SILENT PARTNERSHIPS: SCHELLING, JUNG, AND THE ROMANTIC METASUBJECT

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Despite Carl Jung’s stated debts to Kant, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, this paper articulates a more profound yet silent intellectual partnership between Schelling’s philosophy and analytical psychology. Schelling’s metaphysics navigate the aporias Jung often encounters in his psychology; Jung provides Schelling’s metaphysics with a therapeutics and mode of being in the world. This paper reads the actants’ dynamism in Schelling’s First Outline and the “–‡¨…‹‡•ǯ™”’ˆ›‡ƒ”‹‰‹–Їͣͪͣͧ Ages of the World forward to Jungian metapsychology, which thinks Schelling within a topography of the non-Freudian productive psyche. I end by developing the Romantic metasubject as the non-Freudian subject emerging from this ideational countertransference.

Introduction: Silent Partnerships

In recent Schelling criticism, Matt Ffytche’s The Foundations of the Unconscious (2012) and Sean McGrath’s The Dark Ground of Spirit (2012) are key studies of Schelling’s relevance to the broader field of Romantic psychology. Ffytche emphasizes Schelling’s influence on the psychodynamic tradition through 19th-century disciplinary and ideological conjugations; Schelling’s unconscious is a way of thinking the “self-caused self” as a model of contemporary liberal identity resisting systematization. But Ffytche’s reliance on Freud and his relegation of the unconscious to the status of a locutionary marker, a concept dispersed across disciplines1, strangely represses the subject making possible Romanticism’s discursive miscegenations. McGrath, by contrast, is more willing to consider the unconscious as a real phenomenon, positioning Schelling as “the original theoreti-

cian of the unconscious"\(^2\) in a history of Western esoteric discourses. Werner Leibbrand’s prophetic (if extreme) statement that “Jung’s teachings in the field of psychology are not intelligible if they are not connected with Schelling”\(^3\) reverberates in McGrath’s compelling argument that Schelling is the “missing link” in Jung's thought.\(^4\)

While Fytche and McGrath admirably write Jung into contemporary Schelling discourse and the narrative of depth psychology, the theoretical conversation between metaphysics and metapsychology cementing this missing link has yet to be explored. Jung himself had Schelling’s later mythological work and the *Deities of Samothrace* on his bookshelves, but for him Schelling is only a minor waypoint in depth psychology’s history. To be sure, Schelling and Jung are questioning and answering beings of a missed encounter—but what is the *dialogue* of this silent partnership between metaphysics and metapsychology? This paper will articulate two aspects of this silent partnership. First, I read Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*, and the generation of natural products from actants’ derangement and synthesis, as a first outline of the non-Freudian productive unconscious\(^5\) given its fullest expression in Jung’s archetypes and the collective unconscious. Secondly, I argue that the potencies’ work of yearning in Schelling’s 1815 *Ages of the World*\(^6\) anticipates the dynamic of the individuation process, the “becoming who you are” at the heart of the Jungian analytic encounter. Tilottama Rajan has rightfully argued that the 1815 *Ages* shows us a recursive “abyss of the psychoanalytic past,”\(^7\) but Schelling’s encounter with Jung also lets us discern a futurity—a *purposive* movement toward a horizon of totality reflect-


\(^3\) Quoted in Henri Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious* (Basic Books, 1970), 204.

\(^4\) McGrath, *Dark Ground*, 1.

\(^5\) I use “productive unconscious” here as Deleuze and Guattari use the term, invoking Jung, to critique the Oedipal hegemony of Freud’s “representative” unconscious. But Deleuze and Guattari ultimately fold Jung's thought into an “idealist deviation” from psychoanalysis missing the radical materiality of the Jungian archetypal I take up here. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (tr.) R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1972), 128.


ing the ontoaesthetic “golden age” uniting truth and fable in *Ages.* (AW, xxv) Schelling’s *First Outline* and 1815 *Ages* give analytical psychology a metaphysical ground Jung thinks it lacks; Jung, in turn, provides a hermeneutics and a therapeutics for both the nascent subject of Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* and the ontoaesthetic subject of *Ages.* From this silent partnership emerges the Romantic metasubject as a model of personhood truer to the full compass of Romantic thought and literature than the orthodox psychoanalytic-constructivist model prevailing in Romantic scholarship.

