THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SPRING:
HUSSERL AND THE GÖTTINGEN CIRCLE

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From 1878 to 1881, Husserl pursued doctoral studies in mathematics under Karl Weierstrass in Berlin. In 1881 he moved to Vienna, where he completed his PhD in 1883. After returning briefly to Berlin, Husserl entered military service, upon the completion of which he returned, in 1884, to Vienna to pursue further graduate studies and complete his habilitation. It was at this time that he studied under Franz Brentano, enrolling in his courses for three consecutive semesters.1 In 1886, upon the recommendation of Brentano, Husserl went to the University of Halle to complete his Habilitationsschrift under the guidance of Carl Stumpf, who had also studied under Brentano. In 1887 Husserl completed his thesis, Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen (On the Concept of Number. Psychological Analyses), which was printed (as is generally required for the Habilitationsschrift) but not widely published. This thesis later formed part of Husserl’s first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen (Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations), which was published in 1891. Upon habilitation, which brings with it the granting of the status of Privatdozent, Husserl was formally qualified to lecture at the university, and he

1 As Robin D. Rollinger records, Husserl attended the following lectures and seminars of Brentano:
   Winter 1884/85: (i) Practical Philosophy, (ii) Elementary Logic and Necessary Reform in It, (iii) Seminar on Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding;
   Summer 1885: (i) Elementary Logic, (ii) Seminar on Hume’s Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals;

See Robin D. Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 17. Regarding the influence of Brentano on Husserl, Theodore de Boer writes in The Development of Husserl’s Thought, (tr.) Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978): “…it was Husserl’s teacher Brentano who gave him the problems with which he was to concern himself throughout his entire career and which drove him to ever more radical solutions.” (xx)
remained at Halle in this capacity from 1887 to 1901. During this time he wrote his groundbreaking *Logical Investigations*, the two volumes of which were published in 1900 and 1901 respectively. Dermot Moran offers the interesting following details:

*Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations)*...was the result of this decade of hard, lonely work. The first volume *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Prolegomena to Pure Logic)* was published independently in July 1900, followed by a second volume of six investigations, subtitled *Investigations in Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledge*, published in two parts in 1901. Husserl records that the Prolegomena originated from two lecture series given in Halle in the summer and autumn of 1896 (Hua 18: 12; 24: 57); this was a devastating critique of logical psychologism and a defence of logic as a theory of science, reviving the Leibnizian notion of a *mathesis universalis*. In his 1896 lectures he had already developed the insight that ‘The first and principal foundation of all logic is the objective, that is, non-psychological theory of dependency relationships between sentences’. Husserl had written to Paul Natorp on 21 January 1897 about the work he was composing against the ‘subjective-psychologising logic of our time’, a tendency to which he himself, as a student of Brentano, had once subscribed (*Briefwechsel*, 5: 43).²

It was on the strength of this work that Husserl was appointed *Professor Extraordinarius*³ at the University of Göttingen, where he remained from 1901 to 1916, at which time he moved to Freiburg, where he was employed as Professor until his retirement in 1928. The present collection of essays deals primarily with works and ideas that had their origin in roughly the last ten years of Husserl’s tenure at Göttingen, that brief period that Jean Hering referred to as the “phenomenological spring”.⁴

Now generally regarded as a turning point in the history of philosophy, it was the appearance of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* that prepared the way for this incredibly fruitful period of phenomenolog-

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³ *Professor Extraordinarius* is equivalent to Associate Professor in North America. A *Professor Ordinarius*, the rank at which Husserl was appointed when he subsequently went to Freiburg, is a Full Professor. A *Privatdozent* is usually recognised as a lecturer, but after several years at a university the *Privatdozent* is often accorded a status equivalent to that of Assistant Professor in North America.
cal activity. Not only did it introduce novel philosophical themes for further research but, perhaps more importantly, it also embodied a radical new spirit that inspired and motivated an entire generation of young philosophers eager to explore the fresh new world of possibilities that Husserl's investigations had opened up. As Edith Stein explained, they regarded the *Logical Investigations* as "a 'new scholasticism' because it turned attention away from the 'subject' and toward 'things' themselves. Perception again appeared as reception, deriving its laws from objects not, as criticism has it, from determination which imposes its laws on the objects." These young philosophers saw Husserl's phenomenology as the means to escape from the subjectivism, relativistic psychologism, critical idealism, and skepticism that had come to characterise contemporary thought, for it spoke of a "return to the things themselves," a return to objective truth and essence and to the study of objective laws and abiding truths in logic, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics. The students and colleagues who began to gravitate toward Husserl after his move to Göttingen eagerly explored all of these fields, often achieving quite remarkable results. The present collection of essays offers the reader a brief sampling of some of the startling originality and rich variety that characterised the research of these enthusiastic young scholars.

