

WE STILL DO NOT KNOW WHAT A BODY CAN DO: THE REPLACEMENT OF ONTOLOGY WITH ETHOLOGY IN DELEUZE'S SPINOZA

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Throughout much of his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: "we do not even know what a body can do." The problem is closely associated with Deleuze's parallelist reading of Spinoza and what he calls ethology. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which he intends to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze's suggestion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of "thinking with AND" rather than "thinking for IS." The argument is developed through Deleuze's monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought.

A travers la plupart de sa carrière, Deleuze répète un problème qu'il attribue à Spinoza : « on ne sait même pas ce que peut le corps. » Le problème est étroitement lié à la lecture paralléliste de Spinoza par Deleuze et à ce qu'il appelle l'éthologie. Dans cet article, je soutiens que Deleuze considère l'éthologie tel un nouveau modèle de philosophie qu'il propose alors comme un remplacement de l'ontologie. Je fonde mon argument sur la suggestion de Deleuze que Spinoza propose aux philosophes les moyens de « penser avec ET au lieu de penser pour EST... » L'argument est développé à travers les monographies et collaborations de Deleuze sur Spinoza et aux côtés de sa critique méta-philosophique de l'Image de la Pensée.

For indeed, no one has yet determined what the body can do...
—Spinoza, *Ethics*

Introduction

Gilles Deleuze's repeated confrontation with Baruch Spinoza's *problem* that *we do not know what a body can do* forms a thread in his philosophy that runs through most of his career:

Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*...¹

When Spinoza says that we do not even know what a body can do, this is practically a war cry.²

Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body...*but we do not even know what the body can do*.³

Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the body...we do not yet know what a body is capable of...'⁴

Spinoza asks: What can a body do? ...We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do....⁵

'Give me a body then': this is the formula of philosophical reversal.... 'We do not even know what a body can do'....⁶

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1963), (tr.) H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 39.

² Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968), (tr.) M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 255. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as EPS.

³ Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970/1981), (tr.) R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 17. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as SPP.

⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (1977), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1991), 61. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as D.

⁵ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), (tr.) B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 256. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as ATP.

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image* (1985), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 189.

In addition to his explicit formulations, the problem is implicitly raised in his first book on David Hume (1953) through his later work on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1988) to his final collection of essays, *Critique et Clinique* (1993).⁷ As with many of the threads in Deleuze's work, this is not one that could be exhausted in a single article; but if we accept the invitation to follow, we might do as Deleuze suggests for reading Spinoza and begin in the middle, so to speak, with *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* where Deleuze first suggests that in posing the problem Spinoza offers philosophy a new model (SPP, 17).⁸

Deleuze will call this new model for philosophy *ethology* (*ibid.*, 27, 125; see also ATP, 7). As a new philosophical model, ethology is closely connected to Deleuze's larger philosophical project of searching for what he calls a new Image of Thought. In *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, Deleuze provides a concise yet cryptic summation of this new image for thought: "Thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking *for* IS..."⁹ My understanding of that claim, which will form the central thesis of this article, is that *Deleuze wants to replace ontology with ethology*. In making this claim I am not suggesting that Deleuze wants to abandon or overcome metaphysics, which is something he explicitly rejects.¹⁰ Instead, I am keeping in line with the understanding that Deleuze wants to develop a new metaphysics, but am suggesting that the development of new metaphysics need not be bound to ontology or understood in ontological terms.¹¹ Accordingly, while Deleuze has often been portrayed as a

⁷ The importance of Deleuze's reading of Hume in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* to Spinoza and the problem of the body is argued in Ian Buchanan, "The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?," *Body & Society*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1997): 73–91, here 80. The body is also the subject of the third part of *The Fold*. See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988), (tr.) T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Finally, see Gilles Deleuze, "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1993), (tr.) D. Smith and M. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 138–51, here 141.

⁸ See also Deleuze's more detailed discussion of the doctrine of parallelism in EPS.

⁹ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 57.

¹⁰ "Philosophy is always a matter of inventing concepts. I've never been worried about going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (1990), (tr.) M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 136.

¹¹ For more details on the claim that Deleuze wanted to develop a new metaphysics, see Jeffrey Bell, "Between Realism and Anti-Realism: Deleuze and the Spinozist Tradition in Philosophy," *Deleuze Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2011): 1–17, DOI: 10.3366/dls.2011.0002.

process or differential ontologist, I intend to show that Deleuze's work on ethology points less toward a new understanding of ontology than it does toward a reorientation of philosophy away from ontology. To advance my argument the article will proceed in four sections. In the first part I show how Deleuze's understanding of ethology is grounded in what he calls Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. Next, I provide an account of ethology itself and emphasize the role that *kinesis* plays in ethology, which is something that has typically been left out of the secondary literature on ethology. There I show how Deleuze uses ethology to depart from traditional forms of ontology such as *ousiology* and taxonomy. The third section picks up on that point but takes the argument further by advancing the claim that Deleuze's call to do ethology through constructing a plane of immanence is a more radical turn away from understanding things in a broader ontological sense. Finally, I turn to Deleuze's critique of what he calls the Moral Image of Thought and especially his argument against ready-made problems and questions to advance the argument that the *form* of Spinoza's problem and its corresponding question (What can a body do?) is intended to orient thinking away from ontology (thinking IS) and toward ethology (thinking AND).