**Schelling’s Naturphilosophie**

It might seem strange to open a discussion of Romantic personhood with Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie,* Rajan reminds us that the *First Outline* is not yet part of a human history, and the unconscious here is more of a “collective intelligence” in all matter, even as *Naturphilosophie* informs Schelling’s later work (including the *Freedom* essay as Schelling’s first attempt at a theory of personality). But the “absolute subject” unfolding in the *First Outline* (FO, xxviii) continues to inhabit and inhibit the workings and pretensions of the subject position as “immanent critique...a subject that overcomes subjectivity within subjectivity” by confronting it with its own nonfoundation. Already lending itself to a subjectivity less beholden to egoity than that of psychoanalysis, the *First Outline* is not a primal scene, but a primal site for what is later conditioned as a depth psychology with excesses psychoanalysis cannot contain.

The *First Outline’s Naturphilosophie* “assumes that the sum of phenomena is not a mere world, but of necessity a Nature (that is...not merely a product, but at the same time productive).” (FO, 197) Thus Schelling’s nature constructs itself in a rhetoric of process, drive and compulsion: “Nature can produce nothing but what shows regularity and purpose, and Nature is compelled to produce it.” (FO, 194; my italics) However, this productivity only comes about

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10 McGrath, *Dark Ground,* 82.

through Nature’s self-inhibition—a blockage of infinite productivity into the natural product marking the “original diremption” in Nature as the paradoxical core of its existence. (FO, 205) This incommensurability is at the heart of Nature’s Bildungstrieb, its drive to create in a general economy of infinitely productive relations. The organism, recapitulating Nature’s antithesis, self-organizes according to principles which are irreducible to a logical system. And because each natural product recapitulates Nature’s infinite productivity, the seeds are sown here for a mind-nature parallelism with potentially therapeutic properties: in this sense “Naturphilosophie suggest[s] that nature might furnish a path back to the self...the exploration of nature might even be regarded as a necessary propaedeutic to the development of the self.”¹² This infinite productivity becomes the basis for Schelling’s displacement of the a priori from Kantian formalism into experience: “we originally know nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience.... Every judgment which is merely historical for me...becomes, notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon as I arrive...at insight into its internal necessity.” (FO, 198)

Nature’s infinite productivity is articulated by actants—individual points of inhibition, (de)composable elements which combine in different proportions to form individual products. Irrepresentable in themselves yet not without their own drives to “free transformation,” they are distinguishable only in terms of the product they produce: “they are not themselves in space; they cannot be viewed as parts of matter.” (FO, 20–21, 33) But Schelling nevertheless wants to contain this productivity within a “circle of possible forms” structured by what Keith Peterson calls “a graduated scale of development [indicating] the intensity or degree of evolution...of the powers of nature...in a particular being.” (FO, 28, xxxii) Of particular importance for this Nature’s transference into a selfhood is the way in which Nature’s original antithesis precipitates a fundamentally ambivalent, even unnatural relationship with its own organisms. Schelling’s Nature longs for the original indifference preceding its self-diremption; organisms are its “misbegotten attempts” to get back to this zero-point of the Absolute’s “universal proportion.” But Nature’s actant-driven combination and decombination also strives toward an “absolute product” (which Schelling sometimes calls “absolute organism”) already existing in potentia in Nature. (FO, 35, 24) Nature’s yearning is bifurcated into a nostalgia for indifference

and a drive toward a horizon of futurity inseparable from its perpetual unfolding—thus, the general economy of the First Outline’s nascent subject is irreducible to the psychoanalytic nostalgia of primal scenes or the death instinct’s drive for the inorganic. We turn, then, to Jung’s metapsychology, where Schelling’s Naturphilosophische “circle of possible forms” and its troubling excess is transferred to the level of the psyche—even as the boundaries between nature and psyche remain complicated and porous.

