PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTUITION AND THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY AS METHOD AND SCIENCE: SCHELER AND HUSSERL

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Scheler subjects Husserl’s categorial intuition to a critique, which calls into question the very methodological procedure of phenomenology. Scheler’s divergence from Husserl with respect to whether sensory or categorial contents furnish the foundation of the act of intuition leads into a more significant divergence with respect to whether phenomenology should, primarily, be considered a form of science to which a specific methodology applies. Philosophical methods, according to Scheler, must presuppose, and not distract from, important preconditions of knowledge that pertain more to the philosopher than to logical procedure. Accordingly, the phenomenological attitude serves as a foundation for, and is not the result of, the phenomenological method.

Mortiz Geiger once recounted that what Scheler had primarily taken from Husserl’s phenomenology was a particular theory of intuition. However, Scheler subjects even Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition to critique—a critique which ultimately serves as a point of departure for an expanded critique of nothing less than the methodological procedure of phenomenology itself. Scheler criticises, among other things, Husserl’s claim in the Logical Investigations that the so-called “straightforward” sensory contents provide the foundation for categorical acts. Scheler asserts, rather, that even the seemingly most basic sense perceptions already presuppose an intentional foundation of categorial intuitions according to an “order of givenness.” Such intuitions, as immediate and immanent, are justifiably considered to be part of phenomenological experience.


2 These are Scheler’s two criteria for phenomenological experience. See Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, (tr.) M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 50–53. Hereafter referred to as FE.
This shift in foundation reawakens the question of whether phenomenology, as Husserl maintained, ought to be considered a "science," that is to say, a science which makes operative a specific logical methodology with apodictic results. According to Scheler, any use of philosophical methods must presuppose, as well as not distract from, important preconditions of knowledge which pertain more to the philosopher herself than to the method which the philosopher merely applies. Phenomenological method must be based upon the foundation of a "phenomenological attitude."

I will first explore in detail the shift in the notion of intuitive foundation from Husserl to Scheler, focussing on Husserl's theory of categorial intuition and aspects of Scheler's critique, along with some elements of his proposed alternative. This particular critique of Husserl has been largely unnoted by scholars, but it is an important aspect of Scheler's thought that led him to his more well-known divergences from Husserl. I will then take up these better-known oppositions in light of the first in order to consider the question of philosophy as science, as well as the corresponding differences between their respective understandings of phenomenological attitude. Scheler's notion of phenomenological attitude not only had the historical effect of largely reducing the emphasis on method for subsequent phenomenology, but it also refers to an important relation between epistemology and ontology which nowadays goes largely unconsidered.

Categorial and Phenomenological Intuition

Intuition is itself not cognition, but its basis. Intuition is the source which validates the legitimacy of cognition. It is in intuition that the objects belonging to the domain of cognition are originally given. Phenomenology attempts to attain cognition or knowledge (Erkenntnis) and, in particular, cognition of essences (Wesenserkenntnis), but it recognises that this task must begin on the level of intuition (Anschauung), especially if it takes seriously its claim to base philosophy on an encounter with the things themselves, as opposed to operating with the material of past theses and ideologies; phenomenology wishes to put out of play the "dogmatic attitude," along with the natural attitude. Furthermore, phenomenology’s claim to furnish pure cognition requires the possibility of a correlative pure intuition. We should keep in

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mind that the phenomenological understanding of intuition does not differ qualitatively from the Kantian understanding, that is, that what is first given in intuition can become an object of cognition. However, Kant’s claim that the content of intuition does not extend beyond empirical data is insufficient for the phenomenologist.

When Husserl and Scheler first met, at a Kantstudien gathering in 1901, the two began a philosophical discussion concerning intuition and perception. Scheler expressed that he had grown dissatisfied with the Kantian conception of intuition and that he believed that intuitive content is originally much richer than can be accounted for by sensuous elements. Husserl agreed, referring to his theory of categorial intuition, which similarly enlarged the concept of intuition.

