The New Whitehead?
An Ontology of the Virtual
in Whitehead's Metaphysics

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A good deal of recent work on Deleuze has focused on his importance as a philosopher of the "virtual" and the intensive processes that emerge from it. That Deleuze finds the ontological and metaphysical expression of these virtual processes in the work of Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Bergson is well known. The "trinity" of Deleuzian thought, with Spinoza as the "Christ" of philosophers, is now established in the commentaries. However, one task that remains for Deleuze scholarship is to retrieve those often marginal figures and multiple voices that populate Deleuze's texts, since these figures often provide the conceptual innovations that inform Deleuze's readings of the Nietzsche-Bergson-Spinoza trinity, underpinning his unique trajectories and novel routes through disciplines, knowledges, and traditions.[1] The immense promise of this research into the margins of the Deleuzian text is that it offers the potential not only to "counter-actualize" or "deterritorialize" the now perhaps received views of Deleuze's thought, but it opens up possibilities to re-energize and transform long-forgotten concepts, to revalue and experiment with neglected traditions of thought and release under-appreciated thinkers for new becomings and futures. Above all, outside of the "official" blocs of philosophy, this research offers the opportunity for thought once again to "diagnose our actual becomings" (WP, 56).

In this respect, and still widely underappreciated, at least in the Anglo-American reception of Deleuze, is the extent to which Deleuze "returns" with a difference to the inestimable—yet abandoned (intriguingly, Deleuze says "assassinated"[2])—work of Alfred North Whitehead in order precisely to experiment with the virtual logic of becoming and difference and to continue the work of creating transformative and transversal relations in between science and philosophy. In relation to this task a few Anglo-American readers of Deleuze have, albeit very briefly and indirectly, alluded to the presence of Whitehead in Deleuze's thought.[3] Perhaps the most serious engagement with the Deleuze-Whitehead nexus is now taking place in the Francophone world. In a context already informed by Bergson, Ruyer, Simondon, Serres, Latour, etc., thinkers like Eric Alliez and Isabelle Stengers are exploring the possibilities that a Deleuze-Whitehead conjunction offers for rethinking some of the most important problems of contemporary philosophical, aesthetic, and scientific thought. In his *The Signature of the World*

(Continuum, 2004), for example, Alliez has already worked through some of these possibilities by showing how Deleuze and Whitehead together provide conceptual resources for conceiving a truly "speculative empiricism" and a "superior ethology" that would move us closer towards a "theory of thought capable of diagnosing in our becomings the ontological conditions for the real experience of thought" (xxiii). In her most recent book, *Penser Avec Whitehead* (Editions de Seuil, 2002), Isabelle Stengers deploys Whitehead's concepts as a "free and wild creation" of the Deleuzian type, as nomadic "empirico-ideal notions" that set up camp where they are, luring us toward new feelings and novel forms of experience.

Perhaps the most important aspect of both Alliez's and Stengers' approach to highlight here is that such new concepts and methods operate in accordance with a carefully defined principle of constructivism. This constructivist stance enables Stengers to pursue her Deleuzian inspired "thinking with" Whitehead in relation to some of the most important abstractions of philosophical and scientific thought just as it enables Alliez to find in Deleuze-Whitehead a new transcendental philosophy (a "transcendental materialism") that counter-effectuates the Copernican Revolution in the ontological production and auto-constitution of the new.

By developing some of the leads of the authors mentioned above—especially in relation to the role that this kind of constructivism plays in Whitehead's ontology—I would like to draw out a more detailed resonance between certain elements of the metaphysical framework developed in Whitehead's later works, particularly *Process and Reality* and *Adventure of Ideas*, and Deleuze's own virtual philosophy, especially in *Difference and Repetition*. Here I am trying only to establish a firmer basis in Whitehead's texts from which further work could proceed. It is hoped that this will not only open up new perspectives on Deleuze's thought but it will also show the extent to which Whitehead's work is ready for what one commentator calls "rehabilitation," opening a space in which Whitehead's philosophy becomes once again a living and creative possibility for thought.[4]

It is well known that with his "untimely" practice of philosophy Deleuze invents for himself a tradition of his own, a tradition of "immanent" philosophy within which he would think with and alongside his "nomads," creatively transforming and releasing a thinker for new becomings. I want to demonstrate that Deleuze's work offers us this possibility with Whitehead, but also I want to encourage others to develop this power in conjunction with other neglected Anglo-American thinkers. For example, Samuel Alexander, whom Deleuze describes as a "very, very great philosopher," surely deserves to be read carefully by

