The thesis of Jay Lampert’s book regarding the existence of a philosophy of history in Deleuze and Guattari’s work is provocative. Indeed, we could choose to present Deleuze and Guattari as radical anti-historicist thinkers who experiment with events that escape any form of historical determinism. If there is a motivation behind events, it is certainly not provided by historical laws. Events are not a product of cultural history. However, as Jay Lampert convincingly points out, the very terminology used by Deleuze/Guattari implies a certain vision of historical development. We have only to think here of the notions of repetition, quasi-causality and becoming, or the titles of the chapters in Thousand Plateaus to see that such transformations are a genuine concern for Deleuze/Guattari. The distinction frequently mentioned by Deleuze/Guattari between interpretation (historicism) and experimentation (empiricism) is well known. This does not prevent them from working on a new conception of history. Thus, on one side there are the traditional philosophies of history that deal with interpretations of the past, dialectical laws, causality, condition of progress, hermeneutics, crisis to overcome, etc. and, on the other, there is this new philosophy of history, which concerns “not the past, but the circulation of events.” (3)

Jay Lampert’s book raises an important, difficult and understudied issue. Important because history remains a constant concern for Deleuze/Guattari, difficult especially because their philosophy of history is linked to a philosophy of nature (chaotic forces, although not specifically studied by J. Lampert), and understudied because Deleuze’s harsh critique of Hegel along with the opposition made between history and becomings/geography were taken “too seriously.” It is not too much to say that Jay Lampert’s study contributes to opening up a new field of investigation on Deleuze’s (and Deleuze/Guattari’s) philosophy. His volume does not offer a mere succession of philosophers’ names and con-
cepts; it constitutes, rather, a real attempt to explain a very challenging conception of time and history. This is perhaps the first time that these two interrelated aspects in the work of Deleuze/Guattari are being studied systematically.

The singularity of Deleuze/Guattari’s philosophy of history lies in the delocalisation of events or, more precisely, the multi-localisation in history. They do not view history traditionally as a mere succession of facts; rather, they conceive of it as a series of simultaneous becomings. This leads Jay Lampert, who is consistently faithful to Deleuze/Guattari’s rejection of linear history, to describe the series of co-present relations in term of “succession-in-co-existence.” (156) In this sense, Deleuze/Guattari’s conception of history is an extension and explanation of Nietzsche’s famous sentence, “I am all the names of history.” How can this be? Do the great historical characters that fascinated Deleuze/Guattari (Joan of Arc, Heliogabalus, Genghis Khan, The Great Mogul—there were in fact 17 Great Moguls—etc.) not have their own (his)story? Are they not linked to their specific historical epoch or “Zeitgeist”? How can they not be mere figures from the past? How can they remain “vividly present” and even “still to come”? More importantly, perhaps, (as Jay Lampert tracks this question intensively in the last chapters of his book): “Why this now?” Why and how do such a historical date and such historical characters affect such a BwO? After reading Jay Lampert’s study, it becomes impossible to deny the presence of a new conception of time and history developed by Deleuze/Guattari, who do not hesitate to speak in terms of “historical events.” (118) The shock that the book caused (and will cause) is similar to that of Badiou’s volume on Deleuze after which (despite its controversial analysis) it became impossible to remain blind to the ontological issues at stake in Deleuzian thinking.

A number of questions crossed my mind while I was reading the book. I just want to highlight certain ones. My remarks deal mostly with past philosophers. This may be an inadequate approach to Deleuze/Guattari’s problematic of time and history since I will refer only to one wing of the bird (history of philosophy) who requires two wings to fly (philosophy/non-philosophy), as Deleuze states in the Abécédaire (letter N). The fact that Jay Lampert himself uses the comparative approach in the book with regard to Hegel and Derrida gives some legitimacy to my questions.
1. Nietzsche

My first comment deals with the notion of “untimely” used with care in the book (152, perhaps elsewhere). Nietzsche introduced to philosophy this notion of “Unzeitmässigkeit,” which etymologically refers to something that is “impossible to measure using the usual time scale.” In English, it is translated as “thoughts out of season,” “unmodern” and, more commonly, “untimely.” What makes the “untimely” untimely is that there are no ears to hear it (The Gay Science §125). In the second of his Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche seems to oppose the untimely to historicism. Similarly, Deleuze/Guattari frequently make a distinction between becomings and history. We are not simply the heirs of the past, Nietzsche and Deleuze/Guattari say, we can also and most importantly create the present. In his usual provocative way Nietzsche goes as far as to invite us to cultivate the faculty of oblivion and forget about the past in order to better experiment with the novelty and freshness of the living present. The untimely thinker is fully alive because he knows how to avoid the dangers of understanding the present in terms of past experiences. To be untimely is to be able to “fight against our age” and to become visionary.