Students began to come to study under Husserl almost immediately upon his arrival in Göttingen. In 1902 Dietrich Mahnke came from his home in Verden, remaining in Göttingen until 1906 (and continuing to correspond with Husserl until 1932). William Ernest Hocking, on the recommendation of Josiah Royce, came from Harvard to study with Husserl for the summer semester of 1902 (also continuing to correspond with Husserl for some time thereafter). Spring 1902 also marked the famous visit from Johannes Daubert, who rode his bicycle over 100 kilometers from his home in Braunschweig to discuss the *Logical Investigations* with Husserl personally. This journey proved to be of great importance for the subsequent phenomenological movement, for upon his return to Munich Daubert enthusiastically introduced the new Husserlian approach to the group of phenomenologists.

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who had already been gathering around Theodor Lipps. In July he presented a lecture to the Academic Club for Psychology, "On the Psychology of Apperception and Judgment," in which, as Karl Schuhmann recounts, "he contrasted the theories of judgement of Lipps and Husserl and decided unequivocally in favour of Husserl." In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl had attacked the psychologism of Lipps, and when Lipps attempted to defend his position before the Club, demonstrating how it avoided Husserl's accusation of psychologism, what resulted was more of a revolt of his closest students than a rescue of his ideas. In 1904 Husserl visited Munich for four days (May 26–30), speaking to the Club "about the subject of *fundierte Vorstellungen* (consciousness of image, phantasy and signs) and their relation to perception." By 1905, some of Lipps' best students began shuttling regularly back and forth between Munich and Göttingen, the first two being Daubert and Reinach, followed by Geiger in 1906 and Conrad in 1907. In 1907 these students began to hold weekly meetings in
Göttingen, forming the core of what came to be known as the Göttingen Circle. Other notable members who joined the Circle during this early phase included August Gallinger, Wilhelm Schapp, Aloys Fischer, Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Pfänder, Max Scheler and Maximillian Beck. In 1910 Theodor Conrad and Dietrich von Hildebrand formally established the group as the Göttingen Philosophical Society (Göttinger philosophische Gesellschaft) and, in the summer of 1911, a meeting was held at Husserl’s home for the purpose of founding the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Journal for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research), the first volume of which appeared in 1913. The Society continued to flourish until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

have sadly slipped into obscurity, since neither made any significant contribution beyond their participation as members of the Circle.

Pfänder had been a student of Lipps in 1895, but he had attained the rank of Privatdozent by the time of the Göttingen invasion, and while he is considered a member of the early Göttingen Circle, he never left his teaching post at Munich. (It should also be noted that Pfänder was not a student of Husserl, but a colleague and peer.) While both Scheler and Beck were from Munich, neither was a student of Lipps: Scheler was a Privatdozent at Munich and Beck was a student of Pfänder. However, both men did fit within the spirit of the group, as their work expressed interest in ontology, logic and descriptive psychology.

Alice von Hildebrand, *The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich von Hildebrand* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 110. For an engaging account of von Hildebrand’s role in the Society, see Chapter 2, “University Years and Conversion, 1906–1914,” 65–149. She discusses the founding of the Jahrbuch at 110–11.

The following list of Husserl’s students in Göttingen and of the members of the Circle might prove of interest. The years mark their arrival dates in Göttingen (with their birthplace or previous place of study added in parentheses):