Husserl describes such a “widening of the concept of intuition” in his sixth Logical Investigation. He emphasised two characteristics. First, intuition no longer applies merely to sensuous elements, but includes “new, supersensuous” categorial objects over and against the “older, sensuous” ones. Categorial objects are first and foremost pure objects. In comparison, Scheler agreed that such pure objects, or, as he often called them, “pure facts,” exist. Pure facts are also called “phenomenological facts,” which excludes, for Scheler, both natural and scientific facts, or whatever is given naturally or inductively by means of empirical intuition. An essence is a pure fact, whether of pure logic (formal) or not of pure logic (material), whether independent (concrete) or non-independent (abstract).

Husserl’s second characteristic is that sensuous intuition is the founding act for all categorial intuition. In other words, categorial acts are founded upon acts of sense perception. Sensuous perception is characterised as “straightforward,” as that through which one grasps the whole object directly and immediately; therefore, sensory content provides the foundation for the pure categorial object to present itself. Although Scheler concurs with Husserl about the existence of pure objects or facts, he contests this second point, namely, the issue of foundation, which is the conflict of highest concern here. It is important first to understand what Husserl means by categorial intuition.

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Categorial objects are objective correlates to categorial acts, and categorial acts are acts of meaning which require fulfilment, which is to say, the categorial act is an intentional act. But the question arises, Which meanings are intended in categorial intentionality?

Husserl maintains that since all acts are expressible, all acts are carriers of meaning (LI/2, 192), and the expressed meaning overlays the thing perceived. (LI/2, 201) However, throughout the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl establishes and holds to a subtle but important distinction between the meaning that relates to the data of sense-perception (the content), expressed in a predicative judgement, and the meaning of the compositional form of the predicative judgement itself. Categorial intuition is directed intentionally toward a meaning made present through the compositional form (or "categorial structure") of a linguistic proposition.

Consider the statement “The coffee mug is empty.” The statement manifests a wider intention toward a whole (the mug) and a narrower intention toward some part (its emptiness). Robert Sokolowski explains that, on the categorial level, “A relation between whole and part is articulated and registered…. This achievement is a categorial intuition, because the categorial object, the thing in its articulation, is made actually present to us.” In categorial intuition, not only is the mug made present to us, but the mug’s emptiness is made present in a way that manifests the whole/part relation between the mug and its emptiness. That is to say, a specific state of affairs is given in categorial intuition within which manifests the categorial relation between whole and part.

I want to push this common understanding further for the sake of greater precision concerning the categorial object. At this point, what new "supersensuous" object is in fact made present in the wholly empirical observation of “the thing in its articulation,” i.e., in the intuition that the coffee mug is empty, may seem ambiguous. Why, in other words, is this intuition considered "categorial" at all and not merely an empirical intuition? It seems that Sokolowski’s account fails to highlight how categorial intuition is, in fact, a pure intuition. Keeping in mind that the categorial object is a pure object, I suggest that categorial intuition not so much makes present the mug’s being empty as it makes present the meaningful logical form of the predicative judgement itself, insofar as the judgement about the empty mug is an example of a whole/part relation. Categorial intuition does not intend

7 See Husserl, LI/2, Sixth Investigation, chs. 1 and 6.
fulfilment in the empty mug as such. It is concerned instead with the (meaningful) predicable judgement about the mug being empty, and with how the pure logical composition of the proposition manifests a formal relation which, in the end, is entirely independent from the mug itself. Therefore, the objective correlate of the categorial act is the categorial form, of which the whole/part relation is an example. Categorial intuition, then, is the making present of specific formal categories, such as the relation of whole and part.

Husserl makes the distinction between categorial objects and perceptual objects very clear by distinguishing essences that correspond to concepts or propositions with content, from purely formal concepts and propositions, which are "empty"—"concepts like Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order, Ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc." These have a different character, for example, from concepts such as "House, Tree, Color, Tone, Space, Sensation, Feeling etc." (L1/2, 19)

The preceding discussion becomes problematic when we consider not only the pure object itself, but its foundation. It is peculiar that categorial, or supersenuous objects, which are pure and of a higher order, look to the sensuous elements for their foundation. But is it not the case, after all, that objects (comprising either wholes or parts) appear to consciousness initially by means of the senses, which must be present for a categorial intuition of the holistic interconnections of the parts? For example, it might seem that a sense perception of the empty mug, and the predicative expression, "The mug is empty," are prerequisites for the intuition of the categorial whole/part relation and the cognition of the structural meaning of this perception. Sensory intuition therefore, for Husserl, is immediate and "straightforward," and is thus said to be foundational.

