The New Harmony

RONALD BOGUE, University of Georgia

In a 1988 interview, Deleuze remarks that philosophy has need "not only of a philosophical comprehension, through concepts, but of a non-philosophical comprehension, one that operates through percepts and affects. Both are necessary. Philosophy has an essential and positive relation with non-philosophy: it addresses itself directly to non-philosophers."¹ Deleuze views the arts as the domain that "operates primarily through percepts and affects," and hence as one that affords a particularly vital non-philosophical comprehension of philosophy. Philosophy's primary goal is the invention of concepts, he says, but the concept "includes two other dimensions, those of the percept and the affect." For this reason, "the affect, the percept and the concept are three inseparable powers [puissances], which go from art to philosophy and back again" (Negotiations, 187/137). In What Is Philosophy? (1991), Deleuze and Guattari speak at length of philosophy's relationship to the arts, but perhaps the best examples of this relationship, as Deleuze understands it, are to be found in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988).² What Is Philosophy? is filled with references to various philosophers and artists, but it provides no detailed analyses of any single philosopher's relationship to the arts. The Fold, by contrast, offers an extended reading of Leibniz's thought as a philosophical counterpart of the Baroque sensibility expressed in the arts of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. An especially intriguing and instructive instance of the philosophy-arts parallels established in The Fold is that which Deleuze draws between Leibniz's concept of harmony and the harmonic practices of Baroque composers. In Deleuze's presentation of Leibniz's "new harmony," one can see clearly how Deleuze envisions philosophy's relationship to the arts. Perhaps as importantly, one can see from this example what Deleuze regards as the role that the history of philosophy and its encounter with the arts should play in contemporary philosophical and aesthetic endeavors.

In The Fold, Deleuze draws on several of the arts to characterize the Baroque and establish Leibniz as a philosopher responding to the aesthetic concerns of his age. Chief among those arts are architecture and painting. Deleuze likens Leibniz's differentiation of monads and bodies, for example, to a two-story Baroque building, the upper story representing the domain of monads, the lower that of bodies. The upper story is an essentially interior space, a monastic cell or camera obscura, like the monads, "without doors or windows." The lower story, by contrast, is an exterior facade, horizontally organized in the rhythms of its com-
ponents (doors, windows, columns, pediments), but with no meaningful relationship between those components and the interior space (just as bodies constitute a causally interconnected domain without being linked in any simple or direct way to the domain of monads). Deleuze finds that opposition of lower corporeality and upper monadic spirituality in Baroque painting, and he argues that the motif that organizes both levels and allows for their intercommunication is that of the fold. In Baroque still lifes, the folds of draperies and tablecloths communicate with the whorls of wood grains and marble veins, the curves of goblets, plates, medallions, and armor, the flowing contours of fruit, wild game, and flowers. In El Greco, twisting bodies pulsate within undulating landscapes, earthly figures intertwining and often ascending into unearthly realms of vortical spirituality. The Baroque fold is one that “goes to infinity” (Fold, 164/121), just as Leibniz’s bodies and monads form infinite series, bodies folded within bodies, monads within monads, each monad enfolding the infinite cosmos, each body unfolding a specific constituent of the infinite whole, the folds of bodies and folds of monads communicating through the additional mysterious folds of the vinculum substantiale.

Clearly, Deleuze’s conception of the Baroque is predominantly visual, with architecture, painting, and to a lesser extent sculpture providing him with models of the period’s aesthetic. Yet Deleuze does note that Leibniz makes regular use of the musical metaphor of harmony, and unlike most commentators, Deleuze regards this as more than a casual figure of speech.³ It would be a mistake to look in Leibniz’s thought “for a direct transposition of musical chords [accords, the French word accord capable of denoting both a musical chord and the general notions of agreement, harmony, linkage, or entente] as they are developed in the Baroque.” Deleuze continues, “and yet one also would be mistaken to conclude that Leibniz is indifferent to the musical model: rather, it is a matter of analogy, once it is added that Leibniz never stopped trying to bring the analogy to a new rigor” (Fold, 179/131). That new rigor depends on a deep sensitivity to the new harmonic practices of Baroque composers.

