In one handsome volume, Paul Patton and John Protevi have compiled eleven exceptionally strong (although not "unproblematic") essays in an attempt to establish a "transverse communication" between the works of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida—two of the most radical thinkers of difference since Plato's audacious formulation of the seventh hypothesis of his Parmenides (164b-165e). Despite Patton's and Protevi's mistaken claim to being the first to explore relations between these two members of the French "strong generation"—that honor belongs to François Laruelle's impressive body of work of the 1970s (François Laruelle, 1976; 1977a; 1977b; 1978), which to this day remains unknown to English-speaking readers—the value of their collection is not diminished. It may be hoped that their collection will provide others in our Anglophone context with the inspiration and the lines of research necessary to pursue the side-by-side reading of Derrida and Deleuze.

Paul Patton's opening essay, "Future Politics," finds Deleuze and Derrida converging on what Foucault once called the "undefined work of freedom." The essay attributes to both thinkers a similar passion for philosophy, understood in its ethico-political orientation and openness to the possibility of change. This orientation and openness is sustained by the invention of concepts which, rather than describe or represent actual states of affairs, call forth (in Deleuze's expression) "a new earth and people that do not yet exist." Patton argues, in the sequence, that such concepts are put to work by Deleuze and Derrida only after the distinction is made between a conditioned (contingent) and an unconditioned (absolute) form for each of them; and only after the demonstration that, existing necessarily in an irreconcilable and indissociable proximity to one another, the unconditioned "guarantees" the conditioned, and renders possible the "madness" of the decision that we necessarily bring to the space shared by the absolute and the contingent. One readily recognizes in all of this the structure of the Derridean aporia. As Patton puts it: "[I]n all cases, [the aporia] provides the ... assurance for an open future" (21). Without the impossibility of pure forgiveness, of a gift remaining forever outside the circuit of exchange, of a democracy that will always be "to come"—without the experience of the chiastic contamination of the conditioned by the unconditioned and vice versa—the decision to forgive, to give and to receive gifts, to think melioristically about our ac-
tual democratic experiments would be completely impossible.

All this is well known about Derrida's "affirmative" deconstruction—no matter what misgivings one may have about Patton's insistence on the qualifier "affirmative." What is new in Patton's essay (indeed, problematic) is his claim that the aporematism of the relation between the absolute and the contingent is also indispensable (indeed, present) in Deleuze's ethico-political project. The examples Patton offers to support his claim are the distinction between, and the indissociability of, relative and absolute deterritorialization; the many trajectories of Deleuzian becomings as seen from the vantage point of the becoming imperceptible; the molar and molecular lines of de-subjectivation and de-personalization, placed in the context of the third line (of death); and the discussions of actual states of affairs in light of the pure, virtual event. Patton claims that in these examples the unconditioned (absolute deterritorialization, becoming imperceptible, line of death, pure event) is the condition for the possibility of the corresponding contingent actualizations. After conceding that Deleuze and Guattari did not dwell upon the aporematism of their major concepts, Patton draws this conclusion from Deleuze's alleged "aporias": "the absolute is both the condition of change and the condition of its impossibility" (23).

If Patton's claims about Deleuze's aporematism were to be accepted, Deleuzism would be nothing but a Platonism of the event. Also Deleuze's claims to univocity and immanence would be non-starters, and Alain Badiou's accusation that Deleuze's work is crypto-Platonic (Alain Badiou, 1994) would be vindicated. But I doubt that Patton is justified in making these claims. The virtual, in Deleuze, is not the condition of the possibility of the actual (it is not the formal cause of *Phaedo*); it is the condition (the quasi-cause, Deleuze says, thinking of the Stoics and Spinoza) of its being the actual that it is. The virtual exists nowhere but in the actual (without being, for that, an Aristotelian form). Its reality would not be what it is without the actual relentlessly "impacting" with it. The differentiation of the virtual and its differentiation in the actual are not independent of one another, nor do they occur at separate times, because the "time" of the virtual is no time, in the usual sense—rather, it is the a-chronological Aion. Finally, in Deleuze there is no trace of a Derridean contamination between the pure and the impure; there is no resemblance between the realms of the actual and the virtual. Problems and solutions do not require the horizon of messianicity in order to be related, nor do they need the drama of the Derridean "à venir."