Deleuzians, especially those working on questions relating to the virtual and intensive magnitudes. Indeed, at many points Deleuze's philosophy of immanence connects up with the submerged tradition of "process" philosophy, reconfiguring it in important ways. Placing Whitehead in resonance with Deleuze makes visible a range of marginalized philosophical resources, helping to retrieve process metaphysics and Anglo-American speculative philosophy as vitally relevant and still important but ignored traditions of philosophical modernity.

Thus, the objectives of this paper are several. Retrieving and beginning the work of developing these connections will enable us not only to see the extent to which Whitehead is one of Deleuze's "mediators," it will also allow us to contribute to a "new Whitehead," placing his thought before us once again as a philosophical "event" worthy of attention. As Whitehead writes, "philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher" (PR,11). Whitehead helped to place philosophy in a new position, but we need the contrast of Deleuze, I argue, to help us feel this "shock to thought."

On the Deleuze side many have enjoyed Deleuze's appeal to getting "behind" the authors he loves and, as we have mentioned, Deleuze recognized that a number of authors were already "behind" him in this sense. To that group I wish to add Whitehead as another whom Deleuze loved and with whom he entered into "encounters." But apart from two or three brief discussions, this love is perhaps more "secret," operating internally, virtually, and intensively as a kind of profound "repetition" at the heart of Deleuze's texts. What this repetition and encounter show is the extent to which Deleuze could be read fruitfully as a process philosopher, a philosopher of nature and a speculative metaphysical thinker of a deeply Whiteheadian stripe. Thus, against the all too facile Anglo-American assimilation of Deleuze to "postmodernism," with which he has little in common (in fact, more a deep antipathy), we posit a different image of Deleuze's thought, in connection with traditions and temporalities that still remain undeveloped and distant to its initial and continuing Anglo-American reception. Placing Deleuze's thought within these contexts opens the texts once again to the possibility of unforeseen and novel becomings.

The Actual and the Potential

Although there is much one could say about Whitehead's and Deleuze's shared conception of philosophy, their creative relation to the metaphysical tradition, and their understanding of the relation between philosophy and science, I will focus on how something like an ontology of the virtual operates inside the conceptual structure of Whitehead's later

texts, especially *Process and Reality* and *Adventure of Ideas*. The key context for understanding the development of this ontology in Whitehead is to refuse to read Whitehead as simply a pre-Kantian metaphysical realist.[5] If Whitehead is read as exclusively pre-Kantian then he is an anachronism and the Anglo-American philosophical tradition's treatment of Whitehead is vindicated. Rather, Whitehead's pre-Kantianism plays much the same role in his thought as it does in Deleuze: a way of approaching and confronting the aporias of Kantianism as preparation for the laying out of an essentially post-Kantian philosophy of creativity and becoming. Whitehead is a deeply post-Kantian philosopher in much the same way that Deleuze is post-Kantian. We could say, crudely, that Whitehead's ontology is a fusion of pre-Kantian metaphysics with post-Kantian "constructivism." The concept that Whitehead returns to again and again to articulate this fusion or transformed relation to the tradition is "inversion": Whitehead inverts the pre-Kantians toward a principle of constructive or synthetic activity just as he inverts Kant's epistemic conditions toward a principle of ontological conditioning. Thus, although Whitehead's constructivism is dependent in part upon a Kantian principle of synthetic activity, his "pre-Kantianism" nevertheless steps over any mere cognitive constitution toward a transcendental principle of onto-logical constitution. Whitehead still wants to explain the conditions of knowledge-being in terms of an a priori, but an "ontological a priori" that is not grounded universally in human cognition but emerges and changes with the processual conditions of the world. Thus, Whitehead develops his own distinctively modified yet non-anthropological form of the transcendental where "experience" is a given whose genetic conditions must be found in the ontological a priori. Rather than beginning with the subject and deducing its universal and ahistorical conditions of pos-sibility, Whitehead begins with the objects of real experience and "deduces" their genetic processes and ontological conditions. It is this ontological constructivism or speculative empiricism that Deleuze will take up in the name of "transcendental empiricism" and turn completely in the direction of immanence.