Spinoza's War Cry: The Doctrine of Parallelism Prefigures Ethology

In order to illustrate the relationship between Spinoza's problem—that we do not know what a body can do—and ethology, we must first understand how Spinoza conceives of the body and how this concept of the body informs both Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza and his own philosophy. Spinoza opens Part II of the *Ethics* with a general definition of the body. He explains, "By body I understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as God is considered as an extended thing."¹² The opening propositions of Part II are particularly significant for Deleuze as this is where he sees Spinoza developing the *doctrine of parallelism*.¹³ The doctrine holds that the entire universe exists as one infinite

¹² Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677), (tr.) E. Curley (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), E2D1. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text using a standard notation for Spinoza: Book-Part-Proposition number or Definition, Postulate, Scholium, Lemma etc. where necessary, as represented here.

¹³ Note that Deleuze traces the origin of the term "parallelism" to Leibniz rather than Spinoza. EPS, 107.

substance—God—which is simultaneously yet independently expressed through the attributes of thought and extension (E2P1–E2P2). Or, as Beth Lord summarily explains, “Spinoza’s so-called ‘parallelism’ thesis [is] the view that mind and body are one thing, expressed in two different ways.”¹⁴ While bodies correspond to extension, ideas correspond to thought. To say that they are different attributes is to say they have different essences and so one can never be the cause of another (E2P6). That is, the mind cannot cause changes in the body and the body does not affect change in the mind (E1D2). Instead, God or the universe is the efficient cause of both thoughts and bodies, where both are caused *in parallel* with one another although they do not interact (E2P9, E5P). Despite their lack of interaction, thoughts and bodies are still attributes of the same substance, where substances are things, while—as Brent Adkins helpfully puts it—“attributes are not things; they are ‘ways of perceiving substance.’”¹⁵ Spinoza explains that while mind and body are not causally linked, parallelism demands that each idea has a corresponding object, so “the human mind is united to the body” (E2P13S). In other words, we have an idea of “the human mind,” which means the mind necessarily exists in thought; and because it exists in thought it must also exist as a mode of extension—*i.e.*, the mind must have a body. In Spinoza’s words, “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body” (E2P13).

Through the doctrine of parallelism, Deleuze sees Spinoza unifying the body and mind, which has profound importance in that it “disallows any primacy of the one over the other” (SPP, 18). In Deleuze’s Spinoza, neither the mind nor the body can be understood in opposition to or separate from one another. But it is precisely this insight which, for Deleuze, prefigures the problem that we do not know what a body can do (EPS, 389).

Deleuze locates the problem in E3P2S where Spinoza observes that most people confidently believe “that the body now moves, now is at rest, solely from the mind’s command....” For Spinoza, these people “dream with open eyes” because no one knows how it could be that the mind moves the body. In order for us to know how the

¹⁴ Beth Lord, *Spinoza Beyond Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 2. For a detailed introduction to the doctrine of parallelism that is influenced by and sympathetic to Deleuze’s interpretation, see also the discussion in Beth Lord, *Spinoza’s Ethics: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 53–57.

¹⁵ Brent Adkins, *True Freedom: Spinoza’s Practical Philosophy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 38–39.

mind moves the body we would need to know the mind, but we cannot suppose that such knowledge is pregiven to us. Indeed, at the conclusion of the section on parallelism, Spinoza reminds us that his aim in book two is to provide an account of the human mind, and that to do so we must understand the object of the mind, which is the body. But from the fact that our bodies are always limited by and dependent upon other bodies, we can “see the cause why we have only a completely confused knowledge of our body...” (E2P13S) Thus, on the surface, the doctrine of parallelism seems to lead to a sort of paradox where we cannot know the mind without knowing the body, but unless we baselessly claim to know the body and how it comes to move, we must admit that we do not know the body either. However, this paradox does not show a deficiency with parallelism. Instead, it invites us to begin thinking beyond the traditional dualism of mind/body.

Parallelism is important in the first place because it avoids some of the limitations on more conventional modernist approaches to philosophy. Lord again points out that Spinoza’s “materiality” is a departure from both Cartesian dualisms as well as materialisms and idealisms that attempt to “reduce matter to thought” or vice-versa.¹⁶ This vision of a unified mind and body in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is at the heart of the so-called Vital New Materialism associated with thinkers such as Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, and Rosi Braidotti. For example, Braidotti suggests the advantage of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza is that it allows us to “think with the entire body, or rather, we have to acknowledge the embodiment of the brain and the embrainment of the body.”¹⁷ However, I think it would be a mistake to say the importance of parallelism for Deleuze is that it can lead us to develop new materialist ontologies. By way of introducing his discussion of parallelism in *SPP* he claims that “Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body” (*SPP*, 17). But notice that he does not then raise the problem, “We do not know what a body is,” or the question, “What is a body?” (*e.g.*, thinking matter or embodied brain). Instead, he returns to the familiar problem: “[Spinoza] proposes to establish the body as a model: ‘We do not know what the body can do...’” (*ibid.*). That is, the new model that Spinoza offers to philosophy is not one that invites us to rethink old dualisms, materialisms, or idealisms to better conceive of things in ontological terms

¹⁶ Lord, *Spinoza Beyond Philosophy*, 9.

¹⁷ Rosi Braidotti, “Four Theses on Posthuman Feminism,” in *Anthropocene Feminism*, (ed.) R. Grusin, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), 33.

of what they *are*. Rather, the new model invites us to think of things in terms of what they *do*, which is to say, ethologically.

