repeating them. I strongly believe that philosophical claims that defy effective paraphrasing lack genuine content. It is not good enough, if one is philosophizing, to trade in unique metaphors and the like.

The conceptual issue that effectively precludes effective application of Mensch's ruminations on self-knowledge to the various issues he addresses is more diffusely present. The trouble here is that Mensch deals with the otherness inherent in our selfhood as if it were determinate. There can be no question that otherness or alterity is elemental to being a self, but it is highly questionable whether that otherness is as stable as Mensch's treatment of it seems to assume. Our otherness is only psychiatrically or psychologically accessible, and then only partially so, and this is in part because it is dynamic. Mensch himself makes much of how our "mental life is intersubjectively determined," but largely ignores the resultant volatility of the self's otherness consequent on the diversity of external and internal influences (5). In this connection, I thought it a serious lack that Mensch fails even to mention Foucault.

The more literary elements of Hiddenness and Alterity are much better than the philosophical ones. I thought the treatment of Benito Cereno and Freud, for instance, in Chapter 8, provided interesting insights into the interplay between literary presentation of a character and Freudian theoretical understanding of the individual.

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Le Vocabulaire de Gilles Deleuze, Les Cahiers de Noesis 3
ROBERT SASSO and ARNAUD VILLANI, Editors
2003; 376 pages.

Le Vocabulaire de Deleuze
FRANÇOIS ZOURABICHVILI

Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts
CHARLES J. STIVALE, Editor
Chesham: Acumen, 2005; 212 pages.

Ten years ago, at the time of Gilles Deleuze's suicide in November 1995, only a few daring souls had succeeded in writing books helping the rest of us navigate through the difficult straits of his work. Until recently, despite a glut of texts devoted to Deleuze's thought, there was no map of the great philosopher/artist's concepts and of their interconnections.
In this review, I feel privileged to be welcoming three excellent works, destined to satisfy fastidious researchers and ordinary readers of Deleuze alike, works that attempt to fill a void with well-crafted charts of the archipelago of difference that he bequeathed to us.

In *Le Vocabulaire de Gilles Deleuze*, Robert Sasso and Arnaud Villani, with the help of nineteen seasoned readers of Deleuze from France and Belgium (philosophers, linguists, epistemologists, and writers), index and analyze fifty Deleuzean concepts, supplementing their catalogue with thirty-seven additional entries and their brief, lexicographic definitions. The author of the volume *La Guêpe et l’Orchidée, Essai sur Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Belin, 1999) and scores of essays on Deleuze’s philosophy, Villani is one of the most established, faithful, and insightful readers of Deleuze. Sasso is honorary maitre de conférence in philosophy at the University of Nice–Sophia Antipolis. Among the fifty concepts analyzed in this *Vocabulaire*, one finds key Deleuzean notions, like “actual/virtual,” “body without organs,” “becoming,” “difference,” “smooth space/striated space,” “lines of flight,” “micropolitics,” “multiplicity,” “repetition,” and “univocity.” Each concept receives a brief definition, followed by tracking its history and trajectory in the texts of Deleuze (and Guattari); its transformations are clearly marked and accompanied by the reasons, whenever applicable, for the concept’s modification or eventual abandonment by its creator.

Two examples of entries in this vocabulary will, I hope, serve as helpful illustrations of the conceptual analyses at work. Anne Sauvagnargues is the author of the entry “actual/virtual,” whose central role in Deleuze’s ontology is by now well known. Sauvagnargues begins with the date of the first occurrence of the concepts in Deleuze’s work: 1956, in his essays on Bergson. She then offers a brief definition or characterization of the concept as follows: actual and virtual are “ontological categories replacing the couples, sensible/intelligible, essence/existence, possible/real. Both are real but they exclude each other. Deleuze’s univocity depends on this point: Being is said of both the virtual and the actual in one and the same ‘voice.’ The actual refers to material and present states of affairs; the virtual refers to incorporeal, past and ideational events. Their interchange defines the dynamism of becoming, in its differentiating and creative act” (12). We are told that essential to Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming is the intersection of the ontological and the temporal axes—an intersection that could easily lead one to the conclusion that the virtual must be the actual that has been. Deleuze, however, manages to prevent this misunderstanding as he borrows Bergson’s idea of the pure past that has never been present. The virtual is this pure past. In Proust’s words, it is real without being actual, ideational without being abstract. The distinction between virtual and
actual corresponds to a bifurcation of time, that is, of the virtual durée that proceeds by differentiating itself as it follows two different routes: it makes the present pass and it conserves the past. The preeminence of the virtual in Deleuze therefore rests on the fact that only it can account for the flow of becoming.