In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead's ontological constructivism is developed in terms of a distinction between the actual and the potential which resembles the Deleuzian distinction between the actual and the virtual and parallels the division of the given into extensive and intensive, space and duration, atomic/discrete and continuous, differenciated and differenṭiated. Whitehead's "virtual" has two components: creativity and eternal objects, and both have the virtual ontological status that Deleuze gives to the term; they are "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (DR, 208). These components parallel Deleuze's own notions of "difference" and "Ideas." Both are real potentialities, but only

creativity actualizes or differentiates itself. As with difference-in-itself, only creativity is active, a univocal activity that is expressed, as White-head says, through "two kinds of fluency." Creativity is at once an activity "conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world" (PR, 31) and the creative advance into novelty. Whitehead's virtual and the actual enter into a relation of reciprocal determination and mutual presupposition such that each mode of process and each actual occasion is the general activity of creativity individualized by the imposed con-ditions. Creativity creates its own creatures and, apart from these "accidents," Whitehead says, creativity is "devoid of actuality." However, apart from the conditions imposed by these accidents there would be no novelty. It is what Whitehead calls the "real potentiality" providing both the objects for a new occasion and the "factor of activity" (AI, 179) for the initial phase of the new occasion. Creativity thus serves as the virtual or "transcendental" principle behind the becoming and internal genesis of actuality as well as the principle of movement or extrinsic conditioning between actualities. If, in Deleuze, the virtual must be actualized along lines of difference, in Whitehead the virtual must be actualized through processes of creativity: "creativity is the actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is an occasion of experiencing" (AI, 179).

In one of its manifestations of fluency, creativity actualizes potentials through eternal objects. Eternal objects form a "reservoir" of "pure potentials" (MT, 128). Eternal objects are indeterminate, passive, ideal structures "devoid of becomingness and extension," as Whitehead says, which undergo various modes of "ingression" or "incarnation" into the actual. This is what Deleuze, following Whitehead, calls the "adventure of Ideas" (DR, 181). The adventures of eternal objects are double: on the one hand they involve both their realization or differenciation into actual occasions where their "individual essence" remains unique or "isolated" ("eternal objects of the subjective species") and, on the other hand, the adventures of potentials concern the determination or differenciation of their "relational essence" with other eternal objects whereby patterns of connection and consistency between them are established ("eternal objects of the objective species"). Thus, eternal objects form a fully de-terminate consistency or pattern of connection to each other but are indeterminate in relation to actuality. As Deleuze would say, every occasion or event is double with one part implicated in the fully determinate content of the virtual and the other explicated and receiving actual determination without either half resembling the other. This is no less the case with Whitehead: as "eternal," the objects are "pure po-tentials" in relation to the actual; as "realized," the objects are to be considered as "real possibilities" in the creation of new actualities. As "pure potentials," eternal objects are organized as a "multiplicity"

(Whitehead's term in PR that replaces "realm" in SMW), what Deleuze, referring to the structure of Ideas, calls "virtual multiplicities," understood as "an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity to form a system" (DR, 182). The general system of relatedness among potentials is a multiplicity of interconnected elements, point and relations, an infinite system of incompossibilities held together in "differentiated relevance" by the "primordial nature of God." In relation to this divine element, Deleuze comments "even God … becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes through them."[6]

Like the virtual in Deleuze, the reality of the Whiteheadian virtual may be characterized according to the order of the problem. Thus, Whitehead describes each actual occasion as the "solution" of indetermination in determinateness (SMW, 160). Eternal objects are, like Deleuzian Ideas, multiplicities that acquire the status of a virtual problem when differentiated and a determinate integration and solution in the actual when differenciated. Thus, Whitehead's virtual components function together in a two-fold role: first, they function as something like the continuing potentiality of actual multiplicities (what Deleuze calls "centers of envelopment") to enter into and condition new processes of becoming or intensive multiplicities and, second, by conforming to the conditions laid down in the actual and synthesizing and unifying these conditions with potential objects ("conceptual prehensions"), the processes of virtual becoming acquire their own individualized subjective form that may potentially generate richer and more intense, implicated contrasts or complex forms of individuation. The drive to individuation and unification is the product of the two phases of creative process and brings together the other notions ("many," "one") that form, along with creativity, what Whitehead calls the "category of the ultimate" (PR, 21). Thus, the creative advance into novelty is the process whereby the many become one and are increased by one, but this one creative process of unification is split into the two "multiplicities" of process.

