A Reply to Tina Chanter

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There is very little one can add to or second in an exploration of this wealth of ideas and depth of critical understanding. This is a project Tina has refined and expanded for a certain time now, and I come to it intimidated by its scope and power. I have no criticisms per se. I propose, rather, to make suggestions in the hope that they may be some kind of collaborative contribution.

I want to look first at aspects of the restorative and the destabilizing reading of Antigone. In her paper Tina has shown beautifully how Antigone works to rethink the political order in light of the excluded other of the polis. I have nothing to add to that. I will discuss her role being consistently performed by men and the issue of fetishism, understood as a non-dialectical, historic lag in and resistance of entrenched beliefs. There is something very important in the repetitive creation of absolutes that figure in a logic of substitution that protects men against aspects of sexuality, notably homosexuality, but also against women’s bodies and a certain sacred that has been explored by Catherine Clément and Julia Kristeva.1

The “excessiveness” of Antigone may well be what accounts for her embodying political resistance, especially “at times of political crises” (Chanter, 238) The examples Tina provides in her paper, not to mention the scores of Antigones composed through the ages, attest her power—excessive power?—to reopen negotiations between the public and the private, but above all between social divisions and the essentialisms on which these often rest. Yet I think that, for the Greek men who attended the Oedipeia cycle, the anguish of excess lies less in the character and acts of Antigone than in the strangely mobile role of sexuality itself. Let me explain. I do not intend to rush back into the Freudianism Tina criticizes in a longer version of this essay. I want rather to piece together parts of the play in light of the threefold drama of which it is the culmination, the tragedy of the Labdacidae, Oedipus’s family. In the background I will be thinking this: the excess of passion and act we find in Antigone is certainly inscribed in what Tina calls the “controlled range of representations of femininity” as dictated by those in power. The play certainly creates a “situation that mimics women’s actual marginality,” even as it assures its audience “that the conventions demanding the successful containment of women were not being violated” (Chanter, 242). I appreciate the sensitivity of this presentation of dramatic effects. Yet the figure of female excess that these claims about Antigone immediately brought to mind was, rather, Medea. Recall Medea, who flagrantly
murders her brother Apsyrtus "by the hearth," which for the scholiast stands as the religious analogue of the altar—in short, in the worst of sacrilegious excess. Again Medea, who for love of an Argonaut—the heteroerotic scenario starts typically enough—steals her own people's treasure, the Golden Fleece, and departs from Colchis with Jason. Finally, Medea in Corinth, avenging her lover's imminent abandonment by poisoning her two sons. If, for Aristotle, women's bodies were the vessels for masculine seeds, then Medea sacrificed that seed and not without enormous cost to herself. The lesson is very much in the logic of abjection. This is so true that many commentators make sense of her profile by removing her from the human entirely: "divine initiatrix for Jason," she is a Circe to another seafarer who is not quite Odysseus (Bremmer 86; one such commentator is Fritz Graf). This tragedy—written by Euripides who was about fifteen years younger than Sophocles and, if we take Nietzsche and others seriously, was much less pious and more secularized—also negotiated the public and private with a different philos-echtros dialectic. Did it contest the biological constrictions imposed on women? It is hard to say. I think it brought into stark light the immense danger of women and that danger seems to leave it less attractive as the emblematic gesture of political contestation. Yet the play Medea is related to Antigone, especially for the Greeks, who equated questions of generation and sexuality, kinship, and friendship, and notably, the symbolics of place. One slightly opaque relation between Medea and Antigone concerns Argos, and unfolds like a puzzle.

Of Antigone

Of course, all tragedy is the reworking of myth and fables. This is important because the reworking does exactly what Tina argues: it reworks with a view to examining the political and religious implications of the myth in question. This is important for Sophocles because he was born in the same year as Pericles (496 or 495 BCE), although he lived long enough to see the utter disaster that was the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) and the untimely death of Pericles in 429. Sophocles was the tragedian of Athenian democracy, Aeschylus having been born a generation earlier, in 535. Euripides is the younger brother, some ten to fifteen years the junior of Sophocles—and his work represents the end of the epoch called "tragic."