In the last analysis, Patton thinks that the convergence of Deleuze and Derrida is best illustrated by their reference to "the beyond" and to "the impossible object of experience." "The beyond," he writes, "is an impossible object of experience to the same degree and in the same
sense that the truly other or the pure event are impossible” (25). I hear Derrida in this line, but not Deleuze. The Deleuzean difference between the *cogitatum* and the *cogitandum*, the *sensum* and the *sentiendum*, the *dictum* and the *loquendum* does not lie in the space between an imme­morial past and a messianic future. It lies in the difference between the quotidian exercise of our senses, understanding, imagination, and speech, and their transcendental exercise. The gerunds designate that which cannot be sensed (imagined, understood, spoken) and yet that which ought to be, *and is*, sensed, (imagined, understood, spoken). The terrible moment of the Nietzschean eternal return is intended here—the moment that metamorphoses everything in its Eigenblick—not a messi- anic *à venir*.

Tamsin Lorraine’s “Living a Time Out of Joint” tackles the connection between Deleuze’s and Derrida’s shifts to a non-representational image of time and the search for a different kind of subjectivity, one capable of doing “justice to the other, to the tension between words and things, and to life...” (45). She argues that Deleuze’s “third synthesis of time” (the empty form of time inspired by Nietzsche’s eternal return), as well as Derrida’s *à venir* (the impossible time of the gift and of the mad mo- ment of justice) point toward an unrepresentable time beyond time. To Deleuze’s three syntheses of time (habit, memory, and the eternal return), there correspond three subjects: a subject pursuing the path of habitual sensori-motor responses; a subject capable of learning by re- flecting upon the past; and a subject that “measures himself (or herself) against an order that is not yet created.” From Derrida’s *à venir*, Lorraine claims, one may deduce that fidelity to the here and now requires relinquishing the effort to “calibrate the parts of our lived experience into a unified chronology”(44), and calls for “the pursuit of the differentiating force of sense in the context of a present marked by the traces of another time” (43). I found this essay particularly helpful when (with the help of Deleuze’s and Derrida’s portraits of Alice and Hamlet), Lorraine reaches an enviable concreteness while revealing the trajectory that sub­jectivity must follow as it moves through chronological and non-repre­sentational time (time out of joint), experiences the tension of a language between words and things, and discovers in language and the arts ways and means to access the virtual totality of time.

Daniel Smith’s essay, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Tran­scendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought” takes its lead from Giorgio Agamben’s recent distinction between Derrida’s transcendence and Deleuze’s immanence (Giorgio Agamben, 1999). Smith’s position is that Deleuze and Derrida answer Heidegger’s question “what about Be­ing?” in two specific ways: Deleuze insists that “there is nothing ‘beyond’ or ‘higher than’ or ‘superior to’ Being,” pursuing thereby an immanent
ontology. Derrida, on the other hand, in assigning to differance a status beyond being and beings that transcends ontology, "operates on the basis of a formal structure of transcendence" (48).

With the above characterization of their respective work, Smith is the only one in this collection of essays to argue unambiguously that Deleuze and Derrida have followed "two different trajectories that become increasingly remote from each other, to the point of perhaps being incompatible" (50). The evidence that Smith brings to bear upon this conclusion is the following: (1) Derrida finds the project of "overcoming metaphysics" impossible but, as with all his other famous aporias, impossibility is the condition for the possibility of deconstruction. Deleuze, on the other hand, positions his work squarely inside metaphysics, arguing that there are virtualities in past metaphysical systems that can always be actualized in new and different contexts, thereby rendering possible the transformation of ontology from within. Smith is aware that canvassing Derrida for the cause of negative theology is a wrong choice—Derrida has steadfastly refused to assign any content to transcendence. Nevertheless, faced with the provocation of Duns Scotus and the prickly question of divine names, Derrida opts for equivocity, whereas, faced with the same provocation, Deleuze "explicitly aligns himself with the tradition of univocity" (55). (2) Moreover, argues Smith, Deleuze devotes an entire chapter in Difference and Repetition to developing a theory of immanent ideas, which, by being immanent, do not resemble the Kantian regulative ideas of reason. Derrida, on the other hand, in explaining the aporematie structure of the concepts "gift," "hospitality," or "democracy," points to their having a status that is "analogous" to that of the Kantian regulative ideas—although, truth to tell, Derrida denies that his notions are full-fledged Kantian regulative ideas. (I leave open the question of the plausibility of his reason for the difference between himself and Kant on this subject. His concepts—but not Kant's—maintain their aporematie structure, he argues, precisely because they are not burdened with the horizon of promise). (3) Derrida's work revolves around "a desire for the absolute other ... a desire, therefore, that is infinitely suspended, whose fulfillment is infinitely deferred" (60). In Deleuze's texts, on the other hand, desire is fully positive and never associated with lack and deferral. (4) More importantly, according to Smith, Deleuze's and Derrida's diverging projects are bound to be felt in their respective ethico-political orientations: from Deleuze's point of view, transcendence "represents [one's] slavery and impotence" (63); the route to emancipation for his Spinoza- and Nietzsche-inspired philosophy is to understand and reverse the conditions that make us desire transcendence.

