and should be complemented with external conditions (e.g., the embodied sense of self-agency and self-ownership as well as the social context of action).

Ricoeur’s social and political philosophy, his critique of psychoanalysis, philosophy of law, as well as hermeneutics in dialogue with Confucianism and feminism are the central themes of the volume’s final section. The task of philosophy today, writes Gary B. Madison, is to reveal how cultures can enter into dialogue with each other while attempting to discover values common to all. Hermeneutics assumes this task by asking how to reconcile universality with particularity. This question is central to Ricoeur’s social philosophy, which can be characterized as an attempt to reveal how national cultures can preserve their own heritage while participating in the progression of globalization. The hermeneutic task of reconciling the idea of a single humanity with the notion of cultural difference demands that we acknowledge that certain norms possess transcultural validity. A global ethic suited to our age requires a deconstruction of the opposition between dogmatic ethnocentrism and relativistic culturalism. This is achieved with Ricoeur’s notion of “contextual universals,” a notion that reconciles universality with particularity by means of a “dialogue of civilizations.” By seeking to bring Ricoeur’s hermeneutics into dialogue with Confucianism, Madison himself contributes to this dialogue. Madison’s essay also criticizes Ricoeur on two issues: the distinction between ethics and morality, as drawn in *Oneself as Another*, and Ricoeur’s early views on economics.

Much remains to be said about this voluminous collection of essays. Considering the astonishing range of themes, *Between Suspicion and Sympathy* cannot be entirely accounted for in a brief review. As Wierciński points out, this volume is a true “celebration of the confusion of voices and the fusion of horizons.” This multiplicity of voices is indeed a major strength of a volume dedicated to a philosopher who, in some seventy creative years, has left behind more than 1300 articles. Undoubtedly, this collection of essays, representing the reception of Ricoeur’s work in eleven countries, contributes enormously to contemporary hermeneutic scholarship.

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*Edith Stein: Patrona d’Europa [Edith Stein: Patron Saint of Europe]*
ANGELA ALES BELLO
Edizioni Piemme (Religione), Casale Monferrato (AL), 2000.

On the occasion of Edith Stein’s canonization by Pope John Paul II on 21 November 2000, Angela Aies Bello wrote: “[T]he themes that I have treated briefly in this book are intended as mere openings on the vast ocean of her thought, and an exemplification of her analyses, which I hope to be of help in knowing her works in a deeper way” (9). No better description of her *Edith Stein: Patron Saint of Europe* could be given. This book is a synthetic, clear, careful selection of issues excerpted from Stein’s rich collection of writings, the originality of which Ales Bello highlights. In this sense, her intellectual biography of Stein (1891–1942) represents a critical anthology of
some of the highest theoretical achievements of the Patron Saint of Europe, and a historical commentary on their importance, with special regard to the philosophical context within which they came to light.

Ales Bello's book moves along two tracks, one theoretical and the other historical. The two tracks intermingle throughout the text, combining sketches of Stein's speculative accomplishments, references to the philosophers with whom she exchanged ideas (such as Edmund Husserl and Hedwig Conrad-Martius) or by whom she was influenced (St. Augustine and St. Thomas), descriptions of the personal reality in which her major philosophical insights took form, and cross-references to her many writings. In addition to this, a third element lies clearly in the background of Ales Bello's *Edith Stein*—and this is hagiography. Ales Bello aims at reconstructing the itinerary that led Stein to become a Saint of the Roman Catholic Church. Her selection of issues exhibits a preoccupation with unveiling the close connection between Stein's philosophy and her mysticism. This tight link between reason and faith does not imply that Stein's philosophy has no value, but rather that if one tries to probe the motives, the interests, and the tasks that characterized Stein's activity, it is necessary to appreciate the religious dimension present in all of her work. Philosophy, in other words, is just one kind of intellectual exercise, in which Stein proved to be exceptional. This exercise of philosophy belonged to an all-encompassing spiritual experience, within which philosophy worked as an instrument to understand the many faces of the Christian tradition, as well as a tool to verbalize mystical knowledge.