Before turning to give an account of ethology itself, I want to clarify what is at stake here for Deleuze. He claims that Spinoza's problem is "practically a war cry" (EPS, 255). Under the doctrine of parallelism where the mind and the body are the same thing, the understanding is not limited to *consciousness*—*i.e.*, thinking which would only involve a mind and not a body. For Deleuze, pure consciousness in this respect is an impossibility. Parallelism devalues consciousness and replaces it with a notion of *thinking* that is always in relationship to the body's capacities and ability for action (EPS, 257; SPP, 18). The move away from consciousness and toward thinking is at the heart of the war cry that Deleuze argues is a key for freeing thought from "moral chattering" (EPS, 255). In short, Deleuze thinks Spinoza can help us move from morality (*i.e.*, "transcendent values" that include moral responsibility, duties, divine command, and good/evil) to ethics (*i.e.*, ethology or "a typology of immanent modes of existence") (SPP, 23). The complicated distinction—which involves Nietzsche as much as Spinoza—is the subject of the second chapter of *SPP*, aptly titled "On the Difference Between the *Ethics* and a *Morality*" (*ibid.*, 17–29). This distinction is very important for what Deleuze considers appropriate for philosophy and for where he wants philosophy to move so it will appear again throughout the article, but it is not the main part of the problem that I want to emphasize here. Note that while Deleuze is concerned with articulating a framework of ethics in opposition to what he calls morality, he does not say that morality has merely replaced or distracted us from ethics (EPS, 254). Instead, his exact claim, in context, is as follows:

When Spinoza says that we do not even know what a body can do, this is practically a war cry. He adds that we speak of consciousness, mind, soul, of the power of the soul over the body; we chatter away about these things, but do not even know what bodies can do. *Moral chattering replaces true philosophy.* (*Ibid.*, 255; my emphasis)¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 39: "Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for."

Morality, then, is not only a threat to ethics. If we take Deleuze's claim seriously, morality has replaced "true philosophy" itself. A return to philosophy requires us to turn away from morality, and as Deleuze later points out in *SPP*, "The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness" (*SPP*, 18). Thus, the final significance of parallelism is that it allows us to turn from morality toward true philosophy, which Deleuze says we can do with ethology (*ibid.*, 27).

Ethology: The Kinetic and Dynamic Definitions of the Body

The term ethology is particularly difficult to define for several reasons. First, as Deleuze and commentators have observed, it has connotations not only with ethics and Spinoza's *Ethics*, but also with physics and biology. Second, as a philosophical approach for understanding bodies in terms of what they can do, it entails double-definition of the body through both a *kinetic proposition* (motion) and a *dynamic proposition* (affect); but he (along with Félix Guattari) does not always refer to both when using the term. Furthermore, while Deleuze will praise Spinoza as an ethologist and claim that "the *Ethics* is an *ethology*..." he and Guattari depart from both Spinoza's terminology and his *ousiologie*. In my discussion of ethology which follows I will argue that adequately accounting for both the kinetic and dynamic propositions provides us with a non-ontological approach to philosophy. To begin, I will return to Spinoza to show how his physics leads Deleuze to the kinetic proposition as a starting point for philosophy.

Spinoza follows the claim that we have only a completely confused knowledge of our bodies with an interlude that might seem banal at first glance. Here he provides a preliminary physics explaining what bodies can do. He begins with two axioms. First, "All bodies either move or are at rest" (E2A1'). Second, "Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly" (E2A2'). We can start to see the significance of these two axioms when he follows them with the lemma: "*Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance*" (E2L1). In other words, we can make distinctions between bodies through *kinesis* or an account of motion itself which does not require *ousiologie* or an account of substance. He emphasizes this by positing that the simplest bodies "are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness" (E2A2"). These simple bodies,

which are distinguishable *only* kinematically, can come to constitute “composite” bodies when they have some contact with one another and move relative to one another, although not necessarily at the same speed (E2A2”Def.). He also implies that there are what we might think of as complex-composite or multi-composite—to borrow a term from Lord—bodies which are constituted by multiple composites.¹⁹ Humans are one such example as per his first postulate: “The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite” (E2Post.1). But the human body itself is not a limit point as it too is only part of more multiple composites. Lord illustrates this with a helpful example wherein she suggests that a human body moving with a wheelchair—and we could add a bicycle, car, etc.—forms its own composite body that moves as one.²⁰ Spinoza famously extends this framework to suggest everything is a mode rather than discrete entity and that the only singular thing is the universe as a whole.²¹ He explicitly says,

If we now turn to a [multi-composite body] we shall find it also can be altered in many other ways while still retaining its form. And if we carry this line of thought on to infinity, we shall easily grasp that the whole of Nature is one individual whose parts—that is, all bodies—vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual. (E2L4–EL7N)

Thus, in addition to what we think of as concrete physical entities like humans or rocks or galaxies, Spinoza’s physics is also applicable to more abstract composites like the body politic of a nation, the Dutch East India Company, etc. Deleuze is likewise clear that bodies are not limited to living things and that the concept does not rest on a notion of matter or *extensa*: “A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity” (SPP, 127). His claim that a body can be anything is worth emphasizing since Deleuze’s ethology is sometimes presented in the more limited biological sense of the study of an animal’s behaviour in its habitat.²² While it certainly is

¹⁹ Lord, *Spinoza’s Ethics*, 62–63.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

²¹ Adkins again has a straightforward explanation of this in *True Freedom*, 32–33.

²² Cf. Brett Buchanan, Matthew Chrulaw, and Jeffrey Bussolini, “On Asking the Right Questions: An Interview with Vinciane Despret,” *Angelaki*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2015): 165–78, [<https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2015.1039821>], here 166:

appropriate on Deleuze's account to understand animals ethologically in terms of what they do, the point is that he also seems to think we can use ethology to understand anything.