I consider Smith's conclusions on the (non-) relation between Deleuze and Derrida to be convincing. The only argument in this collection of es-
says that has a serious chance to dispute Smith's is Leonard Lawlor's. Lawlor prefers to read both Deleuze and Derrida as philosophers of immanence—"contaminated immanence" in Derrida's case, "impure transcendence" for Deleuze. I suggest that Smith's refusal to accept Deleuze's alleged "impure transcendence" is valid for reasons that I will offer as I discuss Lawlor's paper. He is also within reason to ask Lawlor what, if not transcendence, would possibly be in a position to contaminate Derrida's immanence. In his essay Smith attributes the "structure" or the "form" of transcendence to Derrida. As Lawlor well knows, the effects of structure are never negligible or inconsequential.

This brings me to what is perhaps the most thought-provoking essay in the collection: Lawlor's "The Beginnings of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida and Deleuze." Lawlor maintains that the experience of death is fundamental for both Derrida and Deleuze. This may not come as a surprise to Derrida's readers, but it does surprise those of us who remember Deleuze's distinction between the unlamented deaths of the ego and the self, and the joyous affirmation of life living on in the singularity of the elements and in the modal degree of power of the one substance (Bruce Baugh, 2000). Lawlor correctly observes that, for both Derrida and Deleuze, death is seen as double. Deleuze, in fact, distinguishes between personal death—one that always comes from the outside and with respect to which the Stoic demystificatory gesture is sufficient to put fear to rest: Take heart! For, as long as you are alive, death is not yet; when you die, you are no more (to fear it). Deleuze speaks also of the death of the "they": on meurt, they die. Here, the infinitive of the verb "mourir," to die, is best suited to express the no more of a past never having been present and the not yet of a future never to become present: the Deleuzean non-lieu. In the non-lieu of the on meurt, the noise of the personal death lessens, and thinking begins in silence. The response to the question raised by death, therefore, in Deleuze's case, is in "the voice of everyone and no one."

Derrida also sees death as double. The iterability of any statement that I care to make prefigures a time without me; yet any statement made by me attempts to fill a present that has survived the death of countless others. If, as Lawlor argues, the experience of the voice in Derrida "occurs when I have wronged another" (80), and the realization of this fact makes me another to myself—another beyond the grave who has to decide what to do, though it is impossible to do so—it follows that the site of the decision must be the mi-lieu where, upon returning from the dead, I become the one who decides and lives on in accordance with the decision. As a result of these analyses, Lawlor feels entitled to conclude that the fundamental experience of death in Derrida is joined to solicitation through the voice of the other; whereas the experience of
death in Deleuze is in being solicited by the voice of the they (on).

There is still more to Lawlor's fine essay. It begins with his decision to focus on the concept of the "informal" in his effort to understand the differences between Derrida and Deleuze. In their determination to overturn Platonism, both Derrida and Deleuze mobilize the simulacrum—an idea or an image, with no prototype to follow. Because Platonism, for Deleuze, is the attempt to exnominate the simulacrum (the image without resemblance) and to admit inside the philosopher's city only those particular instantiations of the universal that earn their legitimacy through participation in the universal, the rising of the simulacra to the surface (Deleuze's vision of the emancipation of difference) amounts to raising to the surface that which is singular and informal. (If the simulacrum were a particular, it would have been a case of something general akin to the Platonic copy; and if it had a form, it would be plural, only after the specification of relations of resemblance or analogy in order to account for the repetition of the same). On the other hand, for Derrida, Platonism entails the exnomination of contamination grounding a vision of pure heterogeneity (only Justice is just). As a result, in order for the law of contamination to work, the simulacrum that would subvert Platonism must have "resemblance on the inside," as well as formality; without the repetition of the form, the iterability responsible for the work of contamination could not exist. Resemblance and formality would be consumed by the logic of identity, if not for the fact that the Derridean simulacrum is characterized by non-presence, that is, it is necessarily thought of as singular and informal. The only way to escape the contradiction looming here is to displace the simulacrum by inserting it in a field (a mi-lieu) where being and beyond being contaminate one another. Contamination in the mi-lieu, therefore, in Lawlor's reading, is Derrida's way of combining difference with mediation, whereas, in the Deleuzean non-lieu, differentiation proceeds without mediation. Deleuze's non-lieu is the site of duality (dissimilarity), whereas the Derridean mi-lieu is the locus of unity (resemblance).