Nietzsche vigorously denounces “the historical education of young modern people” and adds that we must “learn to live and to use history only in the service of life.” It is worth noticing that Nietzsche does not naïvely condemn historical culture. His critique, rather, concerns the excesses of the historical sense from which the present time suffers—as if having a minimum sense of historicity remained a prerequisite for becoming untimely (the real enemy is eternity). Indeed, Nietzsche frequently returns to this need for a minimum historical sense (Human, All Too Human I, Part 1, §2; The Twilight of the Idols, “Reason in Philosophy,” §1; etc.) Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari criticise historicism, but they do not see themselves as having no history or as coming from “outer-space” (as some would perhaps like to see them). They minimally need to know where they come from, where they are and where they wish to go in order to build a resistance to the present that may perhaps be considered their main concern. How can we avoid seeing this need for “untimeliness” as part of a new “historical age”? Perhaps one answer is that this type of resistance to the present is the (forgotten)
essence of philosophy itself. If so it is one of the most striking teachings of Deleuze/Guattari’s work to reconnect with this reality. By transforming all the philosophers he loved (from the Stoics to Foucault) into untimely heroes, and by avoiding speaking in terms of a division of the history of philosophy into different ages (eternity, history, untimely), Deleuze reminds us of the very nature of philosophy. He shares Nietzsche’s views on the philosophy of history and the untimely by adding certain more refined developments to it. These refinements are analysed at length by Jay Lampert.

2. Phenomenology

A major strength of Deleuze/Guattari, perhaps, is to be able to combine original philosophies of time and history. Similar examples tend to be rare in the field of contemporary philosophy. Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time-consciousness remains independent from his later philosophy of history presented in the Crisis, Bergson developed a philosophy of time without having a real philosophy of history and Foucault did the opposite by presenting an historiography without having a philosophy of time. The only other example of the co-existence of original philosophies of time and history in contemporary philosophy is found in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. In my thesis (Deleuze et la phénoménologie, Vrin/Sils Maria, 2nd ed., 2006), I presented Deleuze’s philosophy as a constant struggle against the phenomenologists. The status reserved to them is complex and unique in the Deleuzian corpus since the “science” stemming from Husserl’s works is not made the subject of a specific study, though phenomenological themes remain omnipresent in Deleuze’s development (world, body, passivity, Other, immanence, sensation, etc.). I tried to show that phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) hold a place of honour in Deleuzian drama-turgy. They fulfill a third function that is neither heroic (the subjects of Deleuze’s monographies, with the exception of Kant) nor strictly antagonistic (Hegel, Freud starting in the 1970s, Kant to some extent, and more implicitly Wittgenstein). Deleuze does not fight against phenomenology; he struggles with it, and I attempted to trace all those moments of struggle (intentionality vs. disjunction, Leib vs. BwO, mysticism vs. rationalism, Daseinsanalyse vs. schizo-analysis, etc.)

Deleuze’s battles with phenomenology find no ultimate outcome and would be perpetuated in all the books he never wrote. Deleuze re-
spected and admired his heroes, he denigrated his true enemies, but he
saw phenomenologists through the eyes of an obsessive player. At the
time I wrote my thesis (1998–2000), commentators were placing
Deleuzian philosophy within a particular category (immanence, ontol-
ogy, virtual, event, vitalism, etc.). I thought this was too limiting because
it misses a more general pattern connected to the incessant battle with
phenomenology. It is combat that is not just one among many because, as
I tried to explain, all other Deleuzians’ struggles are subordinate to the
conflicting relationship he maintains, with a kind of sadistic joy, with his
phenomenological rival. Since then I realised that, although no study of
this kind had been done, I had perhaps exaggerated the role of phenome-
nology. I realised that Deleuze provides one of the very few philosophies
that have no real centre. Jay Lampert, to be sure, avoids this mistake as
he does not reduce Deleuze/Guattari’s philosophy to a mere philosophy
of history. Even though a comparative analysis of Deleuze and Heideg-
ger is not the primary objective of his book, I think the subject may be
worth exploring. After all, and despite all their differences, Deleuze and
Heidegger both radically try to move out of the philosophies of presence
and representation, and Deleuze’s synthesis of “Mnemosyne/Habit/Eternal return” (Bergson/Hume/Nietzsche) could be seen as a
critical answer to the interconnection developed by Heidegger between
“Geworfenheit/Augenblick/Sein zum Tod” (Christianity and Kierke-
gaard).

