GERDA WALThER: ON THE POSSIBlITY OF A PASSlVE SENSE OF COMMUNITY AND THE INNER TIME CONSCIousNESS OF COMMUNITY

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If community is determined primarily in consciousness as a mental state of oneness, can community exist when there is no accompanying mental state or collective intentionality that makes us realise that we are one community? Walther would respond affirmatively, arguing that there is a deep psychological structure of habit that allows us to continue to experience ourselves as a community. The habit of community works on all levels of our person, including our bodies, psyches and spirits (Geist). It allows us to continue to be in community even though we are not always conscious of it. Husserl would describe this as part of the passive synthesis of Vergemeinschaftung. Walther’s analysis of the passive structure of habit opens up important possibilities for the inner consciousness of time. Drawing from Husserl’s and Walther’s analyses, I argue for the possibility of a communal inner time consciousness, or an inner awareness of time consciousness of the community, which gives rise to three constitutive moments: communal retention or communal memory, a sense of the communal present or a communal “now,” and communal protentions or anticipations. Ultimately, I will show how Walther’s treatment of habit demonstrates that time conditions the lived experience of community. One can, therefore, speak of a time of the community—its past, present and future—even though Walther herself does not explicitly develop this possibility.

German phenomenology's legacy of thinking-through the structure of social and political worlds, what we now call social ontology¹, is as rich as it is diverse. When one considers this legacy, one immediately thinks of the studies and debates around Husserlian notions of intersubjectivity or of Heideggerian Mitsein. Husserl and Heidegger dominate the discussion, but it must be said that both philosophers draw

from and are deeply influenced by a vast body of thought about the nature and structure of the social world, especially the work of early sociologists such as Tonnies² and Simmel.³ There also exists the work of other phenomenologists, such as Edith Stein⁴, Max Scheler⁵, Dietrich von Hildebrand⁶ and Gerda Walther.⁷ Nor should we forget thinkers such as Max Weber⁸ and Wilhelm Dilthey.⁹ Furthermore, it would be fair to say that contemporary French phenomenology and philosophy have significantly contributed to the discussion by reframing the question of community in terms of alterity. Thinkers such as Sartre¹⁰, Levinas¹¹, and Marion¹² focus on the relationship between the I and the Other. Jean-Luc Nancy develops a notion of the inoperative community.¹³ Today, phenomenological discussions of community, except for some historical and philosophical studies of Husserlian community¹⁴ as well as the work of Nancy, are generally rare. Indeed, Anglo-

²Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005).
³Georg Simmel, Soziologie (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1905).
⁵Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus (Boston: Adamant Media Corporation, 2004).
⁷Gerda Walther, Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften, offprint from Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, (ed.) E. Husserl, vol. 6 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923). Hereafter referred to as OSG.
⁹Wilhelm Dilthey, Die geistige Welt, in Gesammelte Schriften, vols. 5 and 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2008).
American philosophy seems to have taken over where the early German phenomenologists left off, reinvigorating the discussion, albeit more within the framework of the philosophy of mind and language than in phenomenological terms.15

This being said, there is a huge legacy of phenomenological writings that can prove both useful and stimulating for both the Anglo-American tradition of social ontology and phenomenology proper. Thinkers such as Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach16, as well as the better-known writings of Alfred Schütz17, all have much to add to the discourse. Gerda Walther (1897–1977)18 is one of these little-known phenomenologists who, in my view, made a significant contribution to social phenomenology with her seminal text, *Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften*.19 A student of both Husserl and Edith Stein, Walther worked with both phenomenologists to carry out Husserl’s claim that phenomenology must return to the things themselves. Deeply influenced by Husserl’s lectures *Natur und Geist*20, Walther decided to work on the phenomenological nature of community. In particular, she claimed that what makes us conscious of experiencing community is what she called a lived experience of “*Einigung,*” or oneness. What is proper to my mental experience of a community is the living experience of a profound similarity and unity of mind with an other. Her argument is that any full and real experience of community must be defined in terms of this conscious, lived experience of being one with others, being similar to them and feeling together as one.