Before concluding his essay, Lawlor tests his conclusions concerning the diffraction of Derrida and Deleuze by transposing his argument to the domain of language. In a fine discussion of Derrida's and Deleuze's "appropriations" of Husserl's sense and expression, Lawlor observes that, for Deleuze, non-sense (which, rather than being absence of sense, turns out to be the grantor of sense) is immediately sense, and yet separated from it. On the other hand, for Derrida, non-sense is mediating sense, and yet it is united with it. For Deleuze, non-sense is presence and positivity, but so is sense. Their immediate relation is not based on resemblance but rather, in a division between the two, being guaranteed by the informal. For Derrida, on the other hand, non-sense is defined by the
lack of intuitive presence, and sense is constituted through a formal reiteration that in turn implies non-presence. The affirmation and positivity prevalent in Deleuze, as much as the negativity attributed to Derrida, are amply documented here.

This fine essay leaves me with two questions. First, is death in fact as central to Deleuze's thought as Lawlor claims it to be? Second, is it fair to contrast Derrida's solicitation by the other to Deleuze's solicitation by the "or" (the they), without a more sustained meditation on this "or"? There is no question that Deleuze has written some beautiful pages on la fêlure—the crack as a possible harbinger of death—and the lines of flight that may turn out into lines of death (Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 1987; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 1987). But the beauty of these pages, for me, lies in their hope (their child's innocence, if you will) that death is capable of vanquishing itself (just like nihilism is capable of vanquishing itself), that the war machine may be prevented from turning into a machine of self-destruction, and that an impersonal and non-subjective life lies in the trajectory of becoming-imperceptible. It is true that the philosopher who exposes herself to the world and to its powers may encounter death—as a limit that she will try to overcome and to annihilate. But the same philosopher may also encounter madness, superstition, and stupidity; she will be no less threatened by them and in need to strive and have them overcome. Madness, superstition, and stupidity will be no less problem-setting or thought-provoking than death.

As for the Deleuzean "on," its complete determination requires a longer meditation on Deleuze's discussion of Tournier's Friday (Gilles Deleuze, 1990) than Lawlor can afford in a brief essay. What Deleuze set out to show in it is that the constitution of alterity, no less than the constitution of subjectivity, individuality, and personhood, must be accounted for. Unless the transcendental is going to be the mere duplication of the empirical, the other (including Derrida's other) must be bracketed. The other as the structure of a possible world must be foreclosed. Its foreclosure reveals the mutual and simultaneous constitution of self and other. It is natural therefore to see, as Deleuze does, in the foreclosure of the other the corresponding foreclosure of the self: altruicide and suicide are mutually implied in it (Boundas, 1993). The result is the de-personalization and de-subjectivation of the individual. Self and other are dissolved in the realm of the otherwise other (autrement qu'autre)—a strange realm of singularities, somber attractors, necessity, along with all kinds of productive and anti-productive flows. The "or" of this otherwise other has nothing to do with the "they" of the Heideggerian analytic of Dasein (and of course Lawlor does not suggest that it does). But then again the "or" does not solicit anybody or anything. It discloses a world for man constituted in the way the Epicurean clinamen brings about the
chaosmos. The rest is the cooling down of intensities inside extended possible worlds.

Eric Alliez's "Ontology and Logography: The Pharmacy, Plato, and the Simulacrum" is the translation of a 1992 French essay that first appeared in Barbara Cassin's *Nos Grecs et leurs Modernes*. In it, Alliez introduces Deleuze and Derrida as the heirs of the Nietzschean "doubling" of deep caves behind caves, and of abysses behind all grounds. The similarities between the two involve an attempt to overturn (or deconstruct) Platonism through a showing of the latent behind the manifest content of the Platonic text that displaces the opposition between Idea and copy and repositions it on the difference between two sorts of images and two sorts of writing. Derrida (for whom *to be is to write and to be written*) sees Platonism as a "textual system" that arrests the difference between signifier and signified. As a consequence of this reading, Derrida's deconstruction of Platonism will proceed on the basis of his notion of textuality, "where everything becomes discourse ... in the absence of a transcendental signifier able to calm the play 'in the last instance'" (88). Deleuze, on the other hand, sees Platonism as an iconological exorcism based on an ethical vision of a world bent on the exclusion of the simulacra—of the false pretenders, having the image of the archetype without resemblance, yet claiming the right to inherit the proper name of Idea. The iconological exorcism will be undertaken through the recourse to myth and poetry, insofar as poetry supplies "the element that produces and nourishes the false pretender." It is in fact the mythmaker and the poet who—while providing the critical test to distinguish between the sophist's false claim and the well-grounded one of the philosopher—disclose the "unity of the system of this difference," "the inseparability of sophistry and philosophy" and turn them into Plato's unavowed attempt to bring the simulacrum to the surface—despite the intentions of Platonism to bury it (88).

