Zarathustra's Politics and the Dissatisfactions of Mimesis

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ABSTRACT: In this reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I attempt to account for the gradual transformation of Zarathustra's politics and pedagogy in light of his confrontation with a Platonic understanding of imitation. I argue that the provisional teaching of the overman is abandoned in the second half of the text because it fails to teach others to become who they are. It only produces bad imitations of Zarathustra himself. I read the thought of the eternal recurrence, however, as Zarathustra's overcoming of his residual Platonic pedagogy since it challenges the mimetic relationship between master and disciple that Zarathustra originally cultivates but ultimately disavows.

My intention in this paper is not to offer yet another comprehensive, or even wholly original, interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but I do want to pursue a question which sheds considerable light on the overall sense of this notoriously elusive text. I will argue that Zarathustra's political-philosophical failures in the first two books can be explained by his lingering commitments to a Platonic pedagogy which is completely unsuitable for the "teaching" of self-creation that Zarathustra is attempting to offer. More specifically, I will show that what Zarathustra comes to prohibit and mock by the end of the text, despite an initial complicity, is the sort of master-disciple relationship forged according to the operations of a traditional, Platonic understanding of mimesis wherein pupils are taught to believe, act, and evaluate the way the master
believes acts and evaluates. Indeed, this is the same imitative relationship that Kant explicitly rules out between the artist and apprentice in the third Critique. To insist that the apprentice should slavishly copy what the master has created only guarantees that the apprentice can never approach the condition of freedom which is constitutive of mastery itself. That is why Kant, and Zarathustra here, both require a second, implicit sense of mimesis to account both for the master/pupil relation and the possibility of the pupil's freedom. What is required, therefore, is a mimetic relation between two distinct self-legislations, two freedoms that are unconstrained by the operations of the other. Although this sort of relationship is not explicitly referred to in the text of Zarathustra itself, I believe that both its plot and its philosophical sense can be most completely understood if we begin to appreciate the degree to which Zarathustra's pedagogy and his "doctrine" of self-creation are informed by this second sense of mimesis. In what follows, I will attempt to defend this thesis by carefully examining a number of episodes from the text, particularly those in which Zarathustra is confronted with distorted imitations of his own teaching and inferior versions of himself, in order to show how he both implicates and frees himself from the pedagogical horizons of Platonic political philosophy.

The interpretation of Zarathustra that is perhaps most congenial to the reading I am offering here has been recently developed by Daniel Conway. Conway situates the question of Zarathustra's politics and pedagogy within the context of Nietzsche's philosophical relationship with Plato. According to Conway, "the ironic structure of the book is...generated by the gap that obtains between Zarathustra's intentional parody of Socrates and his unintentional self-parody." In other words, Zarathustra's teaching fails in the first half of the text because of the schism between Zarathustra's anti-Socratic rhetoric, the content of his new teaching, and the still highly Socratic practice of attempting to improve his audience. Both Socrates and Zarathustra "fail," Nietzsche is suggesting, by virtue of their shared presupposition of their audience's deficiency and implied need of "redemption." This indicates that Zarathustra's pedagogical experiment with his own version of the Socratic katabasis — his Untergang — ends in failure because it is still too closely tied to a model of Platonic political agency.

While I agree with much of Conway's interpretation of Zarathustra, I believe that what is equally crucial here is the link between the Untergang theme and its presuppositions of authority and deficiency, and the problem of imitation in a text which seeks to offer a teaching of authenticity and self-creation. In other words, like Conway, I believe that given the content of Nietzsche's teaching, his deeper point is that all modes of untergehen must fail as pedagogical models since they assume a nature which is incapable of responding to that very teaching. Additionally, however, I want to account for Zarathustra's continual disappointment that his teaching only seems to
generate bad *imitations* of his teachings and himself. In the first two books especially, his response to this dilemma is to blame his audience, instead of modifying his own still-too-Socratic teaching practices. Zarathustra eventually learns, however, that in order to get others to “become who they are,” he must first overcome the problem of *mimesis* and the political-pedagogical practices to which it is tied. He cannot, that is, “teach” self-creation while simultaneously promoting and demanding allegiance to his own values and beliefs without falling into the most blatant performative contradiction. Zarathustra’s failure, then, to convey his teaching of self-creation through this classical model thus serves as an important prelude and contrast to Zarathustra’s/Nietzsche’s “solution” to this seemingly intractable paradox in book four.6

The doctrine of self-creation that I have been referring to here is the key to understanding both the failures and successes of *Zarathustra* as a pedagogical-philosophical text. But it is also the key to understanding both Zarathustra and Nietzsche as “literary” characters. As Alexander Nehemas has written, Nietzsche is a creation of his own texts, and has attempted to create an artwork out of himself by offering himself (and Zarathustra, I should add) as a model of the very self-creation that he consistently advocates.7 In other words, Nietzsche’s own attempt to become who he is involves teaching others to become who they are. This, I believe, is the insight that Nietzsche attempts to convey dramatically through the complex pedagogy of *Zarathustra*, yet as I have been suggesting, it is the impossibility of teaching self-creation (in the manner that we teach, say, classical mechanics or Latin grammar) which accounts for the failure of Zarathustra as a revolutionary figure. This political failure, however, to which Nietzsche both implicitly and explicitly draws our attention, opens up the possibility of self-creation understood as a radically individuating practice that does not rely upon external claims about history, morality, or any other mode of social reassurance, including Zarathustra’s initial political call to prepare the Earth for the coming *Übermensch*. This gradual withdrawal or dissociation of personal identity from all the usual metanarratives marks the “aestheticization” of Zarathustra’s teaching to the point that he is left with no positive “content” or “doctrine” in any traditional sense (or determinate concepts, to speak Kantian) to communicate by the end of the book. Zarathustra fails as a revolutionary, as a harbinger of new social practices and beliefs, in order to show that what is of ultimate philosophical and existential concern — one’s highest values and beliefs, one’s way of “being” — cannot be taught in any conventional way. What remains, accordingly, is merely the example of Zarathustra, who, increasingly unable and unwilling to tell others what to believe or how to live, is left with offering himself as a model of the type of life that he thinks is possible for those truly “higher men.” It is as if Zarathustra realizes that genuine freedom, independence, and the capacity to
create one's own values cannot be collectively achieved, given that the socially inculcated "herd" values of the masses cannot be transformed through political means, as the earlier episodes of Zarathustra in Motley Cow demonstrate. Zarathustra thus finally repudiates any "spiritual" solution to the problem of modern European nihilism, and turns away in book four from the city, from public life, in favor of the company of the dissatisfied higher men who would otherwise be subject to those same herd values which they too have come to (partially) reject. Consequently, Zarathustra's movement from an attempt to politically or spiritually overcome European nihilism to a non-spiritual, aesthetic practice of self-creation not only opposes the Platonic subordination of art to truth, but also the Hegelian characterization of art as a communal, reflective practice wherein the highest truths of a community could be sensuously expressed.