Deleuze’s primary guide to Baroque music is Manfred Bukofzer, whose Music in the Baroque Era (1947) is one of the pioneering modern works in the field.⁴ Bukofzer differentiates Renaissance from Baroque music first by observing the emergence of a plurality of styles in the Baroque. Unlike other transitions in music history, in which one period’s style is replaced by another, at the beginning of the Baroque “the old style was not cast aside, but deliberately preserved as a second language, known as the stile antico of church music” (Bukofzer, 3). Theorists of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries frequently opposed the stile antico to
the *stile moderno*, framing the opposition as well in terms of a *stylus gravis* versus a *stylus luxurians*, or a *prima prattica* versus a *seconda prattica*. Later in the seventeenth century, another classificatory scheme became common, one dividing the field into church, chamber, and theater music (*musica ecclesiastica, cubicularis, theatralis*), the *stile antico* roughly (but not entirely) coinciding with that of *musica ecclesiastica*. This rather confusing discourse of two practices and/or three styles, argues Bukofzer, was a sign that the Renaissance unity of style had been lost and that with the Baroque development of a plurality of styles had come a heightened consciousness of style per se.

For many seventeenth-century theorists, the *prima prattica* and *seconda prattica* could be differentiated primarily by their handling of music and word, the first practice giving precedence to music, the second to text. Advocates of the second practice often claimed that they alone represented the emotions in their settings of texts, but as Bukofzer points out, neither Renaissance nor Baroque composers attempted a direct, psychological representation of emotions, instead relying on a conventional ensemble of coded figures to render fixed emotional effects. What set the two practices apart was a Renaissance predilection for “the affections of restraint and noble simplicity” and a Baroque love of “the extreme affections, ranging from violent pain to exuberant joy” (Bukofzer, 5). Renaissance settings also often muted emotional effects by allowing multiple voices to sing different words simultaneously, a tendency early *seconda prattica* composers deliberately countered through the development of the recitative, the rhythmically free, declamatory solo component of opera, which from its inception was intended to render extremes of pathos and affective violence by following the inflections of natural speech. Indeed, Bukofzer argues, the impulse to render powerful emotions was the primary motivation for the Baroque’s creation of opera, not (as is often claimed) a vague desire to “imitate the Ancients,” something Renaissance and Baroque musicians both professed. Although Baroque representations of emotions tended to adhere to conventional musical codes, the recitative’s adoption of oratory as a guide to the handling of speech opened music to extra-musical elements (much to the dismay of *prima prattica* composers). Hence, concludes Bukofzer, “Renaissance and early baroque concepts of music stand, at this point, clearly opposed. The renaissance artist saw in music a self-contained autonomous art, subject only to its own laws. The baroque artist saw in music a heteronomous art, subordinated to words and serving only as musical means to a dramatic end that transcended music” (Bukofzer, 8).

In strictly musical terms, Renaissance and Baroque compositions may be differentiated in several interrelated ways. In the Renaissance, dis-
Consonance occurred only on the weak beat or as a suspension of the strong beat. Harmony was conceived of as a concordant sounding of individual voices on strong beats, the voices maintaining an equal and relatively autonomous role. In the Baroque, harmony was thought of as a sequence of vertical chords, and as a result, dissonance on the strong beat became possible as long as the chord was clearly delineated. The Renaissance’s equality among the voices gave way to a dominance of the outer voices, the bass line supplying the foundation for the chord, the melody providing an expressive ornamentation of the harmonic structure. The prominence of the bass line and melody was especially evident in the convention of the thorough-bass, or *basso continuo*, a convention virtually coextensive with the Baroque era. According to this common practice, the *continuo* keyboardist accompanying a violin soloist, for example, was simply given a bass line with a sequence of numerical figures accompanying each note, the numbers merely indicating the chord to be played but not the specific notes of the chord. In such a composition, while the bass line and melody were written out by the composer, the subordinate inner voices of the chord were improvised by the keyboardist.