1902: Dietrich Mahnke (b. Verden, Germany)
William E. Hocking (Harvard)
1903: Waldemar Conrad
Karl Neuhaus
1904: Heinrich Hofmann
1905: Adolf Reinach (Munich)
Johannes Daubert (Munich)
Wilhelm Schapp (Berlin)
Alfred Schwenninger (Munich)
1906: Moritz Geiger (Munich)
1907: Theodor Conrad (Munich)
1909: Dietrich von Hildebrand (Munich)
Jean Hering (b. Alsace, France)
1910: Hedwig Martius (Munich)
Siegfried Hamburger (b. Katowice, Poland)
Alexandre Koyré (b. Taganrog, Russia)
The Göttingen Circle did not accept Husserl’s work unconditionally or uncritically. In 1904 and 1905, for example, Pfäänder noted his disapproval of Husserl’s views that statements of question, wish and command were reducible to judgments; for Pfäänder, wishing is a case of striving, which he argued is not reducible to judging. In 1904, in a letter to Dr. Fritz Weinmann (also a student of Lipps), Daubert wrote that Husserl’s arguments concerning the true status of questions failed to convince him, and thus he sought to develop his own solution to the problem of the status of questions.\textsuperscript{16} According to Schuhmann, speech act theory, as developed by the Munich-Göttingen group, grew out of a necessity felt by its members to develop for the class of non-judicative statements a more satisfactory solution than Husserl’s reduction of them to judgments: Pfäänder wrote a theory of commands in 1909; directly related was Daubert’s development of the phenomenology of the question in 1911–12; Reinach’s phenomenological analysis of promising and obligation followed in 1913. The development of speech act theory among the Munich students is a significant and distinguishing feature of their phenomenology, and it demonstrates clearly their theoretical independence from Husserl as well as the influence of Austrian philosophy, specifically that of Bolzano and of the School of Brentano.

The distinct atmosphere of the early Göttingen Circle did not go unnoticed by Husserl, who, according to Spiegelberg, later described the group as bogged down in ontologism and realism, because they had chosen to ignore his new transcendental phenomenology.\textsuperscript{17} This philosophical gap became explicit with the publication of Ideas in 1913, when Husserl elaborated his turn toward what he would later call transcendental idealism. The members of the Circle had already felt this separation soon after they had established themselves in Göttingen, and they were eventually faced with an important theoretical choice: remain with the realism of the Logical Investigations and the original members of the Circle, or start along the new path of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. As Stein recalls, “All the young

\begin{itemize}
\item 1911: Winthrop Bell (b. Halifax, Canada; via Harvard, Cambridge and Leipzig)
\item Hans Lipps (Munich, via Dresden)
\item Roman Ingarden (b. Kraków, Poland)
\item Edith Stein (b. Wroclaw [Breslau], Poland)
\item Fritz Kaufmann (Leipzig, via Berlin)
\item Helmuth Plessner (Heidelberg)
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{17} Spiegelberg, 171.
The majority of the students chose to follow Reinach and the realists rather than Husserl. In a letter to Alexius Meinong dated 1915, Nicolai Hartmann expresses his preference for the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles over that of Husserl: “My regard for this tendency is related almost exclusively to the younger phenomenologists, with whom in my estimate the method has become really alive and has penetrated the special questions for which it is made. Here I am thinking particularly of Geiger and Scheler, but also of Reinach, Pfänder, Leyendecker, and others.”19 Later, in his biographical notes, von Hildebrand was to write of the group of students in Munich:

At the age of seventeen, I entered the University of Munich; I was taking the courses of Theodor Lipps, and I was especially enthusiastic about his course on ethics. Lipps had assembled around himself a group of highly gifted pupils, some of them already assistant professors of philosophy, such as Alexander Pfänder and Moritz Geiger. But this entire school had turned away from the psychologism of Lipps, under the influence of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. They all became adherents of Phenomenology, not in the idealistic sense given to the term by Husserl later on, but in the sense of a strict objectivism and realism.”20

Classes at Göttingen were suspended on 30 July 1914, and shortly thereafter Reinach and many other students left for military service. As Stein recounts, when seminars at the university reconvened in the winter semester of 1914, Husserl’s seminar had very few students. The Göttingen Circle ceased to hold its meetings, and it was never to meet again. Many of its members perished on the battlefields, and Husserl himself moved to Freiburg in 1916. Why the Göttingen Circle’s realist phenomenology slipped into obscurity after WWI still remains unclear and under-researched, but part of the reason must include the popu-

18 Stein, 250.
19 Spiegelberg quotes this letter in his Introduction to his translation of Pfänder’s Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), xvii. This letter from Hartmann was a reply to a letter from Meinong, in which Meinong had asked Hartmann about his attachment to the phenomenology students and Husserl.
larity of the more subjectivist and relativist philosophical investigations of thinkers who came immediately after Husserl, most notably, those belonging to the existential tradition of Heidegger and Sartre.\(^{21}\) Only today, a full century after the “phenomenological spring,” has widespread interest in this exciting period of contemporary thought awakened.\(^{22}\)

All of the essays here included were written for this collection and have not been previously published. Each has been chosen primarily with respect to how it might provide the reader with a sense of the novelty and originality characterising the thought of the Göttingen Circle. Some of the essays discuss topics that the Circle inherited from Brentano through Husserl, some revive issues from Husserl’s early works that have long been overlooked or totally forgotten, and others deal with concerns that Husserl himself appears never to have considered—not, at least, in the works published and circulated during his lifetime. But all of these topics, issues and concerns were of vital importance and all-consuming interest to the members of the Circle, and their mutual support and encouragement, typically offered along with friendly but incisive criticism, led to novel formulations of the problems and stunningly unique solutions.