The Problem of Philosophical Legislation: Zarathustra’s “Prologue”

Zarathustra’s decision to leave his “cave” and “go under” and his subsequent meeting with the old saint on his way to Motley Cow suggest that Zarathustra is competing with and a rival of both Platonic and Christian pedagogies. But as we shall learn, Nietzsche is also self-consciously placing Zarathustra in the philosophical proximity of Plato’s philosopher-king and Jesus in order to draw our attention to Zarathustra’s own initial complicity with the very positions he thinks he has already overcome. Although Zarathustra, for example, believes he has left the old saint behind, various representatives of Christianity – both religious figures and their ideas, the fragments of European culture – will re-emerge throughout the course the text. When Zarathustra likewise encounters replicas and distorted imitations of his own teaching later on in the work, we should consider the implicit comparison Nietzsche is drawing between Zarathustra’s early teaching and the teaching of Christianity. Both attempts to teach mankind “the way” end in failure, which later motivates Zarathustra to modify his pedagogical strategies.

The deficiency of Zarathustra’s teaching becomes evident in his first public speech. Upon arrival in the town of Motley Cow, Zarathustra immediately begins to address a crowd gathered in the market place. That Nietzsche has Zarathustra appear in the midst of a crowded market without any knowledge of his audience’s philosophical understanding is not without philosophical significance. Zarathustra seems to think that the late-modern public of Europe is ready for his words, and believes that his speech about the crucial historical circumstances of the present will be recognized for its universal importance. What Zarathustra offers, without argument, are philosophical claims, yet he is articulating those claims to an audience of non-philosophers. This will not produce genuine understanding, but only, at best, the mere reiteration of Zarathustra’s words. Moreover, given Zarathustra’s
ostensibly anti-metaphysical stance, his notorious claim that “God is dead,” it appears that his philosophical teaching is itself already compromised. As an ideal, as a telos, the coming of the Übermensch appears to be inconsistent with the implications of the just-articulated death-of-God claim. If all metaphysical horizons have collapsed, then any suggestion of a higher being to come or a new “meaning” for humanity is tantamount to a resurrection of metaphysical thinking.

That Nietzsche has Zarathustra offer this doctrine in the city directly after saying to himself in the forest that God is dead, suggests that Nietzsche wants to draw our attention to the apparently contradictory nature of Zarathustra’s teaching. Like other readers of Zarathustra, I believe the dramatic setting of the speech indicates that the public teaching of the Übermensch should not be construed as the center-piece of Nietzsche’s philosophical pedagogy. It is rather a doctrine that is designated for public consumption, for initiating wholesale political change, as Zarathustra’s preacher-like rhetoric attests, but even this “noble lie” falls on deaf ears. It is for this reason that the speech about the coming Übermensch is misconstrued as a preamble to the subsequent tightrope-walking performance. From the public’s perspective, philosophy is easily mistaken for groundless, verbal acrobatics, and is merely one of many distractions/attractions in the market square. What is significant, however, is that Zarathustra attempts to re-teach the Übermensch doctrine in light of the public’s response. Now Zarathustra claims that man “is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss,” (Z, p. 126) an image which suggests that Zarathustra is already having to accommodate his (already compromised) philosophical teachings to the immediacy of his situation. In order to make the general public pay attention, he employs a rhetoric that appeals to them and is understandable, yet he quickly slips back into a speech resembling the first one, and his teaching once again fails: he is “not the mouth for these ears” (Z, p. 128). The problem is not that Zarathustra cannot get the crowd’s attention, since the people clearly respond to his rhetoric, but Zarathustra is unable to get his audience to respond to the content of his teaching. For this reason, Zarathustra decides to abandon his indiscriminate public teaching.

The “Prologue” is thus important because it begins to reveal the pedagogical difficulties Zarathustra faces and implicitly suggests that it is the production of distorted imitations which lies at the heart of these difficulties. For example, after Zarathustra’s perversely received speech, our attention returns to the tightrope walker’s performance. While on his way across the rope, a jester suddenly appears and starts mocking the tightrope walker, suggesting that his methodical crossing is merely impeding the progress of those who are more able. The jester then causes the tightrope walker to fall to his death directly beside Zarathustra. This scene is significant because it presents us with a crass imitation of Zarathustra’s teaching, one which seems
to be the result of how his teaching was received by the crowd. From the public’s perspective, the jester is just another version of the laughable Zarathustra, yet he is also “devilish” [wie ein Teufel], out to destroy the highest achievements of their culture. In the “Prologue,” Zarathustra is seeking to overcome the vulgar Bildung of late-modernity, but as his compassionate response to the dying tightrope walker indicates, he is importantly respectful of uniqueness, daring, and courage, even in their all-too-human guises. This episode is thus representative of many similar episodes in the book wherein different versions or imitations of Zarathustra’s teachings are wrongly identified or conflated with his own. The deployment of these caricatures once again attests to the difficulties of Zarathustra’s pedagogical task of teaching others to become who they are. What we have seen so far indicates that Zarathustra cannot reconcile the form with the content of his teaching. Despite his apparently unreflective assumption that he has left philosophical and religious tradition behind, his teaching at this point ironically remains an unwitting “imitation” of both Platonic and Christian instruction. The result of this confusion is that Zarathustra’s own teaching, as we will see much more clearly, can only produce fragmented copies of himself: the very opposite effect of what he initially intended.