Moreover, what both Deleuze and Heidegger have to say about
the experience of time seems marginal after their respective Hauptwerk,
but they never ceased to work intensively against the traditional concep-
tion of history (from becomings to the reformation of the utopian tradition
in the case of Deleuze; from Dasein’s historicity to the history of
metaphysics in the case of Heidegger). Finally, they both share a strong
desire to interpret history “violently” while remaining the greatest histo-
rians of philosophy of the past century. Deleuze/Guattari’s philosophy of
time and history can be considered as the “illegitimate” child of Heideg-
ger. More specifically, Deleuze and Guattari offer a secularised version
of time as an alternative to Heidegger’s temporality not mainly inspired
by religious topics (finitude, conversion, authenticity, etc.). Another ex-
ample of this Auseinandersetzung between Deleuze/Guattari and the
phenomenologists would be that “intratemporality” (22–7), which asserts
“the presence of past and future in the present,” was already being con-
sidered by certain phenomenologists. Phenomenologists and Deleuze/Guattari offer a different solution to the same problems: do away with causality and determinism.

3. Kant

Deleuze sees an “historical” shift happening with Kant: from the subordination of time to movement to the subordination of movement to time. Deleuze returns to this at least four times. Not in his monography on Kant, but later, in Difference and Repetition (chap. II), in Cinema II (chap. II), in Essays Critical and Clinical (chap. V), and in What is Philosophy? (example 2). In Cinema II, Kant is presented as the one who operates the “great reversal” (grand renversement), which extends from the classical age to modernity: from Kant onwards, time no longer depends on movement, it is movement that depends on time. (Why do we have to wait for Kant to see this great reversal happening? How does Kant bring it about? Deleuze offers no clear explanation.) The philosophical reversal finds its equivalent in modern cinema when the exploration of flux-raccords, aberrant movements, irrational cuts, discontinuity and disjunctive connections are considered normal or, as Deleuze says, when they become part of everyday life. This is perhaps the essence of the “historical” passage in cinema (dated right after the Second World War) that goes from movement-image to time-image. In the ancient world, time is motionless in the sense that it is an unceasing and uniform sequence that measures the fixed movements of celestial objects; the flow of time never changes, it is, rather, temporal objects that move. For Deleuze, Kant was the first in philosophy to see time as relative (Augustine had previously been of this opinion!) and was able to take into account aberrant movements. Kant’s conception of time as a pure form of internal intuition then becomes the first view potentially capable of assessing irregular speeds of becoming that are impossible to measure “objectively.”

In Essays Critical and Clinical, Kant’s philosophy is no longer linked to the history of cinema but rather (and apparently in a more orthodox way) to the history of the subject. Kantian time ceases to be celestial (measuring the movement of cosmic objects) and spiritual or monastic (measuring the movement of the soul in reference to Christianity): it becomes secularised. Deleuze considers Kant the first one to bring about a laic conception of time. Deleuze then sees Kant as paving the
way to an unceasing metamorphic experience of the self (quoting Rimbaud’s “I is an other”). A few questions emerge: On what grounds can we say that Kant operates the “great reversal” between time and movement? For Kant/Deleuze, what role does time play in overcoming the ontologies of the self? Seeing Kant’s conception of time as the precursor of the new cinema and forecaster of the destruction of pure self-consciousness may stem directly from Deleuze’s specific art of interpretation, which now proposes the idea of a “Kant effect.”

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WHY NO LONGER

Fadi Abou-Rihan

In his most recent book, Jay Lampert leads us back to one of Deleuze and Guattari’s most complex philosophical expositions of time and repetition without fuss or fanfare. He weaves for us an account of history that is both rich and concise. In a wonderfully honest and generous paragraph near the end of the penultimate chapter of Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, Lampert asks: “How is someone trained in philosophy supposed to know how to name even one genuine event of ‘today,’ let alone analyse one convincingly as part of his book? What qualifies someone like me to diagnose it in an interesting way, so as to avoid making amateurish or pop-postmodern pronouncements? … Does any case study, short of one that inaugurates an entirely new world-historical Regime of Signs, show what a historical event is qua event, or show in general how the now captures the ‘why?’, or how the ‘why?’ captures the now?” (154). Lampert’s poetic modesty does not preclude scholarly rigour; it reinforces it. Witness not only his illuminating digressions on Hume, Hegel, Bergson, and Derrida but, and much more encouragingly, his sense of responsibility to detail: 4 arguments for intratemporality, 13 for the pure past, and 2 for the dark precursors of the future; 4 major genealogies of the syntheses of time, 4 similarities and 6 differences with Derrida on dates, and 7 confrontations with Hegel on that selfsame topic; 13 layers to Alice’s obsession with size, 12 features to discuss in relation
to the question of why an event occurs when it does, 5 senses of “falling back into history,” and 4 elements to the theory of consistency.