This provocative claim, however, raises various problems, including the very nature of community. If community is determined primarily in consciousness as a mental state of oneness, can community exist when there is no accompanying mental state or collective intentionalit-

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15 See note 1.
19 See note 7.
ty that makes us realise that we are one community? Walther would respond affirmatively, arguing that there is a deep psychological structure of habit that allows us to continue to experience ourselves as a community. The habit of community works on all levels of our person, including our bodies, psyches and spirits (Geist). It allows us to continue to be in community even though we are not always conscious of it. Husserl would describe this as part of the passive synthesis of Vergemeinschaftung.\(^{21}\)

Walther’s analysis of the passive structure of habit opens up important possibilities for the inner consciousness of time. Drawing from Husserl’s and Walther’s analyses, I want to argue for the possibility of a communal inner time consciousness, or an inner awareness of time consciousness of the community, which gives rise to three constitutive moments: communal retention or communal memory, a sense of the communal present or a communal “now,” and communal protentions or anticipations. This communal experience of inner time allows for things such as a sense of a community's history and of its future. In traditional phenomenology, inner time consciousness is experienced within the intimacy of an egological structure, but if there is a genuine experience of communal life, as Walther argues, then it must imply the possibility of a communal sense of temporality. Ultimately, I will show how Walther's treatment of habit demonstrates that time conditions the lived experience of community. One can, therefore, speak of a time of the community—its past, present and future—even though Walther herself does not explicitly develop this possibility.

The Phenomenology of Social Communities

I will focus on Walther’s claim concerning the habit of community. Limited space prevents me from undertaking here a full exposition of her phenomenology of community, rich as it may be. I would, however, like to highlight some significant points about her theory of community in order to situate what she intends by the habitus of community. The essential experience of community, according to Walther, is marked primarily by a certain form of consciousness, which she calls the lived experience of Einigung, or oneness. Communities are constituted by human beings who are conscious of and united with one another, resulting in the experience of oneness. (OSG, 132) In commu-

\(^{21}\) See Husserl’s Fifth Meditation in *Cartesian Meditations*, (tr.) D. Cairns (Den Haag: Dordrecht, 1977).
nity, the consciousness of Einigung is described as intentional (OSG, 48ff.); that is, it is directed toward a specific object: either the community itself or the objects that a community shares in common. In the case of the former, a community can intend itself as an object of consciousness. For example, Canadians have an awareness of themselves as Canadians, which allows them to identify themselves with their fellow Canadians as well as to distinguish themselves, say, from Americans. In the case of the latter, a community may have an intentional object other than itself. For example, a nation may be aware that it has to act collectively in order to achieve a certain end. Members of that nation share an awareness of the necessity imposed by, and perhaps the urgency of addressing, the problem at hand. Here, the task becomes the object of communal consciousness. This twofold distinction leads to a further development in Walther’s analysis of the intentional-ity that marks community-consciousness: there are noetic and noematic sides to the oneness, which ultimately determine the quality of communal consciousness.

For Walther, the noetic dimension of the oneness of a lived experience of community is constituted by three vital aspects or moments of the subject: the I-centre, the self and the basic essence (Grundwesen). (OSG, 56) Here, she draws from the work of her mentor, A. Pfänder.22 Along with Husserl, Scheler and Geiger, Pfänder was one of the founders of the phenomenological movement, though he is better known for his work in psychology than in Real-Phänomenologie. According to Walther, community is always rooted in the consciousness of individual egos; it is not a self-sustaining entity that lies above and beyond the individual consciousness of community members. Each member or subject of a community is the locus of the community. The experience of the “we” of community lies in the I. An individual ego can experience “we” intentionality, but in order to do so there must be a conscious ego. Every member of a community possesses this basic subjective structure.