In virtue of how his initial teaching was received, Zarathustra resolves to seek disciples, companions, “who follow me because they want to follow themselves — wherever I want” (Z, p. 135). He no longer will play the role of “shepherd and dog of a herd” (Z, p. 135), for his newly self-assigned task involves shepherding of a different sort. Now Zarathustra will attempt to lure the few away from the many; he declares that he will leap over “those who hesitate and lag behind” and seek instead “fellow harvesters and fellow celebrants” (Z, p. 136). There is, however, something, deeply paradoxical about Zarathustra’s resolution here: on the one hand, he claims to be no longer preaching to the many, yet on the other hand he must still seek audiences in order to draw those higher men, his proper companions, away from the herd and the state. Zarathustra is thus still acting in a highly political manner: insofar as many of his subsequent speeches are directed at the moral, political, educational and religious practices of late-modernity. The comment, then, that his companions will follow him “wherever I want” announces the central pedagogical tension in Zarathustra. Much of what follows in the plot of Zarathustra involves Zarathustra’s gradual disengagement from “political” life and his concomitant realization that this “wherever I want” condition ultimately conflicts with the pedagogical task of teaching others to “become who they are.” In the first two books, Zarathustra is still the teacher of the Übermensch, which, if not a literal ideal of a new type of man, is at least a figurative projection of Zarathustra’s desire for a “higher humanity,” a political goal that betrays the sort of revolutionary itinerary only abandoned in the second half of the book. Because Zarathustra
believes that the immediate task of modern Europe is to "prepare" for the subsequent overcoming of man, many of his speeches in the first two parts advocate the destruction of extant cultural practices and social institutions. In light of this revolutionary context, it is clear that Zarathustra's seemingly innocuous "wherever I want" claim takes on a whole new meaning. In addition to pulling the few away from the many and fragmenting the herd, Zarathustra's role as a sort of existential savior must be appreciated from this macropolitical perspective organized around the Übermensch-ideal. Zarathustra has declared war on man in the name of a "higher type," and his new companions are but the first foot-soldiers of the coming revolution. As we shall see, when Zarathustra begins to understand his own historical mission as determined by his own principle of revenge, his own hostility to time and the "it was," he abandons both the doctrine of the Übermensch and the political agenda that follows therefrom, including, gradually, the leader-disciple relationship with his companions.

**Zarathustra's Pedagogical Failure: Parts One and Two**

Much of Zarathustra's attempted philosophical seduction in parts one and two involves challenging the highest values or virtues of late-modernity and the institutional practices within which they have become authoritative. For example, in his speech, "On the New Idol," Zarathustra explicitly links the herd-values and the "tongues of good and evil" (Z, p. 161) with their political correlate, the modern state. Unlike both Zarathustra's new concern for the few and their relationship to the state, the state itself is exclusively concerned with the masses and only flatters the higher man for the sake of his allegiance and affection. The purpose of Zarathustra's speech here is to expose this false flattery and draw attention to the rift between the interests of the higher men and the state. It is, after all, "for the superfluous [Überflüssigen] the state was invented" (Z, p. 161). Unlike the philosophical legislation described in the previous speech "On War and Warriors," the new idol rules by policing the uneducated appetites of the many with the sword, the fear of death. Much of its false authority, moreover, derives from its appropriation and imitation of "the language of customs and rights" from different peoples. Each people has its own "good and evil," its own set of authoritative values and beliefs, but the modern state lacks the unity of style which characterizes genuine cultures and seeks only its own survival through whatever mixed-bag of goods and evils it can assemble in order to extend its authority to as many different peoples as possible. As such, the modern state's existence is antagonistic to the development and education of those who are capable of living apart from the normalized, routinized herd existence actively cultivated by modern, democratic politics. Like Rousseau, Nietzsche clearly understands the irony of a modernity which explicitly champions both
independence and freedom, but in actuality produces conforming masses who are not capable of realizing precisely those virtues which they ostensibly affirm. The opposition between the state and the individual could not be more clear:

Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous... Where the state ends — look there, my brothers! Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the overman? (Z, p. 163)

What is striking about Zarathustra’s utopian rhetoric is the dramatic severance of this future possibility from the traditional site of politics, the state. Unlike both Rousseau and Kant, for Nietzsche the sovereign individual is not produced through the alignment of his will with a general will or a universal law. As Nietzsche suggests here through Zarathustra’s speech, the sovereign individual must be able to create his own table of values, and thus he cannot blindly submit to the previously formulated values of others, especially the incoherent, leveled-down values of the modern state. Because the demands of autonomy exceed any social or political setting, it is only as an aesthetic practice, the practice of self-creation, Zarathustra negatively implies, through which autonomy can be achieved.

The speeches from part two all belong to Zarathustra’s second descent to mankind. After his first journey, Zarathustra returned to his solitary mountain life for several more years, but went “under” again after learning that his teachings were in danger. This is not to say that his teachings were being ignored or replaced; rather, they were “in danger” because they were being badly imitated. Zarathustra learns of this in a dream during which a child holds up a mirror to Zarathustra’s face: “when I looked into the mirror I cried out, and my heart was shaken: for it was not myself I saw, but a devil’s grimace and scornful laughter” (Z, p. 195). The imagery of the mirror is deployed by Nietzsche to draw our attention to the problem of mimesis operative here, and the constitutive role it plays in the drama of Zarathustra.