Now, Scheler’s phenomenology is undoubtedly indebted to Husserl’s development of the concept of categorial intuition. For both philosophers, the expansion of the concept of intuition to include the apprehension of structural relationships beyond sensible features is the starting point of phenomenology. However, there is disagreement about the question of which act and its contents are more foundational. Scheler discusses this problem in greatest detail in his early essay, "The Theory of the Three Facts." There, he discusses the material bases of phenomenological philosophy by exploring the interconnections between three kinds of facts: pure, natural and scientific. The main thrust of the essay attempts to dispel the widespread "sensualistic" illusion that all intuitive, philosophical content is relative to the body, its senses and its particular organisation. According to Scheler, what is given in the natural perception of a cube, for example, is not a
perspectival side view but "a complete material thing with a definite spatial unity of form." (TFF, 203) Furthermore, the concepts of "sensation" and "sensory content" themselves require phenomenological clarification, and it is the task of phenomenology to purify the contents of intuition from the accompanying sensations. (TTF, 204)

Although the expression of this phenomenological "task" is essentially Husserlian, Scheler criticises Husserl's theory of categorial intuition for falling into the same "prōton pseudos" of "sensualism", that is, "the presupposition that sensory contents furnish the foundation of every other content of intuition." (TTF, 221) Scheler writes:

Some [sensualistic] thinkers admit non-sensory but still intuitive contents which in no way reduce to relations and which are not instituted or produced by the activity of thought. Nonetheless, they think they can still say (I cite here Husserl only) that although "categorial intuition" is indeed an independent function vis-à-vis sensory intuition, and although it is distinct from all "thinking" which is merely significative "intending" (e.g., the intuition of equality, similarity, unity, totality, thinghood is distinct from the identically named meanings which are fulfilled only in such intuitions), nonetheless, every categorial intuition is "founded," whereas only "sensuous intention" is unfounded intuition. (TTF, 221–22)

Rather, Scheler insists that the opposite is the case: “[T]he pure fact must have the character of an ultimate foundation of the merely sensory components of natural facts." (TTF, 219) As such, the pure fact or essence serves as the “independent variable” of any datum of experience, while the sense-content remains dependent (contingent) upon the pure fact. (TTF, 219) Scheler explains that if this is not the case, any change in the contingent sensory manifold would indicate a corresponding change in the essential structural identity of the given state of affairs. (TTF, 220) In short, if essence is grounded in sensory content, it necessarily takes on the characteristic of contingency and thus ceases to be an essence. By extension, one cannot say that pure contents found sensory contents while simultaneously saying that sensory intuition founds pure intuition. Scheler himself states that perhaps

9 It appears that the term “sensualism,” as Scheler uses it, refers not only to British empiricism, but to the Kantian view of intuition, to positivist philosophies and to the “physicist’s general prejudice.” As Scheler explains, “This error does not seem to us to lie simply in the radical sensualistic thesis that the entire content of intuition can coincide with the sensory material” (TFF, 221), but also in the presupposition that sensory contents are foundational.
nothing so fundamentally distinguishes his own view of phenomenology from prevailing views than this point. (TTF, 221)

Scheler suggests that the contents of phenomenological intuition, as an intentional act, found sensory contents. Whether this view is tenable, according to Scheler, depends on how we understand the term “foundation.” To understand the expression “to found” according to the order of temporality, an object of perception, posited as real, exists in relation to the human psychophysical organisation. Founding thus becomes confused with causality. Moreover, these natural components are already suspended in the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s theory of the relation of acts of intuition indicates that the reduction is not carefully carried through. (TTF, 222)