There does appear to be a tension in *SPP* despite Deleuze's claim that a body can be anything. Spinoza's insight that bodies can be distinguished from each other kinematically without reference to substance is what Deleuze refers to as the "kinetic proposition." In *SPP* he phrases the proposition as follows: "[A] body, however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slowness between particles that define a body, the individuality of a body" (*SPP*, 123). Deleuze says the significance of the proposition is that, by defining bodies by the relative speed and slowness or motion and rest between particles, it is not necessary to define bodies according to either form or function. Yet, his wording means that bodies must be composed of particles. Later, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari move away from thinking of simple bodies as particles to suggest that Spinoza is speaking of "elements that no longer have either form or function..." (*ATP*, 253). Elements here should not be understood in terms of atomic theory, which merely indicates the limit point of a certain form of matter—*e.g.*, hydrogen is the form of an element with one proton, helium that with two protons, and so on. Nor are these elements like atoms in the Democritean sense because, while an element is indivisible like the ancient concept of the atom, it does not have a definite form as iron, fire, etc. Instead, *element* signifies a pre-formal something like an infinitesimal. Because simple bodies or elements are non-formal, it is only through the relations of motion and rest into which they enter that composite bodies or things manifest themselves. In other words, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari are looking for the language to describe things solely in terms of *kinesis* or their motion.

In his guide to *ATP*, Brent Adkins points out that for Deleuze and Guattari the significance of this kinetic proposition is "quite startling and radical."²³ On their adaptation of Spinoza, substance becomes superfluous because the kinetic proposition provides us with an

I am thinking here about the ethology of ethologists, in the sense Deleuze gives to the word ethology, as that of a practical study of modes of being, that is to say, the practical study of what humans or animals can *do*; not of what they are, of their essence, but of what they're capable, of what they're doing, of the powers that are theirs, of the tests that they undergo.

²³ Brent Adkins, "Chapter 10 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible..." in *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 141–70, here 152.

account of differentiation that is independent of substance. Metaphysics for Deleuze and Guattari can *begin with the kinetic proposition* which conceives of things only in their motion rather than in-themselves or through their being as stable things that ARE. *Kinesis* as a starting point for Deleuze and Guattari is certainly a departure from the pantheistic and ontological account that Spinoza starts with in the *Ethics*, but it is consistent with Deleuze's suggestion that we "understand Spinoza by way of the middle" (SPP, 122). As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd have similarly observed, the ethological approach that Deleuze begins to develop in *SPP* is useful because "it remains faithful to Spinoza's naturalism, his 'physics of bodies', at the same time as it offers a contemporary re-conceptualization of his metaphysics of Substance (God or Nature)."²⁴ In this respect the kinetic proposition means that ethology is not only a matter of ethics and biology, but also a matter of physics. I will provide more details later as to why ethology's emphasis on *kinesis* is significant for my claim that it leads to a non-ontological approach to philosophy; but before doing so I need to account for the dynamic proposition, as ethology is a matter of affect as much as motion.

Although one can begin with the kinetic proposition, it is important to recall that the body is also always expressed through the dynamic proposition. Deleuze locates this proposition in Part 3 of the *Ethics*, on "The Affects" and defines it as follows: "[A] body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality" (SPP, 123). Ethology, then, seeks to determine what bodies can do through both their motions and their affects.

I will briefly discuss the dynamic proposition through some of the examples Deleuze uses repeatedly to explain affect, but I will refrain from giving a full account of affect for two reasons. First, the term has been discussed at length in other secondary literature on Deleuze's ethology.²⁵ In fact, the term has been so emphasized that some commentators have reduced ethology to affect by defining it as "a theory of the capacities of bodies for affecting and being affected."²⁶ While scholars outside of Deleuze studies cannot be faulted for not remaining faithful to Deleuze, this notion that ethology is ulti-

²⁴ Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 2002), 100.

²⁵ See, for example, Anthony Uhlmann, "Deleuze, Ethics, Ethology, and Art," in *Deleuze and Ethics*, (ed.) D. Smith and N. Jun (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 154–69.

²⁶ Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings*, 147.

mately a theory of affect has worked its way back into some Deleuze scholarship.²⁷ Second, there is a large body of literature on affect outside of the work on Deleuze's ethology. Deleuze's work on affect in relation to Spinoza has been foundational to what Patricia Clough refers to as an "affective turn" in the humanities as early as 2008.²⁸ For Clough, the thinkers most relevant to the affective turn are those "critics and theorists who, indebted to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, conceptualize affect as pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body's capacity to act..."²⁹ However, as Clough and other thinkers like Nigel Thrift had noted even earlier, there are several different conceptions of the term affect.³⁰ As a Deleuzian concept, the term is unrelated to its use by other thinkers who "often focused on the circuit from affect to emotion, ending up with subjectively felt states of emotion—a return to the subject as the subject of emotion."³¹ All of this is to say that Deleuze's work on affect has been tremendously influential on the emerging field of affect studies, so to say something substantial about affect would require engaging with the field, which is not my aim here. That said, I think it is worth noting that affect is not a concept that Deleuze takes in isolation but is instead always one aspect of ethology along with motion.

For Deleuze, the way we understand a body in its individuality according to the dynamic proposition is through counting its affects (SPP, 124; ATP, 257). In *SPP* he illustrates this by asking us to imagine an animal and ask the following questions: "[W]hat is this animal unaffected by in the infinite world? What does it react to positively or negatively? What are its nutrients and poisons? What does it 'take' in its world? Every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and the fly" (SPP, 125). Here we again see ethology's indebtedness to biology, and Deleuze's favourite example when talking about affect comes from the biologist Jakob Von Uexküll's description of the lifeworld of the tick which only has three affects:

²⁷ See Tamsin E. Lorraine, "Spinozist Ethology," in *Deleuze and Guattari's Immanent Ethics: Theory, Subjectivity, and Duration* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 147–54.