What motivates Zarathustra to return to man is the distortion of his teachings; the “weeds pose as wheat” and his disciples are now ashamed of Zarathustra’s gifts. As a result, Zarathustra needs to develop a new way of speaking, a new pedagogy, so that he too does not simply become another version of his earlier teaching. This realization leads to the somewhat more direct and philosophically sophisticated teaching of part two in which Zarathustra and an apparently new, more receptive band of disciples journey to a series of distant islands, importantly removed from the concerns and demands of public opinion. The paradox from which Zarathustra still cannot escape, however, is the need to teach and be understood on the one hand, and his desire to immunize his teachings from the imitations and distortions of his words that will inexorably occur on the other. Zarathustra has not yet realized that
insofar as he remains an authority figure — still very much the Platonic teacher of virtue in parts one and two — he is preventing his disciples from discovering their own virtues, their own “good and evil,” and thus from becoming who they are. Moreover, as both a gift-giver and authority figure, Zarathustra cannot help but see his disciples as deficient, as lacking his own ability of self-creation. Thus, from his perspective, the reception of his teachings (his gifts) enacted by his disciples will inevitably be disappointing, as all inferior replications are in contrast to the “real thing.” Nietzsche’s intention here, I believe, is to expose the limitations of a Platonic pedagogy as practiced (indeed imitated) by Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s Platonic pedagogy assumes that once his audience knows what is true, namely, that God is dead, they will then freely will the coming of the Übermensch, but time and again we see Zarathustra’s disappointed reactions to how his teachings are interpreted and put into practice. This suggests that Nietzsche is having Zarathustra initially use the very sort of mimesis that Plato criticizes in order to reveal the inherent limitations of philosophical legislation as depicted in the Republic. Nietzsche is reading Plato against Plato.

At the end of part two, a crisis occurs which provokes Zarathustra to gradually, yet fundamentally re-examine the nature of his own teaching. The nature and cause of this crisis cannot be easily summarized, for Zarathustra’s words are particularly indirect and ambiguous in these especially important sections. In “The Soothsayer,” Zarathustra is introduced to what will become his own “doctrine,” the eternal return of the same: “All is empty, all is the same, all has been!” (Z, p. 245). The mere mention of this doctrine has an adverse affect on Zarathustra. He immediately becomes sad and weary; his heart is grieved and he gives up food and drink for three days. After a deep sleep, Zarathustra’s first speech “came to his disciples as if from a great distance,” (Z, p. 246) suggesting that Zarathustra has either learned something about himself or his disciples that has changed their relationship. The dream he recalls suggests that his Untergang has turned him into a “night watchman and a guardian of tombs upon the lonely mountain castle of death” (Z, p. 246).

In other words, the Soothsayer’s mention of the eternal return “doctrine” has forced Zarathustra to realize that his teachings cannot change man. He cannot simply proclaim a new ideal for man — the over-man — and expect to inaugurate a new and higher human history. Zarathustra’s dream, as I interpret it, is a dream revealing the impotence of his current pedagogy. This is poignantly exhibited by Zarathustra’s favourite disciple’s misinterpretation of the dream: presumably, if Zarathustra were a successful teacher, then his best disciple would not be such a poor interpreter of Zarathustra’s inner life. Significantly, the misinterpretation sounds like something Zarathustra might have said earlier or might have wanted to hear, but the shake of his head indicates that producing well-intentioned, ingratiating mimicry is not what Zarathustra wants from his disciples.
This point is sharpened somewhat in the chapter “On Redemption” wherein we get a glimpse of how Zarathustra’s teaching is understood by man through the words of a hunchback. He tells Zarathustra that his teaching will only succeed when he is able to “persuade us cripples,” and in order to be persuasive, Zarathustra must first “heal the blind and make the lame walk” (Z, p. 249). It is in this section that Zarathustra first gains a sense of the inadequacy of his own teachings when he realizes that his own Untergang is implicated in the production of the very “fragments and limbs of men” (Z, p. 250) he has sought to redeem. Zarathustra has produced “cripples” precisely through the assumption that his teaching is needed in order to overcome man. The relationship of dependency this creates is just what it means to be a “cripple” (or an “inverse cripple” who is only self-sufficient and capable in one respect) in need of redemption. What Zarathustra finds “most unendurable” is the present and past condition of man as “fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents” and he confesses that without his redemptive projection of a future Übermensch, he “should not know how to live” (Z, p. 250). Zarathustra thus realizes that he, too, is a cripple because he too believes in redemption from a distant, transformative ideal — a futural being who will justify the manifold deficiencies of all past and present existence. But again, it is clear that even Zarathustra’s doctrine of redemption through creative willing is still a doctrine of redemption and must, therefore, presuppose the deficiency of the natures it seeks to transform. This means, in effect, that what is lowest (the cripples) and what is highest (the Übermensch) are dependent upon one another and cannot be unproblematically separated.

Zarathustra begins to realize, however, that he is responsible for this condition, that his teaching has produced both the deficiency and the redemptive possibility of its overcoming. From this point on, I believe the importance of the Übermensch is diminished as the sort of redemptive, post-historical ideal against which the present condition of man inexorably seems lacking.

Zarathustra’s realization that he has been deceiving himself prompts him to return “without joy” to his mountain. In the final chapter of part two, Zarathustra’s “stillest hour” (his conscience? his most private speech?) specifies explicitly the connection between nobility and baseness that Zarathustra has just learned: “he who has to move mountains also moves valleys and hollows” (Z, p. 258). But as Zarathustra responds, he has been unable to move mountains because his teaching is yet to reach men; his Untergang has been a failure not because of his audience, but because of the assumptions and strategies of his own teaching. In the first two parts, Zarathustra’s teaching has only managed to produce imitations of himself, mere fragments of a complete human being, since, paradoxically, in order to recognize Zarathustra’s authority his audience had to understand itself as needing such an authority, as deficient kinds or types of human beings. The
illumination of this contradictory pedagogy reveals, of course, the limitations of Plato’s philosophical legislation while affording Zarathustra an Er-like\textsuperscript{12} chance to “redeem” himself through the adoption of a new teaching in the second half of the text. Unlike Zarathustra, Christ would not encounter this dilemma since the moral deficiencies of his audience and their collective need of redemption is consistent with both the content and practice of his teaching. The task of becoming a Christian is to be as Christ-like as possible. For Nietzsche, however, no possible mode of \textit{Untergang} is appropriate for the promotion of self-creation that belongs at the center of Zarathustra’s final “teachings.”

