Nietzsche in order to arrive at similar conclusions to those of Menga. What Menga does that Derrida does not do as clearly is show the textual heritage, to borrow an expression from Derrida himself, which permits Heidegger to read Nietzsche in the way that he does. In the end, this book is excellent and will provide scholars and philosophers both with the background and reading necessary in order to situate and understand the relationship between Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida.

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The New Heidegger
MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI
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Novelty is rarely the standard by which philosophers profess the contribution of a philosophical text. For this reason, readers of Miguel de Beistegui’s The New Heidegger are likely to be concerned not only with the extent to which de Beistegui’s Heidegger is actually a new Heidegger, but also with the philosophical need that this new Heidegger is intended to serve. What calls out for a new Heidegger? For some, the old Heidegger is already one Heidegger too many. De Beistegui’s aim is to introduce an English-reading audience with no prior knowledge of Heidegger to the ebb and flow of Heidegger’s thought by offering a thematic approach that concentrates on several of his fundamental ideas rather than on specific texts or lectures. There is need for such an introduction, de Beistegui believes, largely because existing commentaries have focused on Heidegger’s canonical works, and have thus far failed to include adequately the newer volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe that have been published in English translation over the last decade or so. By addressing these more recently published volumes, and by including “the most significant developments in the literature on Heidegger,” de Beistegui hopes his introduction will provide those not well acquainted with the history of contemporary Continental philosophy “a sense of the extraordinary impact of Heidegger’s thought on twentieth-century philosophical and non-philosophical life” (5).

It is quite surprising, however, and a little disappointing, to discover that the new Heidegger that manifests itself in the first two chapters of de Beistegui’s book comes out looking a great deal like the old Heidegger. It is, once again, primarily the existential analysis of Being and Time that sets the tone and determines the trajectory of de Beistegui’s interpretation. For example, the problem of nothingness that Heidegger addresses in his 1929 lecture, “What is Metaphysics?” is, for de Beis-
tegui, first and foremost an echo of Heidegger's existential concern with anxiety. The experience of nothingness upon which de Beistegui reflects by way of revisiting a childhood nightmare is, for him, a phenomenon of interest primarily because, following the Heidegger of Being and Time, he likewise believes that anxiety (unlike fear) shakes and undermines our pre-theoretical absorption in the natural, fallen attitude. In so doing, anxiety first makes it possible for Dasein genuinely to engage its own Being as Being-in-the-world, and hence to raise the question of who we are and what it means to be human from a more secure foundation. Nothingness is thus elicited as a positivity by de Beistegui primarily because of his conviction that it is instrumental to the existential task of confronting the typically concealed possibility that human freedom is accountable not just to the objects and others within its environment, but to its own finite existence as such. While there is, of course, nothing wrong with this account of the relationship between anxiety and nothingness as it appears in Heidegger's work during the 1920s, it is a rather conventional approach to the problematic.

Even more decisive is de Beistegui's subordination of fundamental ontology as a whole to the existential analysis of Dasein. This is perhaps the most recurrent motif in English-language accounts of Heidegger, and is again a testament to the incredible impact of Heidegger's first major published work. De Beistegui writes: "as a method, phenomenology remains subordinated to the possibility of solving the mystery of the Being of the human being, and, as a result, of the meaning of Being in general" (24). Here, nothing less than the meaning of Being as such is viewed as a consequence of developing a sound understanding of the human Dasein. Certainly, this is Heidegger's own impression of the relationship between existential ontology and fundamental ontology in 1927, but the problem of how and why Dasein-analysis should inevitably give way to a thematic understanding of Being in general is precisely one of the questions that plagued Heidegger most after the publication of Being and Time. For this reason, I think it is legitimate to expect that a text aimed at introducing a new Heidegger would provide some sense of the way in which the newer volumes of the Gesamtausgabe challenge the core assumption of Heidegger's most famous work, rather than simply give way to it.

In fact, the spectre of the old Heidegger haunts de Beistegui's book throughout. Chapters 3-5 clearly rely on works that are not particularly new in the sense de Beistegui requires. Alongside Being and Time it is chiefly "What is Metaphysics?", "On the Essence of Truth," "The Question Concerning Technology," and "On the Origin of the Work of Art" that factor in these central sections. Chapter 6 provides a concise summary of de Beistegui's understanding of Heidegger's Nazi affair, but rather than
charting any radically new territory, he explicitly relies on well known contributions from Ott, Farias, Wolin, and Safranski, as well as on de Beistegui's own *Heidegger and the Political*. Surprisingly, there is little extended discussion of works such as Heidegger's very difficult *Contributions to Philosophy*—a book that, having been published in translation only in 1999, would seem to qualify as one of de Beistegui's "new texts," and which is certainly in need of a synthetic evaluation that places it within the context of Heidegger's overall thought. For these reasons, the principal merit of de Beistegui's book resides not in introducing a particularly new Heidegger but in providing a concise and engaging account of a Heidegger with whom many are already familiar. Of particular excellence in this regard is de Beistegui's account of the relationship between truth, technology, and art. Here, de Beistegui's thematic approach allows him to develop a seamless interpretation of the many connections between Heidegger's conception of truth as *aletheia*, technology as *das Gestell*, and art as a saving power. By refusing to approach these topics as subjects isolated within the confines of any particular work, de Beistegui is able to inscribe these issues into a picture of Heidegger's mature phenomenology as a whole. It is also in the chapters devoted to these three issues that de Beistegui's own novelty begins to shine through. His broad reading of *das Gestell* as "system" opens new avenues for Heidegger's account of technology, such as those concerning cybernetics and the philosophy of mind. His discussion of contemporary art likewise moves Heidegger's phenomenology in a compelling direction, and raises important questions about the relation between Heidegger's vision of art and our own specific cultural position.

It is also within the context of his ongoing discussion of truth, technology, and art that de Beistegui's book is most successful as an introduction. While I believe that his initial discussion of Heidegger takes too much for granted about *Being and Time* to provide an accurate handbook for those with no previous knowledge of that book, de Beistegui manages to analyze many central themes in Heidegger's later thought without resorting to the complex terminology found in Heidegger's own work. De Beistegui meets the high standard of providing a well rounded and insightful interpretation of Heidegger's meaning without resorting to the way in which Heidegger himself lectured and wrote. Overall, while de Beistegui's new Heidegger ends up looking much more familiar than one might hope, anyone with a background in Continental thought who is interested in the relationship between truth, technology, and art in Heidegger's philosophy would be wise to obtain a copy of de Beistegui's well written and engaging book.

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