**Analytical Psychology: Actant and Archetype**

After the infamous 1913 schism with Freud, Jung used the term “analytical psychology” to differentiate his thought from psychoanalysis. Contrary to psychoanalysis, analytical psychology deploys a nonsexualized libido articulating a perpetual drive to integrate conscious and unconscious dimensions of experience—the “individuation process” at the core of Jungian analysis. However far they may peregrinate the short-circuits of Nachträglichkeit, all roads ultimately lead back to the past of primal phantasy in psychoanalysis. But analytical psychology’s unconscious also orients itself to present situations challenging consciousness: “the constellated archetype is always the primordial image of the need of the moment.” Indeed, the “Janus-faced” Jungian unconscious, simultaneously pointing “back to a preconscious, prehistoric world of instinct” and “potentially anticipat[ing] the future” supplements psychoanalytic nostalgia with a futurity, a drive to unfold one’s ultimately unknowable being in and through an existence undecided and without guarantees.

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13 Around the time of *A Phylogenetic Fantasy* (1915), Freud decisively shifted from the ontogenetic (infantile sexuality, the family romance) to a concern with the deeper phylogenetic foundations of psychoanalysis and their properties—the Freudian “equivalent of the ‘philosophical categories’ and, no doubt, the Kantian *a priori*.” The contingency of ontogenesis, by “repeating analogous circumstances...is necessary in order to actualize phylogenesis.” See André Green, “The Primal in Psychoanalysis,” in *Diachrony in Psychoanalysis*, (tr.) A. Weller (London: Free Association Books, 2003), 49–50.


16 I use “supplement” here in its specifically Derridean sense. Analytical psychology “insinuates itself in-the-place-of” psychoanalysis insofar as it implements a
And where Freud entertained an Enlightenment hope that the unconscious would somehow be colonized, made “usable” by consciousness, the unconscious for the middle Schelling and Jung becomes a darker, more enigmatic force. Jung’s emphasis on alchemical teleology as an allegory for individuation and the New-Age popularization of archetypes have led commentators like Žižek to describe “Jungianism” as a New Age “men are from Mars, Women are from Venus” “resexualization of the universe.” But just as Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* marks, in Todd Dufresne’s words, a metapsychological trauma inflicted on psychoanalysis, Jung’s collective unconscious marks a darker metapsychology unworking orthodox conceptions of the archetypes and individuation, as well as Žižek’s unenlightened conception of Jungianism as a “safe haven” of “deeply anchored archetypal identity.” Jung thinks the general economy of infinite (and ambivalent) productivity in Schelling’s Nature on the level of the psyche as the archetypes and the collective unconscious. The dynamic atomism of *Naturphilosophie*, recast as Jungian libido, lets us think a psyche unbound by psychoanalytic nostalgia or bisexual repression.

For Jung, the collective unconscious is the substrate of the psyche common to humanity—a repository, so to speak, of the archetypes: primordial patterns, possibilities of human experience and knowledge repeated in different forms throughout human history. *Individuation* is the ongoing process of integrating this unconscious archetypal material with conscious, lived experience to “become what one is.” At times Jung’s notoriously vague language concerning the archetype (*e.g.*, an unfortunate early definition as “primordial image”) contributes to its misperception as static, *a priori* Platonic form. But “On the Nature of the Psyche” (1947) marks a crucial turn in Jung’s metapsychology: here, Jung conceives the archetype as a boundary concept between psyche and matter, with a nature “which


cannot with certainty be designated as psychic.” Instead of “psychic,” Jung now describes archetypes as psychoid—his term for their radical materiality, a historicity that “can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity.... [S]ubjective fantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process.” And in a startling footnote repressed into the margins of his discourse Jung states the matter more plainly, if paradoxically: “[The archetypes are] the effect and deposit of experiences that have already taken place, but equally they appear as the factors which cause such experiences.” As a “[condensation] of the living process,” the archetype is a centripetal force, gathering and combining specific materialities, “natural products” to itself while remaining irreducible to the metonymy of its possible representations. Jung’s attempt to establish an archetypal teleology in therapy or alchemy is unworked by his acknowledgement of “an indefinite number of archetypes representative of situations” which evolve in baroque tandem with the human race—Jung’s own brand of polymorphous perversity. If we must call the archetype a Platonic form, it simultaneously reflects what Deleuze once famously called the anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism.