Lampert unpacks a most subtle and challenging set of questions that have preoccupied, if not defined, the long tradition of Western philosophy. From Plato to Hegel, the rehabilitation of multiplicity, of difference, and indeed of chaos under the rubric of the One has had to confront the question of repetition and time, time after time, only to relegate it quite often to the status of a seduction. Contra those who have understood repetition as the reproduction in time of an origin or a preceding state of affairs, Deleuze elaborates a repetition “for its own sake” (« une répétition pour elle-même»), a repetition that accounts for that which does not return, for that which is a becoming without origin or destiny. This is a repetition that does not operate in time; it produces time. This is the repetition Lampert deploys to elucidate not one grand “Philosophy of History” but—count them—nine forms of past, of present, and of future, nine forms of succession and simultaneity, and, finally, nine “movements of the name of history.” Lampert braids his concepts, crosses them, stacks them, aligns them, serially, co-extensively, but always deftly and rigorously, in order to argue that “the succession of befores and afters is a triple by-product of there being three simultaneous simultaneities. What takes the place of the classical concept of history is nothing other than these multiple forms of co-existence with their multiple subordinate forms of serial distribution. Once it is proved that an event’s present status and its past status are independent yet simultaneous, it will follow that the succession-effects of the names of history run simultaneously, and that the past is a real place on the body.” (9)

Here, the typical questions of a philosophy of history, of a universal history, (“How come?” “Why now? “What next?”) are all questions of contingency. I believe that these questions very quickly extend into the broader concerns around memory, desire, and life. Indeed, repetition does not belong exclusively on the stage of world historical events with their progressions, interruptions, and recapitulations; repetition also pertains to the passage from one affect to the next, from one performance to the next, and from one observation to the next. A philosophy of history that takes the syntheses of time for a point of departure, a philosophy of history as thought by Deleuze and Guattari and subsequently pursued and elaborated by Lampert is hence a philosophy of psychology, of art, and of science as well. This is why Lampert’s text is neither an intro-
duction to one aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought nor is it an exhaustive account of that aspect. It is rather a plateau, as Deleuze and Guattari deployed the practice in the second volume of their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, a plateau that revisits and repeats, which is to say re-articulates, the as of yet unarticulated—or perhaps that which is beyond articulation—becoming.

I would like to take a moment and consider not Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History but Lampert’s History of Philosophy. I am convinced that Lampert is qualified to “diagnose” (and this is his term), and has indeed diagnosed, the genuine philosophical event “Deleuze-Guattari.” This is why I would like to invite him to deploy his philosophy of history as a measure and an understanding of his history of the philosophy of history, of his history of philosophy tout court, with all of its attendant simultaneities and serialities. If the past never actually dies, if, as Lampert affirms, “an event’s present status and its past status are independent yet simultaneous … [and] the past is a real place on the body” (9), what then is the status of Deleuze and Guattari’s own past on their philosophical body? What, for instance, is the status of their long-standing investments in psychoanalysis, intellectually, as with Deleuze from his *Presentation of Sacher Masoch* to *Difference and Repetition*, to both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, and clinically, as with Guattari the Lacanian-trained psychoanalyst, member of the École freudienne, and institutional psychotherapist at the La Borde clinic? I pose this question of the so-called “past” because I am not sure how to reinterpret Lampert’s deployment of the double dating of any event—that the first time it appears is when it appears for the second time—without Freud’s *Nachträglichkeit* or Lacan’s *après coups*. I am also not sure how to re-assess the discussion in *Difference and Repetition* without Deleuze’s treatment of Freud’s elaborations on the pleasure principle and its beyond as a founding mechanism of repetition. I am even less sure how to understand the syntheses of desiring production in *Anti-Oedipus* as the “motor of history” without reference to the laws of the dynamic unconscious (condensation and displacement) and their structuralist renderings (metaphor and metonymy)?

