known after 1945 as that of the 'three H's' ... being Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger." Following Ricoeur, Descombes characterizes the generation since 1960 as that of the "masters of suspicion": Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980], 3).
38. Allison, *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), ix.
39. In the Anglo-American context, *The New Nietzsche* has yielded several collections on the timeliness of Nietzsche's work. Tracey B. Strong and

Michael Allen Gillespie take a similar tack in their collection, *Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), as does Paul Patton in his Introduction to *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1993). The new/old *Why Nietzsche Now?*, edited by Daniel O'Hara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), followed by the even newer *Why Nietzsche Still?*, edited by Alan D. Schrift (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), are testimony to the perpetual/eternal rebirth of this "most protean of protean thinkers" and to the ongoing attempts to reappropriate and recast Nietzsche's legacy of the new.

40. Patton, *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, xii; Schrift, *Why Nietzsche Still?*, 3, 13.

41. Schrift, *Why Nietzsche Still?*, 3.

42. Robert C. Solomon, ed. *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1973), 1; cited in *ibid.*, 3.

43. Brett Beemyn and Mickey Eliason, eds. *Queer Studies: A Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Anthology* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 165.

44. Alan D. Schrift, "Reading the New Nietzsche, by David B. Allison," *The Review of Metaphysics* vol. 55, no. 3.

45. See Descombes's "Nietzsche's French Moment" in *Why We Are **Not** Nietzscheans*.

46. In Ferry and Renaut, *Why We Are **Not** Nietzscheans*, 2.

47. Alan D. Schrift, *Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 4.

48. *Ibid.*, 5, 3.

49. *Ibid.*, 5.

50. Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 189.

51. Alphonso Lingis, *Sensation: Intelligibility in Sensibility* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996).

52. Allison, *The New Nietzsche*, 3.

53. For a discussion of the eclipse of Simone de Beauvoir both in her own country and abroad, see my article, "The Eclipse of Gender: Simone de Beauvoir and the *Différance* of Translation," *Philosophy Today* vol. 41, no. 1.

54. See Ed Cohen, ed. *Talk on the Wilde Side: Genealogy of a Discourse on Male Sexualities* (New York: Routledge, 1993), for a more extensive discussion of Tissot and others on masturbation and the construction of normative masculinity.

55. See Eve Sedgwick, "Epidemics of the Will" in her *Tendencies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). For a discussion of addiction from a Nietzschean point of view, see *High Culture: Reflections on Addiction and Modernity*, eds. Anna Alexander and Mark S. Roberts (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003); see especially David Allison's "Nietzsche's Dionysian High: Morphin' with Endorphins."

56. Cohen, *Talk on the Wilde Side*, 63.

57. *Ibid.*, 58; my emphasis.

58. See *ibid.*, 224 n. 1.

59. Weeks, *Coming Out*, 5.

60. See Bataille's *On Nietzsche*, trans. Bruce Boone (St. Paul: Paragon, 1992), 20–1.

61. Rosi Braidotti, "Interview with Judith Butler," *Feminism Meets Queer Theory*, eds. Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 51.

62. Weeks, *Coming Out*, 5–6.

63. See *ibid.*, "The Medical Model."

64. *Ibid.*, 4, 24.

65. Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, cited in *ibid.*, 25.

66. Weeks, *Coming Out*, 7.

67. *Ibid.*, 232.

68. Paglia, *Sexual Personae*, 93.

69. Goffman, *Stigma*, 114.

70. Califia, *Speaking Sex to Power*, 396. "Where are the footholds I could use to scale the wall into the castle of manliness? I like penetration, and I'm pretty good at it, but my dick is not a biological organ; there's no way to skirt that deficit. I'm disabled, so I hardly ever pick up heavy things, and what I know about cars could be written on the inside of a matchbox cover in twenty-point type." See Califia's superb piece on "Masculinities" in *Speaking Sex to Power*, 396.

71. Allison, *The New Nietzsche*, xvi, xvii.

72. Allison, "Who is Zarathustra's Nietzsche?" 11-12.