Arkady Plotnitzky's "Algebras, Geometries, and Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathematical Thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarmé)" designates Leibniz as the point of diffraction for Derrida and Deleuze, and underscores the importance of what he calls the "quasi-mathematical stratum" in their work. By "quasi-mathematical" Plotnitzky means "something that philosophically intersects with mathematics but is not mathematical in its disciplinary sense" (98). He considers the quasi-mathematical stratum in Derrida to be algebraic in its orientation (especially in his algebra of undecidables that—both in its Kurt Gödel mathematical manifestation and in its Mallarmé literary manifestation—is able to trace its lineage to Leibniz). Whereas, according to Plotnitzky, Deleuze's work is subtended by a geometric and topological quasi-mathematical stratum, which, through Gauss, Riemann, and Poin-
caré can also be traced to Leibniz and Mallarmé. This essay contains insightful observations regarding Deleuze’s centrality of the manifold that comes from Riemann. It is also about the importance of the fold, for both Derrida (the algebra of the fold) and Deleuze (the typology of the fold). In general, Plotnitzky finds Deleuze’s thought to be more spatial (a possible surprise for those of us aware of the centrality that the Bergsonian duration occupies in Deleuze’s writings) and Derrida’s neither spatial nor temporal (exactly as one would have expected it to be, given the algebraic bend in Derrida’s work). He concludes his essay by stating that the connection between Deleuze’s and Derrida’s “epistemology” is not one of exclusive disjunction. “We certainly need,” he says, “Deleuze’s topological-geometrical and in this sense more intuitive and imaginative philosophy, as much as we need Derrida’s more rigorous algebra, which is ... structurally, irreducibly suspicious of all spatio-temporal or other intuitions” (117). If I characterize as “minor” Deleuze’s philosophy and “major” Derrida’s deconstruction, Plotnitzky’s claim about the co-imbrications of the two philosophies will be reminiscent of Deleuze’s claim that the minor, nomadic sciences have to invoke the formalization of the majoritarian and sedentary; although fertile problems and questions will always be generated and launched by what is nomadic and minor.

Greg Lambert’s “The Philosopher and the Writer: A Question of Style” problematizes our inability to imagine a philosopher who does not write. Together with the mutual contamination of philosophical and literary discourses, he holds the contemporary dispersion of the public functions of discourse responsible for this inability. Truth to tell, Lambert is not meditating on this failure in order to flatter the philosopher-writer. Aside from signaling the proximity of the problematics of writing, silence, and death, he poignantly declares: “the one who writes is not to be admired. He only suffers from a delirium, i.e. from a lack of style” (133). Lambert argues that, in the eyes of Deleuze and Derrida, a confrontation framing the question of writing and the question of style (same thing!) is responsible for the reawakening of modern philosophy. Style, Lambert maintains, expresses in Deleuze’s work “the unity of the multiplicity of fragments, tissues and parts” (125). The fact that style is recognized only by another reader or writer (or myself as already being in the position of another to myself) shows the essence of style as “the expropriation of a singular ... idiom ... handed over to the powers of repetition or imitation, revealing ... a discourse ... strangely divided from itself at the very origin” (127). Derrida, no less, raises the question of writing as one of an essential disequilibrium, of a brutal silence that is “the rupture of language with itself” (130). Deleuze’s invitation to the minor writer to “make language stutter!” follows similar lines.

According to Lambert, however, there is a significant difference be-
tween Derrida and Deleuze. Deconstruction, he writes, "is not an act of creation; it is the relentless tracing of a disequilibrium and the demonstration that a silent language insists in signification, signaling its being opened to what exceeds it" (133). For Deleuze, on the other hand, the disequilibrium is the condition and the actuality of an act of creation. For him, difference is "supremely" created difference and not the effect of a flaw or a crash. Having come thus far with Lambert, I am not certain that I want to follow him in his designation of Deleuze as the philosopher of the "boom" and of Derrida as the philosopher of the "crash," negativity and Gelassenheit.