Deleuze and Guattari’s psychoanalytic past is nowhere to be seen in Lampert’s account. It has become “imperceptible.” Is it excess baggage or last year’s fashion? Is it a passing phase which, once “diagnosed,” is easily overcome? Has it been castrated and/or repressed? Has...
it been excised, sublated, or deterritorialised beyond recognition? Is it no longer? Lampert, via Deleuze and Guattari, and as far as I can observe, never poses the question of endings, of how the “why?” not only captures the “now” but can perhaps sometimes suffocate it and render it “no longer.” Why no longer?

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REFLECTIONS ON Deleuze & Guattari’s Philosophy of History OR WHAT IS REVOLUTIONARY IN DELEUZE AND GUATTARI’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY?

Eugene Holland (Ohio State University)

Deleuze’s theory of time is extremely complex, and so therefore is Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history. Doing justice to the relationship between these two complexities is one of the great virtues of Jay Lampert’s Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, the first of which is recognizing and insisting that Deleuze and Guattari indeed have a philosophy of history in the first place. There could be legitimate doubts about this, inasmuch as Deleuze and Guattari consistently express a preference for what they call becoming over what is conventionally considered history: Lampert’s book lays such doubts to rest, explicitly addressing the relationship between becoming and history. The book may even help explain the potential for revolution in history, when capitalism makes history universal by opening it to becoming, thereby altering the ratio of making history to changing history. In exploring this question, I will lean somewhat more on complexity theory and Marx’s analysis of capital than Lampert does, but my conclusion is not only, I believe, consonant with his analyses, it is in fact enabled by them.

What, then, is the difference between merely making history and actually changing it? By “making history,” I mean acting in accordance with and thereby reinforcing a causally determined chain of events. Although Lampert says at one point that “the theory of succession as causal determinacy is a theory we simply reject, on account of its erroneous as-
assumption that events have power centres sufficient to determine one result rather than another” (9), I take this to mean that causal determinacy cannot by itself constitute a complete philosophy of history: surely there are times in history when power centers do chain events into causally determined series; but there are also moments when causal explanation fails and temporal succession becomes indeterminate—moments that complexity theory calls “bifurcation points,” where power is unable to determine one result rather than another, and history is as likely to swerve off in one direction as another. This is consistent with what Lampert says later, viz. that “events still have a level of becoming even when [they are] most determinate” (139): bifurcation points occur when the level of becoming exceeds that of causal determination, and it becomes possible to change history, rather than merely make it by following the chain of causal succession. But why would the ratio of becoming to history change—and improve—so dramatically under capitalism?

Part of the answer lies in the war capitalism wages against the State. “State historical occurrences and minoritarian becomings are not two kinds of things that happen,” Lampert explains, for “[a]ny ‘innovation’ has both history and becoming co-existing within it.” (168) The difference between State history and the minoritarian becomings unleashed by capitalism is that the State “adds developments to its past, whereas [a minoritarian becoming] subtracts the codifications of its past, until it ‘has realised the immanence’ of each phenomenon.” (140) The narratives of State history retrace and reinforce the causal chains that produced and/or consolidated State rule—one sense in which history is always written by the victor—whereas minoritarian becomings strip away (or de-code) the actual determinations of the past, and restore its virtual potential to become-otherwise. But capitalism (as inherently contradictory or ambivalent) fosters such minoritarian becomings, as we shall see, just as much as it uses the State as a model of realisation to consolidate and extend its rule. Lampert will thus assert that “our struggle against capitalism is not a struggle against a state of affairs, but a struggle with the ontology of the virtual and its effectuation.” (166) So the struggle against capitalism is simultaneously a struggle with capitalism (or within capitalism) to turn its historically unparalleled mobilisation of the virtual to better account, to realise the potential of universal history.
Capitalism makes history universal by reversing the priority between production and exchange, and thereby between the virtual and the actual. Money has always been an instantiation of the virtual—purchase being the moment of actualisation of the virtual (as exchange-value). But until capitalism, production preceded exchange: the concrete determinations of a pre-existing object had to be virtualised in a first transaction so as to be instantiated in the exchange-value of money (the sale of a commodity for money: C-M in Marx’s formula), which value then gets re-actualised in other concrete determinations through the purchase of a different commodity with that money (M-C). For capital, however (whose formula is M-C-M'), all concrete determinations arise after investment decisions have been made on the hypothetical prospect of making a profit: the exchange-value of capital is not merely money’s ability to appropriate (to actualise for me) an object that was already produced, but the ability to actualise production itself. It’s not just that, unlike spiders with their webs, humans produce goods in the imagination or in “virtual reality” before producing them in actual reality, but that decisions as to if and what to produce, and as to when and how and where, are all made in the virtual realm, before a single dollar is actually invested, the first factory actually built, the first workers actually hired—only after which do the goods in all their post-hoc objective determinacy actually get produced for eventual sale and use. Capitalism makes the realm of the virtual the basis and fulcrum of much, if not all, social activity. Yet, in the course of its self-valorisation and self-expansion, capital incessantly ‘revolutionises’ the means of production and consumption, and along with these, constantly transforms society itself at so great a rate of speed that meaningful codification and even profitable axiomatisation cannot always keep pace. Any historical innovation, as Lampert rightly insists, therefore has both a history and multiple becomings co-existing within it; it participates simultaneously in a causal series deriving from and contributing to capital accumulation and state power, and in becomings that may escape capitalist axiomatisation and state codification altogether.

