The Identity of the Architectural Work of Art

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Introduction

The problem of the identity of a work of art—of a particular painting, say, or a particular literary work of art—has been approached from any number of angles. A good deal of the recent discussion has polarized into the two extremes of what we might label "objectivism" and "subjectivism." These extremes are perhaps most clearly visible in the debate over the relevance of authorial intention to the interpretation of the literary work of art. The traditional, "intentionalist" view of interpretation, championed most famously by E. D. Hirsch, representing a radical objectivist approach, maintains that the "meaning" of the work is objectively present in the text, having been bestowed upon it through the intentional agency of the author. The radical subjectivist (and relativist) approach, on the other hand, voiced perhaps most strongly by Richard Rorty, maintains that the meaning of the work is bestowed upon it through the intentional activity of the reading subject, who can make it mean whatever he or she likes. Since each of these positions remains open to strong and compelling criticisms leveled against it by its critics from the other extreme, neither has proved convincing. Yet both positions also enjoy obvious strengths that preclude our dismissing either of them out of hand. We stand, it would seem, in a dilemma, unable to decide which of the horns of this bull would prove less painful, but knowing full well that one of them is going to impale us if we continue to pursue this fight. I want to suggest that we have conceived the battle on the wrong turf, and that this hermeneutic bull is completely imaginary, as is the arena. We have approached this problem, from whatever angle, always from the starting point of epistemology—from the point of view of either the "known object" (the text) or the "knowing subject" (the reader). Yet the problem is not primarily epistemological but ontological. We want to inquire into what the work of art is, not how it comes to be known to mean whatever it means (whatever that might mean) to us.

Recent literature on the philosophy of architecture has tended to follow a subjectivist approach, and has generally been unabashedly Heideggerian. This approach has exercised considerable influence not only in philosophy and aesthetics, but in the field of architecture and monument preservation. In October 2000, an International Conference on Conservation was held in Kraków. As Sherban Cantacuzino explains in the sixth volume of the proceedings: "The purpose of this conference (and the many associated meetings that have preceded it) is to develop the ideas of conservation expressed
in the Athens Charter of 1931 and the Venice Charter of 1964. It recognizes that nothing stays the same in a fast-developing world, and that there is a need to reassess values as well as practices in the light of these changes.” Cantacuzino continues:  

Since the drafting of the Venice Charter 40 years ago new values have been created, the most important of which are authenticity and that intangible aspect of the heritage which has to do with the meanings that a building carries (what Professor Cristinelli, quoting Heidegger, calls ‘the work of art as subject, distinct from man as subject’). This is why, Professor Cristinelli argues: ‘the contents of the Charter of Venice must be reviewed today in a perspective that emphasizes its international dimension in a socio-anthropological sphere in which the actual meaning of heritage relates to all those who use it, to the society in which it finds space in terms of daily life, not just and not necessarily in terms of aesthetic and historiographic interest.’

Twenty years earlier, Christian Norberg-Schulz, in his enormously influential *Genius Loci*, stated even more explicitly the extent of his reliance upon Heidegger.  

I quote the following passage at length not only because it offers an excellent illustration of the direction of so much of the current literature, but also because it employs a couple of central terms that I too shall be employing in what follows—but in the quite different, non-Heideggerian, explicitly phenomenological sense in which they are introduced by Roman Ingarden:

The concept of existential space is here divided in the complementary terms ‘space’ and ‘character,’ in accordance with the basic functions ‘orientation’ and ‘identification.’ Space and character are not treated in a purely philosophical way (as has been done by O. F. Bollnow), but are directly related to architecture, following the definition of architecture as a ‘concretization of existential space.’ ‘Concretization’ is furthermore explained by means of the concepts of ‘gathering’ and ‘thing.’ The word ‘thing’ originally meant a gathering, and the meaning of anything consists in what it gathers. Thus Heidegger said: ‘A thing gathers world.’ The philosophy of Heidegger has been the catalyst which has made the present book possible and has determined its approach. The wish for understanding architecture as a concrete phenomenon, already expressed in *Intentions in Architecture* [Norberg-Schultz, 1963], could be satisfied in the present book, thanks to Heidegger’s essays on language and aesthetics, which have been collected and admirably translated into English by A. Hofstadter.
First of all I owe to Heidegger the concept of *dwelling*. 'Existential foothold' and 'dwelling' are synonyms, and 'dwelling,' in an existential sense, is the purpose of architecture.

As Norberg-Schultz explains some nine sentences later: “The book represents ... a first step towards a 'phenomenology of architecture,' that is, a theory which understands architecture in concrete, existential terms.” Norberg-Schultz has here made the regrettably common error of conflating existential analysis and phenomenological analysis, with the result that his "phenomenology" remains radically subjective. Following such an approach, we find ourselves impaled once again on the subjectivist/relativist horn of the hermeneutic dilemma I discussed above.

I want, in this paper, to redirect the philosophy of architecture by laying the groundwork for a proper phenomenology of architecture. I shall do so by examining the identity of the architectural work along the primarily ontological lines suggested by Roman Ingarden. Part I examines Ingarden's analysis of the ontology of the architectural work. Part II employs the results of Ingarden's analysis in the description of the logical structure of the creation of the architectural work of art as aesthetic object, distinguishing among three tasks undertaken by the architect. Part III first explores some of the demands that architectural integrity places upon the architect involved in preservation or restoration, then concludes with a brief discussion of some of the ontological problems arising from this notion of architectural integrity, problems that we encounter in the consideration of the identity of all works of art. Before we proceed, some clarification of terminology is necessary.

**Integrity**

The word "integrity" is intended to suggest not only what I take to be its usual connotations when speaking of building and architecture, but also something more. The term "structural integrity," for example, is sometimes used in referring to the quality of construction, the structural "soundness," of a building; other times it is used in referring to the "aesthetic unity" of an individual architectural work. I intend my use of "integrity" to comprehend both of these senses, for each is involved in consideration of the ontology of the architectural work.