The "Critique" section that follows informs us that Deleuze's virtual rests on Bergson's severe critique of the possible. The possible is shunned because it gives rise to a number of problems: an ontological problem built into the assumption of the anteriority of non-being to being; a modal problem because it makes existence a derivative of the possible; and finally a temporal problem because it transforms time into the realization of successive, linear processes. With this critique in mind, Deleuze refuses to think of the virtual as a reserve of being, anterior to the actual. He also refuses to think of the actual as the development of the virtual or its suppression.

One wishes that the section devoted to "Critique" had incorporated some critical questions about the workings of the actual/virtual apparatus for the purpose of elucidating the perplexing ontological claims that this apparatus sustains. But Ms. Sauvagnargues has no room for them. This is not the case, however, with all entries. Take, for example, Philippe Mengue's entry for "micropolitics," the critical section of which is a condensation of Mengue's denunciation of Deleuze's politics, given in a detailed manner in his _Deleuze et le problème de la démocratie_ (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003). In its historical section, Mengue traces the transformations of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept "schizoanalysis" to its replacement by the concept of "micropolitics" and offers this definition of the latter: "Micropolitics is the analysis of the flows of desire's cathexes and of the central role played by minorities and the 'minor,' in the context of groups and individuals. Micropolitics presuppose a war machine—individual or collective—turned against the grand, majoritarian and stable institutions—the State, for example" (251). In the critical part of his entry, Mengue goes on to bring the following charges against Deleuze: first, to the extent that not every minoritarian struggle is legitimately revolutionary, one should think that criteria are required to decide which are and which are not. Deleuze does not have any. Second, the public spaces that democracy requires to hold discussions and debates necessary to sustain the aims of political liberalism are denounced by Deleuze as futile and bloodless. This, in Mengue's assessment, makes Deleuze the enemy of democracy and defeats the purpose of his "politics," that is, the establishment of as many connections among heterogeneous elements as possible. Deleuze overlooks the fact that democracy is the sole guarantor of such connections. Mengue therefore concludes that Deleuze has no politics; what, in his work, pretends to be
a discussion of the political is only an ethical stance: "On the hic and nunc, concrete decisions, in view of public spaces, open to debate and aiming at the common good, micropolitics has nothing to tell us..." (257). Its usefulness, Mengue concedes, lies rather in its very presence which reminds us that "no authentic and living democracy (can exist) without a permanent guerilla force turned against the established powers and their (juridico-moral) norm of regulations" (258).

François Zourabichvili's *Le Vocabulaire de Deleuze* is organized around twenty-four entries, presented alphabetically and ranging from "arrangement," "aion," and "complication" to the "univocity of being," "non-organic life," and the "virtual." At the end of the book, the reader will find a list of twenty-one additional concepts, with a page reference to the entry or entries (one or more of the twenty-four) that mention or briefly elucidate the designated concept. Zourabichvili is a very careful reader of Deleuze—meticulous in his conceptual analyses—and his entries are insightful mini-essays that contribute seriously to our understanding of Deleuze. He is the author of *Deleuze, Une philosophie de l'événement* (Paris: PUF, 1994) and of two ambitious books on Spinoza: *Spinoza, Une physique de la pensée* (Paris: PUF, 2002) and *Le Conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza* (Paris: PUF, 2002). His essays on Alain Badiou on Deleuze and Toni Negri on Deleuze are worth reading for their subtlety and their fidelity to the letter and the spirit of Deleuze.

In the first three pages of his *Vocabulaire*, Zourabichvili finds it necessary to justify his decision to compile a lexicon, reminding us that Deleuze himself has done it already three times—in his little book on Nietzsche, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, and in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Deleuze's concepts must be taken à la lettre, as he himself repeatedly suggests; they are never metaphors. But this does not absolve us from the task of pursuing the analysis of these concepts (exposer le concept), because "each concept participates in an act of thinking that displaces the field of intelligibility and modifies the conditions of the problem..." (5). Conceptual analysis is therefore indispensable, the best guarantee that one is ever going to encounter Deleuze's thought. The alternative between "explaining" a concept and "using" it is demonstrably false. Zourabichvili concedes that concepts require affects and percepts to sustain them, but he denies that they can be reduced to them. One has the impression in reading these pages that Zourabichvili conceives of his own work—that of a conceptual analyst—as "displacing the field of intelligibility" and "modifying the conditions of the problem," according to the lines of flight that Deleuze himself has already either plotted or anticipated.