The I-centre is described as a kind of light or flame that animates the centre of the subject; a centre of activity and receptivity, it is the locus of experience. One is reminded here of Husserl’s treatment of the pure ego that stands behind all experience, but is not visible to consciousness. The self, distinguished from the I-centre, is the product of a collection of experiences that endure, and are organised and reorganised, in order to serve as the basis for key human aspects such as personal identity, history and memory. The I-centre can seize the

sense of what it is to be a self, and it can isolate a sense or essence of what it is. In short, the basic essence or nature refers to the constitutive sense or meaning of what it is to be a subject that is an I-centre as well as a self. All three levels of the human being are described as a series of Russian dolls, each of which opens up and contains the other. Each of these moments is inseparable from the totality of the human subject; these three aspects constitute a unity (Dreieinheit). (OSG, 56)

This threefold subject is capable of intending the essence of the lived experience of community as oneness among members, on both the conscious and unconscious levels. The subject lives community both passively and actively; that is, it lives community as both a *habitus* and directly as intentional consciousness. More will be said about this later. The members of a community carry out social acts (willing, feeling, thinking, ethical and political acts), all of which are accompanied by an intentional or habitual consciousness.

The noematic aspect of community refers to the objects of communal consciousness. Here, the object of intentional consciousness is understood as what “we” as a community either intend about ourselves or or what we do, think, believe, feel, doubt, etc. For example, Canadians feel x, y or z about the role of Québec in Confederation. The feeling is the object of intentional we-consciousness. Walther is very faithful to the Husserlian noesis-noema structure laid out in *Ideas I*. The objects of communal consciousness become the things felt, thought, perceived, resented, willed, synthesised, etc. Again, the object is intended by individual egos, but the fact that it is experienced communally distinguishes it from a solitary egoic object of consciousness. There is a oneness, or similarity or identity, among the community members’ objective consciousnesses. More precisely, the communally intended noema is not merely derived from a synthesis of individual members’ objective consciousnesses (i.e., A + B + C + D...), but is the totality or sum of the relations (*Summe dieser Beziehungen*) between A, B, C, D... (OSG, 97) Walther emphasises that there arises in communal consciousness a “Gegenständlichkeit sui generis, die ihren eigenen Sinn, ihr eigenes Sein und ihre eigenen Gesetze hat [an objectivity sui generis that has its own sense, its own being and its own laws]....” (OSG, 97)

In addition to the noematic structure described above, the lived experience of community also entails a reciprocal effect of one member on the other, which Walther calls a *Wechselwirkung*. (OSG, 132) This reciprocating communal effect can be seen fully in various forms, for example, in a communal life that is influenced by an object or unifying sense. This is the most basic level of the reciprocal exchange of effects. According to Walther, the higher level of community is concretised in
knowledge about the communal life and the inner unity of the members, and this knowledge brings to the fore an understanding of the community itself as a higher, unified structure. (OSG, 132) The members of the community live, experience (erleben) and comport themselves in such a manner that they act and are structured by the “sense” of the community as well as by those people and structures (i.e., social acts) that act in the “name” of the community. (OSG, 103ff.) This reciprocal structuring can be done by individuals in the community, for not all members of the community have to be involved all at once. It can also be done by certain organs of the community, such as representative bodies. Finally, the lived experience of the members of the community can be reciprocally structured through various leaders of the community. (OSG, 132) Walther points out that the life of the community can also be concretised internally and externally. In the case of the former, individual members of the community influence and affect one another, whereas in the latter, communities affect one another; that is, one community can affect the life of another. Finally, Walther notes that the life of the community comes to be symbolised, preserved and transmitted through various symbols, conventions and “products,” including specific forms of art, folklore, myth, religion, literature, language, politics, ethics, etc. (OSG, 132) It should be remarked that these products or productions are considered to be extensions or embodiments (Verkörperungen) of the life—the spirit—of the community. They are embodied and often are material objects, but they also incorporate the metaphysical reality of the life of the community. Although one cannot reduce the life of the community to its products, one can use symbols to negotiate, represent, transmit and sustain it.