**The Building and the Architectural Work**

There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between "the building" and "the architectural work." Briefly stated, I employ the term "building" in reference to
a physical edifice designed and constructed for the express purpose of fulfilling a practical and essentially non-aesthetic function. The term “architectural work,” on the other hand, I employ in reference to a physical edifice that has been created to fulfill not merely a practical function but also an essentially aesthetic one. The distinction between the building and the architectural work is not always as clear cut as we might like. It is in fact similar to the distinction often drawn between “works of craft” and “works of art,” a distinction that quickly begins to blur when the craftsman comes to be regarded as more than mere “artisan.” I shall explore this distinction further in what follows.

The Architectural Work, the Architectural Work of Art, and the Architectural Work of Art as Aesthetic Object

The distinctions drawn between (i) the physical object and the work of art and (ii) the work of art and the aesthetic object are often rejected by contemporary analytic philosophers of art. The initial reason for this rejection seems, at first glance, to be legitimate (if one adopts an essentially positivist point of view): the physical object is tangible and already sufficient as the subject of philosophical analysis, and to introduce such intangible entities as a separately existing work of art and, even worse, a still more “abstract” aesthetic object appears to violate a basic principle of all philosophical analysis—namely, not to multiply entities unnecessarily. This analytic approach, however, proves incapable of surmounting a number of serious problems to which it gives rise. To take the literary work of art as an example, the positivist, analytic approach has to maintain that the physical object—for example, my copy of Huckleberry Finn—is identical with the work of art. But if this were the case, there would be as many works of art as there are copies of Huckleberry Finn; that is, there would be millions of Huckleberry Finns. Yet we in fact acknowledge that there exists only one Huckleberry Finn—namely, that unique individual work of art created by Mark Twain, which is indeed to be distinguished from the physical, “real,” mass-produced copy of that work. The same problem arises in the case of the architectural work of art. As Jadwiga Stawińska explains:

[Ingarden] rejects the supposition of the real existence of works of architecture. A work—he argues—is an intentional entity, since a hundred dwelling-houses constructed according to one design do not yield a hundred works of art, but only one [SE, II, 134–5]. The work of architecture is not identical with any one of these hundred houses, therefore it is an entity essentially different from a building; an unreal, existentially not self-sufficient intentional object.
For this reason alone, it is necessary to distinguish between the "real" physical object and the "unreal" work of art. As soon as we draw this distinction, however, we immediately encounter the further problem posed by the fact that millions of people have, for example, read *Huckleberry Finn*. The problem in this regard lies in the fact that the objects of these various experiences are always as unique as the experiences themselves, and this leads us to a difficulty similar to that arising from the positivist view—namely, if the object of the reader's experience is identical with the work of art, and there are innumerable such objects, then there are innumerable works of art—for example, countless *Huckleberry Finns*, and as many Sukiennices' as there are persons who have aesthetically encountered "it." This problem can be surmounted only if we grant the further distinction between the work of art and the object of the experience—that is, the "aesthetic object," which is the object of the "aesthetic experience." With regard to architecture, we have then to distinguish between the "architectural work" (the physical edifice), the "architectural work of art" (the architect's artistic idea as realized in that physical edifice), and the "architectural work of art as aesthetic object" (the architect's artistic idea as concretized by the person experiencing that physical edifice as a work of art). I shall elaborate these distinctions at greater length in Part I, B.

**Creation, Preservation, and Restoration**

As I employ the terms, "creation" refers to the bringing into being of something that did not exist before, "preservation" refers to the activity of maintaining an already created edifice in its present condition, and "restoration" refers to the activity of "recreating" an edifice. As is the case with the distinction between "the building" and "the architectural work," this distinction too is sometimes difficult to draw with precision. I shall discuss this at greater length in Part III of this paper, but for now I can tentatively capture the distinction by way of a simple, and admittedly simplistic, example: If a brick falls out of a wall, replacing that brick is an act of "preservation"; if the entire wall falls down, reconstructing that wall is an act of "restoration." The shortcomings of this example are obvious, but it does serve to call to our attention a crucial, and far too easily overlooked, essential feature of the activity of restoration. Regarded chronologically, an architectural work is created, then it is preserved until it suffers serious damage, and then it is restored. Chronologically, then, restoration comes last. As an activity, however, it is logically to be located between that of the creation and that of the preservation of the work. As we shall see, it is precisely this "creative" dimension of this activity that gives rise to the most provocative and significant questions regarding the integrity and identity of the architectural work.
Part I: Roman Ingarden on the Ontology of the Architectural Work

A. Ingarden's Ontological Realism and Phenomenological Aesthetics

A number of the distinctions drawn above are of more than merely aesthetic significance: they also bear on fundamental problems of ontology and metaphysics, and specifically, to problems lying at the heart of the controversy between idealism and realism. It is therefore helpful to preface the further examination of these aesthetic distinctions with a brief discussion of the larger philosophical concerns that they address, concerns with which Ingarden was engaged throughout his entire philosophical career. As he writes in the Preface to the first edition of The Literary Work of Art:

Although the main subject of my investigation is the literary work, or the literary work of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of idealism-realism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years.... [T]here are various ways in which one must prepare oneself for this main subject [the 'main metaphysical problem' of idealism-realism].

Ingarden was troubled by Husserl's transcendental idealism, and most particularly by its attempt, as Ingarden sums it up in the passage following that just quoted, "to conceive the real world and its elements as purely intentional objectivities which have their ontic and determining basis in the depths of the pure consciousness that constitutes them" (LWA, lxii). According to Ingarden, "whereas at the time of the Logical Investigations he clearly occupied a realist position," Husserl "headed in the direction of transcendental idealism from the time of his Ideas," eventually coming to adopt a radical position of idealism according to which the objects of the "real" world one and all owe their very existence to the constitutive activity of the intentionality of human consciousness. All the objects comprised in the real world are, on this view, constructions of consciousness and, as such, are dependent upon the activity of consciousness for their existence. According to Ingarden, then, Husserl's transcendental idealism was in principle the same as all other forms of idealism that make the world, or "being," or "reality," dependent upon the activity of some mind or consciousness. Husserl, then—at least as Ingarden read him—was clearly leaning toward the "subjectivist" extreme I discussed above.