Of course, Renaissance compositions also had bass lines, but the Baroque bass voice, while still a line with a horizontal continuity, was constructed to emphasize a system of tonal chordal relations. Unlike Renaissance harmonies, which were primarily modal, Baroque harmonies were tonal, that is, organized around the attraction of a tonal center. In Renaissance intervallic harmony, individual voices were coordinated so that concords sounded on strong beats, but with no pressing concern about the sequence of chords from one strong beat to the next. In Baroque tonal harmony, by contrast, the progression of chords was regulated by a system of relations between chords, the tonic (the C triad in the key of C major) providing maximum stability, the dominant (G major triad in C), the subdominant (F major triad in C), and various other chords having degrees of instability that required resolution according to fixed sequential movements from one chord to the next. This tonal foundation of chord sequences made possible a much greater freedom in the treatment of the melody, both harmonically and rhythmically. Not only was the Renaissance dictum that all dissonance be resolved by downward movement no longer observed in the melody, but dissonance occurred on strong beats and melodies made use of a wider range of intervals, most notably chromatic steps and intervals corresponding to augmented and diminished progressions. That increased chromaticism in melodic construction had as its corollary a greater harmonic chromaticism, Baroque composers significantly expanding the Renaissance
palette of triads and sixth chords by introducing unprepared seventh chords, augmented triads, and diminished chords. The heightened freedom of the melodic line was manifest especially in the Baroque system of ornamentation, whereby melodies were embellished with various grace notes (mordants, trills, turns, appoggiaturas, etc.), those additional melodic notes either indicated by signs above the melody or simply improvised by the performer without any explicit instructions from the composer.

Rhythmic innovations also informed Baroque practices. Renaissance compositions typically were organized by the tactus, an even flow of beats maintained throughout a given section of music. A strict system of mathematical proportions governed the rhythms of individual voices, and all voices were coordinated by the unifying tactus, yet the autonomy and equality of the voices tended to weaken the sense of a dominant, emphatic measure controlling all voices. Duration rather than dynamic stress was the primary technique for creating melodic syncopation or accent. Baroque composers, by contrast, exploited the rhythmic extremes of a freely pulsed, expressive lyricism and a heavily stressed, insistently repetitive dynamism. The first extreme was on display in the opera recitative, which followed the fluid cadences of spoken speech, at times entirely without any regular pulse. The other extreme was manifest especially in the dance forms (allemande, courante, sarabande, gigue, gavotte, minuet) that so intrigued Baroque composers. Like their Renaissance predecessors, Baroque composers exploited a full range of contrapuntal techniques, but they handled the individual voices in such a way that the overall metrical organization of the composition was seldom obscured.

The Baroque saw as well the introduction of idiomatic writing, whereby composers exploited the features peculiar to a given voice or instrument, or a group of voices and instruments. Renaissance music typically was conceived in terms of a single part-writing practice common to vocal and instrumental music. Choral compositions generally could be performed a cappella or with instrumental doubling of the lines, or they could be performed by instruments alone. Conversely, instrumental compositions often bore the inscription, “to be played or sung.” With the invention of opera, Baroque composers explored the lyrical possibilities specific to solo voices. In their church music, they exploited a cappella sonorities that would be compromised by instrumental accompaniment. They developed differentiated vocalic and instrumental practices in operas, oratorios, and cantatas. They gradually formulated distinct styles for various families of instruments, especially strings and keyboards. Such idiomatic writing made possible as well an exchange of idioms, a
The New Harmony

violin line adopting a vocalic idiom, a lute ornament appearing in a harpsichord composition. These exchanges and interpenetrations could also take place at the level of entire compositions, the idiom of an organ prelude shaping a choral work, the recitative idiom dominating an instrumental piece. Finally, idiomatic writing informed the widespread practices of the Baroque "concertant style," in which groups of instruments were opposed to one another as contrasting compositional blocks (that contrast of groups frequently taking the form of an opposition of homophonic chord blocks that stressed vertical harmonic relations).