²⁸ Patricia T. Clough, "The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedicine and Bodies," *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2008):]1–22, here 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁰ For an explanation of four different approaches to the study of affect including that following Deleuze's work on Spinoza, see Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, vol. 86, no. 1 (2004): 57–78.

³¹ Clough, "The Affective Turn," 1.

light (climbing to the top of branch), olfactory (falling on a mammal that is detected beneath the branch), and thermal (finding a warm spot on which to feed) (SPP, 124; ATP, 257; D, 60).³² With its mere three affects the tick serves a simple example of how the dynamic proposition allows ethology to account for things qualitatively. By understanding things through affect Deleuze claims that ethology departs from taxonomy, which for him always implies moral thinking (SPP, 27). Instead of differentiating things through genus and species, ethology looks at affect to differentiate things through their capacities. He repeatedly illustrates this through another example where he says that a work horse has more in common with an ox than a race horse because the first two share more affects with one-another than with the race horse (SPP, 124; ATP, 257). By conceiving of things affectively in terms of what they DO, ethology again is unconcerned with understanding things in terms of what they ARE through the imposition of categories.

Just as the kinetic proposition de-ontologizes philosophy by moving it away from ontology, the dynamic proposition de-ontologizes philosophy by moving it away from taxonomy. I will expand this claim in the following section, but before moving on and now that we have covered both propositions, I want to consider a claim that Deleuze makes regarding ethology and ethics. He says, “Spinoza’s ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for affecting and being affected on this plane of immanence” (SPP, 125). Here we can see both propositions at work in Deleuze’s definition of ethology and we can also see that ethology involves what Deleuze calls the *plane of immanence*. Understanding—or rather doing—ethology then requires “the construction of the plane of immanence or consistency” (*ibid.*).

Lines, Bodies, and Planes of Immanence

As I indicated earlier—and as Gatens and Lloyd suggest—Deleuze (and Guattari) wants to adopt Spinoza’s physics, but to do so without also following his substance ontology. As early as *SPP*, Deleuze proposes the plane of immanence as an alternative to substance:

³² See also Deleuze, *The Fold*, 92–93; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 185–86. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *WIP*.

“What is involved is no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a *common plane of immanence* in which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated” (SPP, 122). Deleuze and Guattari echo this later in *WIP* where they suggest that the plane of immanence does not presuppose substance: “Immanence does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes but, on the contrary, the Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence as their presupposition” (WIP, 48). The two also express a similar sentiment in *ATP* in “Memories of a Spinozist, I” where they interchange the plane of immanence with a plane of life: “What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life” (ATP, 254). Thus, in the first place, on their read of Spinoza that begins with *kinesis* and in positing a plane of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari are fairly explicit about their departure from ontology.

Whether we call it the plane of immanence or plane of life, the plane is not merely an alternative to substance. Much like both parallelism (body/mind) and ethology (motion/affect) it entails the conjunction of two simultaneous aspects. Deleuze and Guattari claim that “[t]he plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as *Nous* and as *Physis*” (WIP, 38). The former facet of the plane of immanence will ground my argument in the following section, so here I will limit my discussion to the latter sense. As Nature or *Physis*, we might think of the plane of immanence as the wherein-bodies-move-and-affect or the wherein-life-unfolds. In this respect, when Uexküll or Deleuze talk about the lifeworld of the tick they are talking about its place on the plane of immanence. This leads us to another sense in which Deleuze means that ethology is an ethics. As other scholars have noted, ethics and ethology both share the root-word *ethos*, which can be understood to mean a dwelling, living space, or habitat.³³ Thus, when Deleuze says ethics is ethology and is not morality he means that ethics does not concern moral responsibility or passing judgments about actions that may be deemed blameworthy or commendable. Instead, ethics is about understanding how things enter into relationships in their environment where the creation of good relationships enables them to maintain their compositions while those that are bad lead to their decomposition. To use Deleuze’s example, if we are to say that Adam sins or acts badly by eating a certain fruit, we must mean that the fruit poisons him and eventually leads to his death. In contrast,

³³ Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings*, 147–48.

eating is usually good for an organism in that nutrition is necessary for persisting in one's composition, but it is bad for whatever is eaten as it necessarily undergoes decomposition, which results in the loss of its individuality. To borrow a term from Hasana Sharp, we might say then that Deleuze renaturalizes philosophy through his ethics as ethology which, in Nietzschean fashion, replaces good and evil for an account of good and bad as a function of motion and affect.³⁴

To say that ethology renaturalizes philosophy is to say that it moves philosophy away from transcendence and back to immanence, which is a key part of Deleuze's larger philosophical project. Indeed, immanence is so important that Deleuze and Guattari describe Spinoza as the prince of philosophers because he was "the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere" (WIP, 48).³⁵ Here I want to suggest that the move from transcendent to immanent philosophy is also illustrative for thinking about the move to ethology as a move away from ontology. But what does Deleuze mean by transcendence vs. immanence? In a certain sense we have been talking about this difference already because the things that Deleuze considers morality—moral judgments, values such as good/evil, taxonomic categorization—are all products of transcendent philosophy, whereas ethology comes from a philosophy of immanence. Robert Hurley notes that Deleuze distinguishes the two in *SPP* with different uses of the French "*plan*" to refer to almost every sense of the English words "plan" and "plane." Whereas *plane* is used to refer to Immanence or Nature, *plan* connotes a map or diagram and it points to transcendence or what Deleuze also calls the theological plan. The transcendent plan, according to Deleuze, is never given to us but must always be inferred from some authority and its basic feature is a "development of forms and formation of subjects" (*SPP*, 122). Deleuze does not give examples here but seems to be warning against ways of conceiving of subjects that do not ask what they can DO as an open question but instead make proclamations as to what they ARE according to some *a priori* image or plan: e.g., the *imago dei*, the *zoon*

³⁴ For a more detailed account of Deleuze's Spinozist ethics which proposes ethology as a model for posthumanist politics, see Hasana Sharp, "Ethics as Ethology?," in *Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 210–20.