Ingarden systematically formulated his comprehensive "realist rejoinder" to Husserl's idealism in Controversy Over the Existence of the World. Yet he had already provided a good deal of support for his investigations in Contro-
versy with his previous examination of the ontology of the literary work of art, and his subsequent analyses of other sorts of art works—specifically, theatre, music, painting, architecture, and film—served to provide still further support for his systematic magnum opus. Ingarden's analyses of the various sorts of works of art not only confirmed his suspicions of Husserl's radical transcendental (and "subjectivist") position, but they also served to establish that there exist non-intentional, ontically autonomous entities, both "real" material objects and such purely ideal entities (or ideal "objectivities") as ideal concepts, ideas, and essences. That there exist both "real" and "ideal" entities which do not depend for their existence upon the act of consciousness alone is, with regard to the ontological problematic of Controversy, the most decisive conclusion drawn from these analyses. Ingarden's analysis of the ontology of the architectural work offers substantial support of precisely this conclusion. By way of providing ourselves with an initial indication of the direction of his central argument, we can quote from the concluding paragraph of the first section of his study of "The Architectural Work"12 (to which I shall return in what follows):

The result of this introductory examination of the work of architecture agrees, then, with the surmise we expressed at the start that every work of art, of whatever fundamental kind, is sensu stricto not a real object. Neither is it in any way an ontically autonomous object. Rather, it is characterized by an essential ontic relativity that cannot be banished from any art, namely by relativity to the creative acts of the artist (OWA, 264).

B. The Ontology of the Architectural Work

B1. The Building as Distinguished from the Architectural Work13

Ingarden's first step in analyzing the ontology of the architectural work of art consists in establishing the distinction between "the real building" and "the architectural work." His discussion of this distinction revolves around the difference between the attitudes we adopt when confronted with these two different sorts of "objectivities." I shall quote at length the following passage, for it not only summarizes Ingarden's basic point regarding these "attitudes," but it also includes a few observations, to which I shall be referring in later sections of this paper:

But we should also take heed of the fact that we can assume different attitudes toward what is apparently one and the same building. With regard to a church, as a building of a special kind, we can adopt the attitude of an engineer, for example, who has to carry out preservatory
work on it, or alterations of some kind. But we can also consider the church as an art historian, who attempts to describe it, and who regards it as a product of certain individuals or of an epoch, and who seeks to draw conclusions from its peculiarities about the technical capability of the architect or about the artist's mental structure. But we could just as well assume the attitude of an aesthetic receptor, who admires the harmonious distribution of masses, becomes absorbed in the calm of a Romanesque basilica, or takes delight in the lightness and grace of an Ionic column. To be sure, the transformation of the one attitude into the other does not annul the identity of the real thing, with regard to which we behave in one way or another; but this identity recedes, as it were, into the background. However, each really new attitude confers upon the building new traits, that are given to us—as soon as we have taken up the particular attitude—as moments occurring in the objectivity in question as properties or features which often decide the nature of the objectivity in question and then lead to the constitution of a new, i.e., in every one of these cases different, objectivity. Against the background of one and the same real thing (the building), a new objectivity, so to speak, is built up for each new attitude, as if the objectivity originated from this attitude and were ontically dependent on it (OWA, 256).

The existence of a uniquely "aesthetic" attitude has been challenged by some contemporary aestheticians—perhaps most notably by George Dickie, who has maintained that the notion of the aesthetic attitude "misleads aesthetic theory." Dickie claims that the notion of the aesthetic attitude, specifically as described by Edward Bullough and Sheila Dawson, rests upon the use of such technical terms as "distancing," the introduction of which, Dickie argues, "does nothing but send us chasing after phantom acts and states of consciousness." This is not the place to respond at any length to Dickie's treatment of this matter, but it should be pointed out that when we are analyzing our experience of any object, we cannot neglect to deal with acts and states of consciousness, and when we are dealing with our experience of objects that owe their very existence to acts and states of consciousness of the creative artist, to fail to deal with the acts and states of consciousness involved in our experience of these objects is to neglect what is clearly an essential element of that experience. Such an analysis is admittedly difficult and demanding of extreme caution, but that is no reason to dismiss it as some fanciful "chasing after phantoms." Typically, Ingarden does not hesitate to face this difficulty head on. He clearly recognizes the difficulties that follow from granting the existence of a unique "aesthetic attitude," but this does not deter him from placing the notion of this attitude at the very center of his analysis of the cognition of the work of art—that is, of the aesthetic experience. Returning now to the passage
quoted just above, we can see the value of so doing: it is only through our recognition of the peculiar creative efficacy of this aesthetic attitude that we are enabled to draw the distinction between “the building” and “the architectural work.” We can explain Ingarden’s point by means of a concrete illustration.

Let us consider just a few of the many different manners in which we might “experience” the Sukiennice (Cloth Hall) standing in the center of the old Market Square (Rynek Główny) of Kraków.  

(i) Let us first suppose that we are professional art historians. When we look at the Sukiennice, we might notice the fourteenth-century Gothic gables, or the overall Renaissance character of the work’s sixteenth-century reconstruction. We might also “see” the extent to which this overall character of the work was altered by Tomasz Pryliński’s nineteenth-century renovation of the work. We might ask ourselves such questions as: Have the recent renovations of the north side of the building and the parapet to any extent hidden what was visible one hundred years ago? or Were the mascarons on the parapet really the work of the Florentine, Santi Gucci? Such questions arise from what we might refer to as “the informed art-historical attitude,” and we should note that they are directed at features of an historical objectivity which is not essentially aesthetic.

(ii) Let us next suppose that we are tourists in search of souvenirs. We have been told that we can buy inexpensive, pretty painted boxes at some of the stalls in the Sukiennice. We ask where the Sukiennice is, someone points to “that building over there,” and we quickly enter the main hall and proceed to visit stall after stall, comparing prices. In this case, we have adopted what we might refer to as “the consumerist attitude,” and our exclusively practical concerns direct our consciousness not at the Sukiennice as an historical objectivity but as a purely functional objectivity—that is, quite simply, as a merchants’ hall.