Branka Arsic's "Active Habits or Passive Events or Bartleby" attempts to pinpoint, in Deleuze's and Derrida's readings of Bartleby, the point of diffraction in what otherwise would be their common project—the search for passivity beyond the usual binarism of activity and passivity. For Arsic, the fundamental effort of Deleuze's philosophy is to think the transcendental field as being without depth and without (self-) consciousness. But the problem this endeavor encounters—without begging the question in a mere duplication of the empirical by the transcendental—is finding a means of accounting for the syntheses of the elements and the singularities of the transcendental "ground" that transforms an aggregate into a field. Deleuze's solution to this problem, Arsic argues, comes in the form of the function he assigns to passive synthesis, that is, to a contraction independent of any consciousness or will that would link the elements of the ground through an impersonal contemplation. The repetition of contractions creates habits—the bundles of contractions that we are—or the "larval subjects" of our "constituent passivity." In turn, this solution generates another question: How can we prevent a conservative reading of an impersonal life that is prone to the repetition of the same? Arsic, in her attempt to answer this new question, simultaneously plays two Deleuzean cards. One is the familiar claim that repetitive performances, or reiterations, live and feed on difference: the bundle of contractions with different intensities constitutive of larval subjects permits habit to draw difference from repetition. The second card plays on the paradoxes of temporality. What repetition repeats is the "now" of contraction that is always impersonal and hidden. As such, "the 'now' of contemplation is oblivion" (142). What is repeated is a past that has never been present, the immemorial past of which Blanchot had already spoken. Given this, a series of paradoxes is inevitable. To the extent that what is repeated already took place in an immemorial past, the repetition of what happened can only be gleaned as a repetition of what will happen, that is, of the unpredictable, the unknown, and the different. Is this not, after all, the way that the Humean "necessary connection" becomes ultimately indistinguishable from chance? Arsic, at any rate, feels justified
to conclude: "The repetition of the habit that is difference repeats itself as the repetition of chance. Habit is chance" (143). The manifold of impersonal habits repeated by chance is the transcendental field in all its impassive neutrality. As for Deleuze's quest for passivity, it goes even further. Habits grow tired, and fatigue is a fundamental component of habit. Contraction and contemplation fall apart in dying; but dying is the release of a pure impersonal and yet singular life—a bare life that lives on in the Outside, the plane of immanence beyond all exteriority and interiority.

In the case of Derrida, the search for passivity is also the search for something beyond the disjunction activity/passivity. Derrida's search leads him not to the plane of immanence but rather to differance. This is, in Arsic's reading, the difference between Derrida and Deleuze: the plane of immanence allows Deleuze to maintain univocity; the fact that Derrida puts differance beyond being and beings propels him toward equivocity (which should not be confused with negative theology). Deleuze was able to conclude that difference is the same, in the sense that it is always said about anything that is spoken, although in different ways. Derrida too will conclude that difference is the same, but he will explain that it is always said as unsayable. The Derridean difference is not, because it is neither present nor representable, and yet it is, because it subverts and deconstructs. Beyond being and beings, differance is the secret event—secret, because it cannot take place here or there, but only somewhere where witnessing subsists with no witnesses and no things to witness. To this secret event, only a metalanguage that evokes the future—without predicting it—a metalanguage that takes on the responsibility of responding without responding, a non-active language of passion and the wound, may respond (without responding). The secret event and the non-responsive language on the track of what eternally passes by as what never happened (and as what will never disappear) is the hyperbolic passivity, and Derrida's non-responsive response to Deleuze's plane of immanence.

Jeffrey Nealon's essay "Beyond Hermeneutics: Deleuze, Derrida, and Contemporary Theory" discusses how Deleuze and Derrida are received in today's English-speaking world. Now that the era of deconstruction is supposedly past, and theory has, for the time being at least, become synonymous with cultural studies, Deleuze's (and Guattari's) writings, which shift the discussion from signification to resistance, are heralded for having provided us with a more potent critical paradigm. The time for churning out more and more sophisticated readings of cultural phenomena is over, and the political responsibility to resist capitalism in all its forms is being reinvigorated, with the help of Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The warmer the reception of the two
schizoanalysts becomes, the fewer accolades Derrida receives given his prevalent reputation in the English-speaking world as being the one who stands for the non-presence of full meaning. Nealon challenges the legitimacy of this reception. He disagrees with the reading that makes Derrida's deconstruction a demonstration of lack, negativity, and neutralization—a reading that, according to Nealon, begins with the Yale school of literary criticism and runs all the way down to Judith Butler's queer theory. He correctly argues that meaning and signification, for Derrida, are already inscribed within a force field, and that the force that deconstruction reveals is "the positive or affirmative force of context breaking, the necessity of responding to the emergence of the event" (163). Nealon then argues that mobilizing Deleuze and Guattari for the sake of the politics of resistance is also wrong-headed. Capitalism, according to them, and its latest chapter of globalization, works axiomatically and as a result "judgment, condemnation, authenticity and moralism," along with the decision to resist, are neither possible nor pertinent responses. Nealon's most interesting point is his critique of resistance and the fixation cultural studies has on it. He is convinced that the writings on force, power, and resistance by Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari (and of course Foucault) hardly recommend themselves as the fashionable champions of resistance, "insofar as resistance can often name a stopping point rather than a rallying cry" (166). The essay concludes with Nealon's sibylline reminder that to turn one's back on resistance, as an exemplary political gesture of refusal, does not mean that one must forego one's response to the status quo: "we certainly do have to respond—outside the economies of representation, assured failure, moralizing judgment, and signification" (167). I would have liked for Nealon to spend more time on the response he envisages as the one that could possibly escape all the noxious flowers of contemporary critical imagination. His reading of Derrida and Deleuze against the doxa of contemporary theory would have been stronger for it.