\textbf{The Imitation of Freedom: Zarathustra’s Aesthetic Politics}

In part three, Zarathustra leaves his disciples and begins his journey home from the Blessed Isles. It is this intensely poetic, reflective third part in which Zarathustra spends much of his time alone questioning his own authority and attempting to reconcile himself to the fact that mankind cannot be overcome through any mode of political discourse. He too must overcome his own resentment of time and the “it was,” the fact that his own historical circumstances and identity seem to be so intimately bound up with what he most despises — unredeemed humanity. Zarathustra’s concern here thus shifts from a concern for other human beings to a concern for himself. What he must formulate is a way of affirming who he is without simultaneously willing to transcend or negate that which he wishes to overcome. The section entitled “On Passing By” is important because it clearly shows that Zarathustra’s entire political and pedagogical orientation has unquestionably changed. While wandering from town to town, Zarathustra is confronted by a “foaming fool” at the gates of a great city. Significantly, in light of the theme of \textit{mimesis} that I have been articulating here, the foaming fool is known by the people as “Zarathustra’s ape.” Not only has the fool borrowed from Zarathustra’s teachings, but also from his “phrasing and cadences,” his entire manner of speech. He thus represents the product of Zarathustra’s teaching from the first two parts of the text, and is consequently another reminder of the failure of the \textit{Untergang} which Zarathustra is presently in the process of reversing. The fool launches into an embittered, yet Zarathustra-like denunciation of the great city in which he repeatedly implores Zarathustra to spit on the city and turn back. Counseling revenge of this sort quickly angers Zarathustra because he recognizes the psychology of revenge that was latent in his own earlier teachings. Like the fool, Zarathustra is nauseated by the great city, but the ethos of Zarathustra’s teaching has changed from its previous nomothetic orientation. His “new” doctrine specifies that “where one can no longer love, there one should \textit{pass by}” (Z, p. 290). The crucial suggestion here is that Zarathustra has extricated himself, if not from the
desire, then at least from the practice of seeking a collective transformation of mankind. This section, therefore, ought to be read as a repudiation of his earlier teaching — when Zarathustra refused to “pass by” — and a preparation for part four in which those who seek his company must go up to him.

The continual reduction of strictly political concerns in part three is countered by what is arguably the most famous and important doctrine of the text — the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. As Alexander Nehamas has persuasively argued, the eternal recurrence “is not a theory of the world but a view of the self.” This teaching, therefore, signals a pivotal turn in Zarathustra from a concern with a “political” solution to the sickness of modern European “spirit” to an “aesthetic” solution to the private task of becoming who one is. This is not to say that this “private” task does not have political implications; in fact, I am arguing that the only satisfactory practice of politics offered in Zarathustra is possible solely on the basis of this aesthetic task of self-creation.

Although this is not the place for a detailed reading of the eternal recurrence as it is presented in Zarathustra and elsewhere, I do want to highlight one dramatic feature of the teaching which attests to both Nehamas’ insight and its link with the motif of imitation that I have been examining here. The passage in question is richly poetic and notoriously difficult to interpret; however, I think that the dramatic setting of the presentation of the doctrine furnishes much of the needed context to read this teaching correctly. In the second section of “On the Vision and the Riddle,” Zarathustra and a dwarf — his spirit of gravity — stand before a gateway named “Moment” from which two eternal paths depart in alternate directions. Before Zarathustra can offer his interpretation of the gateway and the significance of the two infinite paths, the dwarf murmurs his own trivial teaching of the eternal recurrence: “All that is straight lies... All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” (Z, p. 270). The dwarf’s teaching is trivializing because he deflates the existential force of the doctrine by reducing it to a series of categorical judgments without attempting to work through the implications of these “truths” for his own life. What is furnished, then, is the mere simulacrum, the bare husk of Zarathustra’s teaching that is not strictly “wrong,” but merely a weak imitation of what Zarathustra will subsequently illuminate. The fact that the dwarf speaks as a philosopher issuing claims about the nature of existence indicates, furthermore, that this is not what Zarathustra’s teaching offers. As an imitation, the dwarf’s reading still conceals the deeper, existential “truth” of Zarathustra’s teaching precisely by refusing to acknowledge that the eternal recurrence offers above all a “view of the self.” By drawing our attention to the inadequate imitation of Zarathustra’s teaching, Nietzsche is attempting to immunize his readers in advance from misinterpreting the doctrine of eternal recurrence.
According to Nehamas (and others), the teaching of eternal recurrence should not be interpreted as a cosmological theory, nor as a metaphysical claim seeking to offer an a priori determination of the truth of beings as a whole. The eternal recurrence does not, on this reading, theoretically vouchsafe the infinite repetition of one’s own empirical life exactly as it has been, as that would not lead to a joyous affirmation of one’s existence but only to a sense of resignation and indifference. Since what is crucial for Nietzsche is the self-understanding we must have in order to affirm our lives in this ultimate way, Nehamas suggests that we read the eternal recurrence in a strictly conditional manner: “If my life were to recur, then it could recur only in identical fashion.” This means that everything that is ostensibly accidental, trivial, evanescent, or momentary about one’s existence can no longer be opposed to, or juxtaposed with, a substantial understanding of the self. If Zarathustra’s identity is the result of all his “properties,” as the conditional reading of the eternal recurrence implies, then he cannot artificially separate a series of contingent features from a stable essence that he identifies with his “true” self, as metaphysicians have traditionally taught. If Zarathustra (or anyone else) must affirm all of his properties in order to be who he is, then to hope for one thing to be different is tantamount to hoping for all things to be different. In other words, the desire to change one thing is the equivalent of the desire to be a completely different person. What nauseates Zarathustra (as the episode with the shepherd and the snake attests) is that his own existence and destiny is inseparable from that of “the small man,” which means that in order to fully submit to the demands of the eternal recurrence doctrine, Zarathustra must learn to overcome his disgust with the herd (and subsequently, his pity for the higher man.)