(iii) We might also be tourists, guidebook in hand, searching for the National Museum. We may already be confused, because the guidebook sometimes refers to it as the “Painting Gallery,” and we know that we have already been to some other “National Museum” here in Kraków, so we are not sure what it is that we are looking for. We walk up and down the inside hall any number of times, and twice all around the outside of “the building,” constantly in search of some sign or entrance to either the “National Museum” or the “Painting Gallery.” We might describe our attitude—one familiar to all tourists—as a “searching attitude,” and characteristic of this attitude is the concern to ignore as much as possible in order to isolate precisely that one thing for which we are looking. This attitude leads us necessarily to narrow the focus of our attention, and as a result we lose sight of the Sukiennice as a whole: we look at bits and pieces, turning our attention away from them when they prove to be irrelevant to our concern. In this situation, the objectivity is never really present at all (until we finally find the entrance).

(iv) Let us assume, finally, the attitude of the tired professor sitting...
in his second-floor office at Rynek Górnym 34, overlooking the old Market Square. The day’s classes are ended, the last meeting is over, and the correspondence is taken care of. We stand up and walk to the window, gazing out at the Square, and, specifically at the Sukiennice (the Cloth Hall). We are not concerned with questions of art history, or with buying painted boxes, or with visiting the Museum. Our concern, if it can even be called a “concern” at this point, is merely to look at the Sukiennice. When we are so engaged, it might happen that our attention becomes suddenly drawn to the Sukiennice not as a “building,” and not even as an “architectural work” with an intriguing history, but as an entirely different sort of objectivity, one that suddenly reveals certain qualities the appreciation of which seems not to demand the knowledge of the art historian, and the recognition of which must surely escape the person engaged exclusively in the search for souvenirs or entrance signs. What has happened here is that we have suddenly adopted an “aesthetic attitude,” and our attention is now directed toward an architectural work of art that we are experiencing as an “aesthetic object.”

We may summarize Ingarden’s basic point as follows. The architectural work remains always the same, but it can appear to us in any number of different ways in response to the concerns and attitude that we adopt in attending to it. In each different case of its appearance, the object is, so to speak, a different object—that is, it is in each case a different phenomenon, and it is always the phenomenon that is the object of our consciousness. The scientific concerns of the historian are directed toward features of a specific objectivity, which becomes, as a result, an “historical object.” The practical (consumerist or searching) concerns of the tourist are directed to specific physical aspects of quite another objectivity, which functions either as a vehicle (receptacle of souvenirs) or as an obstacle (where in this place is the museum?). But the concerns of the relaxing professor staring out of his office window have to do with a different objectivity entirely, an aesthetic objectivity that in fact comes into being only as the object of an aesthetic experience on the part of the person who has adopted an aesthetic attitude.22

To recall Ingarden’s expression of this point in the passage quoted above: “Against the background of one and the same real thing (the building), a new objectivity, so to speak, is built up for each new attitude, as if the objectivity originated from this attitude and were ontically dependent on it.” It seems, then, that the architectural work of art is dependent for its existence upon both (i) the architectural work—that is, the building—that is attended to, and (ii) the acts of consciousness on the part of the attending person. This “dependence” is what Ingarden refers to as “the two-sided ontic relativity” of the architectural work.

Toward the end of his treatment of the distinction between “the real building and the architectural work,” Ingarden writes:
The architectural work of art is an ontically relative object, whose ontic relativity is, though, not one-sided. It refers back not only to the creative acts of the architect and the reconstructive acts of the viewer, but also to its ontic foundation in a fully determined real thing shaped in a particular way. Only when the building is so fashioned that in the concrete material the embodiment of the architect's artistic idea is achieved, only then is the work of architecture truly 'realized,' 'created,' whereas previously, when perhaps only the plans of the cathedral, say, existed, then it was only intentionally thought or maybe imagined in its sensible qualities, but not yet truly 'realized' (OWA, 263-4).

The existence of the architectural work of art, in other words, is dependent upon two other "objectivities": (i) the architectural work, that is, the "real building" itself, and (ii) the act of consciousness, be it creative or "recreative," in which that work appears (qua phenomenon) as the aesthetic object of that act. This "two-sided ontic relativity" of the work points to the ontological complexity of the aesthetic object itself, a complexity that in fact involves a dialectic, of sorts, among three different elements—namely, artistic imagination, physical realization, and aesthetic concretization.

**B2. The Artistic Imagination, Physical Realization, and Aesthetic Concretization of the Architectural Work**

As I explained in the Introduction, we must distinguish between three different entities: (i) the architectural work (the "real," physical edifice itself); (ii) the architectural work of art (the "unreal" work); and (iii) the architectural work of art as aesthetic object (the "unreal" work encountered as the object of aesthetic experience). Each of these three entities corresponds to a separate activity: (i) is physical, (ii) is imaginational, and (iii) is aesthetic. We can sketch this as follows:

(i) the architectural work—that is, the "real building" or "real" physical edifice itself—is the physical embodiment, or the physical "realization," of the work of art that is imagined by the architect;

(ii) the architectural work of art is the purely intentional objectivity existing originally in the imagination of the architect as a potential aesthetic object; and

(iii) the architectural work of art as aesthetic object is the purely intentional objectivity coming subsequently into being as "concretized" in the aesthetic experience of the "viewer."

In the light of the preceding discussions, point (i) is sufficiently clear, while points (ii) and (iii) demand further clarification.
With regard to point (ii), the chief question concerns the character of the work of art as a “potential” aesthetic object. Ingarden is here relying upon the traditional, Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality, in accordance with which an actually existing entity, even a merely “imagined” entity, enjoys also certain “potentialities” for being that are not at the moment “actualized” in the existence of that entity. For example, this actually existing desk is at this same moment also a “potential” piece of firewood; similarly, this article that you are now “realizing” in the course of its reading remains, until it is actually read, a merely potential article. In the case of the architectural work of art, the architect imaginatively envisions, so to speak, the architectural work of art as he or she wishes it later to be concretized, as an aesthetic object, by subsequent viewers. The product of this architectural artistic imagination—that is, “the architect’s artistic idea”—exists as the potential aesthetic object which becomes actualized in two different respects, and in two different stages, so to speak (corresponding to [i] and [iii] above): First, this architectural, artistic idea is realized in “the real building”; and second, this architectural, artistic idea is concretized as the object of an aesthetic experience.

