

such strategies. The resulting difference was that thinkers like Dewey and Foucault historicized modernity in ways that enabled them to break away from modernity's narrative of itself more profoundly than could Benjamin, Adorno, and later Habermas. The merits of each of these moves remain debatable, of course. The point in the context of this review is that a greater sensitivity to the modernist inflections of his own historiography could have sharpened Jay's presentation of some of the decisive differences which continue to separate various traditions of twentieth-century thought, their important similarities notwithstanding.

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Against Cartesian Philosophy

PIERRE-DANIEL HUET

Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003, trans. Thomas M. Lennon; 248 pages.

Against Cartesian Philosophy is the first and long overdue English translation of Pierre-Daniel Huet's *Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae*. Its translator and editor, Thomas Lennon, is a seventeenth-century scholar perhaps best known for producing, with P. J. Olscamp, the authoritative English translation of Malebranche's *Search After Truth*. Here, in the first volume in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy's* new JHP Books series, Lennon brings his erudition to bear on a work that, though now largely forgotten, may well have been the nail in the Cartesian coffin.

Huet published the first edition of his *Censura* in 1689, apparently at the urging of the Duc de Montausier. The work censured not just Descartes, but Cartesians in general, in particular Malebranche, whose *Search After Truth* Huet had publicly denounced four months after it first appeared. What is today striking about the *Censura* is the extent to which Huet's interests in Descartes anticipate those that have particularly occupied scholars over the last half century. That is, unlike his contemporaries who were more preoccupied with the *Principles*, and with Cartesian physics and metaphysics, Huet concentrates his attention on the *Meditations* and on Descartes's methodology, in particular his method of doubt, the *cogito*, clear and distinct ideas, and so on. Thus, while the *Censura* in principle censures all of the Cartesian philosophy, with each of its chapters corresponding to some central tenet of Cartesianism, fully half the work is concerned with issues central to Descartes's first two meditations. As the text makes clear, however, Huet did not regard it as necessary to refute every point of Cartesianism since

he felt that in refuting Cartesian skepticism the mechanism of the *cogito* and the Cartesian notion of evidence, he had destroyed the foundation on which Descartes's system was constructed, and with it the entire system.

However, the work is not merely a critique of the *Meditations* but also, and just as importantly, a salvo in the *querelle* between the ancients and the moderns. For Huet, a cleric and lifelong bibliophile, whose Paris residence apparently collapsed under the weight of his books (16), the Cartesians' rejection of the study of ancient philosophy, history, languages, and geography amounted to an unforgivable "pride, arrogance, and vanity" (24). This is most evident in the *Censura's* final chapter, "A General Evaluation of the Cartesian Philosophy," in which Huet argues that the only good ideas in the *Meditations* were already devised by such figures as Aristotle, Augustine, and the Academic skeptics. While Descartes himself admits as much in the Prefatory Letter that precedes the *Meditations*, Huet's charge that "Descartes advanced nothing new" (218) is almost certainly directed against Malebranche at least as much as it is against Descartes. Huet underscores this charge with acid sarcasm in Chapter Two ("An Examination of Descartes's View of the Criterion"), where he mocks the Cartesian injunction to attend closely to the object of study: "Forsooth, the philosophical until now have been ignorant of this secret, that for a thing to be perceived by the mind, the mind must attend to it! Forsooth, the truth has eluded us until now because, when we sought it, we dallied with an unfocused and unfastidious mind! It took the appearance of Descartes to remind us to focus the mind and pay attention" (132).

While Huet's text is both historically and philosophically interesting in its own right, there is much more to recommend this volume. Lennon precedes the work with a preface and introduction that are as readable as they are useful to readers new to Huet. The preface argues for the relative importance of the *Censura* in the history of Cartesianism (and responses to it) and offers an explanation for why the work is no longer read. (Essentially, Lennon argues that the *Censura* delivered such a death-blow to Cartesianism that it rendered itself obsolete.) The introduction features a warm and witty biography of Huet, as well as a discussion of the context and reception of the work that few are better qualified than Lennon to give.

The text itself is carefully annotated, and Huet's fifth edition (1694) additions and deletions are clearly demarcated from the text of the original edition. This in particular sheds a good deal of light on Huet's relationship with one other figure who was important in the late seventeenth-century French reception of Descartes: Pierre-Sylvain Régis. Régis, whom Huet dubbed the "Prince of the Cartesians" (27), published

a scathing attack on the *Censura* when it first appeared. In response, Huet published an edition of the *Censura* with considerable additions (mostly in the first half) replying to Régis. Lennon's introduction gives a careful discussion of the exchange between Huet and Régis, and of the details of Huet's written responses to Régis. Lennon's thoughtful annotations of Huet's 1694 additions help the reader to discern further the shape of the controversy between Régis and Huet. This sheds interesting light not only on the French reception of Descartes but much more broadly on the tone and substance of the *querelle*.

In his preface, Lennon writes that "both of the two kinds of historians of philosophy, the textualists and the contextualists, those interested primarily in philosophy and those interested primarily in history, should find Huet's *Censura* of great value" (11). This is true not only of Huet's text but of Lennon's contributions to it, which teach us that the very best historians of philosophy, such as Lennon himself, are both kinds of historians in equal measure.

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Géophilosophie de Deleuze et Guattari

MANOLA ANTONIOLI

Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004; 268 pages.

Dans son récent ouvrage intitulé *Géophilosophie de Deleuze et Guattari*, Manola Antonioli se donne pour tâche d'identifier les apports de la réflexion du psychanalyste Félix Guattari dans la pensée de Gilles Deleuze qui est encore trop souvent aujourd'hui étudiée de manière autonome. Pour Manola Antonioli, il apparaît clair que la multiplicité interne de cette œuvre commune constitue la force d'une écriture et d'une pensée qui y puisent une formidable capacité d'ouverture sur les multiples territoires qu'elles se proposent d'explorer. Les ouvrages qu'ils ont signés en commun constituent des «agencements machiniques» auxquels chacun des deux auteurs apporte des rouages mis au point dans une activité de recherche et d'écriture précédentes. Deleuze a ainsi évoqué cette expérience de collaboration: «Une philosophie, nous avons essayé d'en faire Félix Guattari et moi, dans *L'Anti-Œdipe* et dans *Mille plateaux* qui est un gros livre et propose beaucoup de concepts. Nous n'avons pas collaboré, nous avons fait un livre puis un autre, non pas au sens d'une unité, mais d'un article indéfini. Nous avons chacun un passé et un travail précédent : lui en psychiatrie, en politique, en philosophie, déjà riche en concepts, et moi, avec *Différence et répétition* et *Logique*