It is this existential sense that Zarathustra captures in his own interpretation of the doctrine, which he “presents” through a series of questions to the dwarf. Of particular importance is Zarathustra’s suggestion that all things are “knotted together so firmly” (Z, p. 270) that it is only possible to affirm one moment by affirming all moments. This rules out any selective “reading” of one’s life in which certain intolerable or ostensibly insignificant episodes are repudiated or dis-owned while others are celebrated for their continuing meaning and importance. Most importantly, however, the doctrine means that each life is radically unique and, as a consequence, inimitable. If the sum-total of all experience, including that of “this slow spider” and “this moonlight itself” (Z, p. 270), is inextricably a part of who Zarathustra is, then Zarathustra, and everyone else for that matter, have experienced life from vastly distinct, non-exchangeable points of view. The uniqueness of the self is compromised or sacrificed only when one lacks the will or self-understanding to consider existence in this way. If, for instance, one seeks an identity by engaging in stereotypical activities or by self-consciously aligning one’s values and beliefs with those of others, then this
is tantamount to disavowing the very contingencies of experience out of which alone each self is constituted. To substitute even one part of another’s life for one’s own, the teaching of eternal recurrence implies, is to abandon one’s self in its entirety. The deeply individualizing import of the doctrine is dramatically exemplified by the disappearance of the dwarf, the gateway, etc. after Zarathustra has fully articulated his teaching. This helps emphasize the fact that each life is radically unique and non-exchangeable, and that there are no metaphysical formulas (like the dwarf’s) to which we can appeal in order to become who we are. The teaching of eternal recurrence is thus anathema to the spirit of imitation, which explains why this doctrine replaces the teaching of the Übermensch in the second half of the text. Zarathustra may still mention the Übermensch, for this teaching still belongs to Zarathustra, but he realizes that he can no longer insist on the public’s recognition or acceptance of the Übermensch since this would entail that other people take over or imitate Zarathustra’s teaching — a possibility that is ruled out by the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

In the chapter entitled “On the Spirit of Gravity,” Zarathustra’s change of both tone and pedagogy as the result of the full realization of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence becomes evident. Picking up his polemic against the dwarf and the categorical spirit of the dwarf’s teaching, Zarathustra juxtaposes the dwarf’s “Good for all, evil for all” maxim with his own teaching: “This is my good and evil” (Z, p. 306). More famously, Zarathustra concludes the chapter with yet another implicit critique of his own earlier position, the teaching of the Übermensch: “‘This is my way; where is yours?’ — thus I answered those who asked me ‘the way.’ For the way — that does not exist” (Z, p. 307). In addition to calling into question the authority of all transcendent values — be they Platonic or Christian — this new teaching also rules out the sort of collective mobilization required for the imminent arrival of the Übermensch that Zarathustra was advocating in parts one and two especially. “The way” of the Übermensch can thus no longer be recognized as an authoritative appeal to the modern European community, since by implication it is now construed as Zarathustra’s private ideal, one which he can no longer imperialistically present before his audiences without simultaneously undermining the possibility of others discovering or creating their own “ways” too.

It is the fourth and final part of Zarathustra in which the most radical and final turn in the entire text is enacted. Part four begins many months and years later with Zarathustra again on his mountain. The chapter is entitled “The Honey Sacrifice” even though Zarathustra confesses that the mention of sacrifice to his animals “was mere cunning and, verily, a useful folly” (Z, p. 350). In conformity with the eternal recurrence doctrine, we learn almost immediately that — noble lies aside — Zarathustra is no longer interested in the promulgation of ideals that require the sacrifice or negation of some
aspect of existence in order to be realized. Who we encounter here is indeed a “new” Zarathustra, a “squanderer” rather than a sacrificer, one who is more concerned with his “work” than his happiness, yet one who is “neither patient nor impatient” (Z, p.351) for the sort of political revolution he was cultivating during the first cycles of his failed Untergang. From the solitary heights of his mountain, Zarathustra is free to divulge the central features of his new relationship with mankind. Instead of descending to man and haranguing the masses to transform themselves for the sake of a coming new and higher being, Zarathustra now wants to play fisherman, casting his golden rod down to the human world in order to catch those higher beings who are attracted to the sweet honey bait — the honey that Zarathustra has already declared runs in his veins.

With my best bait I shall today bait the queerest human fish. My happiness itself I cast out far and wide, between sunrise, noon, and sunset, to see if many human fish might not learn to wriggle and wiggle from my happiness, until, biting at my sharp hidden hooks, they must come up to my height — the most colorful abysmal groundlings [Abgrund-Gründlinge], to the most sarcastic of all who fish for men. For that is what I am through and through: reeling, reeling in, raising up, raising, a raiser, a cultivator, and disciplinarian [ziehend, heranziehen, hinaufziehend, aufziehend, ein Zieher, Züchter und Zuchtmeister], who once counseled himself, not for nothing: Become who you are! (Z, p. 351)15

A new strategy is thus adopted for teaching others to become who they are, which is not based on the content of any new, determinate doctrine, but on the example of Zarathustra’s own life. Zarathustra now self-consciously understands himself to be the very bait to which the higher men, those queer fish, will be attracted. Instead of descending to man and concerning himself with the spiritual life of mankind as a whole, Zarathustra is now only concerned with individuals to whom he exemplifies the transformative capacity of self-overcoming.