The Two Multiplicities: Transition/Concrescence

For Whitehead, like Deleuze, if these creative processes or multiplicities are not properly articulated together we will be left with a series of "fallacies" regarding the nature of experience ("the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," "the fallacy of simple location," etc.), not unlike the "illusions" that Deleuze diagnoses. Like Deleuzian "transcendental empiricism" and Bergsonian "intuition," Whitehead's method of "descriptive generalization" aims to overcome the spatializing fallacies of consciousness and the "bare" repetitions of habit and memory in order to

account for the creative "temporalizing" or processual conditions of experience. To explore this notion of time and Whitehead's two multiplicities of process in a little more detail, we can contrast Whitehead's procedures with Kant, as Whitehead himself does, revealing the extent to which Whitehead inverts the Kantian transcendental.

As is well known, Kant shows in his first *Critique* how objects conform to the structure of finite reason, and he locates that structure in an opposition between intuition and understanding. Intuition is the form of receptivity and is dependent on what is given. Space and time are the pure forms of receptivity that "we" bring to the given. Space is the "outer sense" through which we represent objects outside us, and time is the "inner sense" through which we receive inner sensations. Kant gives time primacy as that which conditions all our representations. Time for Kant is self-affection, the mode through which the self relates to itself as a continuous identity. Through this self-relation, objectivity is possible: to be an object for us that object must relate to time in one of its phases as past, present, or future. Kant's "Copernican turn" is effectively a revolution in the conception of time—crudely, time is now "in us" in the sense that time is the formal condition though which any experience is possible. However, spatio-temporal determinations on their own are famously "blind." To be an object of experience, that which is received must be filtered though the concepts of the understanding. Understanding might be thought of as a kind of gridding or net through which lumps of intuition must pass to receive conceptual form and shape. For Kant, sensibility and understanding are completely irreducible components but are brought to unity by the synthesizing activity of the transcendental ego—the "I think" that must be able to accompany all my representations. In other words, the disconnected and passively received data of intuition and the concepts of the understanding are shaped into meaningful experience by the synthesizing activity of the "transcendental unity of apperception" mediated by the "schema" of the imagination. This forms the very rough and basic outline of Kant's solution to Hume's scepticism in the first *Critique*.

Whitehead would seek to invert the Kantian solution since it "assumes the radical disconnection of impressions *qua data*" (PR, 113), such that knowledge begins with the bare datum or percept affecting an essentially passive and simple receptivity of intuition. Thus, Kant "conceives his 'Transcendental Aesthetic' to be the mere description of a subjective process appropriating the data by orderliness of feeling" (PR, 113). This is a false beginning, for Whitehead, since the datum is already an interconnection and an activity of "feeling" or synthesis of "prehensions" already in process. Behind the receptiveness of the ego and its perceptions (what Whitehead calls "perception in the mode of presentational

immediacy") lies the "causal efficacy" of the past which precedes and conditions the activity of the "I think." In order for the active "I" of the understanding to represent what is given, there must be sub-representative or non-representative syntheses conditioning its activity, what Michel Foucault would call an "unthought" element that conditions me and that I do not control. The "other" lives in me, or to use Rimbaud's formula: "I is another." The "other" lives objectively, for Whitehead, through the "transference of throbs of emotional energy" (PR, 116), passing through the "vector" of time, an experience that Whitehead designates as "the passage of nature." In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead names this mode of process "transition," and describes it variously as the "vehicle of the efficient cause," the "immortal past," or the "perpetual perishing" (PR, 29, 81, 210) in us. Traditional readings of Whitehead tend to downplay or ignore the role played by "transition" in Whitehead, but it is the key to Whitehead's ontology of the virtual. Without transition there would be no real creative or differential "repetition" and, as Whitehead says, "tear 'repetition' out of 'experience' and there is nothing left" (PR, 206). For Whitehead, "what becomes involves repetition transformed into novel immediacy" (PR, 207), and this process of transforming the bare, naked, material repetition and clothing it with feelings of novel immediacy is initiated in transition. Transition is, then, not just the handing over or "picking up" of already completed occasions. It is both the "perishing," or better, the "immortalizing" or "becoming immortal," of the present but also the power of repetition that originates a new present in conformity with the past. It is the "passing on" (PR, 213), as Whitehead calls it, of the creativity into which the actual occasion will infuse its own particularity. This unthought or unconscious creative element is, then, more properly understood as a temporalizing synthesis in conformation with the past, or as Whitehead says, following Bergson, the synthesis is "unspatialized" (PR,114). These non-conscious and non-spatialized elements or "feelings" exhibit a vector character transforming the past into a merging with the present. As Whitehead writes: "The *how* of our present experience must conform to the *what* of the past in us" (SYM, 58).