The first chapter of Ales Bello's book is devoted to phenomenology. It is in fact within this school of thought, and precisely under the guidance of its founder, Edmund Husserl, that Edith Stein grew as a philosopher. As Ales Bello stresses, however, in spite of this direct supervision, there existed major theoretical differences between Stein and her mentor. Already with her earliest studies on empathy, Stein had moved beyond Husserl. More precisely, Stein claimed that the human disposition toward intersubjectivity carried relevant ontological implications that Husserl had not recognized. Stein proposed a fundamental reconsideration of the ontological assumptions of phenomenology, and this eventually led her to join the Goettingen group, who were working out a realist interpretation of phenomenology. Bello stresses Stein's adherence to phenomenological realism, because this departure from Husserl's position shows a deep concern for the existent or, in Stein's own terms, for "the constitution of an evident nature [in which] there are a physical nature absolutely evident on one side, and a subjectivity structured in a certain manner on the other side" (42). Stein wanted to move beyond the scepticism of the phenomenological epoché and the idealism that Husserl saw as the only solution to this scepticism. She wanted to achieve something more real and worthy of commitment than the transcendental epistemological structures that Husserl hypothesized. This "something" became the goal of her entire life, says Ales Bello, a goal that Stein assumed not only in the name of the natural but, more ardently, in the name of the supernatural.

Chapter 2 introduces Stein's theology and her mysticism. As an expert on St. Augustine's thought—and even more, as a member of the Carmelite Order—Stein realized that modern philosophy had too quickly and cavalierly dispensed with the experience of God that human beings can attain in their lifetime. Instead of rejecting
it on strict and perhaps narrow-minded epistemological grounds, Stein stressed that it is necessary that such an experience be fully explored by the philosopher. If faith is kept constantly in the background as the prime source of enlightenment, then philosophy can become an extraordinary tool of inquiry. Consistently with this picture, Stein took the unprecedented step of applying phenomenological analysis to mystical experience. Teresa d’Avila and the Fathers of the Church became accessible to her philosophical scrutiny, which accepted the peculiar evidence of faith as intellectually admissible.

The third chapter deals with a second, apparently odd, field of philosophical scrutiny: solidarity. I say “odd” because solidarity has only recently become a fashionable term among philosophers, whereas it was scarcely considered in Stein’s time by her colleagues. The novelty of the issue did not prevent Stein from pursuing this kind of study, which Ales Bello considers a direct consequence of Stein’s original works on empathy. According to Ales Bello, empathy was for Stein an undeniable human phenomenon that necessarily entailed intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity required certain fundamental assumptions regarding the ontology of the human being. As a realist, Stein was ready to make such assumptions: intersubjectivity implied the acceptance of a community of individuals as a starting point for phenomenological research. Having accepted this as a starting point, an entirely new field of concepts could be explored by the phenomenologist (e.g., person, community, society, subjective and objective interrelations, state and politics). Solidarity was eventually to be analyzed in relation to such concepts as these, and Stein concluded with the discovery that a fundamental openness toward others underlies the development of all human behavior.

The book’s fourth chapter introduces a further original topic in Stein’s philosophy: femininity. In this regard, Ales Bello underlines the personal motives that made Stein aware of the need for a systematic reflection on the condition of women. As an academic, as a nun, and as a Jew converted to Catholicism, Stein had known many forms of discrimination, all of which had the same root: gender. Moreover, from her work as an educator of adolescents, Stein acquired sufficient evidence to furnish detailed gender typologies which could be used to explain, condemn, or even justify many of the various forms of division and characterization existing between the sexes. Once more, Stein used phenomenological analysis in a new way. Her starting point remained Husserl’s anthropological phenomenology, but she supplemented this anthropology to construct a “dual anthropology” (68) in which she described the “two species [of] the human essence ... the male species and the female species” (69). Both species were provided with an identical set of faculties, but they were distinguished by the way these faculties were utilized—the male tending to select single specific faculties and maximize them against the others, the female tending to unify the various faculties and implement them harmonically.

Chapter 5 outlines a second major theological topic of Stein’s: the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. This time it was not a new topic to be discussed, but rather an old topic to be rediscovered and revisited. Stein believed that only a serious reconsideration of the great authors of the Christian tradition could supply an effective response to the process of secularization that Europe was undergoing at the time, as well as to the pervasive atheism that was spreading across the continent. Philosophy and theology
were to be developed together, and Stein rethought the notion of truth under this double light. In fact, she identified two forms of philosophy: "pure" and "mixed." Pure philosophy did not accept any external influence and, consequently, remained within the limits of natural reason. Mixed philosophy, on the other hand, faced problems that lie beyond the scope of natural reason, without rejecting the illumination provided by faith. Stein obviously proceeded along the line of the latter form of philosophy, pursuing a harmonization of reason and faith, in the true spirit of Saint Thomas's thought. Stein thought it necessary to reevaluate the notion of transcendentism through a phenomenological analysis of the self. As anticipated in the first chapter, Stein took into consideration the particular, religious, or mystical evidence that individuals might attain by reflecting on their own inner experiences. She argued in favor of the cognitive validity of this internal ground of proof, from which she derived a number of most dramatic ontological consequences, including the existence of God.