21 Jung, “On the Psychology,” 95 n.3 (my emphasis). Like Schelling’s famously baroque footnote on the actant (F0, 21n.), Jung’s footnotes on the archetype often trouble his more orthodox Kantian formulation of the archetype as noumenal a priori form.


24 Aware of the problem of delineating an “infinitely varied and ever changing” economy of archetypes in the phenomenology of case material, Jung’s only answer is to proceed “as if” there were an archetypal taxonomy. While Schelling is no more capable of resolving this dilemma, the actant nevertheless offers an antidote to Jung’s occasional Cartesian tendency to enforce this psychic taxonomy against an external Nature. See Carl Jung, “Concerning the Archetypes, With Special Reference to the Anima Concept,” in The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, 2nd ed., (tr.) R. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 70.

The archetype’s psychoid co-implication of psyche and nature gives the collective unconscious a strange consubstantiality with the organic processes of Schelling’s Nature. Schelling’s organism, as a collectivity of actants (FO, 51), is forever incommensurate with the Nature engendering it. Similarly, the actants allow us to read the archetypes as psychic figurations of Nature’s infinite productivity; Jung’s dissociationist psyche is articulated by this general economy of archetypal knowledge, and for Jung “[the psyche], together with ‘life’ itself...is the only ‘natural factor’ capable of converting [natural organizations] into ‘higher’ or ‘unnatural’ states, in opposition to [inorganic entropy].”26 Like Schelling’s Nature, Jung’s “Janus-faced” collective unconscious wants to lead consciousness back to established paths of phylogenetic nostalgia, even as its ontogenetic integration with consciousness provides new life-situations and conscious attitudes. If Schelling’s natural product draws this productivity into a “circle of possible forms,” no less is archetypal knowledge conditioned by the specific intensities of the individual psyche in lived experience.27 And finally, just as Schelling’s absolute organism marks an ideal in Nature that is always becoming and yet present in potentia, so with Jung the archetype of the Self marks an ideal totality of self-development. But to discuss this I want to turn to Schelling’s 1815 Ages, where the movement of the potencies is dramatized in the Jungian analytic encounter and the individuation process. This encounter, in turn, embodies the potencies’ dynamism in the human psyche through a therapeutic language and a mode of being in the world.

The Ages of the World: Potencies, Thanatopoiesis and the Libidinal Gradient

Already near the end of the 1790s, Schelling’s break with Fichtean subjectivism took him toward a conception of the absolute in terms of “polarities...which oscillate around the possibility of synthesis rather than being integrated in a completed formal structure.”28 Indeed, Ages carries forward Naturphilosophie’s dynamism from nascent subject to psyche, inaugurating an organic epistemology with the conception of knowledge as “the development of a living, actual being.” (AW, xxxv) As in Ages “the person is the world writ

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27 Jung, Symbols, 294.
28 Ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious, 79.
small” (AW, 3), so the antithesis of Nature is recapitulated in the person. And yet this doubling of antitheses in turn recapitulates the difference between them—what Deleuze has called a repetition of difference against the repetition of the Same under the hegemony of categories.

We read early in Ages that the person contains a “supramundane principle” outside and above the world. This higher principle, in turn, is bound to an “unknowing and dark” lower principle, an “archetype of things” which “rests in the recollection of things, of their original relationships, of their becoming, of their meaning.” (AW, xxxv–xxxvi) Almost in anticipation of Jung, the very idea of “archetype” is transformed across the First Outline and Ages: where the Naturphilosophische archetype is a horizon of totality in Nature as “absolute organism,” in Ages the archetypes, as “ideas” in life’s unfolding, gather up the dynamism of the actant. “These [archetypes] are certainly not to be thought of as physical substances or as empty genera, nonetheless neither are they to be thought of as finished and available forms. [They are] eternally becoming and in incessant movement and generation.” (AW, 66–67)