Sophocles thus reworks a myth, very much in his own religious way, formally and materially: there were other Antigones, but Sophocles
inaugurated the three-character tragedy out of Aeschylus’s more formalist two-character stagings. Sophocles sets Antigone in Thebes, the same city to which Oedipus had appealed for safe haven after being banished from his home by his sons, Eteocles and Polynices. In important ways, Thebes was an extraordinary city-state. Founded by Cadmos with the surviving giants who had sprung up from the teeth of the dragon that guarded Dirce’s spring—that same dragon who symbolizes the Theban forces at war in Antigone, and is an archetypically female symbol—Thebes is the home of Dionysos and his “religion,” the Baccanalia. Early on in Antigone, the leader of the chorus invokes Dionysos: “Let us run and visit the temples and set up choruses throughout the night, that Bacchus, child of Thebes, lead them away from all that makes the soil tremble” (155). Thus Thebes will be from the outset aligned with the god of sexuality, the god dismembered by the Bacchantes, and who is repeatedly reborn.

Knowing this, the Greek contemporary likely also knew about Oedipus at Colonnus, where Antigone, Creon, and the enemy brothers first come into prominence. It is important for Antigone, who insists on burying Polynices, that we also know that she begged to be allowed to see her father-brother, Oedipus’s grave—and that she was refused this by Theseus, King of Colonnus. It thus becomes doubly important that she bury Polynices, her abandoned dead brother—her philos, which denotes both kinship and an ancient possessive, according to Benveniste. Moreover, the theme of the mourning sister was apparently very familiar in Greek mythology (Alcmene, the sisters of Meleager, those of Phaethon, Bremmer, 94).

Perhaps more important in Oedipus at Colonnus is the figure of Creon. At the beginning of Antigone, he seems a fairly mild autocrat. Creon has placed guards around the body of Polynices because that son, or brother, of Oedipus married a princess of Argos and attempted to invade Thebes itself. A matter, then, of domestic security; for Creon, Polynices seems at first to be an “enemy combatant,” even if he is his nephew. Eteocles, the other brother, was co-ruler of Thebes before his death. Thus, if we did not know Oedipus at Colonnus, we would see Creon’s madness emerge mainly in the third act, when his own fetishism shows through. There, Creon’s son Haemon tells him that everyone supports Antigone’s gesture and Creon, the self-appointed savior of Thebes, retorts: “Is it up to the city to dictate our behavior.... Is it not for me, perhaps, that I must govern.... Should we not allow that the city belongs to the sovereign?” (732–40). Later we hear his most famous retort which more than justifies Tina and others’s observations about the dramatic mimicry of female marginality: “Oh, vile nature, that a woman enslaves!”
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(750). Still, at the beginning of Antigone, Creon is relatively mild; he supports city and family, and he is not a one-dimensional representation of the political. This only emerges over the course of the play. In fact, we would think that circumstances led Creon to tyranny if we overlooked that, in Oedipus at Colonnus, he had tried to abduct Oedipus, Antigone, and Ismene. He was motivated by another fetish: the good luck emblem that was the now-blinded Oedipus, epitome of the power of Moira, or necessity. In that play we immediately see Creon’s true character.

I say this because outside the Greek context the characters take on a different, perhaps more pronounced, aspect. I cannot emphasize enough how ambiguous the allegiance to family versus city seems to me in Antigone. There appears to be a three-part structure of laws here: the law of kin, certainly; the laws of the city; but also the dualist law of the gods, which includes the law of Zeus but also that of what Antigone’s betrothed calls “the infernal gods.” These are the Eumenides or the Furies—invariably female deities who are trumped by masculine gods like Zeus or Athena, but never paralyzed, never eliminated. The tensions between these three laws are everywhere obvious. Take the chorus: in Act I, it praises humans, who have “grafted the law of the earth onto eternal justice” (368). In Act II, the chorus sings to Zeus and his law—that no mortal reaches the apogee of happiness without perishing (610). In Act III, the chorus sings to Eros “tyrant of your conquests” (782). In Act IV, it hearkens to Dionysos, the maenads, and above all the “terrible power of destiny, Moira.”