Phenomenologically, “to found” is to be understood, instead, according to the order of intentionality, namely, as an intentional foundation. That is to say, relations of founding are in accordance with the given order of phenomena and the “objective relations of dependence” among these phenomena. (TTF, 222) Scheler explains that intentional acts and their contents are “built upon one another according to their essence [ihrem Wesen nach aufeinander aufbauen].” (TTF, 222) He calls these relations of founding, at different times, “the order of foundation” or “the order of givenness.” According to this theory, certain categorial intuitions, as principles and forms of selection, must have taken place in order for other related content to be intuitively given, including related empirical intuitions or “sensuous intentions.” Using the example of the category of spatiality, Scheler writes that “Spatiality is given prior to, and independently of, figures in space, the place and position of anything whatever, and more than anything else, the qualities these things have.”10 Indeed, the category of spatiality must be given in intuition in order for the cognition of some empirical thing as spatial to be possible. In this way, every act of sense perception presupposes a host of categorial intuitions in order to make sense of it, or to be able to hold it in cognition. There must already be an intuition of categories such as sensibility, materiality or corporeality, subjectivity and objectivity, contingency and necessity, relationality and vitality, unity and plurality, similarity and equality, not to mention the prior intuitions of spatiality and temporality, motion, change and alternation, which are foundational to the entire sphere of sensory content. The sensory content is embedded in a pre-given intuitive whole.

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10 Max Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, 183. Hereafter referred to as PTC.
Manfred Frings calls this aspect of Scheler’s phenomenology “Subliminal Phenomenology.”

These relations of foundation also arise in the section on the a priori in Scheler’s Formalism. The problem of knowledge of the a priori is of more concern for Scheler than for Husserl because Scheler was engaged in a closer dialogue with Kant. Dealing with this problem seemed to help solidify Scheler’s position in phenomenology, as his concern was to show that phenomenologically intuitive content was independent from experience, namely, from inductive or empirical experience. Accordingly, Scheler insists that essences and their interconnections are “a priori ‘given’ ‘prior’ to all experience (of this kind)” (FE, 49), and that contents of observation—such as the observation of an empty mug—find their fulfilment in the intuitive content rather than the other way around, as Husserl suggests. “Indeed,” Scheler writes, “it is a criterion of the essentialness of a given content that it must already be intuited in the attempt to ‘observe’ it, in order to give the observation the desired or presupposed direction.” (FE, 50) Such is the case for all categorial intuition; for example, the intuition of motion is the necessary basis for all possible observations of motion. Scheler writes that “all mechanical principles lie in the phenomenon of the motion of mass-point...and...they are at the basis of all possible observable motion.” (FE, 50n.) Or, in other words, the cognition of all mechanical principles lies in the intuition of the phenomenon of the motion of mass-point, and this intuition and corresponding cognition are at the basis of all possible observation of motion.

Such categorial contents are intuitive non-formal (materiale) phenomena, which are presupposed in every sense perception. Rather than being given as “straightforward,” as Husserl suggests, it is the sense-data, as they are mediated by the foundational, immediate categorial intuitions, by which sense content can arise and can be selected for perception. Indeed, the first distinguishing criterion of phenomenological intuition (which, I am arguing, includes the intuition of categories) for Scheler is that it “yields facts ‘themselves,’ and, immediately,” and that this intuition is not in any way mediated. (FE, 50) It is thus the intuitive content that is given as “straightforward.”

On this point, Scheler is closer to Kant than he is to Husserl. Kant established the law of the formation of perceptual givenness “in part correctly, in part falsely,” according to Scheler (PTC, 183); for although Kant was correct that categories of experience are foundational to empirical intuition, (a point that Scheler argues Husserl did not see),

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11 Manfred Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001). Hereafter referred to as MMS.
These categories are by no means structurally inherent in human understanding; the structure is itself an object of intuitive inspection. But Scheler’s close proximity to Kant should not be neglected. Scheler agreed with Kant that what can be given in empirical intuition is only the data which shows themselves as “suited to fulfilling the forms, modes and laws of comprehension [which for Kant are] already inherent in human understanding.” (TTF, 223) That is to say, Scheler agreed that “the ‘structure’ of experience precedes all sensory contents.” (TTF, 223) As such, Scheler’s phenomenology holds, with Kant, that the range of possible sensory data is already limited and circumscribed by the contents of phenomenological intuition. He maintained that all categorial intuition, according to the order of givenness or foundation, is given as the principle by which we select whatever enters into the content of our perception. (PTC, 183) In other words, whatever enters the field of sense perception as meaningful is already given as suited to fulfill intentional acts. Therefore, acts of sensuous intuition have an intentional foundation.

