As stated in its Preface, “this book defends the right of feeling — meaning the whole realm of passion, emotion, mood, and affection in general — to be admitted to equal partnership with reason and will in human consciousness” (1-2). Unfortunately, it does a poor job of it. The first 194 pages read like a graduate research paper for a history of contemporary philosophy course. These first seven chapters of this ten-chapter book consist largely of uncritical exegesis of the following twentieth-century figures: Chapter 1 (“Phenomenology, Intentionality, Embodiment”), Levinas, with brief nods to Kwant and Merleau-Ponty; Chapter 2 (“Intentionality of Affection & Emotion”), Sartre; Chapter 3 (“Mood & Affective Tonality”), Heidegger, Langer, Ricoeur; Chapter 4 (“Emotional Presentation & Will”), Meinong, Strasser, Pfänder; Chapter 5 (“Value & Affective Consciousness”), Scheler, Michel Henry, Ferdinand Alquie; Chapter 6 (“Affectability & Affective Response”), Dietrich von Hildebrand; Chapter 7 (“the Structure of Affective Intentionality”), Strasser, Steven Smith. If someone’s looking for an annotated bibliography, this is fine. But the reader will quickly grow tired of such exegesis in a book that’s ostensibly arguing its own thesis, especially when the exegesis is both repetitive and already unduly long. To cite only one example from the above list, in Chapter 4, having heard something of Meinong’s and Strasser’s positions, we find the next ten pages peppered with the following: “Pfänder speaks of” (124), “In Pfänder’s language” (125), “Pfänder adds” (125), “Now Pfänder goes on the clarify” (127), “Pfänder is not saying” (128), “Pfänder says” (129), “Pfänder is describing” (129), “Pfänder gives several examples” (129-30), “Pfänder offers” (130), “Pfänder speaks of” (131), “Pfänder does not suggest” (132), “Pfänder organizes his conclusion, saying...” (132). This kind of exegetical writing does not belong in the text of a book that’s trying to argue its own thesis - it might be fine to have some expository endnotes, but not 194 pages of expository text. The point of such lengthy exegesis becomes particularly puzzling when, having completed it, Tallon proceeds to maintain that it has little relevance, as he does in the case of Pfänder (and elsewhere):

Despite the clear advances realized in this chapter through the contributions of Pfänder, I find his analyses only provisionally and temporarily helpful. They are important stages on the way to a complete theory of triune consciousness. But there is something about locating affectivity too much in embodiment that runs the risk of regressing toward the periphery of consciousness rather than progressing toward the center (133).
If Pfänder's analyses can offer us only provisional and temporary assistance, why should we read them, or Tallon's exegesis of them, in the first place? Presumably, because Tallon did. But there is no need for an author to take his or her readers down every step of every road that the author took in order to get to the destination. Frankly, we no longer have time for that (if we ever really did) - there are simply too many authors and too many roads.

Tallon thus appears to confuse the conceptual and thematic with the biographical and historical - but there is a far more significant confusion that runs throughout his book. This confusion arises, ironically, from Tallon's failure to clearly distinguish conceptually the three "kinds" of consciousness he's talking about; namely, affection, cognition, and volition. In the first pages of his book, he identifies cognition with reasoning, willing with volition, and feeling with affection. He appears to do so in the attempt to clarify what he means by the terms in the book's subtitle. But nothing at all is clarified - quite the contrary, in fact: The material is obscured by Tallon's first problematic assumption: (i) That we know what reason and will are. And his second problematic assumption makes the situation still worse: (ii) That we know them to be different from feeling.

This same confusion accompanies Tallon's exegesis and use of quotations. For example, in the Preface he quotes a lengthy passage from Damasio that includes the following sentence: "Contrary to traditional scientific opinion, feelings are just as cognitive as other percepts. They are the result of a most curious physiological arrangement that has turned the brain into the body's captive audience" (9). Immediately following the quoted passage, Tallon writes: "this again, is another way to express connaturality. Feeling is necessary not merely for the correct operations of reasoning and willing but is also the necessary condition for the higher operational synthesis of cognition and volition with affection..." (9-10). Whether Tallon has read too much into the Damasio passage is not the issue. The point is that he fails to explain what his notion of "cognition" has to do with Damasio's notion of "cognitive". In other words, is Tallon telling us (i) that feeling is a cognition or is he telling us (ii) that it's not a cognition? If he's telling us (i), then exactly what kind of distinction is he trying to make? And if he's telling us (ii), then how can he quote and use Damasio as he does?