Creon and Antigone stand in similarly ambiguous positions vis-à-vis the three “systems” of law, if one can call them that. It may even be that Antigone rejects the laws of Thebes because Thebes, ancestral home of Oedipus, first refused him asylum, then attempted to abduct both Oedipus and Antigone. Thebes has now become Creon. But Creon is also attached to the law of the family and recognizes the power of the “infernal gods” as well. After his son’s suicide and that of Euridice, his wife, Creon is calling on the same Hades as Antigone; he no longer knows whether “a god has struck him weightily” (1271) or whether it was Destiny herself. But interestingly, his eyes are opened by the same horror that caused Oedipus to put out his eyes, and Creon leaves Thebes, similarly exiled. The final lesson, of but a vaguely political character, is delivered by the Coryphaeus: “What counts above all, if one wants to be happy (eudaimonias), is to be wise. And above all, never to lack in piety. The presumptuous will pay dearly their chatter and their teaching, by the great blows of destiny” (1348–50).

I bring up these details because I appreciate the complexity of Tina’s analyses. Her observations about the Greek performance of female
gender are on the mark; they should also apply to other female figures, such as Electra and Medea. The symbol that connects Medea to Antigone is none other than the war between Argos and Thebes. For the enemy brothers who also structure Antigone stand at the head of armies of precisely those two cities. Argos is the city Medea embraces through Jason, just as Polynices embraces Argos. In Antigone, Argos is represented by the masculine symbol of the eagle, while Thebes, home of Dionysos, has for its arms Dirce’s dragon. Moreover, while Creon repeatedly equates Antigone, the feminine, and impotence (“In truth, of us two, it is she who will be the man if I let her triumph with impunity” [485]), Ismene, Antigone’s sister, echoes the same thing: “Don’t forget that we are women,” she tells Antigone, “and we will never have reason against men” (62). Yet all these remarks pale before the power and presence of female divinities which figure sleep, death, destiny, necessity, and the cortege of Dionysos. Fetishized or not, Antigone seems “masculine” at times, but she is much more than that. By Act IV, the chorus calls her alone: “‘ali autonomos dzōsa’—‘taking your law into yourself, living; an unheard-of destiny, to descend into Hades” (820). Note that autonomos, was almost never used in Greek to designate a person. It was a quality reserved for the political, for the polis. Thus Jean-Pierre Vernant’s remark that the tragedians introduced an uncanny legal terminology into many of their works, rethinking that language, is well borne out here. In a word, Antigone is uniquely autonomous, though rigid; she figures a quality that redounded neither to women nor to men in the Greek polis. On the other hand, her sisterly acts appear both excessive and yet typically Greek: the sisters of Meleager mourned their brother so long that Artemis turned them into birds; Cassandra vowed to murder Agamemnon to avenge the deaths of her father and brothers. Greek (male) spectators knew this. But clearly, something about the character of Antigone remains constant even as its meaning changes over the history of its representations. That is important, and I suspect it is less a “thing” than a movement—the continuous movement between the erotic, the religious, and the political.

“The god”

I am aware of a kind of plodding traditionalism when I cite male philosophers and male psychoanalysts before Tina’s essay, which taught me a lot. I will not remain stuck in these citations. Although blind to the failure to challenge the rules of conduct governing performances of women by male actors, Nietzsche focused on the Dionysian dimension of the chorus:
The dithyrambic chorus is given the task of stimulating the mood of the audience in such a Dionysian way that when the tragic hero appears on stage they do not see ... the awkwardly masked man, but rather a visionary form born ... out of their own rapt vision. If we consider Admetus lost in contemplation, recalling his recently departed wife Alcestis, and completely consumed by his imaginary vision of her—and suddenly a woman with a similar form and gait is led towards him in disguise; if we imagine his sudden tremor of unease ... then we have an analogy of the emotion that the spectator felt when, in a state of Dionysian excitement, he saw the god, with whose suffering he had already identified, walking on the stage.6

What is important here is another related tension. Tina points out the amphibolous effect of female characters played by men: spectators were reminded that no female actors were allowed on stage, or again, this fact was obfuscated through the drama itself. If Nietzsche is right, this amphibolous tension is never overcome, but it shares ground with the tension of seeing any character in an awkward—and incidentally enormous—mask. In Sophocles's work, the chorus recedes somewhat, such that it is always voiced by one speaker. Certainly Antigone does challenge the political by reconfiguring it in light of the movement between a woman who is "all' autonomos dzōsa"—the only and uncannily autonomous figure in the drama. But if we do not see Nietzsche's "god" in Antigone, her chthonic power sets us into his Dionysian excitement, the more so that this is Thebes, precisely Dionysos's own city, and symbolically Thebes is the dragon, attacked by Argos, symbolized by the eagle. Nietzsche remarks that the world we see through tragedy is "a new world, more distinct ... and affecting than the other, and yet more shadowy" (BoT, 8). It would be a mistake to call this shadowy world merely death. Antigone refers to death, but she represents this other world. We do not and are not supposed to grasp "where" Antigone goes, any more than Oedipus's whereabouts when he is carried off by Zeus at a crossroads between cities, between a crater and the peak of Thorikos. The chorus will call his a happy dénouement. Antigone remarks that she does not even know whether Oedipus has been buried, though she has one last desire: "to see this subterranean sojourn." Thus Nietzsche's Dionysian world becomes a quest to see a certain sacred, which Antigone will come ultimately to embody.