Other than this first evidential point, which demonstrates the significance of intuitive categories and the order of givenness among them, there is a second point that refers to the intentional indifference of sense-function to cognition. By themselves, sense-functions are not aimed toward the purposes of cognition, but toward biological purposes, namely, the preservation of life. In fact, cognitive data are not furnished directly by the sense-functions, but by the act of intuition performed by means of these sense-functions. A large portion of “The Theory of Three Facts” is devoted to this “error of thinking,” which interprets sense-functions as having an inherent cognitive meaning. He calls this a “strange mystification,” the idea that sense organs should be something other than “an apparatus for the reception and analysis of environmental stimuli,” that is, an apparatus “for something as indifferent to life as ‘cognition.’” (TTF, 208) Of course, Husserl considers sense content to be not only operative, but foundational for philosophical intuition and cognition. Scheler suggests, instead, that knowledge of the world is given through pure intuition, even if this intuitive content is given access to the world through the constant dialogue between the organism and its senses and its environment. (TTF, 208)

Although an act of pure intuition is performed by means of sensory perception, and although we are certainly bound to the real existence of the senses, we are not cognitively bound to the intentional existence of them. (TTF, 216) There must be a foundation of intuitive intentionality that seeks to glean pure facts from the sensory content. In any act of intuition, we must always already have an intuitive intentionality to
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see an essence in the course of our sense perception; that is, one must be aimed toward it in order to see it, or one must wish to see it. A pure intuition does not automatically appear within sense content, for our sense-functions are first concerned with the preservation of life, and not cognition. In order for sensory content to be utilised for the sake of cognition, a more fundamental intentionality must be “behind” sensuous intentions in order to grasp the intelligible content. Therefore, in cognition, sensory perception merges with a foundational intuitive intentionality.

Can we apply the Schelerian theory of foundation to Husserlian categorial intuition and the example of whole and part? Scheler does not wish to neglect the importance of sense perception as one condition for pure intuition. However, as in the case of the simple perception of an empty mug, the mug is already perceived in terms of a pre-given structural order of whole and part, which is the foundation of any perception of whole/part relationality among real objects. According the order of givenness, we must already have intuited whole and part categorically for it to inform our understanding of every instance in which we perceive a relation of whole and part empirically—not only when I perceive the mug to be empty, but when, in perceiving the mug as empty, I understand it to be an instance of a whole/part relation. It is therefore not the sensible instance of the pure fact that is the occasion for the intuition. If the sensory content is foundational, and sense perception the “founding act,” as Husserl suggests, then we would be able to notice nothing but the disappointing fact that, because the mug is empty, there is nothing to drink in order to quench my thirst. The logical relation of wholes and parts would not even arise for us as a concern.

Questioning Philosophy as Science: The “Phenomenological Attitude”

In making the transition from the theme of categorial intuition to phenomenological method (from the Logical Investigations to Ideas I), we might notice that, despite the various ways in which Husserl’s thought develops, the basic thesis that phenomenological intuition is founded on sensuous intuition does not change. This thesis informs the method of phenomenological reduction as well as the claim of phenomenology to be a science, even if an eidetic one. For if the sensuous, contingent elements of the natural attitude serve as the foundation for the phenomenological attitude, it follows that after the senses supply the material for pure intuition, putting the sensuous contents out of play allows the phenomenologist to see the pure content or
essence more clearly. Taking the previous example of the empty coffee mug, we can see that this state of affairs is only important for categorial intuition as an occasion for the intuition of the logical whole/part relation. The real coffee mug can subsequently be suspended, which helps the phenomenologist see more clearly the “residuum,” or the logical whole/part category. The process works not only for instances of predicative judgement in categorial intuition, but also for pre-predicative experience in eidetic intuition (Wesenserschauung).

Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is a methodological procedure is tied to the fact that sense content is the foundation for phenomenological intuition. The method is that by which the natural and contingent (i.e., sensory) content is cleared away. Furthermore, phenomenology’s status as method is, in part, derived from Husserl’s claim that philosophy is to be scientific. Scheler agrees that philosophy must be “strict” or “rigorous” in Husserl’s sense, but he insists that philosophy and science are distinct and he “denies” that philosophy belongs among the sciences.\textsuperscript{12} Husserl is too hasty in his terminological identifications. Scheler thinks it is wrong for Husserl to identify so-called “scientific philosophy” “with the good name of Weltanschauungsphilosophie”\textsuperscript{13}, even if they agree that it is unsuitable to consider philosophy itself Weltanschauung. But more problematic for Scheler is Husserl’s attempt to name philosophy science, which he thinks misses a qualitative difference between the two. Husserl tends to grant to the sciences a much greater independence of Weltanschauungen than Scheler is willing to grant them. Rather, Scheler argues that the positive sciences correspond more with Weltanschauung philosophy than with phenomenological philosophy. Thus, far from science being “a title standing for absolute, timeless values” (PRS, 136), as Husserl describes it, Scheler suggests that the possibilities for scientific progress are confined within the overriding Weltanschauung and that the structures of science change in history when the Weltanschauung changes. (NP, 83)

Furthermore, Scheler contends that phenomenology ceases to be scientific when the “phenomenological attitude” is contrasted with method, and especially a method of phenomenological intuition founded upon empirical experience. This is true of Husserl’s phenom-


enological method even if, in the end, the philosophical knowledge it achieves is entirely different from positive knowledge. What Husserl calls “phenomenological attitude” not only includes, but is in part defined by, a method akin to the scientific. Phenomenological attitude, in Husserl’s sense, is both a condition for the possibility of phenomenology and the product of its method.

For Scheler, on the other hand, phenomenology is not a method which operates by abstracting from sense-data the data of pure essences. Scheler understands method to be “a directed procedure of thinking about facts,” but phenomenology is a matter of disclosing new facts themselves “before they have been fixed by logic.” (PTC, 157) So, if in phenomenological intuition the intuitive content founds the sensory content, then such a methodological bracketing of sensory content becomes less of a concern. The following passage from Frings’ *The Mind of Max Scheler* explains this well:

> Methods, observations, and definitions, *presuppose* that which is to be uncovered by them. This is why the *that* which is spatial, temporal, material or alive is neither observable nor definable as “something” that can be uncovered by a method. Phenomena are therefore “pure” facts and are not arrived at by method. The fact of spatiality would allow observations or methods only when a particular extended configuration of a thing, such as something triangular or a [living] organism, is in question. But the “fact” of the spatiality of something triangular, or the “fact” of the aliveness of something, is already intuited and, in this sense, *a priori*. (MMS, 183)

A more foundational concern, then, is the intentionality appropriate for intuition—an intuitive intentionality concerned with the way one initially approaches the world, and which is characterised by an attitude of openness and driven by the act of loving (the basis of all openness). It is this attitude of the person or spirit (this “Geisteshaltung”) which lies at the core of Scheler’s understanding of “phenomenological attitude.”

Husserl uses the phrase “phenomenological attitude” to emphasise as well how the results and standpoint of phenomenology are distinguished from both the natural and dogmatic attitudes\(^{14}\), and rightly so. Scheler, however, includes among these attitudes the scientific attitude (or “scientific worldview”) as a contrasting vision. It is not within the scope of this paper to explain in detail Scheler’s extensively devel-

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oped distinction between the phenomenological and scientific world views. What is important here is the fundamental intuitive intentionality, by which, as an attitude, we encounter and “see” (Anschauung), or have intuition through “the sources in which the contents of the world reveal themselves” (PTC 138), namely, that place where phenomenological experience and the world “touch one another.” (PTC, 138) In brief, I claim that Scheler describes an ontological condition for epistemology and specifically phenomenological knowledge, and not simply a methodological condition for knowledge, and that this ontological condition has an important connection with intuitive intentionality as a founding act. As we will see, the endeavour of philosophy, for Scheler, has its basis in a unique attitude in the being of the spirit or person, and as such, in the whole personal being, which is the condition for the possibility of phenomenological intuition. This meaning of “phenomenological attitude” differs qualitatively from Husserl’s meaning, which is essentially linked with a methodology identified as scientific.