Creativity here is the ever-advancing reality of the world, "the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact" (AI, 227). The processes of transition from the past, then, include an "active" factor of desire, creativity, or power, a "living urge" which, at a critical stage, changes in kind and intensifies forming concrescences or modes of intense becoming which precede and enable the formation of things, individuals, or organisms. Whitehead's theory of "objectifications" explains how, in its transitional phase, this activity drives the processes whereby the completed occasions of the past are repeated inside the

concrescing occasion. Objectification involves "decisions" that push the datum to a critical or poised threshold, marking points at which the process of transition spontaneously changes its structure, breaks symmetry and becomes self-organizing. Whitehead describes this self-actualizing nature of concrescence in terms of how the nascent occasion "feels" that datum given in the transition, and makes its "decision" with respect to what it has received, "grafting," feeling and incorporating the data as an increasingly unique, individuated "subjective aim." The process of concrescence is properly *causa sui* or self-actualizing, but it emerges out of the datum given in transition. If the transition is the disjunctive datum stripped bare with creativity approaching zero, yet still carrying a factor of activity or desire, concrescence is the intensifying subjective form, including the "ingression" of relevant eternal objects, which conjunctively "clothes" itself in its movement of becoming toward "satisfaction"; the subject becomes "superject." In any case, the product of transition is the new occasion in its earliest stage and concrescence is the complex, self-directed unfolding, dissociation, and differentiation of transitional components into intensive fields, dynamisms, and interiorities progressively passing through what Whitehead calls the "diverse routes" and "borders of chaos" (PR, 111) that eventually determine and compose the extensive organism. As Whitehead writes, "organism has two 'meanings,' interconnected but intellectually separable, namely, the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning" (PR, 128–9). The microscopic process is "the real internal constitution" of the organism, enabling its growth from the real to the actual by a complex process of condition conversion. The macroscopic process is the transitional movement from the actual to the real, the "superjective" advance or thrust whereby "the future is merely real without being actual" (PR, 214). The actual occasion can be understood as an indissoluble double process with two odd, dissimilar, and dysymetrical "halves" or multiplicities, what Whitehead calls a "subject-superject," a process-product, an organism and environment that are meaningful only with reference to one another.

  Thus, both transition and concrescence are distinct yet continuous phases or multiplicities of creativity. Transition *from* concrescence is creativity that is other-caused and transition *to* concrescence is other-causing, yet concrescence itself is self-causing creativity. Transition is creativity *that affects and is affected by the other*, and concrescence is creativity that *affects itself*. Transition is creativity of the product to enter into other processes and concrescence is creativity to enter into the product.[7] These modes of creativity together drive the processes of becoming that constitute the real and its individuation.

Whitehead's Virtual as the Inversion of the Kantian Transcendental

Although there is much more that we could add here, this constitutes the basic core of Whitehead's ontology of the virtual. Like Deleuze's, Whitehead's ontology is dependent on a reconfiguration or "inversion" of the Kantian transcendental, what Whitehead calls a "critique of pure feeling" (PR, 113). Essentially, Whitehead reproaches Kant for laboring under a misapprehension generated "by an inversion of the true constitution of experience" (PR, 173). Rather than appeal to the a priori structures of consciousness to explain how something can be given to the subject, Whitehead, like Deleuze, points to an ontological con-structivism to describe how the subject is constituted in the given according to the multiplicities of process. Thus, for Whitehead, "Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what should have been his main topic" (PR, 113).