Historical struggle thus necessarily splits in two co-existent and undecidable directions: struggle within the axiomatic for whatever ameliorations can be wrung from capital and/or the State—a mode of struggle that Deleuze and Guattari insist is perfectly valid and necessary (TP 463–4 and 470–1) and struggle to escape axiomatisation and codification
altogether—the mode of struggle for lines of light which they in some sense prefer. A third mode of struggle—revolution—actually pits the one against the other, instead of allowing them to simply or peacefully co-exist in their undecidability; undecidability refers “to the co-existence and inseparability of that which the system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it following lines of flight that are themselves connectable.” (TP 473) The supreme challenge is therefore to actually change history rather than merely make it, to “construct revolutionary connections in opposition to the conjugations of the axiomatic.” (TP 473)

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RESPONSE

Jay Lampert (University of Guelph)

I am honoured that Eugene Holland, Alain Beaulieu, and Fadi Abou-Rihan read my book so thoughtfully, carefully, and critically. I will try to take a step or two towards the challenges they raise regarding Marxism, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis.

My book set out the following problem. Given Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the pure past, that all events of the past co-exist with the present, what can they say about actual history? The sweep of Deleuze’s argument in Difference and Repetition is that the phenomenological account of time as lived anticipations and retentions must be replaced by an ontological account of time as co-existing events in the pure past, which in turn must be searched through and chosen in the temporal form of futuricity, a desiring production that staggers the simultaneity of co-existential events. As important as this text is, there has not yet been a concerted attempt in the scholarship on Deleuze to analyse exactly how the details of his argument work, to assess its degree of success point by point, and to improve on Deleuze’s arguments on the points where they are slack. Now, concluding, as I do, that Deleuze’s arguments in some form do succeed, and that we are forced to see historical events in a kind of chaotomic flux, the question is whether events retain at least some kind of chronological markers, some at least quasi- causal interactions, some kind of machinic assemblages that explain why they
happen when they do and not some other time. I think my questions do not arise entirely out of an idiosyncratic agenda of my own; Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, discuss dates and quasi-causes, and in three of their texts—*Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, and *What is Philosophy*?—there are almost identical passages asking why capitalism arose in Europe around the eighteenth century, and not earlier, and not, for example, in China at various times when the economic, social, and psychological conditions seemed to have been given. I find this an interesting type of question, which I refer to as the “Why this now?” question, as it raises difficult problems concerning how history actually functions. To put together an interwoven account in the Deleuze and Guattari mode, I had to invent some concepts of my own.

Interpretations of Deleuze tend to fall on one of the two sides of Deleuze’s conceptual plane—either on the side of chaoticmic forces, or on the side of machinic assemblages. Of course, both kinds of interpreter think they are balancing the two sides fairly, but the version I think is correct is that virtual openness is always produced in a machinic assemblage, that there are no abstract machines in general, that the plane of immanence subsists in the movements and distributions of the concepts and collectives that populate it, that events are becomings only through the intricate distributions of simultaneities and delays whereby they fall back into history. In short, while it is obviously essential for Deleuze and Guattari that events, experiences, and being itself, are explosive becomings whose differential multiplicity makes them undecidable, becomings are produced in determinate machinic assemblages.

The correlative hermeneutical principle is that there are no Deleuze and Guattarian theses independent of the intricate arguments that assemble them. The key to Deleuze’s argument is that the phenomenological anticipation and retention scheme of experiential time in the lived present cannot explain one of its own key elements, namely how the present passes. If the present does pass (and surely it does), then passing must have its own structure not derivative from the structure of presence. Pastness must be part of the nature of a temporal moment *at the same time* that presence is part of its nature. The lived present can only be explained by the co-existence with it of the virtual past; the ontological past must co-exist with the experiential present. Obviously, this argument is complex and controversial. Three chapters of my book try to interpret and evaluate the micro-processes of this argument. I have
surely made errors, and I would love to have them pointed out, and my construal of the text improved upon.