The scientific world view pertains to what Scheler calls a “theory of cognition,” meaning that science is not only existentially relative to a specific sphere of objects, but that it approaches these objects with the kind of instrumental rationality that aims at mastering and controlling that which it seeks to know. Phenomenological philosophy, by contrast, is not relative to a specific sphere of being, but investigates all being, given as absolute, according to a specific attitude. For Husserl and Scheler alike, absolute being is only given in intuition that is specifically phenomenological, namely, when intuition is “immanent.” As Husserl writes, “Immanent being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanent being nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum.” (IP, 110; Husserl’s italics) Although Scheler relies less on the distinction between immanent and transcendent objects, he does speak of intuition as “immanent,” such as when there is “no separation between what is ‘meant’ and what is ‘given.’” (FE, 51) “Something given in this way is at the same time absolute being,” that is, “an object whose being...is given with ideal adequation.” (PTC, 161)

Despite the fact that Husserl and Scheler agree that phenomenological philosophy corresponds with the arrival of the absolute, only Husserl presupposes that the correlation between absolute objects and consciousness is an actual one, as opposed to being only ontologically possible. If the correlation between consciousness and the absolute is always already actual, then the only obstacle preventing consciousness from “gaining” the absolute world is a matter of discovering the correct philosophical method, namely, that which obtains “the
sought-for "phenomenological residuum."” (IP, 113) For, as Husserl states, "though we have [methodologically] 'excluded' the whole [natural] world...we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being." (IP, 113) Thus, method is the sine qua non for philosophical knowledge.

But Scheler opposes this view. For as soon as we acknowledge that the human ontological condition admits of only a possible correlation with absolute being, a correlation that the person might first have to actualise internally (ontologically), the question of methodology, at least as a point of departure, becomes meaningless. Method is no longer the sufficient condition for philosophical knowledge, even if it does have a place as a necessary condition. Consider the following passage from Scheler's essay "Idols of Self-knowledge":

A philosophy based on the procedure of phenomenological insight into essence ought to assert...that absolute being, in every sphere of the external and inner world alike, can be known with self-evident and adequate knowledge. Furthermore, it should assert that any actual separation and detachment of our spirit with absolute being rests not on something inalterable in the constitution of the knowing subject, but only on weakness and inclinations which we can, in principle, overcome.\(^\text{15}\)

From this passage, we can demarcate three points: (1) Any limited or inadequate knowledge is not fundamentally a question of illusion or error, but a question of an ontological “separation” and “detachment” of spirit from the absolute. (2) Inadequate or limited knowledge is not necessarily ontological in the sense that it “rests on something inalterable” in the human condition, such as human finitude. It is, rather, ontological in a moral sense, concerning “weakness” and disordered “inclinations.” Finally, Scheler specifies that (3) though these impediments or barriers to knowledge of absolute being can be overcome, they can only be overcome “in principle.”

Scheler's claim is clearly distinct from two contrary positions. On the one hand is Husserl's position: knowledge of absolute being is possible with the application of a correct method. In this view, the ontological preconditions are already actual, so it is only a question of deciphering the correct method. On the other hand, this differs from the claim that knowledge of absolute being is humanly impossible because human finitude and historicity are natural and inalterable impediments to knowledge. I take hermeneutic phenomenologists

\(^{15}\) Max Scheler, “The Idols of Self-Knowledge,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, 4.
(such as, for example, Paul Ricoeur) and many contemporary French postmodernists, among others, to hold a variant of this position.

Scheler's position is located between these extremes, for though the problem of adequation is not, for him, simply epistemological, as it is for Husserl, but ontological, it is by no means inalterable, as it was for Ricoeur. Alterability, however, concerns the matter of a particular philosophical attitude—a notion that has lost momentum since modernity, but which was, arguably, simply assumed in Greek philosophy. Indeed, Scheler writes:

There is a certain prejudice in epistemology which in recent time has become so general as scarcely to be felt as a prejudice anymore. It consists in the opinion that it is easier to define a "sphere of relevance" or a "problem" than to describe or descry the type of person who possesses genuine competence in that sphere and for that problem.... If one were to say that art is what the true artist produces, religion what the true saint feels, represents, and preaches, and that philosophy is likewise the true philosopher's relation to things and his manner of regarding them, I am afraid that many people would laugh one to scorn. Yet I am convinced that, heuristically at least...this method of determining a sphere of relevance by reference to the type of person is both more certain and less equivocal in its results than any other procedure. (NP, 70–71)