We may say in general, then, that Baroque music displayed an increased heterogeneity and heteronomy in comparison with Renaissance music. Baroque composers developed three separate styles and two distinct practices. They made use of the rhythmic extremes of unpulsed recitatives and heavily stressed dance forms. They expanded the Renaissance harmonic vocabulary to include various altered chords. Melodic composition gained a new freedom, chromatic variation and ornamental elaboration providing options for linear construction unavailable to Renaissance composers. The development of idiomatic writing complemented the Baroque's increased sensitivity to stylistic differences, the Renaissance's single part-writing technique giving way to divergent techniques suitable for individual voices, instruments, and ensembles. The Baroque's fascination with emotional extremes in early opera was gradually communicated throughout a number of other forms, and opera's openness to textual, extra-musical influences gave evidence of an increased sensitivity to extra-musical affectivity in general. What made all this possible was a new harmonic system, one based on tonality and an achordal conception of harmony, with a privileging of the outer voices of a foundational bass and an expressive, ornamental melody. This harmonic system was the force designed to bring unity to the multiple styles and idioms, the extremes of rhythm, intervallic movement, and harmonic palette, and the centrifugal influence of extra-musical concerns.

In this opposition of Renaissance and Baroque conceptions of musical harmony Deleuze sees a parallel to the opposition of Malebranche's occasionalism and Leibniz's pre-established harmony. In Malebranche, the occasion of God's constant intervention ensures a harmonious relationship between bodies and souls. The occasion, says Deleuze, "plays the role of a sort of counterpoint that still belongs to a melodic or polyphonic conception of music" (Fold, 175/128). In other words, Malebranche thinks of bodies and souls as equal and autonomous melodic voices brought into regular harmonic relations through a single unifying force, as in Renaissance musical practice. Leibniz's pre-established
harmony, by contrast, is a harmony of accords, one that is analogous to Baroque musical harmony in its emphasis on vertical relations and the production of unity within a pervasive heterogeneity.

Like many before him, Leibniz finds inspiration in the Pythagorean conjunction of music and mathematics when articulating his notions of harmony. In Deleuze’s analysis, the controlling metaphor in Leibniz’s conception of pre-established harmony is that of the relationship among inverse, or reciprocal, numbers (e.g., 5/1 is the inverse, or reciprocal, of 1/5). Pre-established harmony “is a numeric harmony, in that it envelops a multiplicity” (Fold, 175/128). The one of God envelops the multiplicity of monads. Each monad is an unfolding of the one, and each monad expresses the entirety of the one from a specific point of view. God is the infinite one, and God envelops an infinity of monads; each of the infinite monads, though only an infinitely small entity, expresses the infinite one from its individual point of view. Hence, if God = ∞ / 1, the individual monad is the inverse of God, or 1 / ∞. According to Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles, however, no two monads are exactly alike, and thus we must insist as well that each monad has a specific value, say 1/3 or 1/7, even though the number of monads is infinite, each monad is infinitely small, and each expresses the entirety of the infinite one. Leibniz reconciles this dual nature of the monad by asserting that “each monad expresses the world (1 / ∞), but clearly expresses only a particular zone of the world (1 / n, n having in each case a specific value)” (Fold, 178/130). Each monad is like the singular point at which a curve meets a tangent straight line. The straight line and the curve are made up of an infinity of points, the line and curve converging at the singular point, the distance between the line and curve decreasing by infinite gradations as the two near the singular point. The singular point may be said to integrate the differentials of this particular relation between tangent and curve, and it is in this sense that each monad’s zone of clarity may be characterized by the convergent series of differentials it is capable of integrating. From this analogy, Deleuze concludes that “each monad, in its portion of the world or in its clear zone, thus presents accords, inasmuch as one calls ‘accord’ the relation of a state with its differentials, that is, with the differential relations between infinitely small elements that are integrated into that state” (Fold, 178/130).

