certainement nuit à la diffusion de l'œuvre deleuzienne. Nous disions regretter la tendance à sa décontextualisation. Mais plus regrettable encore serait la stricte récupération de la pensée deleuzienne par l'histoire de la philosophie. Lui-même grand historien de la philosophie, il enseignait que l'histoire était constamment à réinventer. Qu'il faut aussi se méfier des figures philosophiques qui ne subissent aucune éclipse au cours de l'histoire.


ALAIN BEAULIEU, Université McGill

Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers
CHESHER CALHOUN, Editor.

The conviction that “gender makes a difference” holds together this collection of essays by nineteen eminent moral philosophers. The volume has two main aims, which seem to be in tension. On the one hand, it politicizes the category of “woman philosopher,” raising the question of why women are frequently included in mainstream collections as representatives of the feminist point of view, or of woman’s voice, when such multiplicity exists under this head. On the other hand, Cheshire Calhoun draws out the unity, or common character, of women’s work in moral philosophy, which she describes as sharing the approach of “inventive realism”—realist, because women tend to focus on what moral experience is actually like, rather than forcing our ordinary practices to fit the traditional models. In setting the moral compass, this volume points toward a new north, “when it is no longer necessary to insist that the difference women make to moral philosophy is something to be prized” (vi).

Following an Editor’s Introduction, the collection is divided into six sections, each addressing new directions that moral philosophy has taken in the past two decades, largely due to the work of the women philosophers listed below. The first section, “An Ethics for Ordinary Life and Vulnerable Persons,” contains contributions from Marcia Homiak, Elizabeth Spelman, Virginia Held, and Martha Nussbaum. The second, entitled “What Ought We to Do for Each Other?” includes papers by Barbara Herman, Susan Wolf, and Cheshire Calhoun. The third part is devoted to “The Normative

Noteworthy for its originality is Robin Dillon's essay, "Kant on Arrogance and Self-Respect." Self-respect is crucial to our ability to set priorities and goals for ourselves. At issue for feminists in particular is the question of how self-respect can be engendered in victims of oppression. If arrogance is the opposite of servility, it might be thought that victims of oppression should cultivate a heightened sense of self-importance. Yet Dillon argues against this view, drawing upon Kantian moral philosophy to support her claim that arrogance is a failure of what she calls "interpersonal recognition respect." The failure to recognize others as equals is also, importantly, a failure to recognize the proper domain of one's own self-worth. This is because the arrogant person uses the supposed weakness of others to heighten his self-esteem, taking their deference to him as a sign of his greater, and their lesser, worth. Thus, "[t]he kind of self-worth the arrogant person cares about is essentially comparative and competitive," unlike the dignity that we all already have by virtue of our autonomy as rational agents (195). Dillon's essay is illustrative of the inventive side of "inventive realism," as she draws on examples from a wide variety of sources, from personal testament to a newspaper story about Alfred Stieglitz's relationship with Georgia O'Keefe, to Harry Potter.

The question with which Dillon frames her essay is of interest to feminists, however her paper is one of several in the volume that is not explicitly feminist in scope. Marcia Homiak's essay, "Virtue and the Skills of Ordinary Life," is another piece that blurs the lines between feminist and mainstream philosophy. Homiak challenges the common view in Aristotelian scholarship that virtue can only be understood from within the virtuous perspective, which restricts the Nicomachean Ethics to an exercise in self-understanding for those who have already achieved a virtuous character. Homiak provides an alternative reading that explains the attractions of a life of unimpeded activity in a way that could appeal to a self-interested character, like Thrasymachus. To this end, she argues for the possibility of achieving unimpeded activity in daily life. To illustrate her thesis, Homiak uses an example from Michael Baxandall's Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy, which describes how Florentine art patrons used the mathematical skills developed in their business practices to a new purpose in appreciating art. Homiak contends that the art patrons's activity approximates the continuous, unimpeded, and self-realizing praxis that Aristotle describes. If Homiak is right, then Aristotle's life of unimpeded activity is not restricted to those with an interest in virtue; although, as she argues, participation in unimpeded activity would encourage the cultivation of the virtues. Homiak's paper lends credence to Calhoun's claim that women approach philosophy in the spirit of realism. Rather than marking
off virtue as something special and separate, Homiak finds it to be quite naturally interwoven into our quotidian affairs.

Calhoun justifiably claims that the essays in this volume are similar in spirit, if nothing else. The tension between diversity and unity is never resolved, yet it is a tension that contributes to the book's success. The question of how the category "woman philosopher" operates within the discipline is brought to the fore, and remains very much an open question.

**PAULA SCHWEBEL, Queen's University**

**UnForeseeable Americas: Questioning Cultural Hybridity in the Americas**

RITA DE GRANDIS and ZILA BERND, Editors


The notion of a "pure identity" has dominated cultural and political thought for much of human history. Although we tend to think of it as an ideal, pure identity has two major faults: it often serves as an ideological support for "ethnic cleansing" or some other politics of exclusion, and it assumes as possible what never was, is, or can be: a univocal identity. One's identity is hybrid: other identities simultaneously transcend and are immanent aspects of it; we intersect each other and yet remain distinct. Bakhtin provides one version of this thesis. He accepts that subjects are not separate from what he calls "social languages" or "voices," and then shows that each social language always "intersects" or "cites" other such languages: "[A]t any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles, and so forth, all given a bodily form. These 'languages' of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying 'languages.'" Because of this linguistic heteroglossia, subjects, like society itself, are hybrids, that is, an interplay of voices including the one that usually serves, or is taken as, the subject's "true" identity.

Most of the authors in Unforeseeable Americas refer to Bakhtin and his notion of hybridization. But they also draw from a tradition of thinking about hybridity that precedes Bakhtin and has developed largely independently of him. Since the conquest, Latin American thinkers have always seen "mestizaje," that is, their mixed Amerindian, African, and European legacy, as characteristic of the countries south of the U.S. border and as that which, in a positive manner, distinguishes them from Europe and the imperialistic power to the north. Indeed, Mexico's Minister of Education from 1921 to 1924, José Vasconcelos, wrote a famous book, *La raza cósmica (The Cosmic Race)*, in which he valorized the integration of races in Mexico and Latin America. Through individual miscegenation a fifth cosmic race would replace the four existing ones. Most Latin American thinkers have taken this biological hybridization as only a symbol for what they consider a more important cultural and linguistic hybridization.