This notion of “concretization” (mentioned in point [iii] above) demands some elucidation. Briefly stated, a “viewer” is said to “concretize” the work of art during the course of his or her aesthetic experience of that work. To take once again the Sukiennice by way of illustration, the western, Gothic wall—when viewed from a second-floor office of Rynek Głównej 34—is in itself quite beautiful. But when the viewer at the window makes a conscious effort to integrate it into the Renaissance reconstruction of “the building” as a whole, as seen from that point of view, that effort is doomed to fail. When, however, the viewer attends neither to the wall alone nor to the Renaissance reconstruction, but instead to the (so to speak) living presence in the Market Square of the work as a whole, certain intangible features of the Sukiennice appear, features that appear contradictory but which work together in such a way as to produce a unique sort of unity: one senses its “heavy massiveness,” as if the work were somehow holding the entire Market Square on the ground, and at the same time one feels its “lightness” and (typically Renaissance) “delicacy.” Actually to walk into the hall while experiencing this sensation and feeling can produce an almost dizzying effect: the “interior” suddenly feels far less stable and secure than the physical “heavy massiveness” allows it any right to be. This is the Sukiennice as it may be experienced in the aesthetic attitude, and that is what is meant by the “aesthetic concretization” of the architectural work of art. Through attending to “the real building” in a quite peculiar manner, that building appears as (indeed, becomes) an architectural work of art, and as such it holds within itself an artistic idea—the artistic idea of the creative architect (or, more precisely, in the case of the present example, the reconstructive architect)—which, while already “realized” in the physical building, at the same
time enjoys a potential existence until it is actualized as the particular object of the experience of a viewer. It is important to note that this process of actualization, which we refer to as “concretization,” need not result in the production of identically the same aesthetic object for different viewers; in fact, it appears extremely unlikely that it ever does or can do so. The concretization will proceed differently, and a different aesthetic object will come into actualized being, in every separate instance of aesthetic experience. An important conclusion follows from this: the aesthetic object of a viewer’s experience can be fully identical neither with the aesthetic object of another viewer’s experience nor with the aesthetic object as originally conceived, or imagined, by the artist, that is, the architect’s artistic idea. I want to stress this point, for, as we shall see in what follows, it has far-reaching implications regarding the possibility of what we might call “historically faithful” architectural preservation and restoration.

Part II: The Creation of the Architectural Work

A. The Peculiar Character of Architectural Creation

While I shall here be speaking of the “creation” of the architectural work, I should stress that I do not purport here to be describing the psychological processes or mental states of an architect actually engaged in creating an architectural work. My goal is simply to identify elements, or “constitutive moments,” that must necessarily be involved in the overall process of such creation. To this end, I shall proceed by means of a preliminary “transcendental analysis,” the chief purpose of which will be to distinguish among three distinct tasks undertaken by the architect—specifically, the engineering, the technical, and the artistic. I shall be suggesting in what follows that the third of these tasks, the artistic, involves ontological concerns that must be considered when dealing with the integrity and identity of the architectural work.

A1. A Preliminary Transcendental Analysis

It has long been fashionable to draw a hard and fast distinction between art and technology. This general distinction is familiar enough to demand no elaboration here. In the case of architecture, however, the distinction poses obvious difficulties. We might want to claim, as one way of stating the distinction, that the essence of art lies in imaginative creation, and that of technology in physical construction. But then what precisely is architecture: art or technology? If we want to say that it is both art and technology, is it fair to ask which it is primarily, or most fundamentally? Further, is architecture perhaps more than simply art and technology? Louis Sullivan, for example—whom Frank Lloyd Wright was fond of referring to as “The Master”—maintained that architecture
was not merely one of the traditional "fine arts" but belonged also to the social sciences and humanities. Is it legitimate to regard architecture in this manner, and if so, what follows from this claim? In approaching these questions, I shall proceed by way of an exclusively logical (as opposed to chronological or psychological) investigation into the conditions of the possibility of the architectural work of art as aesthetic object.

When we regard this work as the "final product," so to speak, of a complex process, we can identify a number of separate "stages" that must belong to that process. As I have explained above, following Ingarden, one of the ontic foundations of the architectural work of art as aesthetic object is the architectural work as "the real building" itself. This building is the product of the activity of its construction, and this activity involves the employment of technology in accordance with an architectural design. The design is itself the product of an activity of designing, and this activity involves the employment of both engineering knowledge and technical skill proceeding in accordance with the architect's artistic idea. We can sketch this analysis as follows:

1. "the architect's artistic idea," which guides the employment of
2. the technical skill employed in the activity of designing
3. the engineering knowledge and
4. the activity of designing—which yields
5. the designs and
6. the technology employed in the activity of constructing the work
7. the activity of constructing the work
8. the constructed architectural work (the architectural work)
9. the experienced architectural work (the architectural work of art as aesthetic object)

While the creative activity of the architect looks ahead, so to speak, at moments (5) to (9), that activity itself consists exclusively in moment (4), which is dependent for its existence upon the three moments that we now must investigate in more detail—those moments, namely, that comprise the three separate, yet essentially related, tasks of the architect: the engineering, the technical, and the artistic.

B. The Architect as Engineer, Technician, and Artist

B1. The Architect as Engineer and Technician

My use of the two terms "engineering" and "technical" as distinct from one another may sound somewhat strange, given that the latter term is often employed in reference to "technological" matters. That is not the manner in
which I am employing it here. The term “technical” refers to the skill of the architect in drafting the designs of the building; that is, the architect is a “technician” in the sense that he or she must employ the technical skills of drafting, drawing, sketching, and so on. (Such skills are often referred to as “artistic,” but I shall reserve that term for a separate task of the architect.) The architect is an “engineer” in the sense that he or she must possess knowledge both of the demands and of the possibilities of the physical construction of a building, knowledge that must include, among other things, not merely a familiarity with the basic principles of physics but also an understanding of the existing and possible technological means that may be employed in the construction of the building. The engineering task of the architect, then, points primarily to the technological character of architecture. While the fulfillment of the technical task of the architect obviously demands engineering knowledge, without which it could never get off the drawing board, it nevertheless consists essentially in the activity carried out on that drawing board. As I have suggested above, however, this activity is guided by a moment that is logically (although perhaps not chronologically or psychologically) prior to it—namely, the moment of what Ingarden refers to as “the architect’s artistic idea” (OWA, 263).