Pre-established harmony, then, is a harmony of accords. The accords produced in the individual monad are of three basic types, which Deleuze sees as analogous to the basic chords (again, in French accords = musical chords) of the tonal harmonic system—major chords, minor chords, and dissonant chords. Each monad is a point of view on the world, and as such, it has perceptions and affections specific to its point
of view. Each monad perceives and senses the entire world in a confused way, but only a small portion of the world in a clear fashion. That clear perception is like the sound of waves at the shore (a favorite example of Leibniz’s). That sound is an integration of unconscious, differential micro-perceptions of the infinite sounds of individual waves, individual drops of water, individual molecules, etc. The monad’s zone of clarity is its clear perception of the sound of the sea, but its perception extends confusedly to include an infinity of vague and decreasingly distinguishable micro-perceptions. Likewise, a monad’s specific affection is like a moment of hunger, a conscious feeling that integrates a differential series of moments passing by infinite gradation from unconscious appetitive inclination, to vague gastric unrest, to full-fledged hunger. Major accords are those integrations that allow the monad to expand its zone of clarity, to continue its pleasures in proliferating accords. Minor accords are those integrations that are unstable and temporary, “simple pleasures that are inverted into their contrary, unless they are attracted by a perfect [i.e., major] accord” (Fold, 179/131). Dissonant accords are those integrations that interrelate negative and positive series, such that dissonance is, according to standard Baroque musical practice, either prepared or resolved. When a dog enjoying a juicy bone seems to be abruptly sent into pain by a blow from a stick, it actually has already been sustaining a watchful alertness to possible danger, has had a vague sense of some approaching movement, an unconscious awareness of the scent of a human, etc., and in this regard it has been preparing itself for the dissonant blow, thereby integrating the series of its eating pleasure into the series of corporal pain. Conversely, the martyr at the stake resolves the dissonance of rising flames by integrating her torments into the prospect of an imminent eternal glory.

The accords of monads are constantly forming and unforming, tending “toward a resolution or a modulation” (Fold, 180/132). Although each monad’s accords express the entire world, and hence extend through all other monads, its accords arise from within, for each monad is without doors or windows, a self-enjoying, self-contained locus of unfolding. Though that unfolding occurs as a temporal process of constant transformation, through major and minor integrations of differential series, through preparations for and resolutions of dissonance, the accords of each monad trace a trajectory of instants that exist in a co-present, virtual simultaneity. In each moment of a monad’s unfolding, the entire history of the world is implicit, as is the future course of the world. The course of each monad’s unfolding has been inscribed in it from its creation, that course like a musical score that the soloist monad performs without promptings from its sonic surroundings. The monad’s unfolding,
then, though manifested in a horizontal temporality, exists vertically as a virtual score, the total history of the monad’s changing accords already written in its soloist part. In the simplest terms, one may say that the monad’s accords are like arpeggios, melodies made up of the notes of a chord, temporal unfoldings of simultaneous, virtual forms. In that each monad integrates multiple series, however, we must imagine its solo score as one made up not solely of monodic arpeggios but also of multi-voiced chordal progressions (perhaps the score of a truly grand piano).

Each monad acts spontaneously, without prompting from without, and hence its accords constitute a harmony of spontaneity. Yet in addition to spontaneity, there is a harmonious arrangement of all monads among one another, a harmony Deleuze calls “concertation” (a harmony, he suggests, that may be seen as the analog of Baroque music’s “concertant style”). Although each monad plays its individual part without regard to other monads, all the monads belong to a single world and perform the music of that world together as a harmoniously coordinated orchestra. Concertation is “an accord of spontaneities themselves, an accord among accords” (Fold, 181/132). The cosmos is God’s great orchestral score, each monad a separate part in the score, the whole composition a manifestation of an unfolding pre-established harmony. Deleuze insists, however, that Leibniz’s God does not so much create the individual monads as he creates the world within which the monads unfold, that world incapable of existing outside the monads that express it. The harmonies of spontaneity and concertation are mutually implicated, then, in that God’s orchestral composition is a total world, selected from all possible worlds, a world already replete with its monads, which are the necessary expressions of that world.