Note too that Nietzsche emphasizes the mask. Men and women were clumsily masked, designed to be "appearance through and through" (BoT, 9, 46). "The light-image [and the] Apollin[ian] mask ... are the
inevitable products of a glance into the terrible depths of nature" (BoT, 46). Whatever we make of the romantic young Nietzsche, he understands well that this vision, won through suffering, unravels "every law, every natural order, ... the whole moral world" (BoT, 46). Though he is referring to Oedipus, we can refer just as well to Antigone, who evinces the same "elevation in a process of infinite transfiguration" (BoT, 47). This unraveling and transfiguration are also that which survives in the play. But in Antigone, they concern the strange confluence of the political, the religious, and a feminine connection to the sacred.

Psychoanalyst André Green provides an insight into the temporal mutations of Antigone, as well as into the movement between a certain eros and politics. He writes, of both the Oedipeia and the Oresteia:

If the symbol is a narrative (of some fundamental history), and if this narrative is inseparable from an interpretation—just as the interpretation renders indispensable the narrative that it is supposed to interpret, and which itself is an earlier interpretation—then we understand that meaning is inseparable from that questioning contained in the story and its projection.

Green continues:

[W]e have argued that this [fundamental] story is one of kinship relations. What Greek scholars (Ramnoux and Vernant) have shown us is that the initial knowledge [of the Greeks] concerns myths of generation and sovereignty; cosmogonies are their translation and cosmogonies pose implicitly the problem of power. To explain his remark about cosmogony and power, Green cites Vernant: "the myth does not ask how an orderly nature arose out of chaos, it responds to the question, 'Who is the sovereign god? Who was it that who came to reign over the universe?'"

Tragedy is the reworking of mythic themes. It multiplies them and varies them, so many interpretations giving rise to new narratives, or new-old narratives with new shadings and transposed effects. In the case of Antigone the problem of power is posed in Oedipus’s native city, cradle of Dionysos. We know that the question of the generations has been complicated in the Oedipeia to the point of looking like a line and a vicious circle. Here, Tina’s remarks are crucial. Antigone, daughter and sister, demands to know: "Who [in Thebes] is the sovereign?" Moira, Dionysos, Creon, or the spectral enemy brothers whose deaths also imply the destruction of both Argos and Thebes, masculine and feminine cities.
In this sense, Antigone undoes the fetish in the name of the justices of necessity, of eros, of politics, and of the family. Yet predictably, the fetish does not go away and we would be wrong to hold to Nietzsche’s Dionysian reading. Nevertheless, for the Greek social imaginary, the “drag” dimension of Antigone seems to me to be both too present and secondary. Antigone is guilty of acting as if she were a man for Creon, above all. Creon is obsessed with her femaleness and his masculinity. But Creon is like the distorted mirror image of Oedipus. He finally “sees” where Oedipus elected to stop seeing; Creon exiles himself as well, yet he will never know Oedipus’s apotheosis because the Oedipeia end with his demise. But let me come back to André Green before examining the question of power. Green observes that power, whenever simultaneously political and “genealogical,” cannot be separated from representation. Greek tragedy redoubles the phenomenon of representation. The first instance is the myth itself, while the representation of representation is tragedy, which “gives a second life to the fable.” This second life that is tragedy is then “sent back, projected” toward its addressee “with an invitation to enter into it” (OT, 96). Thus tragedy is redoubled representation, staged and enriched with the work of interpretation, and destined to the Other—whether that other is the gods whom Antigone, Creon, and the chorus invoke as their witnesses, or whether that other is the spectators. Keep in mind that for men participation in the competitions among tragedians was a civic duty. This other, who is a variable “we,” is the telos of the tragedy because this “we” sees represented what is un-representable to the actors themselves. This has a political and a religious sense, so far as the “we” participates in the chiasoscuro world to which Nietzsche refers. But this “we” also participates in Antigone’s capacity to draw attention to the excluded other,” as Tina puts it; that other who is the object of an “exclusion ... accomplished by means of a porous boundary” (Chanter, 243).