Alphonso Lingis, in his "Language and Persecution" does not attempt to track down points of intersection between Derrida and Deleuze. Rather, he does what he has been doing best in the past twenty years: in a free style—doctored by years of patient work through the philosophers' canon, and marked by an immense erudition and superb fidelity to the texts he reads—Lingis rewrites a few passages in Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. He specifically focuses on passages that deal with different regimes of signs, dipping, as he moves along, into his own rich travelogues and blowing life into the presignifying semiotics of direct expression; the world of meaning of the despotic regime with its hermeneut/priests and its scapegoats; the modes of subjectivation inherent in different sign regimes (self-consciousness and passionate love);
and finally the possibilities for the grand escape upon the body without organs. One breathes the pure air of grand escapes in this essay—a potent antidote to the heavy air surrounding the (non-) promise of a certain à venir.

Finally, John Protevi’s “Love” is an intriguing attempt to show that throughout their work Derrida and Deleuze have been thinking of nothing but love. The essay, as far as its argument on Deleuze goes, brings to my mind Monique Scheepers’s fine effort (several years ago) of envisioning Deleuze as the bard of love (Monique Scheepers, 1991); sadly, no one was ready to listen to her song at that time. I only hope that Protevi’s renewed efforts will find a better reception. Protevi argues that Derrida’s aimance (a term coined to join in resonance the philic and the erotic senses of love) designates, in his early work, the “necessity of the possibility” of mourning the other. In his later work, aimance designates “the experience of the impossibility of a pure relation to the other ... the endurance of aporia” (186). Protevi strives to elucidate Derrida’s position in his early work by referring to his book on Paul De Man—and I am not sure that he succeeds. “Love,” in this early work, Protevi writes, “marks the necessity of reading the constitution of subjectivity as passage through the finitude of the other” (186). But since it is the other that rends the living present, her love cannot be experienced in the living present; the living present itself becomes fiction, having always been divided by an originary alterity. In an absolute past that vitiates the present, rending it by finitude, an originary difference inaugurates friendship as the possibility of mourning the other. Protevi has an easier time in bringing his point across when he proceeds to elucidate the aporematic structure of love in Derrida’s later work. Love must be acknowledged and recognized by the lover and the beloved; but then, as with the gift, love cannot fail to enter the circuit of reciprocity, of mutual benefit and utility. Pure love is therefore impossible, but its impossibility is precisely the condition for its possibility: aimance testifies to its own aporematic structure in the experience of mourning the other.

In the case of Deleuze and Guattari, Protevi signals the duality of Oedipal/paranoid love that is “personal, exclusively disjunctive, fixed in meaning, guilty and familial,” and revolutionary/schizophrenizing love which is “material (not representational), social (not familial) and multiple (not personal)” (188). Protevi in the sequence claims that “love,” for Deleuze and Guattari, “is ... the release of multiplicities from their servitude as predicates of a subject.... Love ... is exactly this creative novelty of connection, this joining of multiplicities” (188). His reading, I think, is correct as far as it goes. I only wish that he had done something more in his essay to soften the grand exclusive disjunction between paranoid and schizoid love (in accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s desire to avoid
dualisms), or to conclude that in the work of Deleuze and Guattari love's exclusive disjunction cannot be negotiated. Protevi's essay concludes with his decision (with respect to Deleuzean/Guattarian schizoanalysis) to assign a propaedeutic function to Derrida's deconstruction. Deconstruction, he argues, has the tendency "to become stuck" on the experience of *aporia,* and to relegate *ad calendas* the material experimentation for the sake of de-subjectivation and depersonalization. Deconstruction, therefore, should be entrusted with the labor of dissipating metaphysical illusions (a quasi-Kantian critique of critical reason, I suppose)—a task that could precede the liberation of flows and the construction of the body without organs, as required when experiencing Deleuze and Guattari's creative love.