The dynamic of the potencies in Ages is animated by eternal nature’s paradoxical “uplifting through pulling downward,” an anticipation of the encounter with metaphorically “lower” or “primitive” archetypal dimensions of the unconscious in the Jungian analytic scene. For Schelling, the first potency (A¹) is “that force of the beginning that draws the being to or into itself,” “the abyss of the past” (AW, 31), the force of negation containing the world in potential. But like the pre-decisionary cosmos it has its own “rotatory movement,” a contradiction giving it “loathing and anxiety” making it yearn for Being. A¹ is compelled, driven to liberate itself through an “organic relationship” with the second potency (A²); here “the spirit is manifest and the negating force of A¹ is repressed” in a diremption through which the world comes into existence—negation and being in an ineluctable but loving agon. But where diremption is described in terms of protopsychoanalytic repression, the emergent dynamic between the negation of A¹ and the expansive, spiritual force of A² prefigures what Jung privileges as the countertransference between analyst and analysand. “Just as in the potency of the beginning [A¹] the expansive being strives to get away from negation, so does the darkening primordial force in the higher potency [of A²] [whose] law is to repress the negating primordial power.” (AW, 30, 32, 35) In this way “each subordinated potency attracts the potency immediately higher than it.” (AW, 56, 59) Through this countertransferential exchange each potency perceives, in the higher potency, that which it
is capable of (its ectype); through this pulling down of the spiritual $A^2$ to the primordial beginnings of $A^1$, $A^3$, the threshold of a unity, a futurity that can only be glimpsed, becomes visible to itself. (AW, 66)

But how is this translated into a therapeutics, a mode of being in the world? Ages’ proto depth-psychology dramatizes the antithesis in the individual catalyzing the narrative nature of knowledge in terms of questioning and answering beings: “there is in the person that which must again be brought back to memory, and an Other that brings it to memory; one in which the answer to every research question lies and the Other which brings the answer out of it.” (AW, xxxvi) And the paradoxical uplifting through pulling downward marking the potencies’ work of yearning—here the individual’s “silent dialogue”—is cast by Jung as what he somewhat curiously calls the transcendent function: the countertransferential dialogue between analyst and analysand stimulating the creation of new knowledge in each individual. Jung writes:

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions creates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing...a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. The transcendent function manifests itself as a quality of conjoined opposites.29

Jung uses “transcendence” here not as a metaphysical notion but rather to mark a transition from one state to another, a mediation of opposite attitudes by a grounding third term. The transcendent function is the motor force of the individuation process, where the consciousness of the analysand, through being pulled “downward” into a confrontation with unconscious forces and images, ideally catches a glimpse of a threshold of higher unity, a new integrative attitude and relationship to one’s life experience represented by the archetype of the Self. With this, we turn to the Jungian individuation process, which writes the narration of knowledge in Ages.

In Ages’ poetic cosmogony, the narrated nature of all knowledge is inaugurated by eternal nature’s cision, the breaking away from sheer rotatory movement marking the emergence of Being and the hierarchy of the potencies. (AW, 28) Schelling insists on the ontoaesthetics of this Being by likening $A^3$ to “artistic wisdom of the Whole”

and underscores the yearning soul’s “artistic desire” to arouse the bifurcation permeating nature. (AW, 56, 58) When Jung narrates his own “confrontation with the unconscious”—his own “being pulled downward”—his guiding question was that of finding the myth by which he lived.30 To this end analytical psychology’s emphasis on sculpture, poetry, painting, and especially active imagination31 underscores the importance of thinking and living aesthetically: expressing one’s experience to oneself through a metaphoricity and mythos characteristic of the arts, but also organizing one’s knowledge and experience around an absent center—the horizon of a totality whose unfolding beckons through affect-charged experience. This individuation process is underpinned by the general economy of Jungian libido. We recall from the Naturphilosophie that natural products are not emanated from a primary cause, but are dynamically produced from the relation of actants. In contradistinction to the restricted economy of Freud’s sexualized libido, Jung articulates an energetic aspect of libido, concerned more with the dynamic relations between objects which follows a prospective libidinal gradient. In the energetic approach,

The [psychic or physical] event is traced back from effect to cause on the assumption that some kind of energy underlies the changes in phenomena [with] a definite direction [following] the gradient of potential in a way that cannot be reversed...it is a concept abstracted from relations of movement...whereas the moving substance itself is the basis of the mechanistic point of view.32