Power

So many of these arguments and reconstructions require that we think both a social imaginary and a social and individual pre-conscious, something subliminal to intentional consciousness. Tina reminds us in the spoken version of this essay that “castration” belongs to the experience of the male child. “The missing penis, which for Freud was a product of the masculine imaginary,” she writes, “turns out to have been there all along in the case of Antigone—albeit veiled.” This should underscore the sometimes massive difference between what we might call a feminine imaginary and a masculine imaginary, rooted in a body with an organ
that rises and falls initially with a good deal of autonomy. I mention the masculine imaginary in its connection to the unreliability of phallic sexuality because profound cultural mutations have expressed the growing lassitude before phases of Dionysian enthusiasm—and this in politics and religion. Pascal Quignard has written a history of the heyday and decline of Bacchantic religion in Rome in his book *Le sexe et l'effroi.* Quignard argues that the replacement of once widespread Bacchanalian rites, from the *Lucibriae* to the mysteries, by a ponderous *taedium vitae,* or disgust for life, with its explosion of anchoresis, began *long before Christianity* overtook Dionysian Rome. The immense religious and political turnaround begins in Stoicism, Epicureanism, and many lesser movements. All of them rejected the Dionysian fetish, which paraded the *phallos* and then the *fascinans* in various civic rituals. To Quignard, the turnabout was related to the economic decline of Rome as Empire, to the institution of laws like marriage that enhanced women’s status, and to the intrinsic insecurity of what we could call phallicism. Quignard expresses this in a number of ways, but illustrates it well by comparing a Roman fresco of the equestrian Troilus and a comparable scene from Homer’s *Iliad.* First, the *Iliad*:

Achilles lay hidden behind the fountain where Troilus led his horses at night, out of love for them. Achilles leapt from behind the trough and Troilus fled immediately. Achilles pursued him, while Troilus took refuge in the temple of the Thybrian Apollo. Night fell. Achilles begged him to leave the temple. Troilus refused. Achilles pierced him with his lance inside the sanctuary (SE, 221).

The Roman fresco depicts this scene, with an ithyphallic bull just above it. All around the scene are homoerotic images. What is happening? “We will never know the meaning, for those who ... painted them, of the phallic symbols in the tombs,” writes Quignard.

Perhaps the fountain toward which Troilus proceeds ... gives us an immediate sense. To let the cremated or buried dead drink a bit of life, to keep them down in their subterranean sojourn, so as to preserve themselves from evil spells cast by the envious souls; thereby suspending, on the wall of the tomb itself, their vindictive [ghostly] return. Such is perhaps the sense [of it].... Or perhaps the homoerotic scenes surrounding the erect bull were sketched with the design of assuring the [dead], if not a survival or a
rebirth, at least the company of a paroxystic vitality in the ... crypt (SE, 222–3).

Quoting Quignard, I am addressing the question of the masculine imaginary, its anxieties about life and eros, and the demise of Dionysism. Quignard recalls that the parallelism—between eros and combat, the fear of “feminine nudity” in the domus, and the ineffaceable link to our first domus, the womb—all this can be seen through Greek and Latin semantics. “In Homer the verb meignuma, says 'coitus' and the mêlée of combat. To place a woman under servitude is the same verb as to put an adversary to death.... The first domus is the womb of a woman. The second domus is the domus in which a man rapes women ... to reproduce his domus. The third domus is the tomb” (SE, 224).