It must be obvious to the reader by now that Derrida's claim of a "nearly total affinity" between his work and Deleuze's (at least as far as the theses of these works are concerned) does not convince me. My reading of *Between Deleuze and Derrida* did not change my mind. I do not think that it serves us well (or that it serves well the two great thinkers of difference in our times) to try to bridge the abyss that separates the Nietzschean paganism of Deleuze (with its laughter of great health and its joyful wisdom) from the messianic drama of the Derridean *à venir*—even if in this drama the road and the Messiah are one. I do not think that in our attempt to counterbalance our earlier superficial reading of those we wrongly called "poststructuralists" (with our belated rehabilitation of the ethical and political significance of their works) we should confuse Derrida's post-phenomenological, post-hermeneutic piety with Deleuze's *post-death of God* impiety. The doubling of the affirmation "yes, yes"—which we find in their texts—has, I believe, in each of them a radically different function. Between the "otherwise other" (*autrement qu’autre*) of Deleuze/Robinson and the "otherwise than being" (*autrement qu’être*) of Derrida/Levinas the difference is not negotiable: Lawlor, I think, is right about this. Between Deleuze's ethics articulated for the sake of putting an end to God's judgment (*pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu*) and Derrida's eternal *mi-lieu* of the pure and the impure, there can be no mediation: I conclude, therefore, that Smith too is right.

Moreover, it seems to me that our two philosophers, as long as they were both alive, maintained, with respect to each other, an uneasy truce, punctuated by the occasional indication of deep-seated disagreements. Jeffrey Nealon, in this volume, reports on one of these disagreements (161–2). During the 1972 Cerisy colloquium on Nietzsche, Deleuze clearly stated, in response to a question, that as far as he was concerned "it is not a question of commenting on the text by a method of deconstruction, or by a method of textual practice, or by any other method; it is a
question of seeing what use a text is in the extra-textual practice that prolongs the text” (Pierre Boudot et al. 1973, 186–7). On the other hand, Derrida’s response to François Laruelle’s championing of this extra-textual practice on behalf of Deleuze’s “libidinal hermeneutics” is even less reconciliatory: “aren’t you reducing,” Derrida asks, “precipitously (and surreptitiously) the value of the text to its limits, the most recognized today ... in order to oppose to them an a-textuality that very much resembles what I myself am tempted to attribute to textuality?”; and he adds: “the break between the textual and the a-textual is made with a cutting instrument that is very classical (metaphysical, logocentric—an instrument determined by the onto-logic of the sign ...” (Laruelle, 1977, 252–3). I have argued elsewhere (Boundas 2000) that Derrida’s grammatology, where the signifier reigns supreme (unlike Deleuze’s ontology, which grounds itself on virtual intensive tendencies), cannot be trusted to bring about the end of the judgment of God (of the text, the sign, the signifier, or writing). Gregg Lambert, in this volume, seems to give his support to this assessment. Similarly, I do not see how the urgent tendency “d’en finir avec le jugement” that informs the theory and practice of Deleuzo-Guattarian schizoanalysis can be made compatible with Derrida’s slow and patient deconstruction of psychoanalysis that, as a matter of fact, guarantees that the latter is (and will be) interminable. Finally, Derrida’s belated claim about the undeconstrucible character of justice and Deleuze’s twofold political posture (subversion and perversion) may still be capable of the kind of co-ordination that John Protevi suggests in his Political Physics (a Derridean deconstructive clearing of the field from the sedimentations of classical political illusions followed by the creative imagination of the Deleuzo-Guattarian politico-libidinal materialist project). Protevi, of course, does not suggest that co-ordination implies the “nearly total affinity” between Derrida and Deleuze. He is clearly unconvinced by Derrida’s “in memoriam” and, I think, he has the right to be.

Here, then, is my conclusion: Between Deleuze and Derrida is a superb collection of essays, responding in a thought-provoking way to our human-all-too-human wish to compare and contrast; but it must be handled with care. The healthy laughter of the bard of life should not unnecessarily be brought close to the “prayers and the tears” of a certain reading of Derrida, if we do not want to turn it into an unseemly snigger. Between Blanchot’s beggar at the gates of Rome, who recognizes the Messiah but still asks him “when will you come?” and the joyful proclamation, “the Kingdom is among you,” there is a subtle difference, but a difference that should not be erased.
References