As von Hildebrand observed in the passage quoted above, the members of the group of phenomenologists in Munich at this time, many of whom, as we have seen, abandoned Munich for Göttingen, “all became adherents of Phenomenology, not in the idealistic sense given to the term by Husserl later on, but in the sense of a strict objectivism and realism.” One of the features of Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} that they found most attractive was precisely its commitment to this “objectivism and realism,” a commitment that the early Husserl appears to have adopted from Brentano. In “The Power of Abstraction:

\(^{21}\) In “Phenomenology and Relativism,” the opening section of his \textit{Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies} (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 25–44, David Carr discusses this at some length, also exploring the extent to which Husserl’s phenomenology may indeed lend itself to relativistic interpretation.

\(^{22}\) Commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Göttingen Philosophical Society, Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Antonio Calcagno and Mark Roberts founded the North American Society for Early Phenomenology, the first meeting of which was held in conjunction with the Canadian Philosophical Association at the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Canada, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, on 30 May 2010. Subsequent meetings were held on 5–6 November 2010 in Baltimore in conjunction with the American Catholic Philosophical Association annual meeting and on 29–30 April 2011 in conjunction with the Annual Conference on Christian Philosophy at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio, sponsored in part by the Dietrich von Hildebrand Legacy Project.
Brentano, Husserl, and the Göttingen Students," Neb Kujundzic examines how abstract objects occupied a curious place in Brentano’s thought, and how Husserl’s move beyond the empirical “realm of nature” in his development of the concept of the intuition of essence (Wesensschau) marked a significant departure from Brentano’s own approach to the treatment of abstract objects. As Kujundzic proceeds to explain, Husserl’s difference from Brentano on this particular topic sheds a good deal of light on the critical reaction of Daubert and Reinach to what they saw as a dangerous flirtation with an idealism that they and their fellow students had hoped had been left in the past. As Husserl’s own commitment to this new direction of phenomenology grew, so too did this critical reaction of the members of the Göttingen Circle.

Brentano’s project of descriptive, empirical psychology also guided Husserl in his early conception of the nature and task of phenomenology, which Husserl initially identified as “descriptive psychology.” This characterisation of phenomenology was to provide the members of the Göttingen Circle—Daubert and Reinach in particular, as well as Pfländer—with further grounds for disagreement with the Master. The extensive familiarity with current research in psychology enjoyed by the Munich students, most of whom had been studying under Theodor Lipps, lent considerable weight to their refusal to regard phenomenology as descriptive psychology. However, as Guillaume Fréchette recounts in admirable detail in “Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology: The Munich Interpretation,” the reasons for Husserl’s eventual abandoning of the label “descriptive psychology” make for a somewhat more complex story, revolving around not only the psychologism of Lipps’ descriptive psychology but also (again) the peculiar role played by abstraction in Brentano’s psychology.

For the many and various reasons discussed by Kujundzic and Fréchette, then, Husserl’s conception of phenomenology quickly developed beyond that of a descriptive psychology. In the one hand, the newly developing phenomenology held the promise of the discovery of a kind of objective truth and certainty, the possibility of which had been all but forsaken for almost a century—for by the time of Hegel’s death in 1831, skeptics had already been waiting in the wings for decades. In the other hand, however, this new phenomenology carried with it the program for a new elaboration of the Kantian critical philosophy—as he remarked in his 1901 Kant-Studien review of the work, Paul Natorp had already detected the spirit of Kant in the first volume
There was a brief moment in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology at which these two tendencies stood in counter-balance and the possibility for a radically new and securely grounded logic and epistemology announced itself. It was at this moment that the Göttingen Circle flourished, prepared to explore other avenues of thought opened up by these foundational accomplishments. It was understood by the members of the Circle that such phenomenological research would proceed in accordance with the methodological conditions that had provisionally been put forth in the Logical Investigations. Of foremost importance among these conditions was the adherence to a strict logical grammar. In “Category Mistakes and Logical Grammar: Ryle’s Husserlian Tutelage,” John K. O’Connor points to the influence that Husserl’s insistence on philosophical method and logical grammar exercised beyond the circle of phenomenologists, suggesting that Gilbert Ryle’s notion of the “category mistake” clearly reflects this influence.