The Habitus and Gewohnheit of Community

In this description of the basic structure of the lived experience of community, one detects a heavy emphasis on consciousness and activity: community members are aware of a basic unity between them; active intentionality figures prominently; knowledge of the community marks the highest structural forms of community; there is an awareness of mutual affectivity; and there are social acts. Given Husserl’s deep awareness of the passive elements that go into and structure our understanding of our own subjectivity, our knowledge and our sense of the world, it is no surprise that Walther, too, attends to the passive structures that inform community, including the unconscious, the subconscious, habit or Gewohnheit. Walther uses the Latin habitus, and sometimes the German Gewohnheit, to characterise the passive life of community, that is, community that is not purely deter-
 mined by consciousness alone (a more Hegelian claim). Both the German and the Latin are translations of the Greek *hexis*, which means a certain way or mode of being that persists or endures. Rather than a constant state of being by which an individual can be categorised, habit refers to how one typically or continually lives or dwells in one’s being. Habits are formed from a passive awareness as well as an active consciousness, but they are usually lived passively insofar as we are not generally aware of them; that is, our habits do not normally become intentional objects of our awareness. Yet these habits deeply influence the way we experience, presentify and live community.

Walther accords a prominent place to habits and their passive structuring force on the lived experience of community. The inner life of a community is marked by an inner oneness (*innere Einigung*) which is constituted at various grades, layers or levels: lower to higher, less complex to more complex, passive to active. The habitual lived experience of oneness finds itself between a mere, but nonetheless intentional, awareness (*blose Zusammenwachsen*) of being together, and the intentional, and therefore noetic, experience of community firmly rooted in knowledge. Unlike Husserl, who averred certain claims regarding a natural, low-lying intersubjectivity, Walther makes no claims for the possibility of naturally occurring or given communities. Communities are primarily possible because they are intentional and conscious. They derive their sense through conscious, lived experience. Vital to Walther’s account of the habitual oneness of communities is the centrality of the I, understood as a conscious centre. Once the I experiences and understands itself as part of community, and understands the sense or life of community in general, it has fully intended a particular noema about its own subjective life as unified with others. This active consciousness, the starting point of any community, is then collected as part of the general stream of consciousness, which becomes embodied in consciousness and can either be remembered or can fall back into habit. The lived experience of community is absorbed into the stuff of consciousness and is, therefore, preserved at a passive level (as opposed to the active level of consciousness).

The difference between active and passive consciousness is marked by temporality. Here, temporality is understood primarily as duration in consciousness\(^{23}\), both active and passive. In intentional,

\(^{23}\) *Der noetische (erlebnissmässige) Umfang einer habituellen Einigung als solcher (natürlich auch eines beliebig anderen habituellen Erlebnisses) würde sich dann nach dem Umfang der Erlebnisse bestimmen, bei denen es in dieser Weise wieder anklingt. Seine Dauer aber würde sich u. a. bemessen*
active consciousness, the oneness of community endures, but it does so vividly and intensely for a finite period of time. Traces of this experience are preserved in memory. Even an unconscious experience of low-level community can only have sense if it is brought to some form of consciousness. Once the I-centre has experienced community as oneness, it understands its sense. But is community dependent only upon an active, intended consciousness of it?

Walther thinks not. Active consciousness of community is marked by an intentionality that has the oneness of community as its object. The intentional object stands directly before the I-centre of consciousness. In habit, the I is also the main point of reference, but the sense of the intentional object now fades behind the I-centre; it is not in a direct, face-to-face encounter with the I. (OSG, 46) Walther here describes the oneness of community as literally being in the background or behind the I-centre. As such, it continues to influence the I, though passively. It is memory, or recollection (Rückerinnerung), that holds the oneness of community in this habitual Hintergrund. (OSG, 34–37) Memory here is to be understood as the passive retainer of the stream of consciousness. (OSG, 37) It allows traces of active lived experiences to endure and to continue to have meaning. It is also the place to which elements are drawn to form continual syntheses in active consciousness. Because, for Walther, intentionality always implies an I-centre actively directing the gaze of consciousness toward an object, she does not speak of intentionality in habitual consciousness. In habit, there is no direct movement of the I-centre toward an object. It is only when active consciousness draws intentionally from memory, that is, in the conscious act of remembering the past, that we have intentionality. (OSG, 35)