Deleuze’s move from phenomenology to virtual ontology (Alain’s concern) bears on the senses in which virtual history can and cannot supersede historical actualities.

Deleuze’s critique of phenomenology in *Difference and Repetition* and elsewhere is that phenomenology, like Kantianism, is right to deduce transcendental structures from our experience, but wrong to assume that the transcendental structures will look like generalised empirical experiences. For example, our experiential ability to see square and circle shapes needs an a priori capacity, but what makes shape possible is not just the capacity for Euclidean geometry, but a broader capacity of linearity, what Deleuze, following Worringer, calls the “frenzy of the line.” Similarly, empirical experience includes memories in succession, but transcendental deduction does not merely affirm the capacity for chronological order, but rather the capacity to position events in any kind of temporal order. Pure or virtual time conditions experience, but is prior to experience. It helps explain non-standard experiences, but as a transcendental condition, pure time not exactly “in” experience. I agree with Alain that what is at stake for Deleuze is the transition from time as movement to pure time: movement-time is phenomenological time, and time-time is ontological time. Of course, there has to be some observable effect of pure time on actual history. But I think that Deleuze’s view is that conceptual events directly condition us without always requiring the empirical experiences of correspondingly determinate states of affairs. We are, as it were, made up of concepts and incorporeal events, as much as we are made up of psychological representations.

Eugene suggests that I spend too much time with the ontological puzzle of dated events in non-successive history, when I ought to be worrying about how history is “made,” and more important, “changed.” I am not sure why a Deleuzian must prefer the latter phrase, but let us assume that “changing history,” in contrast to letting new actualities occur, means changing the course of events, intervening in favour of those actualities (like post-capitalist formations) that promote virtualities (like revolutionary events). I agree with Eugene that the topic of revolutionary history needs more work in my account, but whatever we take “changing history” to mean, it has to incorporate the aionic co-presence of pastness, presence, and futuricity. One might say that history is made
and experienced in the present, read in the past, and changed in the future, all of which co-exist in each historical event. Making and changing history is, at least on one of its three levels (or three of its nine), the act whereby something in the past is relived at a new level.

Like Eugene, Alain affirms “creating the present,” “experimenting with the novelty and freshness of the living present.” But again, if history can be made, it does not consist in doing anything in the present but in the past. I do not think Deleuze’s is a minimalist conception of the past that provides a slight foothold to limit the voluntaristic present; I think it is a maximalist conception that makes the past into the field of the historical future. I like Alain’s formulation that Deleuze and Guattari “transform” philosophers of the past into “untimely heroes”. Transforming the past is not just re-interpreting the past, but entering into the past, as Bergson says. We do not just recreate the past in the new present; we recreate the past anew in the past, we recreate the past during the past. To be sure, our work in the past is something we experience, so it is present too; and it opens up acts of desire, so it is future too. But before it is present or future, the new event is past.

Now, having said that making history today involves re-entering the past, I have to say something about the double bind that Fadi puts me into. Of course, I expected someone would say I have not done justice to the psychoanalytic content of Deleuze and Guattari’s historiographic concepts, and I was planning to simply concede that point, to plead that I am not qualified, and to invite others to write what I have not. Fadi has anticipated this feint; he declared that I am qualified, and invites me to declare myself on the topic. Of course, Fadi knows I am not qualified, so his praise is an invitation to self-ruination. So I decline it again, but again Fadi will not let me. He tells me that my own philosophy of history requires that Deleuze and Guattari’s histories in psychoanalysis entail that if I want to read them as making history, I have to re-enter history’s psychoanalytic past. Eugene tells us to hurry up and change history, but Fadi tells us to slow down and let the old history work.

My general way out is that the pure past does not require that every event in history be re-lived in each successor with the same force that it was lived the first time through; the pure past precisely makes that evaluation a matter of choice. After all, Deleuze introduced the pure past in order to explain how the present passes and becomes “no longer.” Each period of history has its own peculiar way of dying, or of surviving.
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as an anachronism, or of being in denial about its own past, and sometimes succeeding through that denial. Now, this might allow one to avoid discussing Deleuze’s background—his Humean roots for example—and would allow a reader to underplay his psychoanalytic background if that reader thought psychoanalysis was outmoded. But actually, I do not think it is outmoded. I am just unqualified to discuss it.