Thorough treatment of the topic of logical grammar in Husserl must include the analysis of problems posed by indexicals (terms that derive their meaning largely through one or another kind of indicative function, such as various adverbs, prepositions, pronouns, and so on). Husserl addressed some of these problems in the Logical Investigations, but a convincing solution remained out of reach. As Saulius Geniūnas illustrates in “Indexicality as a Phenomenological Problem,” Husserl’s continuing attempt to reach a solution to problems of indexicality actually links the Logical Investigations with Ideas I, in which the new concepts of noema and horizon-intentionality provide an entirely new manner in which to conceive of the nature and function of indexicality in general. The view of indexicality that Husserl subsequently develops has immediate bearing on the supposed objectivity of scientific discourse, for it entails the recognition of the primacy of lived experience (Erlebnis) and the life-world, from which scientific discourse emerges.


24 As Johanna Tito explains in her Logic in the Husserlian Context (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), however, scientific discourse itself becomes part of this life-world: “Even if we are not scientists immersed in the scientific attitude, the tenets of science have seeped into the life-world and we are imperceptibly influenced by these. Even in the life-world we find ‘the scholastic dominance of objective-scientific ways of thinking’ [Crisis 129].” (178)
According to Horacio Banega, Husserlian phenomenology is properly to be regarded as a science of the life-world, and Husserl’s attempt to articulate the structures and elements of our experience of the life-world required the elaboration of a formal ontology. Playing the central role in Husserl’s formal ontology is the mereology that he presents in the third of his *Logical Investigations*, “Towards a Theory of Wholes and Parts.” In “Formal Ontology as an Operative Tool in the Theories of the Objects of the Life-World: Stumpf, Husserl and Ingarden,” Banega examines several of the main concepts of Husserlian mereology, having first demonstrated how they were central also to Carl Stumpf’s *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung* (which was published in 1873, thirteen years before Husserl went to Halle to complete his *Habilitationsschrift* under Stumpf’s direction). Banega concludes his article with a brief illustration of the manner in which mereological investigations in formal ontology might be employed in the analysis of the structure of the dramatic work of art. This illustration points to a feature of Husserl’s early phenomenology that continued to inspire those of his students who, like Roman Ingarden, openly objected to what they perceived to be a clear return to idealism in Husserl’s thought as it developed after *Logical Investigations*.

As mentioned above, the critical response to the danger of idealism in Husserl’s phenomenology was already being voiced by his students just a few years after he came to Göttingen, and the Göttingen Philosophical Society provided a healthy forum for the expression and testing of their own new ideas. The central figure in the Society and in the Göttingen Circle in general was unquestionably Adolf Reinach, who was at the centre of “the Munich invasion of Göttingen” in 1905. In 1909 Reinach habilitated under Husserl, and he remained in Göttingen as Privatdozent until he left for the War in 1914. In May of 1909, Reinach organised an informal seminar, the guiding theme of which was “the main ideas of the new movement initiated by Husserl, with special reference to their historical context.” This lecture marks the first time that phenomenology was referred to as a “movement” (*Bewegung*), and this lends considerable credibility to the idea that Reinach was the one who was responsible for baptising phenomenology as a movement. Reinach, who published his masterpiece on

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26 *Ibid.* Schuhmann had traced the reference of phenomenology as a movement to 1912, when Husserl and Conrad-Martius first described it as such. But as they explain in their biography of Reinach, “the fact that the latter was a devoted
social acts, The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law, in the first issue of the
Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, was
considered by the majority of his students to be their true teacher,
rather than Husserl. For example, Winthrop Bell referred to himself as
a “Reinach phenomenologist,” and Hedwig Conrad-Martius described
Reinach as the “phenomenologist par excellence”; more expressions of
the same sentiment can be found in the notes of Edith Stein, Dietrich
von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré and Wilhelm Schapp. Reinach’s chief
contributions include his phenomenology of justice and civil law, a
novel and highly influential description of speech acts (such as obligation
and promising) and the elaboration of a realist theory of states of
affairs.