The sixth chapter deals with Stein's "adversary": Martin Heidegger. Ales Bello portrays Heidegger in this way not only with respect to the theoretical challenge that Stein posed to his philosophy, but also for biographical reasons, since Heidegger was probably responsible for Stein's exclusion from German academia. Ales Bello argues that, from the speculative point of view, Stein and Heidegger embody two antagonistic attitudes toward the notion of being: the former is convinced of the constant presence of being behind the existent, while the latter stresses the oblivion and remoteness of being. The question of the limits of philosophy is also perceived quite differently by the two authors. Stein favors a pluralistic and open solution, i.e., by relying on the contributions of other disciplines (such as biology and religion). Heidegger instead inclines toward a declaration of the "death of metaphysics," a passive acceptance of the impotence of philosophy—yet waiting for a new revelation of being operated by being itself. It would seem that both Heidegger and Stein are trying to find a way out of the limitations of philosophy by referring to some form of revelation, but they have two very different ways of "listening to" this revelation of being: Stein thinks that it is present and accessible while Heidegger places it in an undetermined future. Stein also offered an interesting criticism of Heidegger's notion of Dasein. Sketching it briefly, Stein noted that Dasein's related notions of "affective condition," "thrownness," "understanding," and "authenticity," which play a fundamental role in determining that which Dasein is like, imply the characterization of Dasein as a person and, a fortiori, the institution of a philosophical anthropology, which Heidegger claimed to have avoided in *Being and Time*. Stein offered a further criticism of Heidegger's philosophy with regard to the notion of community. She accused Heidegger of endorsing an overly negative characterization of it. He depicted community as the place of inauthenticity, dejection, and alienation of the self. Stein replied that a community is required to develop the self and to sustain the self before, during, and after the achievement of full self-consciousness. After all, if authenticity must be gained through the angst connected with the experience of mortality, then such an experience, and the intellectual resources necessary to face it, can be found by the self only within the context of the community of which the self is a member and in which such an epiphany takes place.
Chapter 7 briefly summarizes Edith Stein’s ontology. Ales Bello starts again by distinguishing between Husserl, who was primarily concerned with the transcendental conditions for human knowledge, and Stein, whose work aimed at finding a way out of his phenomenological idealism. In this direction, Stein revisited medieval debates on the essence of being; she came to criticize the notion of essence as mere generality, endorsing a strongly realist position. Essence has a double essence: essentiality and essence in the actual world. The former responds to the usual nominalist characterization of essence as generality, or as an intellectual archetype. The latter is instead the equivalent of a classical Scholastic form, i.e., the organizational principle of a substance, or its distinctive quid.

The eighth chapter sketches Stein’s epistemological exploration of the phenomenon of human consciousness. Revisiting the Cartesian doctrine of the cogito, Stein individuates three immediate findings attainable through the act of cogitatio. First, there is a being, and a being that is thinking. Thus, in the second place, there is a thinking. But then, together with these two determinations, there is a third element, which has been neglected by most modern philosophers: a “spiritual motion” (125) or “vital force” (127). In other words, together with a cogito, there is also a vivo. Following St. Augustine’s teaching, Stein starts from this vivo her itinerary ad Deum, for within the self lies the road from “the finite being” to “the eternal being” (123).

The ninth and final chapter comments more extensively on Stein’s mysticism. In Stein’s view, Teresa d’ Avila’s Internal Castle is, on faith’s side, what St. Augustine’s exploration of consciousness is on reason’s side. This text she regards as a fundamental testimony of the most peculiar experience that the believer can have during its mortal life: the experience of God within oneself. As already mentioned, such an experience Stein regards as relevant evidence for the supernatural, which cannot be easily discharged by the philosopher on the basis of materialistic prejudices or analogous intellectual preclusions derived from alternative epistemological faiths. Of course, in the case of the philosopher who intends to scrutinize this area, natural reason can play only a partial role since faith still constitutes the main ground.

In sum, Angela Ales Bello illuminates several theoretical and historical aspects of Stein’s intellectual life and provides a rich account of the religious, theological, and mystical concerns pervading Stein’s work. The religious element is at the forefront of Bello’s study; the audience for whom she writes this book is not philosophers alone, but also, if not primarily, believers who wish to be introduced to the intellectual and religious endeavors of Edith Stein. This explains why the author limits herself to a sketch of the main points of Stein’s work, leaving it to the reader to approach Stein’s texts directly.

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