In judging whether a Plato, an Aristotle or a Descartes is a "true philosopher," the judgement is guided by the idea "of a certain universally human, pre-eminently basic spiritual attitude to things; an attitude of which we have...a mental image enabling us...to say whether an object conforms to or deviates from it." (NP, 71) In this regard, Scheler follows the Platonic view, which describes the ascendancy to Being in terms of eros. Scheler, likewise, defines this spiritual attitude, which underlies all philosophical thinking as "a love-determined act aimed toward the participation of the core of finite human persons in the essential reality of all possible things." Anyone who takes up this attitude to the world, insofar as he or she takes it up, "belongs to the essential type 'philosopher.'" (NP, 74)

Scheler also, at times, uses the notion of ontological participation (Seinsverhaltnis) in the primal essence (Urwesen) to describe the

ontological conditions of knowledge. This can be seen in various
elements: If the primal essence is, as it was for Orpheus, “a cosmic
drive or thrust, the right way to achieve the most direct and intimate
participation can only be to share in the thrusting...” if the primal
essence is, according to Fichte, an “eternal obligation,” participation is
to “share that obligation;” ...if it is a cosmic vitality, such as Bergson’s
elan vital, than participation can only be “a living, parallel with or
drawing upon that vitality, in empathy and sympathy toward all
things...” (NP, 75) According to Scheler, the primal essence is a supra-
individual, universal love in which we participate only by sharing in
the activity of love. And as for the importance of this participation for
the possibility of philosophy, Scheler writes: “[S]uch participation
must first have been completed, by the entry of the inmost human
personality...if philosophy wishes to attain its own particular kind of
[epistemic] participation, or even to initiate it with regard to the
primal Reality.” (NP, 78; emphasis in the original). Furthermore, the
cause of the illusion that “the methodically rigorous course of intellec-
tualistic philosophy” can lead to such a content of Reality is not
logical, but moral; that is, it results from “the moral vice of arrogance
of the learned philosophizing person.”

Scheler proposes remarkably difficult stakes and preconditions for
the philosopher. But these stakes, such as they are, may help to explain
the fact that, despite its long history, philosophy has been unable to
attain an unequivocally complete body of knowledge, and that the
methods of phenomenological philosophy, despite Husserl’s ambition,
have not changed this inescapable fact. In any case, there remains a
remarkable correlation between Scheler’s ontological understanding
of the phenomenological attitude and what I have here called a fou-
dational intuitive intentionality. Scheler is markedly uninterested with
the way the contents of sensation lend themselves to cognition (an
enterprise that he seems to think has been overdone in the history of
philosophy, and one that leads to specious results) because the basis
for a healthy adequation and range of cognition is better grounded in
spiritual preconditions than in the contents of sensation. When Schel-
er speaks of an intentional foundation to intuition altogether prior to
the contents of sensory perception, which in a sense lays the ground-
work for phenomenological methods, he means a unique kind of
intentionality that is a love-determined Actus, which creates an open-

17 “der methodisch streng intellektualistische Gang der Philosophie.” Scheler, “Vom
Wesen der Philosophie,” 70.
18 “das moralische Laster des Hochmutes der philosophierenden gelehrten Person.”
(Ibid; emphasis in the original)
ing to essential content. Scheler is certainly not suggesting that one can engage in philosophy without the senses or do phenomenology independent of the body. As he puts it:

There is no real and experimental elimination of the sensory character of our perception any more than there is an elimination of the circulation of the blood, the heartbeat, and digestion, when perception occurs. The phenomenologist can no more do phenomenology without these things than he can do without eyes and ears. But it is a totally different question whether the phenomenologist as a cognitive being...is necessarily bound to the intentional existence of eyes and ears, seeing and hearing [which are intentionally bound to their environment] as much as he is to their real existence. (TTF, 216)

Intentionally speaking, we can rise above the environment-focused life-direction of the senses and become cognitive beings. But this requires us to understand ontological conditions, which are arguably concerns even before an initial sense perception. One might consider this to be Scheler’s primary contribution to phenomenological philosophy, even if it is, in part, at odds with and largely critical of phenomenology’s “father.” It has been my purpose to show the ways in which Scheler critiques Husserl by providing more detail than Scheler himself. We might notice that Scheler’s phenomenology has an original character right from the start, even concerning the very foundation of and way of doing phenomenology.19

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19 The influence of Rudolf Eucken, Neo-Kantianism and, later, Henri Bergson, is not to be downplayed.