The ontology of states of affairs was a topic widely discussed
among the members of the Göttingen Circle. The topic had already
proven to be a source of disagreement among Brentano and his stu-
dents: Brentano had maintained that the realm of "the real" contained
only physical and psychical entities and that if an expression referred
to an object that was neither a physical nor a psychological entity, the
referent was to be regarded as a purely fictitious entity enjoying no
real ontological status. Carl Stumpf, Brentano’s student and subse-
quently his successor at Würzburg, disagreed with this strict division,
arguing that there exists a third sort of entity—namely, the contents of
our acts of judgment (the Urteilsinhalte). Stumpf used the term Sach-
verhalt, “state of affairs,” to name these contents, which are distinct
from the act of judgment itself, which either affirms them (in accep-
tance) or denies them (in rejection or refusal). In his Untersuchung
er zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie (Investigation into Theory of
Objects and Psychology) of 1904, Alexius Meinong, who had studied
with Brentano from 1874 to 1878, identified four sorts of objects: (1)
real and ideal/theoretical objects, which are presented (vorgestellt) in
or to thought (e.g., lions, elephants and the idea of specific difference);
(2) objective objects, which are affirmed or denied in judgments (e.g.,
there are animals in the Toronto zoo); (3) dignitative objects, which
are assessed in appraisals (e.g., the felt recognition of the preceding
statement as true); and (4) objects of desire (e.g., goals, duties). States
of affairs, for Meinong, belong to the class of "objective objects," or
what he called Objektive, which may or may not obtain in the real

student of Reinach lends plausibility to the thesis that it is he who was responsible
for so fatefuly baptizing phenomenology as a 'movement' in 1909.” (Ibid)
world. In the formal ontology developed in his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl explored this concept at length, and his analyses promised to banish once and for all the possibility of subjectivism in logic and epistemology with an invigorated realism. As Spiegelberg observes: “After the appearance of the first volume of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, for most of his readers Husserl was a realistic objectivist, and his emphasis on ideal laws even seemed to predispose him for full-fledged Platonism.” Such a “predisposition” is evident throughout *Logical Investigations*, as in the following passage from the opening chapter of the First Investigation:

The state of affairs is what it is whether we assert that it obtains or not. It is intrinsically an item, a unity, which is capable of so obtaining or holding. But such an obtaining is what appeared before us, and we set it forth as it appeared before us: we said ‘So the matter is’. Naturally we could not have done this, we could not have made the assertion, if the matter had not so appeared before us, if, in other words, we had not so judged. This forms part of an assertion as a psychological fact, it is involved in its intimation. But only in such intimation; for while what is intimated consists in inner experiences, what we assert in the judgment involves nothing subjective. My act of judging is a transient experience: it arises and passes away. But what my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. It is an identity in the strict sense, one and the same geometrical truth.

The charge of Platonism has been directed not only toward the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* but also, and more commonly, against Reinach, who stated his own position regarding states of affairs—including those which are non-obtaining, i.e., negative states of affairs—even more strongly than did Husserl in the above passage. In “Negative States of Affairs: Reinach versus Ingarden,” Arkadiusz

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27 “Obtain” is used here for Meinong’s *bestehen*, which Bertrand Russell translated as “subsist.” As Spiegelberg points out: “‘To be the case’ might be a less hypostatizing equivalent of the rather harmless German word ‘bestehen.’” (88)
28 Spiegelberg, 92.
29 *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, 285.
30 That Reinach was a Platonist in this sense remains a point of disagreement among the commentators. While Chrudzimski maintains that “He developed an extremely Platonic approach,” Kimberly Balzer-Jaray has recently argued, primarily against the position presented by Barry Smith, that Adolf Reinach was not a Platonist. See Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, “Adolf Reinach is not a Platonist,” *Symposion*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2009), 106–12.
Chrudzimski locates Reinach's position with respect to those of Brentano and Meinong and then presents Reinach's theory in some detail before contrasting it to the position elaborated by Ingarden.

While Ingarden is best known, at least to English-speaking philosophers, for his work in aesthetics, he in fact first turned to the analyses of works of art and aesthetic experience in order to establish his realist position against the idealism he saw in Husserl's development of phenomenology after *Logical Investigations*. In 1935 Ingarden began his magnum opus, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, a three-volume work in which he fully develops his realist rejoinder to Husserl. Ingarden explains in the Foreword to the German edition that the first chapter "was at first supposed to be an extension of 'Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus [Remarks on the Idealism-Realism Problem]' from the year 1929." It is in the second volume of that work that Ingarden turns his attention the ontology of states of negative states of affairs. As Chrudzimski explains, it is Ingarden's detailed analyses of ontological dependence and independence, deployed in conjunction with his distinction between actually obtaining and potentially obtaining, that enables him to construct a compelling case against Reinach's view.