We must immediately note that the architect’s artistic idea is by no means to be identified with any single “design” of a building. To begin with, very few buildings are in fact constructed according to one single design. They are generally built with reference to any number of separate designs (blueprints, sketches, models), no one of which alone is capable of “comprehending” the structure in its entirety. The artistic idea alone is capable of such comprehension, and it is this idea that provides the architect with guidance in the drafting of the several designs. In the artistic idea the work as a whole is conceived and imagined, and first comes into being as that potential aesthetic object that will subsequently be concretized by the viewer. The chief aesthetic question that the architect must address is whether the work will be “appropriate,” and this in what we might call both “internal” and “external” respects. Regarding the former, it must be asked whether the separate parts of the work will be appropriate to one another, and thereby together cohere into an harmonious whole, that is, whether the completed work will exhibit what Ingarden refers to as “inner qualitative unity” (OWA, 277). This internal appropriateness is what some authors refer to as “aesthetic integrity.” With regard to “external” considerations, then, the most important question that must be asked concerns whether the work will be appropriate to the proposed location, that is, whether it will aesthetically complement the already existing buildings surrounding its proposed site. For example, leaving all moral considerations aside for the moment,
Part III: The Preservation and Restoration of the Architectural Work

A. The Distinction Between Preservation and Restoration

It is necessary at this point to expand a bit on the distinction I drew in the Introduction between preservation and restoration. I suggested there that this distinction is not always easy to draw with precision. I would now like to point out that there sometimes exists a very fine line indeed between the two activities. In previously drawing this distinction, I characterized preservation as the replacing of the occasional brick and restoration as the rebuilding of an entire wall. While that characterization served its initial clarificatory purpose, it is now necessary to revise it along more realistic lines. It is rarely the case that the architect involved in preservation is simply replacing bricks. In fact, there are as many and varied sorts of preservation as there are architectural works to be preserved, and even the seemingly most simple of these sorts of preservation generally involves more than mere masonry (as demanding a trade as masonry already is in itself). But let us for the moment remain with that simplest example: let us suppose that one of the stones has just fallen out of the inside passageway of the Florian Gate. Were this to happen with, say, the entrance to a private garden, a mason or other artisan might be employed to replace the stone. As the Florian Gate is, however, a recognized historical monument, its preservation falls within the domain of the Institute of the History of Architecture and the Preservation of Monuments—in short, an architect must be employed. Why is this the case? That is, why could we not hire a bricklayer, or a mason? The answer is that this monument, as an architectural work, demands a special sort of care that only specially trained professionals are capable of offering. Even in the matter of replacing a single fallen stone, a special sort of knowledge and ability is demanded. When we ask the further question, Why is this demanded?, the answer must be: the stone that fell was one of the original pieces belonging to the work, that work was constructed (approximately) 700 years ago, and it embodies certain architectural values that might not be evident to any but the trained eye, qualities the recognition of which depend upon the peculiar aesthetic appreciation of characteristics that belong exclusively to architectural works of art. But this answer leads us to another series of questions. If this single fallen stone is in fact so crucial to the structural unity of the architectural work of art, and its replacement therefore demands the aesthetic appreciation of this structural unity of the work, even this most simple act of preservation must necessarily demand that the architect be capable of concretizing the aesthetic object existing potentially in the archi-
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The architectural work of art as a whole. In other words, this capability of "grasping" the work of art as a whole is demanded not merely in the restoration of the architectural work, but also in its "mere" preservation. This observation suffices to demonstrate that the line between these two activities is very fine indeed. We might say, in fact, that the distinction between preservation and restoration is not qualitative, but merely quantitative.

Each of these activities rests upon the ability of the architect to concretize the aesthetic object. Recalling now that this aesthetic object is originally the creation of the architect who originally designed the work, we are led to the question of the extent to which this later concretization is "faithful" to the original architect's artistic idea.

B. Ontological Problems Arising from the Consideration of Architectural Preservation and Restoration

Consideration of the nature of the architect's aesthetic obligation in restoration leads us to the heart of the ontological problem. Let us proceed by way of example. Let us suppose that an architecture student, embittered at having just failed out of the program, employs her knowledge of chemistry and physics in constructing a small but powerful bomb, which she then places in the basement café of the architecture school at Kanonicza 1. 27 The bomb explodes, and the basement is destroyed (the remainder of the building remains, however, undamaged). Fortunately, there is a large team of qualified personnel ready at hand just upstairs to take immediate charge of the task of restoring the basement. All the members of this team of architects agree that the most recent restoration of the basement had proven largely successful in the production of an architectural work that was, in fact, a powerful work of art which inevitably led the persons visiting the café to concretize it as an aesthetic object with positive aesthetic qualities—for example, the "sturdiness" of the walls and of the arch, which one felt, walking through the café, to be almost effortlessly supporting the entire building. 28 Desiring to "preserve" that aesthetic object, the team of architects agrees to "restore" the same work of art by faithfully "reconstructing" the basement exactly as it was before (as far as that proves possible). In this case, the architects have recognized their "aesthetic obligation": purely aesthetic concerns have dictated the manner in which they will proceed in their activity of restoration.