He wants to prove, of course, "the existence of affectivity as a distinct kind of consciousness inseparable from the other two" (2), but he never really addresses the nature of the "kinds" of consciousness he's talking about. And his interminable summary of other thinkers' treatments of features of consciousness that appear to be in some way related to those on which he's focusing proves unsatisfactory.

In his concluding chapter, Tallon writes: "the model [of human beings] proposed here is based on phenomenologically described and ontologically interpreted human experience...and is not the result of pure speculation or
religious inspiration, although both are sources of examples in aid of interpreting experience, as we saw. Rather, a detailed description of consciousness is the basis of the model” (290). Actually, what we saw was not phenomenological description but summaries of parts of texts, for the most part works in phenomenology, that fit into the model of consciousness that Tallon is arguing for. This is not a bad model, and Tallon’s thesis itself - or at least something like this thesis - might win approval from a good many hermeneutic and postmodern thinkers. But the book itself doesn’t propose a model that’s really new. It’s Lonergan’s, with (more) Aquinas thrown in. And that fact points to the book’s major flaw: there’s nothing new here. In the Preface, “Restoring Feeling to Consciousness,” Tallon writes:

So entrenched is the prejudice against accepting affectivity as part of consciousness that books like Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence (1995), Damasio’s Descartes’ Error (1994), Turski’s Toward a Rationality of Emotions (1994), Smith’s The Felt Meanings of the World (1986), Restak’s The Modular Brain (1994), and MacLean’s The Triune Brain (1990), to mention only a few recent works, continue to fight uphill to gain recognition for affectivity as necessary for sound reasoning and responsible decision making. The thesis that no feeling is just as bad as — and probably worse than — too much feeling, is long overdue.

What has been lacking up to now is a single philosophical argument that takes seriously the challenge of integrating head and heart from start to finish on the basis of one consistent principle. That principle is intentionality, the central thesis of any contemporary phenomenology of consciousness...And the thesis would be that insofar as an affection is intentional, it merits being included in human consciousness as a full and equal partner along with cognition and volition. Once affective intentionality...has been established as the best contemporary explanation of feeling (the heart)--and I need seven chapters to do so, constituting the phenomenological “half” of this book--then comes the task of taking this phenomenology and interpreting it (the hermeneutical “half”), that is, of proposing a theory to “cover the phenomena” described in the first seven chapters (2-3).

Unfortunately, as stated above, those first seven chapters simply do not do the job Tallon would like to have them do. What is needed - and what remains necessary for cognitive science in this regard - is a proper phenomenological
account of the "heart," or "feeling," that can help to complete the picture of cognition as a whole. In his concluding paragraph Tallon writes: "As long as human consciousness continues to exclude or diminish the heart, it must remain less than fully human" (292). It seems we already know that. What we don't know, and what Tallon's book doesn't teach us, is precisely what feeling is, and how the "heart" operates. We need further, proper phenomenological research here.

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Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty
RICHARD WHITE

In stark contrast to the recent glut of books devoted to Nietzsche's 'politics', it is refreshing to read a work that focuses almost exclusively on the persistent theme of 'sovereignty' in Nietzsche's texts. As such, Richard White's book not only "fills a niche in Nietzsche studies," as Maudemarie Clark suggests in her merely tepid back-cover endorsement, but it also, I believe, helps wrench Nietzsche scholarship out of its wearisome political groove. But while I agree with White's philosophical focus here and applaud his general approach to Nietzsche's thought, I cannot help but see this book as a useful, interim prolegomenon to a much more comprehensive study of sovereignty that still remains to be written.

White begins his study by opposing the 'deconstructive' approach to Nietzsche's work with his own. The problem with deconstruction, White claims, is that it subordinates "the material concerns" of Nietzsche's philosophy to "the free play of the text" (3). As a result, deconstructive readings of Nietzsche inexorably misconstrue his project, particularly the persistent and fundamental concern with the problem of sovereignty — a problem "which allows us to view categories as diverse as eternal recurrence, will to power, master and slave, and Apollo and Dionysus as the shifting manifestations of a single project" (3). The theme of sovereignty thus links what are often perceived to be the discontinuous early, middle and late periods of Nietzsche's work, and similarly establishes the continuity of his thinking with the central concerns of modern philosophy.

White's reading is also organized around the claim that Nietzsche's writings are 'strategic,' that Nietzsche is primarily a 'performative' writer. This means that Nietzsche cannot be read simply as an astute diagnostician of modern culture who merely works out the implications of the death of God and presents them to us. We must also attend to the fact that Nietzsche's