Furthermore, Walther is careful to distinguish habit from acts of memory. Remembering is an act of consciousness whereby the I intends an object, bringing it to the fore of consciousness. In remembering, one intentionally activates what lies passive in memory. The I becomes central again. With habits, the content of consciousness lies always behind the I, though it continues to have an effect; habits are embodied and endure—when not activated, the oneness of the community simply endures behind the I-centre. Drawing upon Pfänder’s work, Walther gives love as an example of the habitual aspect of oneness that marks the life of a community. (OSG, 44–48) Love passively or habitually endures in a relationship; one is not always and actually

nach dem zeitlich erstreckten Teil des Erlebnisstromes, *in dem es noch mitklingen kann, ohne einer neuen Aktualisierung zu bedürfen.* (OSG, 40, my emphasis)
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aware of it. Rather, a habit of love is embodied in the members of the community, at various constitutive layers of human and social existence, which allows that love to endure. It is only because one has the habit of community that one can claim that the oneness of community need not be constantly intended and activated. A community may very well be passive. Moreover, not all members of a community need actively to intend oneness in order for the experience of community to persist.

Walther makes clear that though the habit of community is passive, it nevertheless continues to influence the life of individual members of a community and the community in general. (OSG, 48, 136) In fact, habit plays a constitutive role in community.

One is reminded here of Husserlian *Vergemeinschaftung*, which has both active and passive elements. The active parts of community are built through empathy and mutual exchange between subjects in the world, which result in higher-order objectivities. But community also happens in passive synthesis, according to Husserl, especially as subjects develop senses of themselves: their feelings, drives, impressions, instincts, etc.

An example of what Walther intends by habitual oneness can be seen in the language with which she describes habitual community, namely, *Ruhe*—quiet or rest. One thinks of a community of friends. Here, there is an intense, active component of awareness, as when friends demonstrate their love for one another by exchanging gifts, but friends can also habituate to the experience of the oneness of their friendship without constantly intending it. In this case, rather than explicit awareness, there is an habitual dwelling together in quiet security. Habitual oneness can also be found in ethical communities. For example, a religious community may develop a particular habitual behaviour that marks the way members of the community behave, interact and relate to one another; they may not, however, always be conscious of their comportment. But this habit is not only of a certain way of being as individuals; it is also a habitual way of experiencing oneself as one in the community of religious believers.
Walther’s treatment of the habitual oneness of community may strike the reader as overly ego-centric (even though habits reside in the background of the I-centre) and too rooted in consciousness. Habits are formed in consciousness and are then assimilated into the background of the general stream of consciousness. One is reminded of the background of Searle’s social ontology and theory of mind. One may speak of traces of oneness as properly constitutive of Walther’s notion of habit. I wonder, however, whether there can be an habitual oneness. It seems to me that Walther is right to postulate that communities exist even though their members may not always or fully be aware of the life or experience of community. Drawing from Searle, however, one could counter that members are always reminded that they are in community by the constant signs and products of the community’s existence. In The Construction of Social Reality, language plays a significant role in the construction of communities. Searle cites the example of marriage: one utters a promise that is prescribed and validated by law, and recognised by the community. Interestingly, Searle contends that there are signs—linguistic and objective—that help us recognise the existence of a community. These signs are practical, external and material. In the case of marriage, there are licences, rings, events, ways of speaking, poetry, even tax forms, that constantly and actively remind us of what marriage means and, by extension, how we experience or live it. It is by the constant and active recognition and remembering of such signs—linguistic and social conventions—that we recognise that we are in a community. To employ the language of Austin, perhaps we perform community each and every time we recognise, consciously and unconsciously, these signs. The failure to actively and constantly recognise these signs or to intend or be aware of them, need not mean that we have become habituated to them. We may abide together as a community in quiet or silence or rest (Ruhe), but does this necessarily imply a habit of oneness? Perhaps there is simply a being together, a kind of association with no direct awareness of communal oneness. Perhaps, and contrary to Walther, it is active, conscious recognition, remembering and reference to such signs on which the continuing survival of a social community depends. It could be argued that her claim that habituation is foundational for community is exaggerated; rather, what is required is the continual activation of communal consciousness through its signs, products and feelings. For example, if friends or lovers do not recog-