But there is a problem here—indeed, the central problem that I want to address in this paper. This problem involves the architects' agreement concerning the supposed "aesthetic object," and their decision to preserve the work of art by "faithfully" reconstructing the basement. In what does such "faithfulness" consist? What does it mean to preserve or restore an architectural work faithfully? We here encounter difficulties arising from both the peculiar, "un-
real" ontological status of the work of art (as I described this in Part I) and the complex and enigmatic nature of the architect's artistic idea (which I described in Part II). The problem arises from the following considerations. What we want to preserve or restore is the "unreal" work of art, not just the "real," physical edifice, and this unreal work of art exists only as the potential bearer of aesthetic qualities that become manifest only in the concretization of that work as the aesthetic object of the aesthetic experience of the viewer, with this concretization being guided, but never in all of its details, by the original architect's artistic idea. We should here recall one of Ingarden's claims that I quoted above: "The architectural work of art is an ontically relative object, whose ontic relativity is, though, not one-sided. It refers back not only to the creative acts of the architect and the reconstructive acts of the viewer, but also to its ontic foundation in a fully determined real thing shaped in a particular way" (OWA 263). To return now to the basement of Kanonicza 1, it is crucial that we remember that it was not originally designed as a "basement" at all. It became that much later, as the streets of the city rose ever higher. The building was also thoroughly reconstructed in the sixteenth century, and the basement itself was only quite recently renovated. When our team of architects now tries "faithfully" to restore that work, to what are they being faithful? We here confront a delicious insight into this particular architectural work of art. It could be suggested that since the original, fourteenth-century, architect's artistic idea had to do with the ground floor of a building, when our team of architects now restores this portion of the building with reference to the aesthetic qualities of the "basement," they are not at all attending to that original architect's artistic idea. But this suggestion would be mistaken, for it is precisely the really "supporting" character of the walls as conceived in the original artistic idea of the ground floor that has been recaptured in the aesthetic experience of the unreal work of art based upon the restored "basement." This observation suggests that in order to be "faithful" to the original architect's artistic idea, it may, ironically, prove necessary to introduce significant alterations in the design of the physical building itself. In other words, architectural integrity in the faithful preservation and restoration of architectural works of art may demand that the architect look beyond the "engineering" and "technical" aspects of the original architectural work and, attending to its "artistic" features, preserve and restore that work by more or less drastically altering its physical appearance.

This conclusion suggests that the threat posed by historical relativism in the aesthetic experience and evaluation of the architectural work of art—or, indeed, of any work of art—is not as great as is often supposed. That is, the aesthetic power of the original work of art seems, at least in some cases (like Kanonicza 1), to be capable not only of ensuring the continued existence of that work—which, again, is "unreal"—but to do so, moreover, by surviving, and perhaps even dictating, extensive alteration of its material, ontic foundation,
the "real building" itself. But this observation opens the door to any number of further ontological problems.

I have argued that the faithful preservation and restoration of architectural works of art may entail the introduction of significant alterations in the design of the physical building itself. Assuming that we are dealing with a work that is several centuries old, and that it has been previously preserved and restored any number of times, then we are in fact restoring not the original architectural work, but only its later descendent. But must not this process of ongoing preservation and restoration result eventually in the creation of an entirely new work of art? At what point? Moreover, preserve the "real building" as we will, how long can the work of art endure? I have argued above that the danger of historical relativism is not as great as is often supposed, for the aesthetic power of the work of art is capable of ensuring the existence of the work of art over time. But surely this power is not unlimited. We have to bear in mind that the existence of this work is based not only on the "real building" itself but also upon the acts of consciousness of, initially, the creative artist and, subsequently, the recreative viewer. This might suggest that we are once again flirting with subjectivism and relativism, but we cannot forget that this subjective dimension of the work constitutes only one of its ontic moments. The contribution of this dimension to the ontology of the architectural work—and to the ontology of any work of art—remains essential, but limited in extent. It must be the task of further phenomenological investigation, along the lines I have laid out above, to identify the limits and establish the extent of this contribution of subjectivity. It is already clear, however, that any approach that begins and ends with attention solely to what Norberg-Schultz refers to as the "existential dimension," or to what Cristinelli describes as "the socio-anthropological sphere in which the actual meaning of heritage relates to all those who use it," must prove inadequate.

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Notes

1. Tanya DiTommaso, Aref Nayed, and I have critically reviewed this discussion at some length in The Author's Intention (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004).


4. In 1993 the Institute of the History of Architecture and Monument Preservation in Kraków invited me to deliver a paper on Ingarden's work on architecture, and our continuing collaboration over the years resulted in the publication of an earlier version of the present paper, "The Integrity of Architecture as Creation, Preservation and Restoration," in the *Proceedings of the International Conference on Conservation: Krakow 2000*, vol. 6: *Architectural Intervention in Monuments' Ensembles—From Historic Relic to Artistic Creation*. In the earlier version I focused on problems having to do with the aesthetic and moral integrity that the architectural work demands of the architect involved in its preservation and restoration, but my treatment of these problems remained desperately inconclusive. The intractable nature of these questions eventually forced me to conclude that my approach had led me to formulate them in the wrong terms. I saw that I had failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental ontological issues that must precede such aesthetic and moral considerations. The present paper attempts to take a step toward remedying this shortcoming.

5. This is not to say that "the building" cannot perform any sort of aesthetic function. Such a function, however, is not essential to the building.


7. Most of my examples are provided by architectural works in Kraków. I would like to thank Jacek and Magda Czubiński for supplying the photographs.

8. The term could equally well refer to "rebuilding," but I shall not be using it in that sense.


11. *Spór o istnienie świata, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt.* Ingarden began *Controversy* in 1935 (as he tells us in *Streit*, vol. I, ix [in the Foreword to the first edition]), explaining further that the first chapter “was at first supposed to be an extension of ‘Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus’ from the year 1929”), hoping to be able to show it to Husserl, for whom, as Ingarden tells us, he began the work in the first place (see “Final Comment” to 1918 Letter, 437). His work on *Controversy* was soon interrupted, however, when he felt compelled to address certain problems of the cognition of the literary text (as he more precisely explains in *Streit* [vol. I, ix]), a new circle of problems [*Problemkreis*] had opened up: “the problem of the possibility of the intersubjectively secured cognition of the literally fixed text, which appeared to me as the problem of the possibility of intersubjectively secured science in general [überhaupt]”); this led to his writing of *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (*O poznananiu dzieła literackiego* [Lwów: Ossolineum, 1937]. By 1938 he was able to return to *Controversy*. During 1938–39, by way of further preparatory research, he devoted himself to the study of Aristotle’s metaphysics, offering a “free seminar” on the subject, and in 1939–40 he offered a “special seminar” on the Idealism-Realism problem (as he explains in *Streit*, vol. I, x). It was during the last years of the war that Ingarden was finally able to complete the first two volumes of *Controversy Over the Existence of the World*.

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the volume Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst (Tübingen: Niemeyer), and in English in 1989 as The Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film. The essay on music was published separately in English in 1986 as The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity, trans. Adam Czerniawski, ed. Jean G. Harrell (Berkeley: University of California Press).