The harmony specific to concertation is one of clarity and obscurity, of pre-established mutual adjustments of relations among monads. Each monad is characterized by its zone of clarity, no two monads possessing precisely the same range and degree of clarity. As a given monad expands its zone of clarity, necessarily somewhere else another monad’s zone contracts. All monads express the same world, but in a given event that expresses it with greater clarity is a cause, and that which expresses it with less clarity is an effect. The causality among monads is not like mechanical causality, since each monad is an autonomous entity and hence unaffected by any other monad. Rather, it is an ideal causality, the causality of mutually coordinated harmonious relations that constitute the unified world created by God. Ideal causality always proceeds from clarity to obscurity, or from the more-clear to the less-clear. Concertation, then, may be defined as “the ensemble of ideal relations of causality.” Ideal causality “is concertation itself, and thus it is
in perfect agreement with spontaneity: ideal causality goes from the more-clear to the less-clear, but that which is more-clear in a substance is produced by that substance by virtue of its proper spontaneity, and that which is less-clear in the other is likewise produced by virtue of its own spontaneity” (Fold, 183/134).

In addition to spontaneity and concertation, Deleuze proposes the existence of a third element of Leibnizian harmony, one that parallels the basso continuo of Baroque music: the vinculum substantiale, or substantial link (vinculum, literally “fetter,” “chain”).6 Late in his life, Leibniz addressed the question of transubstantiation in a series of letters to Father Des Bosses, and in the process took up the question of the identity of bodies as they change through time. We humans have bodies that are more than aggregates of particles (such as buckets of sand). Our bodies are organisms, collectively organized entities, and yet they also include various organs, themselves more than aggregates. While the components of our bodies function together as unified entities, they are routinely replaced (skin is shed and regrown, blood is lost but then replenished). The body, as Leibniz frequently expresses it, is like Theseus’ ship, patched and repaired piece by piece such that the ship that docks is entirely different from the ship that set out at the voyage’s beginning, and yet it is the same ship. Every monad has a body, and that body’s formal unity comes from its related monad. The human body’s organs are also bodies, and hence bodies with their own corresponding monads (a heart monad, a liver monad, a blood cell monad, a bile cell monad). The monad of an individual human body is a dominant monad, the monads of its component are dominated monads, and that which puts the dominant and dominated monads in relation to one another is the dominant monad’s vinculum substantiale. Itself not a monad, the vinculum is a pure relation, created by God, one that produces a cooperative cohesiveness among monads, while also allowing for periodic reassemblages of monads, as some dominated monads break away from the vinculum and other, new monads fall under its sway. What the vinculum adds to Leibnizian harmony is an element of flux and variation. The vinculum is like the Baroque basso continuo, the anchoring harmonic foundation that supplies a solid tonality, yet that also makes possible a new freedom in the melodic line. The continuo’s subordination of inner voices secures the piece’s chordal harmonic structure, thereby ensuring that the wide-ranging chromatic, intervallic, rhythmic, and ornamental variations of the melody do not compromise the work’s tonal logic. In a similar fashion, the vinculum of a given body establishes its dominant tonality, while allowing its assemblages of dominated monads to form, partially dissolve, and reform again in a flux of changing combinations.
Yet the vinculum effects more than links among monads. Though it is itself neither monad nor material body, and though it only links monads to monads, in its linking of a dominant monad to its dominated monads it induces a "back-and-forth from the soul [of the dominant monad] to the body [that belongs to the dominant monad], and from bodies [that belong to the dominated monads] to souls [of the dominated monads]" (Fold, 162/120). Monads actualize the virtual, whereas bodies realize the possible, and the domain of actualized monads remains separate from that of realized bodies. Leibniz generally explains the alignment of monads and bodies as the result of God's pre-established harmony, but in his speculations about the vinculum Deleuze sees an additional principle at work, one that connects monads and bodies in a new way. The back-and-forth induced by the vinculum suggests that it serves an intermediary role, one that presides over the incarnation of monads. Bodies realize the possible, but that which makes them real is their animation by their attendant monads. Bodies become real as that which is actual in the monad (a given perception or affection) is realized in those bodies. "One does not realize the body, one realizes in the body that which is actually perceived in the soul. The reality of the body is the realization of phenomena in the body. That which realizes is the fold between the two stories [Le., the two domains of monads and bodies], the vinculum itself" (Fold, 163/120). This mysterious passage from monads to bodies, this realization of the actual within bodies, is the principle of incarnation and creation in general, a divine principle beyond human comprehension. By interfolding monads and bodies, the vinculum animates matter, creating a harmony that is characteristically Baroque in its simultaneous spirituality and insistent sensuality. Because of the vinculum, in Leibniz "there is not only harmony within harmony [i.e., spontaneous harmony within the harmony of concertation], but harmony between the harmony and the melody. It is in this sense that harmony goes from the soul to the body, from the intelligible to the sensible, and continues within the sensible.... It is in the melody that the harmony realizes itself" (Fold, 185–6/135).