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25 Ibid., 59–78.
nise or activate the signs and products of their communal oneness, these relations can easily wither and die.

Walther might counter such a criticism by remarking that her analysis of habit does not primarily refer to the external realities of communities. She, too, would agree that a community can be symbolised and objectified in ethical, social and political, as well as linguistic conventions and products. We noted this earlier in her treatment of symbols. All of these signs can indeed be active, conscious reminders or intentional objects of living in community. When Walther refers to habit, however, she is referring to the inner experience of community—what it is for us to live through the experience of community in consciousness, as a presentification (Vergegenwärtiging). Memory and recognition, understood as active, intentional, noetic acts of consciousness, require material (hylê) in order to become active. They draw this material from the stores of retained memories, which are embodied and manifested in habits. Memories are not only a series of retained images or signs triggered by present moments, as Anscombe argues; 26 they also condition the way we embody complex structures, including communal, ethical and political ones. Consciousness is capable of retaining memories, and these memories continue to have sense and to affect us. They can become embodied in the form of habits. We are all familiar with body-memory, in which the body manifests certain habits even though one may not be aware of them.

For example, the body habituates to specific physical stimuli, such as caffeine. If caffeine is removed, the body longs for it. Another example: those who have suffered amputation often report feeling in the body part that has been removed. The body has a habit of being configured in a particular way, with particular limbs, which, when removed, continue to be experienced as present and constitutive of the sense of the body. The same argument can be made for the inner experience of community. Friends, lovers or members of a group may dwell together, without exchanging words or signs. But they know they are together as one. We know that a habit of togetherness forms because once it is ruptured, either by conflict or death, one experiences a profound loss or undeniable change—a change that is lived, bodily, psychically and spiritually (geistlich). The death of a lover, for example, results in an acute awareness of how one is used to existing and relating in the world. Lovers often think as a couple, and the sudden loss of one partner brings to an end that intimate or inner experience of thinking and living as one.

Habits are the structures whereby memories continue to passively influence and structure our ways of being, thus giving duration to that being. We may not always actively know or recognise that we are in community, but we possess some kind of habitual knowledge about our ongoing communal existence that is not only externalised in objective concretions of community, but is concretised inwardly as a habit of the oneness that marks the essence of communities. For Walther, Searle’s account is too externally based and fails to recognise the inner sense of community that habit helps preserve.

The Inner Time Consciousness of the Community and Communal Memory

Gerda Walther’s analysis of habit lays the groundwork for deepening the phenomenological account of time and memory qua their communal import and reality. Walther insists that the lived experience of community can be apprehended only by individuals. There can be no community outside the individual sphere because there is no supra-individual. The primacy of the I is critical for Walther. At the same time, however, there are “we” lived experiences that are “sui generis.” The I can experience itself as part of a “we,” can mutually influence and be influenced by others and be aware of this reciprocal influence or effect of each on the other. The I can execute a conscious act of remembering. It can also remember itself as part of the life of the community. But when the I carries out this act of memory, is only the object communal? In other words, do we have only a communal memory presentified in the consciousness of the I? Walther helps us see that, in addition to this I, there is also a “we”-memory that draws from a “we” or communal habitus.