Except for one small point. In a crucial passage in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze rejects Freud’s category of Nachträglichkeit. In an early text, later to become controversial, “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” Freud studies a teenage girl who has recently developed a phobia of going into stores. Under analysis, she reveals that many years earlier, she had an uncomfortable experience in a store with a lascivious salesman. Freud concludes that a mechanism of delayed reaction (*Nachträglichkeit*), triggered unconsciously at puberty, leads the now sexualised teenager to confer new meanings onto her childhood past. There is a lot to say about Nachträglichkeit, starting with Derrida’s discussion of why Husserl rejects it. But here is Deleuze’s remark: “There is no room to ask how the childhood event acts only after a delay (*retard*). It is this delay, but this delay itself is the pure form of time which makes the before and the after co-exist.” (*DR* 163) Deleuze’s view is that there is not one event, then later a mechanism that refers backward, then a delayed reaction; his view is that there is one event whose singular occurrence takes place simultaneously at two separated moments of time. The dark precursor is not a cause whose results cannot yet be known or realised; it is the communication across two real series, the childhood series and the adult series. Pure time explains Freud’s case study better than psychoanalysis does. In other words, Deleuze argues that his own psychoanalytic concepts should not be read psychoanalytically. But of course, by the time an author says not to read his text psychoanalytically, it is too late. Can an answer that comes too late defeat something in the past? And can being too late in changing history be precisely what changes history for the better? I want to end with a passage where Deleuze says it does.

On the last pages of the “Crystals of Time” chapter of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze says that in Visconti, and later he adds, in Syberberg, “something arrives too late” (*trop tard*). It’s the SS; it’s Hitler. “History growls at the door.” We do not exactly experience it, yet we more than experience it; as Deleuze says, History is never just “scenery.” If that
something could have been “caught in time” (*pris à temps*), we might have averted it, but “it is History, and Nature, itself, the structure of the crystal, that makes it impossible for something to arrive in time.” (126) It is not just that Visconti is nostalgic; history is an “autonomous factor”; being “too late” is the very “rhythm” of history, “a dimension of time”, the universalised “Nevermore.” It is too late, and yet, “history arrives too late *dynamically*.” (127) It arrives too late, so we cannot stop it, so it remains forever, but it is too late, so it never was where we looked for it, so if we stop looking for it so obsessively, we do not have to keep finding it, so it no longer has to be there. Because of its dynamic, the too-late has three exceptions. First, the work of art thrives on it. It is too late for the human, phenomenological eye to see, but as Vertov says, the camera eye can see it, and by extension, I would say, the History-Eye can see what is always already still no longer. Second, the too-late succeeds and preserves time itself, “time regained.” (128) Third, Deleuze says surprisingly in the “Conclusion” chapter to *Cinema 2*, that when cinema sees the too-late, it “defeats Hitler.” (352–3) What is Deleuze saying? Obviously it is too late to defeat Hitler. Why does cinema not just try to change history now, then? Of course, it depends on how we describe what and when the Hitler-event is. Strangely, Deleuze assesses Hitler in a way similar to the assessment in the most famous too-little-too-late text in all philosophy: Heidegger’s *Der Spiegel* interview, which defines the problem with Nazism as its inauthentic communications technology, its reduction of discourse to information. Surely that says too little. But Deleuze says it too, later: Hitler succeeded by convincing his people that what he said was what he said it was; that what he said is what was; that what was, was what he said; in short, by creating the cinematic illusion that expression is simultaneous with content, by synchronizing the sound and the picture. Defeating this requires a different kind of cinema, a delay between speech and the visible, to make each too late. Perhaps this counterattack of the too-late should have been caught at the time. Some Godard should have made *Medium Cool* at Nuremberg. In fact, Ernst Bloch already in 1935 (*Heritage of Our Time*) was arguing that Hitler was succeeding in harnessing the power of “non-contemporaneous” social forces, and that Hitler’s opponents had to find a way to defeat him with their own non-contemporaneities. It may be an accident that the too-late was discovered too late, but it is not too late to discover it now. It is not too late to make and change history, but to do it is to unweave
the one-at-a-time event-units that claim they will not be no longer for a thousand years. To make history now is to make an act that is the delay, an act in which the now is not merely now but simultaneously stretches along staggered time, to act in the dimension of the too late, though of course, hopefully just in time.

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