Deleuze sees many parallels between the new harmony of Baroque music and the Leibnizian harmony of spontaneity, concertation, and the vinculum substantiale, but that analogy, though brought by Leibniz "to a new rigor" (Fold, 179/131), by no means provides the program for a mechanical or rigid construction of philosophical concepts. The Baroque harmonic system has an internal coherence as well as a specifically musical relationship of continuity with, development of, and departure from Renaissance contrapuntal practices. Likewise, Leibniz's harmony is part of a philosophical system, with its own inner coherence and a strictly
philosophical relationship to the systems of his contemporaries and predecessors. The Baroque’s musical harmony of chords, tonality, and *basso continuo*, its heterogeneity of styles and extremes of rhythm, its idiomatic handling of instruments and concertant-style contrast of ensembles, its free-flowing chromatic and intervallic ornamentation of melodic lines, its heteronomous, oratorical approach to the setting of texts, and its pervasive expressive sensuality—all may have their counterparts in Leibniz’s thought, but the relationship among the elements differs from the musical to the philosophical system, and there is no way one could predict what role the *basso continuo* might play once one had established the role of accords/chords in the Leibnizian system. Nor could one predict what form Leibniz’s thought would take based on an identification of occasionalism with Renaissance harmony, for Leibniz’s response to occasionalism, though principled and systematic, is an inventive and unforeseeable transformation of the questions and terms informing occasionalism, just as Baroque tonality represents a creative and unpredictable metamorphosis of Renaissance polyphonic counterpoint.

Yet there remains a common concern in Leibniz and Baroque music, an effort to conceive of the One and the Many in a new way, to develop a model that stresses heterogeneity and differences among components, that provides for cohesiveness while admitting flux and variation, and that allows for both centripetal and centrifugal forces, thereby ensuring the internal structural integrity of the One while making possible its expansive engagement with new elements. Leibniz’s philosophical response to the non-philosophy of Baroque music remains philosophical, yet his concept of harmony reverberates with the new harmony of the music of his age, especially with that music’s percepts and affects, its expressiveness, its delight in extremes, its play with contrast and variation, and its incessant effort to engage the spiritual within the sensual. Leibniz and the composers of his era pursue their separate ends, but they all inhabit the world and attempt to engage that world through thought, Leibniz via a thought in concepts, the composers via a thought in sonic percepts and affects. Leibniz’s thought in concepts and the composers’ thought in sonic percepts and affects meet in a permeable membrane that forms the outside of each thought, one that affords passages from concepts to percepts and affects and back again.

Deleuze regards Leibniz’s system as a last, valiant effort to sustain theological order in a rapidly disintegrating world, and in Voltaire’s critique of “the best of all possible worlds” he sees evidence of the system’s demise. Yet Deleuze finds much in Leibniz that is of more than historical interest. *The Fold* is not a mere exercise in the history of philosophy, for
while Leibniz’s system may have collapsed, its component concepts have a potential for exploitation that goes beyond his times, an “untimely” potential that Deleuze is intent on exploring. In a parallel fashion, Deleuze discovers in the contemporary arts certain tendencies that echo Baroque artistic practices, such that he can speak of a “new Baroque, neo-Leibnizianism” (Fold, 187/136) in modern aesthetic practice. Those contemporary tendencies in the arts and his own philosophical explorations have in common the practice and concept of the fold within a new harmony, a harmony that is Leibnizian, but with a difference. Leibniz’s world of infinite folds-within-folds, of monadic minds/spirits inter-folded with matter and topological folds of reversible insides and outsides, remains a potent model, but the harmony of that world can no longer be conceived of as a unity, since our inter-folded universe is not circumscribed and complete. Leibnizian monads are subject to two interrelated conditions, “closure and selection” (Fold, 188/137). Each monad is without doors or windows, entirely closed in upon itself, spontaneously expressing the entire world. Its spontaneous harmonic interrelationships with other monads arise from God’s selection of the best world from among the infinite number of possible worlds. In our neo-Leibnizian cosmos, by contrast, the principle of selection no longer holds. Multiple possible worlds coexist, worlds that are incompossible and yet co-present. Each monad expresses a world, but not necessarily the same world, nor does a given monad express the same world from moment to moment. Hence, with the demise of the principle of selection, the principle of closure also falls away, as the monad opens onto the various divergent, incompossible worlds with which it is attuned.