13. This distinction has become common in the literature since Ingarden wrote. I belabor it here only to present the manner in which Ingarden himself adopted it as fundamental to his own phenomenological analyses.

14. An important terminological distinction is to be drawn here between “object” and “objectivity.” As Ingarden notes (Streit, vol. II/1, 101–2, note 35): “I there [in Streit, vol. I] took over my terminology from the treatise ‘Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus,’ which I also employed in my book, Das literarische Kunstwerk. I have there directed the words ‘Gegenstand’ [‘object’] and ‘Gegenständlichkeit’ [‘objectivity’] in their fields of meaning in such a way that every ‘object’ should be an ‘objectivity,’ but not conversely. For example, properties, states of affairs, ideal qualities and the like were intended as other types of objectivity.” In other words, the term “objectivity” has the wider field of meaning and is employed in reference to that which is more general (for example, “heaviness”), while the latter term is employed in reference exclusively to that which is particular (for example, the individual Romanesque vault).


17. Dickie, 802.

19. As Helen R. Michejda writes: “The scope, rigor, and independence of his thought and his pertinacious refusal to accept the concept of philosophy that dismisses problems hitherto unsolved on the assumption that they cannot be solved, open new avenues to their resolution that constitute a challenge to all philosophers.” (Translator’s Preface to *Time and Modes of Being* [Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1964], viii. This work is a translation of a good deal of Part I of *Controversy*.

20. From Jan Adamczewski, *An Illustrated Guidebook to Cracow* (Czechoslovakia, no date), 26–9: “In the centre of the Main Market Place stands the monumental long building of the Cloth Hall, with its enchanting arcades, Gothic brick walls and a Renaissance parapet. Its oldest, underground part dates back to the Romanesque period. Under King Casimir the Great (1333–70), the old market hall was expanded. The beautiful Gothic gables also date from the 14th century. Following a great fire in 1555, the Cloth Hall was rebuilt in Renaissance style. Gianmaria Padovano topped it with a Polish parapet adorned with sculpted mascarons presumably by Santi Gucci of Florence. In the 19th century this imposing edifice was tidied up and renovated by the architect Tomasz Pryliński and with the completion of conservation work, Poland’s first National Museum was opened on the first floor in 1879. For centuries the wall high up under the arcades in the centre has borne a sword which once meant that the town was administered according to Magdeburg law and at the same time was a warning to evil-doers who were to be punished with it (hence its name, the ‘Bloody Sword’). This sword is associated with a legend about the two brothers who built the towers of St. Mary’s. The elder brother noticed that the younger had built stronger foundations and his tower was rising higher and faster, and for this reason he murdered him with this sword. However he suffered from such acute pangs of conscience that eventually he committed suicide by jumping down from the tower.”

21. We might note a curious effect that disappointment as the result of such a search can exercise on aesthetic perception and evaluation. I was once looking for the “bloody sword” of Magdeburg law that I had been told was hanging on one of the walls of the Sukiennice. Two of my students and I spent a good half hour wandering through and around the building in search of that sword. When we finally discovered it—and only, finally, with the help of Monika Czubińska, the daughter of a well known architect—one of my students exclaimed, “That’s not a bloody sword—it’s a rusty knife!”
22. I here say "an" and not "the" aesthetic attitude, for it seems likely that there exist various such attitudes. I am here unable to explore this matter further.

23. And/or a "model," which, for our present purpose, we may include with the design in the same stage (6).

24. We need not concern ourselves here with the production of the technology that is employed, although a complete account would certainly have to deal with this as well. It is by no means irrelevant, as already becomes clear in the observation—which I shall discuss in what follows—that the creative activity of architectural designing may involve the consideration not merely of existing technology but also of possible technology.

25. Immediately upon the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR, Western commercial interests began to claim their territory in Central and Eastern Europe. By 1992, McDonald's had persuasively proposed to the city of Kraków that it establish a franchise at this location. Heated debate followed. There is now a McDonald's located just off the Market Square.

26. The Florian Gate, dating from around 1300, was the main northern gate through the wall encircling the city. It is the only gate of the old city that remains. The construction of the wall began in the thirteenth and ended in the fifteenth century.

27. From An Illustrated Guidebook to Cracow, 52: "This is generally recognized as the most attractive street in old Cracow. Though its name derives from the canons of the Cracow cathedral who once lived here, in the past it also had many knightly manors. In the course of research carried out before the complete restoration of the entire street it was discovered that all houses had Renaissance loggias, cloisters, portals and polychrome paintings, frequently hidden under layers of later accretions. Many of the houses feature beautiful portals with armorial cartouches emblazoned with a sculpted cardinal's hat and three crowns: the emblem of Wawel cathedral. The house at no. 1 dates back to the 14th century, although in the 16th century it was thoroughly reconstructed as the residence of Bishop Ignacy Maciejowski. During the period of the Republic of Cracow, it was the Inquisitorial Court of the Free City of Cracow and a prison. After the restoration of this now seriously damaged building is completed, it will be turned over to one of Cracow's cultural institutions." The "house at no. 1" subsequently became the home of the Institute of History of Architecture and
Monument Preservation, in the “basement” of which is now located the student café that I shall be talking about. This basement café now displays works of students on its walls. It also serves some of the best inexpensive “Polish” dishes in town. These observations might have some bearing on my discussion of the “faithfulness” of preservation and restoration.

28. We should note, in passing, that this points to the “unreality” of the work of art: the walls and arch of the “real basement” itself—that is, the architectural work—do not in fact support the building. When it is concretized, however, as a work or art, the walls of this work do support the building. As belonging to the object (the constituted phenomenon) of consciousness in the aesthetic experience, the walls and arch are, essentially, “supporting” elements in that (unreal) work. When this “basement” was first constructed, in the fourteenth century, the walls did in fact serve to support much of the rest of the building, for the street was considerably lower then, and this “basement” was in fact the ground floor. This historical observation will prove crucial, as we shall see in what follows.
Sukiennice (Cloth Hall)

Sukiennice interior
Clock Tower & Sukiennice

Florian Gate
Kanonicza 1

Kanonicza 1 (basement café)