Heidegger. Calcagno draws from both works easily available in English and from texts not yet translated. The latter is a particularly important service for Stein studies.

Although the essays are only loosely joined together, nonetheless certain themes continually reappear. Chief among them is our dependence on one another and our nature as deeply communal. Calcagno describes us, for example, as a "multiplicity of persons" (see, e.g., p. 37) and distinguishes a threefold meaning to this claim in Stein’s thought. This understanding of our interdependence is significant for Stein’s evaluation of Heidegger’s work, her account of our political life, her vision of the distinctiveness of the feminine, etc. But, Calcagno rightly points out that Stein never loses the individual to some greater community; she maintains a distinctive and unique individual core present in each of us, marking us distinct and individual even as we are also highly relational.

Calcagno’s concerns and questions are fresh; his interpretation of Stein is both reliable and distinctive—it will open up new lines of thought for both amateurs and specialists reading Stein; and his style is dialectical. He continually raises new questions, provides insights for answering them, and raises further concerns and questions.

Like a good dinner guest, Calcagno leaves us longing for more of his company. I wanted to know, for example, more about how Stein’s account of care compares with Heidegger’s, how the inclusion of gender might be significant for our account of the ego, and how Stein argues for the immortality of the soul. Calcagno moves through little-trodden territory. He does not wear down a clear path, but he does show that these treks would be fruitful both for Stein studies and contemporary philosophy more generally.

Sarah Borden, Wheaton College (IL)

Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor
Ian Fraser
Exeter and Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2007; viii + 205 pages

After a series of critical essays on some aspects of Taylor’s thought, published in both Philosophy & Social Criticism and Contemporary Political Theory, Ian Fraser has brought this research together in his Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor. In this work Fraser offers “an immanent and tran-
scendental critique of Taylor’s notion of the self, through which [he] will demonstrate the continued relevance of the humanist Marxist tradition [Taylor] came from but ultimately rejects” (3). While Fraser does an excellent job in his early chapters of tracing out Taylor’s debt to Marxist thought, it is in the end not enough to support his critique.

In his first chapter Fraser briefly lays out Taylor’s view of the self and his criticism of (vulgar) Marxism as a theory which ignores human motivation in favour of economic determinants. Fraser compares Taylor’s view of the self to that expressed by Marx in some of his works and shows them to be closer, at least on the social aspect of identity, than Taylor’s criticism would suggest (30). On this basis Fraser concludes that class and its intersection with culture, i.e., alienation and its overcoming, must play a far more important role in the formation of modern identity than Taylor allows, a relation which Marxist thinkers like E.P. Thompson and Adorno, for example, have already traced (28-29).

Fraser does acknowledge the force of Taylor’s criticism of Marx, but points out that it is a criticism that has already been taken up by certain strands of 20th-century Marxist thought; in the second chapter he offers a reason for Taylor’s failure to appreciate this fully. Fraser argues that Taylor’s Catholicism and his wish to provide a theistic source for the good leads Taylor to dismiss or, at the very least, undervalue non-theistic sources like those offered by Marxism (59).

It is in these first two chapters that Fraser lays the basis of his immanent and transcendent critique, immanent because of the similarities between Taylor and Marx on the self, and transcendent because these Marxist elements can only be fully developed by moving beyond Taylor’s theism. Fraser’s third chapter then shows how Bloch and Benjamin can give an account of transcendence from outside a theistic perspective; his fourth chapter shows how Adorno can do the same in relation to epiphanic art.

In the fifth chapter, where Fraser offers one of the first extended discussions of Taylor’s more recent work Modern Social Imaginaries, the limits of Fraser’s reading become apparent. In his previous chapters, Fraser has shown that a Marxist treatment of certain elements of Taylor’s thought is possible and that this treatment does in some way resonate with Taylor’s thinking, but he does not adequately deal with the question of why Taylor, despite his earlier Marxist commitments and his familiarity with the Marxist thinkers discussed, chooses not follow this line of thinking. Somewhat uncharitably, Fraser has laid the blame for this on Taylor’s Catholicism and has then, somewhat
hastily, assumed that Taylor avoids historical explanations according to class struggle because of this. It is on this assumption that Fraser criticizes *Modern Social Imaginaries* for its lack of explanation according to class struggle and lauds, in his sixth and final chapter, the work of Hardt and Negri who, by putting class struggle at the centre, provide a means of understanding how the conflicts of modernity, as identified by Taylor, can be overcome (177-178).

While one cannot doubt that Taylor’s thought does have a theistic dimension, one can wonder about the bearing that this has on Taylor’s historical explanations. In his works, Taylor is attempting to explain modernity in terms of the moral sources which have given rise to it and that continue to enliven it, but it is difficult to see how this kind of explanation is motivated by his Catholicism, as Fraser suggests, rather than by his desire to provide a more adequate and illuminating form of historical explanation. Fraser’s failure to address Taylor as an historian undermines his critique. Not only does Taylor criticize Marxist explanations, as Fraser has pointed out, but Taylor also criticizes neo-Nietzschean explanations that focus upon structures of domination and the means of overcoming them. Fraser gives no attention to Taylor’s criticism of neo-Nietzscheanism. In short, Fraser has criticized Taylor’s treatment of Marxism without taking into consideration its fuller and more far-reaching theoretical underpinnings.

Fraser has done much to show Taylor’s early debt to Marxist thought, but his critique is, in the end, unsuccessful because of its failure to investigate properly Taylor’s own historical method, a method that, quite independently of Taylor’s own religious views, is able to offer a powerful, alternative vision of modernity.

*Matthew J. M. Martinuk, University of Guelph*

**Contemplating Woman in the Philosophy of Edith Stein**
Maybelle Marie O. Padua
Manilla, Philippines: Far Eastern University Publication, 2007; 129 pages

Maybelle Marie O. Padua’s Master of Arts thesis in Philosophy at Far Eastern University of the Philippines earned the Atty. Lourdes L. Lontok-Cruz Award in 2006. This recognizes Padua’s intellectual achievement and hails her contribution to combating the historic and scholarly marginalization of female philosophers. Indeed, this study’s strengths and limitations reflect Padua’s rever-