What Nietzsche is appealing to, yet simultaneously parodying, is the erotic ascent articulated in Plato’s Symposium. Zarathustra’s exemplary self-creation that we have been witness to throughout the text is now implicitly invoked as the highest moment of a reversed erotic ascent. Unlike the Platonic ascent which begins from an erotic attachment to particular beautiful objects and moves toward the world of forms, the inverted Zarathustrean ascent begins by drawing people away from an attachment to a metaphysical “true world” and the various ascetic ideals derived therefrom, to the worldly yet still ascetic
ideal of the Übermensch, and finally to the full and unconditional endorsement of the self in all its connected, contingent moments. Because the eternal recurrence stipulates that one cannot affirm one moment without also affirming all moments, it is impossible to will to become who we are if we still cannot affirm the entirety of our existence. The last stage of the ascent thus means, in effect, submitting to the “test” of the eternal recurrence; Zarathustra is thus such an “attractive” figure because he too has had to learn that in order to be who he is, he must say “yes” to life in all its questionableness and suffering, including the great nausea of the small man’s recurrence. Whereas Plato sought to channel Eros away from the tangled and imperfect world of particularity and becoming, Nietzsche now terminates Zarathustra’s Untergang and explicitly connects the erotic ascent of the higher men to Zarathustra’s own aesthetic project of self-creation which is determined by a will that is capable of affirming all the imperfections and sensuality of the flux. Zarathustra thus represents a new and inimitable ideal of human being (and, as I have shown, an imitable ideal of human becoming) and unlike Socrates, he actively acknowledges his solicitation of erotic attachments. Zarathustra’s “retreat” to his mountain may well be a retreat from the political macrosphere and an abandonment of an attempt to legislatively impose a new “table of values” on a disinterested and fragmented European culture, but as he explicitly states from the outset of part four, he has not abandoned either his concern with mankind or politics despite this radical reassessment of his pedagogy. What has changed is the scope of Zarathustra’s immediate goal and its mode of execution. Having reconciled himself to his inability to reach mankind as a whole, Zarathustra now confines himself to exemplifying the teaching of the eternal recurrence. As a squanderer, a term Nietzsche often associates with artistic genius, Zarathustra’s over-fullness mimics the over-fullness of the sun, which means that Zarathustra’s creative expenditures always reach beyond the self toward others for whom this excess becomes an erotic attachment. The true squanderer, however, is not primarily concerned with how his offerings are taken up by others, since this is not the telos but only one possible effect of Zarathustra’s self-creative practices. Zarathustra is not an artist in the conventional sense of creating distinct, original objects with “aesthetic qualities,” but insofar as he has created himself as a unique, original and complete being - qualities vouchsafed by the test of eternal recurrence — it is legitimate to say that his self is first and foremost an artistic production. In the first parts of Zarathustra, the emphasis is placed on what Zarathustra taught; here in part four the focus shifts to who Zarathustra is. If Zarathustra is reducible to a series of doctrines or ideas about mankind and its future, then such a teaching is prone to imitation (as Kant claimed in his discussion of how science is learned in the third Critique). Learning is
imitation if what is to be learned is nothing more than a set of determinate claims. This implies, as Kant observes, that "the greatest discoverer differs from the most arduous imitator and apprentice only in degree." The first parts of Zarathustra dramatically confirm Kant's claim, since we are witness to the production of multiple mob-like hybrids and versions of Zarathustra throughout the text. Moreover, as a teacher of the Übermensch and by virtue of his own complicity in the ascetic ideal and the politics of ressentiment, there is still much of the mob in Zarathustra too. The continuum which Kant describes and Zarathustra despises is precisely the result of Zarathustra's early pedagogical strategies. This changes in part four wherein Zarathustra is now apparently unconcerned with his public reception in order, paradoxically, to be received in any way at all. He has distanced himself from man precisely in order to have an influence upon him. He offers himself as the model of an exemplary being, one who can affirm all aspects of who he is, in order to seduce others to do the same. Although this too may engender a desire to imitate Zarathustra, a full understanding of the implications of the eternal recurrence, as I have indicated above, would reveal the incompatibility of this teaching with the self-denying will to imitate. Zarathustra thus attempts to overcome the problem of imitation by offering himself as an exemplary figure to be imitated as a self-creating being, not as a finished product to be copied by others. This "solution," of course, recalls Kant's attempt to both account for the originality of the fine arts and account for the relationship between the fine-artist and his apprentice (and thus for art-historical traditions) by specifying that while the mimesis of artistic products is contrary to the spirit of genius, the mimesis of production is not. It is the split between these two modes of mimesis, I believe, which must be taken into account in order to understand Zarathustra's final transformation in part four. Zarathustra thus still wants to be imitated or followed, but now in a way that is compatible with his denial in part three that there is a single "way" of becoming who one is.

It is important to emphasize that Zarathustra is not attempting, like Richard Rorty, to divorce the private ideal of self-creation from a public concern with justice. In fact, it is the unity of these ideals which motivates Zarathustra to formulate an ethic of exemplarity in book four wherein the virtue of self-sufficiency is offered as an example of a more perfect life than other alternative ways of being. If there is a trace of Hegel in Zarathustra's teachings, it lies in the fact that Zarathustra comes to inhabit a world of absolute knowing; he cannot offer any independent reassurances to the higher men that his way of life is a legitimate response to the crisis of nihilism of modern Europe. What he can at least suggest (but not logically demonstrate) is that the various institutional practices of modern Europe — science, religion, and democratic/nationalistic politics in particular — are all committed in various ways to the ascetic ideal, to life-denial, and thus cannot
provide the context in which the individual’s life can be unconditionally affirmed. These practices, Zarathustra circuitously argues, have failed life, and we can only expect nihilism to be perpetuated if we keep blindly adhering to the same old suite of rationally/metaphysically/democratically vouchsafed beliefs and values. To be persuasive, however, Zarathustra has learned that he cannot simply offer new ideals that are external to what and who he himself is. That is why the ideal of the Übermensch loses its political force in the second half of the book at the hands of the eternal recurrence doctrine. The opposition between man and overman is thus ultimately subordinated to the question of what type of self is required to live in a world in which there is nothing authoritative to imitate except for the very freedom that makes becoming who one is possible.
Notes


2 As Kant claimed, the possibility of scientific progress is grounded in the teachability of determinate concepts, whereas this process of learning through imitation is unavailable to practitioners of the fine arts. Since progress is thus explicitly ruled out in art-historical traditions, all that remains open to the artistic genius is the possibility, to use Rorty’s terms, of furnishing a new metaphor, a new description that is understood not as a claim to represent reality correctly, but “simply as one more vocabulary, one more human project” among many others. This proliferation of new vocabularies, and a gradual abandonment of the early-modernist attempts to finally “get things right” or construct a “final vocabulary,” marks the victory of poetry, of “self-creation” over philosophy and science in late-modern Europe. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, pp. 39 and 40, and my articles, “Modernity and Historicity in Kant’s Theory of Fine Art,” *Philosophy Today*, Volume 42, 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 16–25, and “Nature, Deception and the Politics of Art: Divisions of Labor in Kant and Nietzsche,” forthcoming in *International Studies in Philosophy*. In *Zarathustra*, I am arguing here, the doctrine of the *Übermensch* corresponds to this early-modern attempt to get things right, while the later example of Zarathustra’s inherently private attempt self-creation corresponds to the formulation of just one more vocabulary amongst others.