Whitehead's thought here may be understood as detaching the power of synthesis and unification from the transcendental subject and trans-posing it onto the creative processes, multiplicities, and occasions of real experience rather than possible experience, refusing any externally transcendent and anthropocentric first principle, ground, or foundation. Thus, Whitehead's ontology of the virtual as an "inversion" of Kant includes a return to a "pre-Kantian" sense of the transcendental as relevant to all the properties of being and not just its cognitive representation through concepts. While Whitehead retains the Kantian development of the transcendental as an analysis of conditions, the conditions are not "universal" in the Kantian sense but "concrete uni-versals," since they are no broader than the conditioned and the relation of condition to conditioned is radically heterogeneous and yet "causally efficacious." In other words, although the transcendental pertains to all acts of existence and cannot be reduced to any anthropocentric principles, Whitehead's transcendentalism still includes the search for the antecedent and genetic conditions of all real acts of existence, but the conditions operate according to different "laws" from the conditioned empiricities they govern. In effect, Whitehead's "categoreals," as he calls them, are the "nomadic" conditions—or speculative constructions—of the self-differentiating or self-creating nature of what is. For Whitehead, Kant's positions in the first *Critique* require a transcendental, virtual, or "ontological" account of their conditions, an account of their internal genesis. This is in part what Whitehead's later texts, especially *Process and Reality*, provide. Deleuze himself recognizes this in *Difference and Repetition* when he declares that *Process and Reality* is "one of the greatest books of modern philosophy" (DR, 284–5) on account of

Whitehead's construction of "empirico-ideal notions" that radically modify and reconfigure Kantian categories of representation. Whitehead's philosophical positions here are deeply and distinctively recognizable as *post–Kantian*, an effort to "*supersede*," as Whitehead himself says, the Kantian philosophy (PR, 113). These strategies are taken up and repeated with a difference by Deleuze as part of the effort to continue, in a radically revised form, the Kantian critical project as an "ontology of the virtual."

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Notes

1. One thinks, for example, of Maimon and Cohen from the neo-Kantian tradition and their respective understandings of the concept of "intensity," Duns Scotus and the doctrine of univocity, Peguy and the "aternal," Deleuze's use of C. S. Pierce, etc.

2. "En ce sens j'accuse la philosophie analytique anglaise d'avoir tout détruit dans ce qui était riche dans la pensée, et j'accuse Wittgenstein d'avoir assassiner Whitehead, d'avoir réduit Russell, son maître, à une sorte d'essayiste n'osant plus parler de logique. Tout ça fut terrible et dure encore." See Deleuze's course on Leibniz, cours Vincennes, St. Denis: l évènement, Whitehead, 10/03/1987, www.webdeleuze.com.

3. John Rajchman, for example, in a discussion of Deleuze's adherence to a "radical empiricism," mentions the importance to Deleuze of Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" in the claim that the abstract does not explain but must itself be explained. See his *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). Most recently, Brian Massumi in his *Parables of the Virtual* (New York: Routledge, 2004) suggests that there is a "close kinship" between Deleuze/Guattari and Whitehead, especially in relation to a shared commitment to an expanded empiricism. Although Manuel Delanda does not explicitly reference Whitehead, his own "ontology of the virtual" is also, in my view, close to a certain understanding of Whitehead.

4. George Lucas, *The Rehabilitation of Whitehead* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). I would like to think of my work here and elsewhere as a contribution to the project laid out in Lucas' outstanding work.

5. One of the notable exceptions here is the work of James Bradley, who is one of the most original and important readers of Whitehead. See especially his "Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead," *Process Studies* 23, no. 3 (Fall 1994).

6. Deleuze, *The Fold*, 81. Deleuze, in his only extended discussion of Whitehead (*The Fold*, 76–82), argues unequivocally for the pure immanence and openness of Whitehead's system as a "chaosmos." However, to what extent Whitehead's "virtual" retains elements of transcendence is a very important topic. Eternal objects are arguably still too Platonic for Deleuze, and although Whitehead's God may not prevent incompossibles from passing into existence, He would not affirm them. I do not have space here to do full justice to this topic.

7. In terms of Whitehead"s work it is Jorge Luis Nobo who has argued the most persuasively for this distinction between transition and concrescence. See his *Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986). The Spinozist distinction between the power to affect and be affected operates throughout Deleuze's work and is transposed into varying contexts and vocabularies. This distinction would form the basis for an analysis of the "ethical" in Deleuze and Whitehead.