³⁵ See also Deleuze and Guattari's claim that Spinoza is the "Christ of philosophers" because "he showed, drew up, and thought the 'best' plane of immanence—that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions" (WIP, 60).

*logon echon, Dasein, Man, the human, etc.*³⁶ The contrast between the plane of immanence and plans is, I think, also clarifying as to why Deleuze takes ethology to be a departure from taxonomy. In conceiving of things in terms of what they DO (*e.g.*, plowing or racing), ethology resists categorizing them in terms of what they ARE according to plans whereby species (*e.g.*, horse or oxen) or subject forms are predetermined by whatever authority happens to be making the determination.

By renaturalizing philosophy toward immanence and away from transcendent plans, ethology departs not only from ontology as oisiology or taxonomy but from ontology more broadly. I think this becomes clear by considering the following point of contrast: although Deleuze's account of ethics as dwelling is original, the idea itself came to popularity through Heidegger. In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger claims that while ethics following Aristotle understood *ethos* in the more usual contemporary sense as having to do with one's character, in Heraclitus "*Ēthos* means abode, dwelling place."³⁷ For Heidegger, this "original ethics" must mean that "'ethics' ponders the abode of man..."³⁸ We might expect then that for Heidegger, like Deleuze, ethics is an ethology concerned with how things form relations in their habitat. "However, this thinking [*i.e.*, original ethics] is not ethics in the first instance, because it is ontology."³⁹ Thus, whereas ethics is ethology for Deleuze, it is ontology for Heidegger, which—as he goes on to explain in his usual fashion—has little to do with how things actually live or dwell and is more concerned with "being-in-the-world" learning to properly think about Being so as to be able to think properly about the more primordial meaning of concepts like "house" or "dwelling."⁴⁰ The suggestions that ethics is primarily about thinking Being and that dwelling refers to something other than what bodies do would no doubt be evidence of a transcendent philosophy for Deleuze. Heidegger is of course a bit of an extreme case and therefore an easy target, but even with a looser conception of ontology than we find in Heidegger, I think it is

³⁶ Other representatives of transcendence that Deleuze mentions are the three personages of the sad passions who use transcendent values to turn life against itself: the slave, the tyrant, and the priest (SPP, 25–26).

³⁷ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," (1947) in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, (ed. and tr.) D. Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 213–66, here 256.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 258.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 260. The account that Heidegger eventually gives for those terms comes later in the essay "Building Dwelling Thinking."

still evident that the way ethology understands things is distinct from ontology. In asking us to understand thing in terms of what they DO rather than what they ARE, it would seem that ethology is unconcerned with things in terms of being. In other words, unlike ontology which is concerned with the being of beings—if not the being of being—ethology is concerned with the way that bodies move. In this respect, ethology on the plane of immanence as *Physis* is a matter of physics as well as ethics.

Deleuze argues that for philosophy to express immanence it cannot solely refer back to itself; it must go beyond itself. Indeed, he says that Spinoza, as “the most philosophic of philosophers...teaches the philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher” (SPP, 130). Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari conclude *WIP* by emphasizing this: “*Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs non-science*” (WIP, 218). Ethology does this by beginning with *kinesis*, which concerns physics as much as philosophy, although it has often been regarded as belonging solely to the former. In his recent opus *Being and Motion*—which aims to develop a comprehensive philosophical account of motion—Thomas Nail observes, “Motion, for the most part, has been treated as a nonphilosophical category best left to physics.”⁴¹ Despite its neglect, Nail finds philosophies of motion in thinkers such as Lucretius, Marx, Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze—especially in relation to his work on Spinoza—whom he reads as a process ontologist or ontologist of becoming.⁴² Similarly, as the title implies, Nail treats his philosophical account of motion as an ontology. He is very explicit that, for him, ontology does not mean fundamental ontology—the study of being *qua* being, which he considers impossible—but he is nonetheless concerned with the ontological task of “describing the being of motion and the motion of beings.”⁴³ I raise this point not to dispute Nail’s thesis but to suggest a point of contrast. That is, by considering some classical examples of motion as a matter of physics we can once again see how Deleuze’s interest in motion is ethological but not necessarily ontological in that it is concerned with motion as a way of accounting for what things do rather than in terms of the being of motion or motion of beings.