To give the reader a taste of Zourabichvili's *Vocabulaire*, I chose the concept "event" as one example from among the twenty-four entries of
the book; after all, our lexicographer is also the author of the book that proclaims Deleuze as the thinker of the event. As with all his entries, Zourabichvili begins with two quotations from Deleuze's texts (in this case, *The Logic of Sense*) that set the tone for the conceptual analysis that follows. He then reminds his readers that in articulating his theory of the event Deleuze borrows from the Stoics the distinction between events and states of affairs. The actualization of events in bodies is responsible for the “before” and “after” of succession. Language, on the other hand, ties differences between states of affairs in the instance of their disjunction. “As Alice grows,” we remember Deleuze saying, “she becomes bigger than she was before and smaller than she will be—at the same time.” But in order to avoid our temptation to make events strictly an affair of language, Zourabichvili suggests that we must follow Deleuze in tracing a line of demarcation, not between language/event and language/world, but rather between two interpretations of the relation between language and world. For logicians, the distinction is between propositional form (language) and the form of states of affairs (world). But for Deleuze the paradox of the event is in its identity as both the affair of the “expression” and also an attribute of states of affairs. The event subsists in language and belongs to the world. This sheds a better light on the vexing question that hangs over the relations between the virtual and the actual in Deleuze’s ontology. The virtual event actualizes itself without ever permitting the actual to exhaust it. The plain signification of the early phenomenologists, as well as the successful intuitive fulfillment of our intentions, are therefore out of the question. Neither “the expressed” of language nor the attribute of states of affairs can exhaust the virtual. This is why, in the ethics of Deleuze, for the recommended counter-actualization—recommended, for the sake of reaching behind the states of affairs toward the event itself, and for becoming ethically worthy of it—it is possible to draw on the “unrealizable” aspect of all actualizations.

At this point, Zourabichvili pauses to raise the question whether we are entitled to pitch the thought of the event against the thought of being. Is Deleuze’s theory of the event an ontology? Zourabichvili seems satisfied with issuing a few cautionary remarks to those of us who speak lightly of Deleuze as an ontologist. Later, his “Introduction inédite: l’ontologique et le transcendantal” (Zourabichvili et al., *La Philosophie de Deleuze* [Paris: PUF, 2004], 5–12) will be more severe with the vulgar and sophisticated attempts to peg an ontology on the backside of a reticent Deleuze. In the *Vocabulaire* he advises caution to those who ascribe an ontology to Deleuze, reminding them that Deleuze himself uses “being” as little as possible. But if one insists on seeing a transition in Deleuze’s works from critical philosophy to ontology, one is advised to
remember, first, that Deleuze disengages the pure given from the sovereignty of the subject and, second, that Deleuze’s search is for a heterogenesis that has nothing to do with the usual talk of engendering or constitution. A gulf exists between the Deleuzian événement and the avenement of the phenomenologists. Neither the beginning of time nor the genesis of historicity fuels Deleuze’s preoccupations; the event, for Deleuze, is given in the strange inclusive disjunction of the “still here” and “already past” and of the “yet to come” and “already here.”

A careful reading of Zourabichvili’s insightful mini-essays in his Vocabulaire reveals folds and rhizomatic connections within Deleuze’s thought that may not have been previously detected. This alone should make the reader overlook her occasional irritation with Zourabichvili’s tendency to style himself after the guardian of orthodoxy—the one and only who can take Deleuze’s concepts à la lettre.

Finally, in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, Charles Stivale, the author of The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari (New York: Guilford, 1998) and one of the first corners to the field of Deleuze studies, has brought together sixteen scholars, most of them with long-standing credentials in Deleuze scholarship, and put them to work in the elucidation of concepts central to Deleuze’s thought. Unlike the two works discussed above, Stivale’s collection is not a dictionary in its inception or in the ample room provided for its subjects. Each essay in this collection attempts to explicate (in Deleuze’s sense of “explication”) one concept by putting it to work (or showing how it works) in a domain (philosophical, political, literary, cinematic, painterly) of the author’s choice. In his Introduction, the editor reveals the principle that presided over the selection of essays: “The contributors to the volume are well aware,” he says, “of the pitfalls of wasting the ‘generative activity’ of concepts and show this awareness in their efforts to prevent the closing off of the text, and to release key-concepts for the sake of a play in the ‘in between spaces.’”