3 This is not to imply that Socrates was not also aware of the pedagogical limitations of his own dialectic. He realizes that the force of the better argument is no guarantee that others will be convinced that their opinions are false.


6 Stanley Rosen is much more pessimistic about a way around Zarathustra’s pedagogical dilemmas, as the following summary of Zarathustra’s double-bind suggests: “If we become disciples of Zarathustra, then we are not supermen. If we become supermen, then we repudiate Zarathustra or become his enemies.” See Stanley Rosen, *The Mask of Enlightenment*,
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 145. As I have already indicated, my own reading of *Zarathustra* is much closer to Conway's. Conway argues that Zarathustra accommodates "the deconstruction of his own authority" in order to "promote the sufficiency of others without simultaneously exerting on them an unduly formative influence." See Conway (1990), p. 108. I believe that Zarathustra subverts his own authority precisely through the linking of his pedagogy to the servile mode of *mimesis* that Plato and Kant have likewise condemned. I have suggested above that the final mimetic relationship between Zarathustra and the higher men is not imitative at all in this sense, but permits only an imitation of Zarathustra's freedom and self-creation. That this turn in Zarathustra's teaching can only be exemplified on the mountain and not in Motley Cow or the Blessed Isles suggests that this "teaching of freedom" through exemplarity is neither democratically enjoyed nor a merely utopian ideal, but a possibility for the capable few. In this sense, Kant's doctrine of genius finds a resounding echo in Zarathustra's final pedagogical position.

7 See Alexander Nehemas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 170-199 especially. Nietzsche's appropriation of Pindar's line is perhaps best expressed in section 335 of *The Gay Science*: "We, however, want to become those we are — human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves." This suggests that Nietzsche viewed the self "aesthetically," but the emphasis on uniqueness and individuation foregrounds the difficulties of how those who want to become who they are can possibly co-exist with, and relate to one another, particularly in pedagogical and political contexts.

8 Conway argues that the "teaching of the *Übermensch* more properly belongs to Zarathustra" — not to Nietzsche. This is because in *Zarathustra* the *Übermensch* is presented as the "transcendence," rather than the "perfection of humanity." I agree with Conway that Zarathustra's teaching thus "lapses regularly into idealism," but I think this is why such an ideal is implicitly repudiated in the text. In fact, the plot of *Zarathustra* would not make sense if the *Übermensch* were understood (as in *The Anti-Christ*, for example) merely as an exemplar of the "higher man." In general, however, I agree with those commentators like Conway, Lampert and Rosen who argue that the doctrine of the *Übermensch* is merely Zarathustra's "provisional" teaching, which eventually gives way to the "definitive" doctrine of the eternal return. Lampert in particular is extremely persuasive on this point: "It seems to me that one of the greatest single causes of misinterpretation of Nietzsche's teaching is the failure to see that the clearly provisional teaching on the superman is rendered obsolete by the clearly definitive teaching on the eternal return. That there
is no call for a superman in the books after *Zarathustra* is no accident, but rather an implicit acknowledgment that the philosopher of the future has already come in the one who teaches that the weight of things resides in things and not in some future to which they may or may not contribute.” See Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Teaching*, New Haven, Yale, 1986, p. 258. According to Robert Pippin, Zarathustra ultimately rejects the teaching of the *Übermensch*-ideal because he comes to see his “transformative ‘solution’” as merely the ideal of nihilistic, modern Europe. See Robert Pippin, “Irony and Affirmation in Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra in Nietzsche’s New Seas*,” eds. M. Gillespie and T. Strong, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 56. I disagree with Pippin’s assessment of Zarathustra’s abandonment of his provisional *Übermensch*-teaching, because his account cannot explain the failure of a teaching that ought to be appealing to the modern European community if it is, indeed, a modern European ideal. If, however, Zarathustra’s teaching is understood as a *private* doctrine with a determinate content that can only be communicated didactically, then we can understand his abandonment of this teaching by tracing how he comes to realize that the didacticism of his instruction undermines its very content.

9 Zarathustra alludes to this scene again in “On the Flies of the Market Place:” “Full of solemn jesters is the market place — and the people pride themselves on their great men, their masters of the hour” (*Z*, p. 164). Moreover, the “devilish” impersonation of Zarathustra is encountered again at the beginning of the second part, motivating his second *Untergang*.

10 This should be contrasted with Socrates’ argument in the *Republic* that the philosopher-king should return to the cave after his lengthy education, thus suggesting that the few have to be lured back to the many.

11 It is in this sense, then, that I agree with Pippin’s claim that the *Übermensch* is merely the contingent ideal of late modernity, which means that its “self-created status” is vitiated by its dependence upon the particular needs of “late bourgeois culture.” See Pippin (1988), p. 52.

12 Conway points out the echoes of the myth of Er in Zarathustra’s choices in part three wherein he “reproduces his original Socratic errors” of the first two parts of the text before making the correct, anti-Socratic choices in part four. See Conway (1988), p. 270.


15 Zarathustra’s *Züchter und Zuchtmeister* resonates with the title of part four of *The Will to Power*, “Zucht und Züchtung” [Discipline and Breeding], although the political teaching of the later text — the classical locus of the “bloody Nietzsche” — is precisely what Zarathustra has abandoned in his own pedagogical practices. For an interesting assessment
of Nietzsche's return to the beliefs that I am arguing Zarathustra rejects, namely, the determination that only an explicitly political transformation of modern European life is possible, see Tracy Strong, “Nietzsche’s Political Aesthetics” in Nietzsche’s New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, eds. M. Gillespie and T. Strong, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 153-174.


17 I would like to thank Tracy Strong for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.