If philosophy needs nonphilosophy then the two cannot be exclusive, and indeed they often were not in ancient and early modern philosophy. Prior to Newton, the dominant Western views on phys-

⁴¹ Thomas Nail, *Being and Motion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 14.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 40–45.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 13.

ics came from Aristotle; and, importantly, two of the three books of Newton's *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* are both titled "The Motion of Bodies." Similarly the first of his axioms, which he calls "laws of motion," concerns how bodies persist or change with respect to their rest or motion.⁴⁴ Curiously, a helpful comparison of the two can be found by turning once more to Heidegger, who observes that "they share from the start the experience that beings, in the general sense of nature—earth, sky, and stars—are in motion or at rest. Rest means only a special case of motion. It is everywhere a question of the motion of bodies."⁴⁵ Despite their shared concern, Heidegger details eight ways that Newton's account differed from Aristotle's and thereby revolutionized our understanding of Nature. For my argument, two points are significant. First, for Aristotle, the way a body moves will depend on the kind of body that it is. Earth is surrounded by water, then air, then fire, and each will tend linearly toward its respective sphere. In addition to the earthly bodies there are also the celestial bodies, which (Aristotle believes) move in a perpetual circle. Newton revolutionizes both bodies and motion by extending the first law to every body, which eliminates the need for either kinds of bodies or kinds of motion. In the second place, then, rather than view things as kinds, Newton accounts for them in terms of how they move.⁴⁶ All of this is to say that what might be at stake is not the relationship of motion to being(s) (ontology), but the relationship of motion to bodies (ethology). And while Deleuze is clearly interested in the latter, he seems unconcerned with the former.

The previous example is not meant to imply that Spinoza or Deleuze are Newtonians, but is meant to demonstrate that Spinoza anticipates Newton by conceiving of every body as a complex or multi-complex body which is an aggregate of simple bodies that are only distinguishable with respect to differences in their motion. But—at least on Deleuze's reading—Spinoza also goes beyond Newton. For Newton, a body is also a mass which is only a "measure of matter," and in this way Newton is limited to classical materialism.⁴⁷ In contrast, as demonstrated above, the doctrine of parallelism takes

⁴⁴ Isaac Newton, *The Principia: The Authoritative Translation: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687), (tr.) I. Cohen and A. Whitman. (Oakland: University of California Press, 1999. Reprint, 2016), 62.

⁴⁵ Selection from "What is a Thing?" (1962) reprinted as Martin Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, (ed. and tr.) D. Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 271–305, here 283.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 283–87.

⁴⁷ Newton, *The Principia*, 48–49.

body to be expressed in parallel with thinking. Likewise, the distinction and relationship between the kinetic proposition and the dynamic proposition means that motion always entails affect and affect entails motion, so bodies are not reducible to matter. For Deleuze, the difference between motion and affect is a difference in what he calls *extension* and *intension*. He asks how relations compound to form new “extensive” relations or how capacities compound “to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power” (SPP, 126). Extension is correlated to relations (motion/kinetics) while intension is correlated to capacities and degrees of power (affect/dynamics). Borrowing from geography, he says that we can understand bodies in terms of their “*longitude* and *latitude*” (SPP, 127; ATP, 256–57). The combination of latitude and longitude allows us to create a cartography or “construct a map of a body” (SPP, 128; ATP, 12, 253).⁴⁸

The ethological map of the body (cartography) is constructed on the physical plane of immanence and is thereby freed from the limitations and impositions of transcendent plans (SPP, 127). Because the relations and capacities of a body are always in motion, cartography is both iterative and open-ended. In this respect, cartography is ethological, which also means it is non-moral. Although “moral chattering” which replaces “true philosophy” is concerned with making judgments, for Deleuze it also takes the form of Law as any set of imperatives that demand obedience. At one point, he is fairly explicit that ontology itself is a form of morality that has distracted philosophy from knowing:

In this, as we shall see, there is a confusion that compromises the whole of ontology; the history of a *long error* whereby the command is mistaken for something to be understood, obedience for knowledge itself, and Being for a *Fiat*. Law is always the transcendent instance that determines the opposition of values (Good-Evil), but knowledge is always the immanent power that determines the qualitative difference of modes of existence (good-bad). (*Ibid.*, 24–25)⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Although it is not always associated with ethology, Deleuze’s call for cartographies has also been methodologically influential on Critical Posthumanism and some account of New Materialism. Cf. Rosi Braidotti, “A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 36, no. 6 (2018): 31–61, [<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418771486>].

⁴⁹ Note the reference to Friedrich Nietzsche’s “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fiction: History of an Error,” in *Twilight of the Idols* (1889), (tr.) R. Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 23–24.

Whereas ethology as an ethics can give us knowledge of bodies, it would seem that ontology, which makes declarations about the nature of being or beings, must lead to error in that such declarations demand fidelity to the accounts that are given. To avoid such errors, for Deleuze, philosophy must resist falling back into morality or Law. As I mentioned earlier, *Physis* or Nature is only one facet of the plane of immanence, but its other facet is *Nous* or Thought. This means that to avoid compromising with transcendence, philosophy must orient thought itself toward immanence. Thus, in the final section which follows I will argue that the replacement of ontology with ethology applies not only to Deleuze's understanding of natural bodies, but to his understanding of philosophy itself.

Thinking with AND instead of Thinking IS

In the introduction I suggested that by replacing ontology with ethology we can understand what Deleuze (and Parnet) mean with the cryptic call for "Thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking *for* IS..." (D, 57). To do so is important for demonstrating the role of Spinoza's problem of the body in Deleuze's meta-philosophical project of critiquing what he calls the Moral Image of Thought. Up to this point I have mostly limited my discussion to Deleuze's monographs on Spinoza and his collaborations with Guattari insofar as they concern Spinoza. Here, however, I will briefly turn the discussion to the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, "The Image of Thought," which Deleuze would later call the "most necessary and most concrete" introduction to all his subsequent work, including that with Guattari.⁵⁰

Deleuze's aim in the chapter is to reveal how philosophy has subjected thinking to a sort of blackmail by presupposing that certain concepts, questions, and problem are necessary. Such "subjective presuppositions"—as Deleuze calls them—ironically tend to work their way into philosophy when philosophers profess to disavow all presuppositions. The most famous example of such presuppositions that Deleuze talks about is found in Descartes who, in his exercise of radical self-doubt, finds it *necessary* to conclude that he exists as a thing which thinks. As Deleuze points out, doing so is only possible if we begin with and proceed from a sort of pure non-conceptual

⁵⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), (tr.) P. Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xvii. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as DR.

immediate understanding of the terms expressed therein: “self, thinking, and being.” He acknowledges that Hegel makes the same critique of Descartes but then commits the same error in writing about “pure being,” and he also points out that Heidegger is guilty of asserting that everyone has a pre-ontological or everyday understanding of Being that we invoke every time we state or ask about something that IS (DR, 129). Given its relation to our topic, this final example that Deleuze provides is worth some further consideration.