Politics and a certain sacred thus flow together in this imaginary. But I think they do so differently than in what we might call a feminine imaginary. The linguistic and symbolic connections of the domus are related to what recoils before “feminine castration,” only to “see” a veiled phallus. The question of what tragic characters and their spectators see is as important as what they refuse to “see.” The god Nietzsche claims we “see” in the drama is not more “there” than Alcestis is there, as woman or ghost. Of course, it is that desire, like politics, concerns what is there and not there, representable and un-representable. Fetishism phantasizes first that “it,” that es, ça, is not there, then proceeds to “see it there, veiled,” Tina argues. The functioning of power in the foundation of regimes works similarly. Democracies—ancient and modern—have no “full” core, no matter what our desire. Indeed, Antigone dismantles the desire for visible power before “disappearing” into the realm of an older power. Was it not another blind itinerant, Tiresias, who warned Creon that Antigone’s “phallic” effect had moved gods and cities alike?10 He says: “Already the cities are rising up, where dogs, wild beasts, birds carry around that impure stench of [Polynices's] unburied cadaver” (1013–17, 1079–82).

Tiresias blames the feminine power of Hades for supporting Antigone’s gesture. So much for the vicissitudes of the “masculine” imaginary. If Antigone represents a veiled phallus, the source of her power eludes representation, opening something like a play-space for the displacement of power positions. This play-space represents a sacred that diverges from religions of representation and surrounds these. It is arguably the uncanny bond between a certain religious dimension and the political institution of society as ongoing division and combination. For men, Antigone may represent the ça, the it that is there and veiled. For women, a different ça, perhaps otherwise phantasmatic may have to do
with what Catherine Clément and Julia Kristeva call “the sacred,” le sacré.

Conclusion

I will end on this. In exploring the relationship between women and the sacred—not the holy—Catherine Clément recounts a strange incident at a Catholic mass, some thirty kilometers outside of Dakar. It is 1996 and the event is a Catholic pilgrimage in honor of the black Virgin, in a large town called Popenguine. Attendance, Clément estimates, is 85,000—men, women, and children. Rather like a Greek tragedy. Mass begins and: “Suddenly, strident shrieks in the crowd: it is the voice of a woman. Immediately, medics leap into the crowd, stretchers in hand; they discover the origin of the voice, tie down the screaming woman, and disappear.” These interruptions repeat over and over, every ten minutes. “A strange sacred phenomenon erupts in a religious ceremony,” writes Clément. “Is the mass sacred? No doubt. Nothing is lacking in it.... Why then do I have the impression that these women introduce an other form of sacred than that of a Catholic mass?”

Clément and Kristeva will speak of trances, hysteria, and those who “bring” this sort of sacred into various spaces, public and private. Clément closes her first letter thus: “I would suggest to you a first track, then, erased by centuries. The sacred for these women would express an instantaneous revolt that cuts across the body, and which cries out. It’s up to you [Julia], to explain to me the porosity of bodies” (FS, 21).

The overlap between public and private, masculine sacred and feminine sacred, should be noted. If this is an ancient “sacred,” it is also tied to subaltermity. Clément writes, “I’m more assured about the class origins than about the porosity of the body, which is your domain.... After voyages and long stays throughout the world, I have seen, everywhere, women in the grip of the sacred. The fact is I’ve rarely seen it when they knew how to read and write” (FS, 19). Clément’s observations are not incompatible with Kristeva’s porosity of bodies. Together, they may explain why Antigone endures: “This, ça, must come out somewhere, and lacking education, the site of expulsion is that of the sacred. Or the crime. Or both, that has been seen too” (FS, 20). Clément could be writing of Antigone or Medea, or again, the way in which the feminine imaginary crosses through masculine spaces—only to be interpreted in terms of castration by man. What interests me is the way in which this imaginary loosens the rigidifications of political institution, but also, of its mythico-religious foundations, which provide authority the appearance of
indestructibility in its foundations, not to mention the possibility of some pure political immanence.14

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Notes


7. Green, Un oeil en trop, 98.

8. Ibid., 108. Hereafter abbreviated as OT.


10. “[T]he consecrated viscera were consumed without providing prophetic indication... Our altars, all the hearths where we sacrifice are filled with the strips that the birds have torn from the cadaver.... The gods no longer
receive the prayers of the sacrificers.”


12. Neither the nuns nor the bourgeoises of Dakar cried out. Rather, it was villageoises, like the domestics diagnosed as hysterical from the nineteenth century Salpêtrière—all the way to ... the same André Green in 1964.

13. “Recall the spell of violence one witnessed ... in the 1930s when the Papin sisters, excellent servants by all accounts, slit the throats of their patronnes.... They cut them up under the effect of a raptus, might as well call it a transe. They were exhausted after the crime and without any remorse, like the heroines in Greek tragedies, stricken by the immeasurable.” FS, 20–1.