To the extent that the world is now made up of divergent series (chaosmos), or that the throw of the dice has replaced the game of Plenitude, the monad can no longer include the entire world as if it were in a closed circle that can be modified by projection. Instead, the monad now opens itself on a trajectory or an expanding spiral that moves further and further from a center (Fold, 188/137).

In The Fold, Deleuze offers an extended example of the ways in which a given philosopher may respond to the arts. Leibniz’s pre-established harmony is analogous to the new harmony of Baroque music in many respects, but the musical analogs take on different functions in their philosophical milieu, and their transfer from the aesthetic to the conceptual sphere obeys no simple transformation rule or procedure. For Deleuze, philosophy has an internal integrity and rigor, and its thought in
concepts is incommensurable with other modes of thought. Yet it also opens itself to the non-philosophical, finding counterparts to artists’ thought in percepts and affects within its own conceptual field. The new harmony of the Baroque is Leibnizian, in part because Baroque composers and Leibniz operate within a similar world, attempting to think the One and the Many in new ways. Yet their musical and philosophical innovations possess an untimely potential as well, their practices and concepts capable of assuming unexpected configurations and functions in other contexts. For this reason, the history of philosophy is a vital component of contemporary philosophy, just as the history of the arts supplies invaluable inspiration for modern artistic practice. If philosophy bears an essential relationship to the non-philosophy of the arts, that relationship is not restricted to one with the contemporary arts. The new harmony of the Baroque is as much a contributing element of Deleuze’s thought as is the new new harmony of Cage, Berlioz, Stockhausen, and Berio. In philosophy and in the arts, a continuing co-presence of untimely elements from both domains prevails, each with its own mode of thought, but each open to the movements of the other. Hence, at the conclusion of The Fold, Deleuze can say of both philosophy and the arts, “we remain Leibnizians, even though accords are not what express our world or our text. We discover new ways of folding, like new kinds of envelopment, but we remain Leibnizians, because it’s always a matter of folding, unfolding, refolding” (Fold, 189/137).

rbogue@uga.edu

Notes


3. Christiane Frémont, for example, in L’Être et la relation (Paris: Vrin, 1981) says of Leibniz’s use of the word “harmony” and other musical terms that he “makes use of these musical notions without worrying too much about their technical sense or the difficulties that they imply” (32).

5. At another point in *The Fold*, Deleuze proposes a tri-partite parallel between philosophical approaches to the soul-body problem and musical conceptions of harmony. "Leibniz likes to compare diverse concepts of the soul-body to modes of correspondence between two clocks: either influx [the soul directs the body through a direct influence], or occasion [occasionalism], or harmony (which Leibniz judged to be superior). These are the three 'ages' of music: monodic, or unison [Medieval music], polyphonic or counterpoint [Renaissance music], harmonic, in chords—that is, baroque" (*Fold*, 187/136). This periodization is unfortunately obscured in the English translation of *The Fold*.


7. Deleuze does not offer this historical reading of Leibniz in *The Fold*, but in an interview about *The Fold* Deleuze comments: "What takes place from Leibniz to Voltaire is a fundamental moment in the history of thought. With Voltaire, we are in the Enlightenment, that is, precisely a regime of light, of matter and of life, of Reason, completely different from the Baroque regime, even if Leibniz prepared the way for this new age: theological reason had crumbled and become purely and simply human. But the Baroque already marks a crisis in theological reason: it was a final attempt to reconstruct a world in the process of disintegrating" (*Negotiations* 221/161).