If the inner sense of community is grounded not only in intentionality or active consciousness, but also in habit, then we must admit that it is not only the I that has habits, but the we-life of the community also has habits (Gewohnheiten). It is the very capacity for habit that allows community to endure even when individuals do not actively intend it. At the same time, the implications of this account of habit can be extended to the life of the “we.” The “we” has its own habitus. The community not only endures habitually in individuals, but “we the community” also have collective or communal habitus in addition to our merely individual ones.

Let me explain. To follow Walther’s account, habitus or Gewohnheit can be read as a transcendental structure that makes possible the persistence of community in individuals even though they may not be aware of being or living in community at a given time. One retains
traces of the objective oneness of community. But if community is
determined not only by intentional objects that we collectively experi-
ence as intended, but also by a noetic structure, as Walther claims
when discussing the intentionality of the community qua knowledge,
one can rightly postulate a communal habitus, or we-habit. We collec-
tively experience the oneness that marks community in a passive
sense, as habit, but this lived experience can also be a means of ac-
counting for the reality of communal habits that deeply influence the
community as a whole, as a togetherness. Insofar as the oneness of
community is habitual, what is passively stored and manifested as
habit was once experienced in the present as an intentional object of
consciousness but is now retained in the past in the hylē of habit. It can
be activated in memory and made present again; it can be lived and
relived intensely in consciousness, again and again. Here, one can
think of the Nachverstehen of Husserl. Habit, as a locus for traces of
communal noesis and noemata, becomes vital for inner time con-
sciousness. It is the structural retainer of the passive oneness of com-
munity, and it can be drawn upon to anticipate future possibilities for
the community.

If the community is marked by having an intentional object, name-
ly, oneness, it also can also intend this object. The community is con-
sciously aware and capable of collective intentionality and, therefore,
it can think, doubt, will, feel, etc. Inner time consciousness not only
structures individual consciousness, its acts and objects, but the life of
the community as well. The community has an internal time con-
sciousness that is related to, but distinct from, the inner time con-
sciousness of the individual. Walther’s notion of habit shows how the
lived experience of the oneness that determines a community is first
consciously experienced in the present and then recedes to the back-
ground of the I and is retained there as a trace of what once was. The
members of the community can draw upon these past retentions and
future protentions that give sense to the living in the present of the
community. Habit allows the oneness of community to be retained as
past, but as a past that can be drawn forward in the present as well as
in the future. We can understand, here, what it would mean for a
community to apprehend its collective history. We can understand
why a communal history continues to be meaningful to a community
or nation. Habit reveals a temporal structure at play in the collective
intentional life of a community.

To give an example, a community of British citizens may actively
recall moments of oneness that typify their sense of what it is to be a
community of British. It is habit that retains the material that the
present act of remembering draws forward into present conscious-
ness. The memory persists in consciousness because it can be anticipated or pro-tended for a certain duration of time. The sense of the community's oneness, and how it is lived in particular circumstances, is dependent upon a communal operation of time; the members of the community recollect together now. Individual members can, of course, do this on their own, but this would constitute an act of individual recollection rather than a remembering together.