The energetic aspect of libido is radically ateleological; its gradient is purposive, with no fixed goal, no teleological endpoint in sight. And if it weren’t for Schelling’s poor organism, forever double-bound by sex-hating nature (FO, 231n.), we might call this gradient sheer futurity; but Ages invokes both the abyss of the past and a horizon of a future golden age. Informed by a collective unconscious containing everything forgotten, everything that can never be remembered but also “all the future things that are taking shape...and will sometimes

31 “One of the highest forms of psychic activity,” active imagination is the process of aesthetic “elaboration” whereby “the conscious and the unconscious personality of the subject flow together into a common product in which both are united” (Jung, “Definitions,” 428).
come to consciousness,”33 the ateleology of the libidinal gradient unfolds as what I call a Thanatopoiesis, a Jungian refiguring of the Freudian death instinct comprehending death’s primordiality and futurity as a systole-diastole, attraction-repulsion dynamic. It is both “a work against death so that the boundaries of personal identity might be forged” and “a work towards death [to] gather oneself together and reconnect with the source of life itself, thereby deepening the metaphors through which personal existence is lived.”34 Through these two possibilities, the libidinal gradient traces the “abstract line as the determination absolutely adequate to the indeterminate”—or, in the rubric of Schelling’s On University Studies, absolute knowledge as “a following of the particular wherever it might lead, regardless of its consistency with a larger whole.”35 And if the kernel of Idealism in Ages holds out the endlessly deferred promise of a golden age uniting science and fable, then all the more fitting that Jung, a couple of years before his death in 1961, confides to Miguel Serrano: “So far, I have found no stable or definite center in the unconscious and I don’t believe such a center exists. I believe the thing which I call self is an ideal center, equidistant between the ego and the unconscious…. As nature strives to express itself, so does man, and the self is that dream of totality.”36

Conclusion: Romantic Metasubjectivity

Schelling has finally emerged from under Hegel’s idealist shadow to be rethought as a philosopher at the margins of philosophy—a liminal figure between an idealist emphasis on system and absolute knowledge and a Romantic idealism without absolutes, emphasizing the incompleteness and remainders in every system without abandoning a yearning to articulate the absolute in history. I define Romantic metasubjectivity as the model of personhood emerging from this liminality: conditioned not by primordial metanarratives but by the open economy of an ambivalent Nature, the metasubject’s personal history writes in the dialect of its unique gradient, bound only by the

33 “On the Nature of the Psyche” 185.
35 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 275; Rajan, “First Outline,” 315.
enigma of a Self knowable only, paradoxically, in its Thanatopoietic unfolding.

Depth psychology emerges from Romantic thought, and the psychoanalytic unconscious of the Romantic subject marks a self-alienation which does indeed open into the “abyss of the past,” where primal beginnings and primal scenes are put under erasure in interminable analysis. Seen in this light the Romantic subject feels the burden of an impossible history, a genesis knowable only through its traumatic effects. But the yearning for origins is only part of Romanticism. In his Miscellaneous Remarks (1797), Novalis writes that “the highest task of education is—to seize the mastery of one’s transcendental Self—to be at the same time the Self of one’s Self.”37 Similarly, Schlegel tells us that poetry which is also the “poetry of poetry” narrates a romance between ideal and real whose ending remains unfulfilled but ever hopeful—breathless for the glimpse.38 “The Self of one’s Self” and “the poetry of poetry”: two meta-gestures thinking the subject away from Kantian formalism and toward a transcendental empiricism, an aesthetic “science of the sensible” articulated by actant and archetype.39 The Romantic metasubject lives in dialogue with a radically productive, Thanatopoietic unconscious which does not deny the abyss of the past—the trauma of primordial origins in personal and collective history—but leaves open the possibility to pronounce them in a larger archetypal grammar of adaptation and development toward a provisional image of totality. Yet even as this totality paradoxically impels the repetition of difference, it does so in an existence without guarantees—self-knowledge can come at the wrong time; the path can be lost; the grammar of the Self can be unlearned. Wholly determined by an undetermined Nature but led by its own enigmatic undercurrent, the Romantic metasubject persists, post-decisionary yet productively undecided.

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38 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, (tr.) P. Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1991), 51.
39 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 56.