ally geschickt experience of Seinsvergessenheit, “the forgottenness of Being.”

In sum, then, Rephrasing Heidegger systematically retranslates, reorder and reinterprets Being and Time in clear and unambiguous English for both the beginner and Heidegger specialist. In so doing it lays the groundwork for future Heidegger scholarship in the English-speaking philosophical world, perhaps even a new translation of Being and Time. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in engaging Heidegger as a truly systematic thinker.

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Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings
David J. Kangas

This important book directly interrogates the relationship between time and subjectivity in Kierkegaard’s early works. Kangas also provides a fresh interpretation of Idealism, using Kierkegaard’s conception of “the instant” in order to show that Kierkegaard’s critique of Idealism actually takes the form of an appropriation. According to Kangas, Kierkegaard in effect reads Idealism backwards by focussing attention on the continual beginning that the instant is. The instant is the “beginning presupposed in any beginning.” (183) As such, it is what gives birth to both past and present.

Kierkegaard’s Instant primarily treats the individual’s existential condition as a relationship to time. Kangas argues that, for Kierkegaard, the individual has an anarchic relationship to time, since her beginning always precedes her. Whereas Greek and Hegelian thought obscures this truth, Kierkegaard exposes it. According to Kangas, the instant “is the pre-eminently real event through which self-consciousness is opened up, or first of all born, again and again.” (5) The book focusses on how in Kierkegaard’s early works the instant is understood as a continual beginning that never becomes present. Kangas examines the instant as paradigmatic for time, asserting that for Kierkegaard time is groundless. The instant is the point of contact between the temporal and the eternal, yet
each instant is the source of itself. This means that the subject must, in
each instant, relate herself to groundlessness. Kangas additionally argues
that Kierkegaard is indebted to Meister Eckhart for his thinking of time
in terms of groundlessness. Without producing copious evidence to sup-
port the claim that Kierkegaard was directly familiar with Eckhart, Kangas
nevertheless makes a convincing case.

The six chapters of the book each provide us with a nuanced and
sophisticated reading of one of Kierkegaard’s early philosophical works:
The Concept of Irony, Either/Or Book I, Johannes Climacus, Repetition,
Fear and Trembling, and The Concept of Anxiety.

According to Kangas, Kierkegaard’s account of subjectivity
leaves us with the imperative Gelassenheit, an Eckhartian concept which
Kangas translates as “releasement.” Gelassenheit requires that we be ca-
pable of paradox, that we acknowledge the groundlessness of our situat-
edness in time, and recognise that our own self-consciousness is both de-
pendent upon, and undone by, the disjunction of the instant. Existence
requires that we hold ourselves open to the instant (that is, the temporal-
sation which dispossesses us from ourselves). In his treatment of Fear
and Trembling, for example, Kangas argues that the description of Abra-
ham is an instance of essential concealment. Relative to the “stages” de-
scribed in that pseudonymous text, Abraham remains singular, interrupt-
ing all categories of description. Abraham thus represents the paradox of
existence because his situation can only ever be pointed at indirectly; his
existence precedes and conditions each stage but without ever being de-
termined by any of them.

Kangas counters the teleological account of Kierkegaard’s stages
of existence, claiming that, because of the primacy of the instant, each
stage is merely an aspect of existence. Existence is the very realisation
by the self-conscious subject that she is not the origin of her own sub-
jectivity, and that the origin she seeks only ever comes about in the instant.
This encounter with groundlessness occurs in each instant as the subject
must continually confront her own beginning. Any teleological ordering
of the stages of existence would require a continuous temporality in
which self-consciousness comes to know itself. This cannot be the case
for Kierkegaard, since each aspect of existence must be understood in re-
lation to groundlessness. Insofar as Kierkegaard prioritises the religious
over the other so-called stages of existence, it is not because the subject
realises her telos therein. Rather, the religious involves letting go of the
demand for a ground and holding oneself open to the infinite beginning that the instant is.

In this book, Kangas provides much needed scholarship on the Eckhartian threads in Kierkegaard’s corpus; he also deftly traces the problematic of the instant that continually gives birth to its own beginning. This is a carefully written, insightful work that will be useful to all readers of Kierkegaard, as well as those interested in thoughtful commentary on the Idealist tradition and in existential analyses of time and subjectivity.

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*Edith Stein: Comunità e mondo della vita—Società Diritto Religione*  
[Edith Stein: Community and the Lifeworld—Society, Law, Religion]  
Eds. Angela Ales Bello and Anna Maria Pezzella  

Angela Ales Bello and Anna Maria Pezzella have put together a timely and well-researched collection of essays that focus on Edith Stein’s philosophy of community. It would not be an understatement to claim that Stein’s social and political philosophy, though now becoming better known, has not been sufficiently explored by philosophers and scholars. While working with and under Husserl, Stein began to develop a phenomenology of the social-political world that was largely influential on thinkers like Husserl, Gerda Walther and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Though Alfred Schutz is often recognised as the thinker that largely developed Husserl’s phenomenology within the field of sociology, it is Stein that was the first phenomenologist to carry out and elaborate a systematic phenomenological account of social and political objectivities. This volume amply demonstrates this. Ales Bello’s extensive body of scholarly work has already mined the work of Husserl and Stein to draw attention to the enormous riches and potential that lie within the phenomenological tradition. Along with the work of Pezzella, this volume extends this philosophical itinerary.