Another example of the manifestation of a communal sense of inner time can be seen in public acts of communal commemoration. The public memorials following the tragedy of 9/11 or acts of commemoration of the war dead are forms or expressions of the life of communities in which the members of the community intentionally and communally remember the past and the communal sense of loss and grief. In order to do so, the community collectively draws upon the memories of community that are passively retained as traces in habit. By intentionally remembering, the traces of memory that are localised in habit become clearer, more meaningful, and can thus be lived through intensely once again. More senses (Sinne) may accrue to these acts of memory and their respective content if we continue to practise our phenomenological reductions. In sum, to extend Husserl's thought, we can distinguish between the retention, the present-moment and the protention of the individual and those of a collectivity or community. In the case of the latter, members of a community not only experience the past, the present and the future of themselves and one another as individuals, but also what it means for a "we" or a community to live through the communal experience of the past, the present and the future, understood as a oneness. It is only by positing a communal inner time consciousness that we can understand what it is for a community to understand itself in and through its history (i.e., the time of the past), in the present (i.e., the now of the Gegenwart), and in relation to its future (i.e., through the protentive structure of consciousness). The traditional account of empathy or Einfühlung guarantees that each individual can understand the mind of another as intentional rays are directed to individual consciousness, and the content gleaned from the intentionality is represented in the mind of the conscious I in an analogical fashion. But, here, the rays move from person to person; the emphasis in the account of empathy is on a highly individualised or egoic person. The primacy of one's own ego-logical presentifications is central. In the account of we-consciousness and we-intentionality, the emphasis shifts as the intentional rays are directed to a collective or communal object of consciousness, namely, the content of the we-life; this communal object of consciousness is subject to phenomenological analysis.
Walther's treatment of habit not only opens up the inner temporal dimension of community but also creates the possibility for communal memories. That which is retained passively as communally habitual, namely, the oneness of the community, can be made more actively present and more clearly defined through intentional “we” acts of remembering. By focussing our acts of recollection on the passive content that is stored in traces of habit, we can intensify, once again and anew, what was already lived through in the past. The memory evoked is communal, as it belongs not only to the individual members of the community but at the same time is experienced as being one for all members of the community. For instance, communities of various nationals experience the communal joy of victory at an international sporting event, say, the World Cup. An individual can later recall his or her feelings of pride at a past victory, but he or she can also remember the experience of living through this victory together with others, as a community. Also, communities can feel their own dissolution as a community, especially in dark times, as they recall from past memories former senses and lived experiences of togetherness and feelings of oneness that no longer are the case; instead, these feelings are replaced by present feelings of disunity and a collective sense of the breakdown of the community and its life.

A counter-argument to the notions of a communal inner time consciousness and communal memory might be based on the structure of subjective consciousness itself. Ultimately, the community can only be experienced by the individual ego. It could be the case, then, that what the ego experiences as genuinely communal, in my and Walther's account, is simply an analogical extension or projection by an individual's consciousness. In other words, the lived experience of the “we” might simply be an inference: The we-experience is possible only insofar as individuals extend what they feel to all other subjects, and hence the Waltherian emphasis on oneness and similarity. I project this experience onto to others, but this projection does not constitute the experience of all of us together. In other words, I imagine what it would be like for others to have the same experience as my own. I want to counter this contention by pointing to the concrete products and conventions of a community. It is at this point that a strong externalist argument, as advocated by Searle and others, comes in very handy.

The products, symbols or conventions that a community employs in order to register and concretise its communal desires, wishes, ends, limits, pleasures, etc., are not arbitrary. Were they so, they would fail to have any sense for the members of the community. In fact, it is because these social objectivities have meaning precisely as communal
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or higher objectivities that they continue to be maintained and used. The objects of a community are useful and serve as evidence of a communal lived experience and a communal sense of time—think of history concretised in monuments, rituals, traditions; think of future projects of communities; recall the maintenance of the past through archives and public art, etc. Community members interact and intend these objects, understanding their meaning for all members of the community. This points to the fact that my knowing the sense of a given object as communal is not only my own, für-mich or eigen, as Husserl aptly reminds us, but also mit- und für-einander.27 One can distinguish between what is properly one's own and what is the community's. I can know this, too. I can understand my own interpretation of the law, but I can also understand the received, communal interpretation of the same law. Communal consciousness, communal inner time consciousness, communal memory, as well as communal habit, are necessary to prevent our lapsing into an irresolvable solipsism. Moreover, the reality of the life of the community, even though it is expressed in and through its individual members, faithfully accounts, in part, for the things themselves that belong to the communal life. Thus does Gerda Walther's phenomenological account of consciousness richly contribute to an understanding of how the conscious living of the individual coincides with the conscious living of the community.28

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27 See his "Introduction" to the Cartesian Meditations.
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