Deleuze says that we can recognize subjective presuppositions as those which take the form “Everybody knows...” (DR, 129). Heidegger, for instance, posits that “everyone understands ‘The sky is blue’, ‘I am merry’, and the like.⁵¹ In taking that form, subjective presuppositions perform a double function. By designating some claim as *knowledge that is held by everyone*, the presupposition posits itself as universal and necessary. And in doing so the presupposition demands to be understood as an objective or apodictic fact that *does not and cannot* reveal itself as a presupposition (DR, 131). For example, Heidegger claims that “even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies...*But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact.*”⁵² Yet, if we recognize that such claims are presuppositions, then we see that these so-called facts are neither proven nor can they admit to any challenge and are therefore “opinions” instead (DR, 129). For Deleuze, one need not recognize such presuppositions or their related postulates as “*pre-philosophical*” necessities but should instead “denounce” them as “*non-philosophical*” (*ibid.*, 132).⁵³ As philosophers we need not acquiesce to the *doxa* or common sense approaches to thinking if we are open to engaging in a radical critique of thinking itself—as Deleuze thinks we ought to do—but doing so is not easy as it once again requires an opposition to moral thinking.

Deleuze points out that it would be an outrage to dismiss as opinion that, by definition, everybody knows. But it is precisely through presupposing what everybody knows that philosophy subjects thinking to a sort of blackmail where the thinker must uncritically accept what everybody knows and conform to “a dogmatic, orthodox, or moral image [of thought]” (*ibid.*, 131). Deleuze alludes to Aristotle,

⁵¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1927), (tr.) J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 23.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵³ Note the distinction between the “non-philosophical” which Deleuze says we should denounce and the “nonphilosophical” which he claims philosophy needs.

Descartes, Hume, and Kant to suggest that this image is characterized by common sense and good will, and he invokes Nietzsche's observation that "the most general presuppositions of philosophy...are essentially moral, since Morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will..." (*ibid.*, 132). As a moral image, the Image of Thought has predetermined a certain way that we as philosophers *ought* to think about thinking itself, and as a result there have been certain trends that have tended to pervade Western philosophy.

Deleuze notes that one of the most pervasive trends in philosophy is the tendency of philosophers to consider problems ready-made, which he calls an "infantile prejudice [wherein] the master sets the problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority" (*ibid.*, 158). In contrast to that approach, Deleuze—as early as his work on Bergson—argued that for philosophy to think freely, philosophers need to posit their own problems and identify those false problems that result from a confusion of terms or badly-stated questions.⁵⁴ But the fact that philosophers have so often failed to do that has led certain problems to dominate. In *Dialogues* again, Deleuze and Parnet observe that "the history of philosophy is encumbered with the problem of being, IS" (D, 56). The problem, they say, has always concerned the judgments of attribution and existence, in that such judgments require philosophy to continually resort back to certain forms of questioning and thinking. Some of these question forms have been so pervasive that they have been incorrectly taken to be not only ready-made but eternal. The most persistent of these has been the ontological Socratic question that takes the form "What is...?" By taking that question form as a given, philosophy restricts the paths that thinking can take.⁵⁵ For Deleuze and Parnet, conjunctions and relations serve as an alternative to thinking with the verb *to be*:

Substitute the AND for IS. A *and* B. The AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their

⁵⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism* (1966), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 15–21.

⁵⁵ See Daniel W. Smith's comments in Constantin V. Boundas, Daniel W. Smith, and Ada S. Jaarsma, "Encounters with Deleuze: An Interview with Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith," *Symposium*, vol. 24, no. 1 (2020): 139–74, here 144–46.

terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole. (D, 57)

Reenter Spinoza. Deleuze and Parnet ask, "Why write about Spinoza? Here again, let us take him by the middle and not by the first principle (a single substance for all the attributes). The soul AND the body; no one has ever had such an original feeling for the conjunction 'and'" (D, 59). It should now be clear the extent to which Spinoza's problem is practically a war cry. His parallelism which grounds the problem offers a new model for philosophy in that thinking itself need no longer be encumbered by the IS but can begin with the AND. In asking "What can a body do?" rather than "What is a body?" Spinoza dissolves the Socratic approach to thinking and opens up a new path for thought itself. Ethology, as we have seen, de-ontologizes philosophy by both moving away from ontology and taxonomy and by providing us with the means of understanding bodies immanently. But it also de-ontologizes philosophy by providing us with the means of an orientation to thought that is no longer bound to the problem of the IS and subject to the Moral Image of Thought. In doing so, the construction of the plane of immanence can be realized in thinking so that philosophy might enable "thought's 'engagement with the maximum perspective possible....'"⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ Robert Hurley (SPP, iii) quoting Deleuze, qtd. in Karen Houle, "Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics as Extension or Becoming?" *Symposium*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2015): 37–56, here 40.