Eight among the sixteen essays captured my attention, either because they reveal new insights or because they are written with clarity and sure-footedness. Kenneth Surin’s “Force” displays the central role that the notion of force plays in Deleuze’s “libidinal materialism” and attributes this to the formative influence that Spinoza and Nietzsche had on his work. Surin is particularly helpful with his quick but accurate sketch of recent French politics. His demonstration shows that the echoes of this politics decisively influence the space that Force occupies in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. Gregg Lambert’s “Expression” tackles a concept both difficult and indispensable for our understanding of Deleuze, and does a good job of it. Given that any discussion of this concept requires a relentless struggle with Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense
and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (both notoriously difficult texts), the occasional obscurity in Lambert’s writing is pardonable. Among the strengths of his essay I count the pages on indirect discourse. In a limited space, the author successfully elucidates how indirect discourse displaces subject and author from the center of our literary-philosophico-political attention, and thereby replaces old intentions with never-ending intensities. Eugene Holland’s “Desire” traces the roots of Deleuze’s affirmative and productive desire back to Kant and Marx, shows what revisions must be made to the positions of Kant and Marx in order for desire to be conceptualized as the producer of the real, and contributes valuable notes on the function of the body without organs—a condensed version perhaps of what Holland has already given us with his Introduction to Schizoanalysis, but valuable nevertheless.

Patty Sotirin’s “Becoming-Woman” revisits one of the often contested concepts of Deleuze and Guattari and places it in the context of the many Deleuzo-Guattarian becomings. She briefly discusses the reluctance of some feminist philosophers to adopt it as well as the admiration lavished on it by others, and concludes with an ambivalent gesture that will put the concept “becoming-woman” to use, provided that proper precautions are taken. The essay also makes room for a discussion of the “becoming-girl” that Deleuze and Guattari advocate, but regrettably it does not benefit from John Protevi’s recent discussion of the Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming-girl, with his not-to-be-missed reminder that in order to be understood correctly, this particular becoming presupposes the reading of the French syntagm, “jeune fille,” in its double denotation, as a girl but also as a young lady. (See his Political Physics and his essay “Love” in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. John Protevi and Paul Patton.) Christa Albrecht-Crane’s essay “Style/Stutter” takes the reader through the relevant chapters of A Thousand Plateaus, in an attempt to assess the revolutionary potential in Deleuze’s advice to the minor writer to make language itself stutter. “Through the concept style/stutter,” Albrecht-Crane writes, “Deleuze articulates a revolutionary, political aspect, one that links style and artistic creation to resistance” (130). Deleuze, of course, did not easily embrace resistance as a political gesture, and usually writers on this topic do not display the required prudence in discussing it. It is to the credit of this writer that she chooses to talk of resistance (and therefore of style and stuttering as resistance) the way that Deleuze preferred, that is, in terms of “resistance manifested in becomings.”

Gregory Seigworth’s essay, “From Affection to Soul,” is also exceptional. In fact, if this essay had done nothing but underscore the three different senses of “affect” in Spinoza, and caution us to read Deleuze with all three senses of Spinoza’s notion in mind, I would have thought it
a success. But the essay does even more: it discusses the differences between Deleuze and Lacan, offers fine insight into the often misunderstood scope of the virtual, and includes a helpful discussion on points of diffraction between Deleuze and Foucault. The collection concludes with Daniel Smith's essay, "Critical and Clinical." Smith is the translator of Deleuze's *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) and, for this reason, coupled with the fact that Smith is one of the best philosopher-readers of Deleuze in North America, the reader would be right to expect an insightful paper. Smith does not disappoint; with his usual meticulous scholarship, he shows us how Deleuze's critical and clinical project moves from its early incarnation in *Coldness and Cruelty* to its Anti-Oedipus phase, and then to its encounter with literature. Although less centrally than in his previous works, Smith undertakes the task of revealing that the answer to the question, "What difference does Deleuze's difference make?" lies in Deleuze's distinction between morality and ethics.

Limited space allows me merely to make mention of the other fine essays included in the volume: Melissa McMahon's "Difference and Repetition," Judith Poxon and Charles Stivale's "Sense, Series," J. Macgregor Wise's "Assemblage," Karen Houle's "Micropolitics," Ronald Bogue's "The Minor," Jennifer Daryl Slack's "Logic of Sensation," Felicity Colman's "Cinema: Movement-Image-Recognition-Time," and Tom Conley's "Folds and Folding." Stivale's volume is a multifaceted tool to which those interested in Deleuze will want to have access should they need a more elaborate and informative conceptual analysis than the one that the vocabularies of Sasso/Villani and Zourabichvili have provided.

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**Gadamer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics**

BRUCE KRAJEWSKI, Editor

This latest volume of essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics demonstrates both the significance of Gadamer's work and the breadth of its application to many facets of philosophy. It also provides further proof that Gadamer's legacy is dialogue—dialogue with the text as well as with each other—as most of the writers are answering each other's comments or those of other critics. This collection allows the reader to experience many varied interpretations of Gadamer's work, and thus