Although he was never a student of Husserl, Max Scheler was an enormously influential presence in the Göttingen Circle, with interests that were as numerous as they were wide-ranging and an energy and passion that were nothing less than infectious. Scheler’s contributions to the fields of ethics, social theory and political issues inspired further work along similar lines by many members of the Göttingen Circle, but his forays into the more strictly theoretical and methodological aspects of phenomenology exerted less of an influence on the young

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31 Since he undertook the work for Husserl, Ingarden began writing the volume in German. He had completed about half of it before World War II broke out. During the war he completed the first two volumes in Polish; these were first published in 1947 and 1948 by PWN in Warsaw. Ingarden’s German versions of these volumes were first published by Max Niemeyer Verlag in Tübingen in 1964 and 1965 respectively. Ingarden wrote the third volume, which remained unfinished at his death in 1970, in German; it was published by Niemeyer in 1974. This volume was translated into Polish by Danuta Gierulanka and published by PWN in Warsaw in 1981. It has still not been translated into English.

32 *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, vol. I (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1964), ix. The Forewords to the German and Polish editions differ.

phenomenologists. His critiques of fundamental features of Husserl's phenomenology—in particular, his attacks on Husserl's concepts of categorical intuition and the phenomenological attitude, and on the view that phenomenology was essentially a method of scientific investigation—seem to have carried little weight among the members of the Circle. Yet, as Eric J. Mohr explains in "Phenomenological Intuition and the Problem of Philosophy as Science: Scheler and Husserl," it was Scheler's critique of Husserlian methodology that came to direct the course of phenomenology after this period, for this critique enabled Heidegger and others to re-conceive the nature of phenomenological inquiry itself. It was to be regarded no longer as an essentially scientific and methodical mode of inquiry and analysis into non-subjective structures of consciousness and experience, but as precisely the sort of inquiry for which the young thinkers of the Göttingen Circle had hoped the new Husserlian phenomenology would provide the antidote.

In "The Values of War and Peace: Max Scheler's Political Transformations," Zachary Davis explores an area of Scheler's writing that is more familiar to most readers, and one that perhaps most clearly reveals the ardent character of his thought. In his famous The Genius of War and the German War (Genius des Krieges und der Deutschen Krieg), which he quickly wrote and published at the outbreak of World War I, Scheler presents a passionate justification not only of the War itself but, more pointedly, of German military aggression. Scheler argued that such antagonism was the means through which the German spirit must be expressed in order not only to nurture German culture but also, in so doing, to advance life itself. As Davis explains, Scheler subsequently abandoned this position, arguing against most if not all of its central claims. Davis demonstrates how Scheler's reconsideration of his earlier position belongs to a constantly developing series of political and philosophical transformations that are themselves informed by a deep concern with the spiritual dimension of human existence, a concern that Scheler voiced also in his criticism of the institution of the Catholic Church and the Christian conception of God, and in his own elaboration of the concept of "a becoming God," a concept that had been growing in popularity in German thought since the time of Goethe.34

Scheler's passionate concern with the spiritual dimension of human existence struck a responsive chord among the members of the Göttingen Circle, many of whom had found in Husserl's phenomenolo-

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34 For a discussion of the development of the concept in German literature, see Walburga Lösch, Der werdende Gott. Mythopoetische Theogonien in der romantischen Mythologie (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996).
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gy the promise of a means whereby this spiritual dimension of existence might for the first time be rigorously investigated. In her recent book *The Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations*, Angela Ales Bello illustrated the extent to which explicitly religious and theological concerns motivated and guided Husserl’s research, and in her contribution to the present collection, “What is Life? The Contribution of Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein,” she demonstrates how these two students adopted their teacher’s concerns and adapted his phenomenological method in their investigations of, respectively, the sciences of life and the sciences of spirit. As Ales Bello explains, Conrad-Martius drew from Hans Driesch the concept of entelechy, which she then refined and elaborated phenomenologically, distinguishing between two sorts of entelechy one which governs the development of the organism throughout its life and another which establishes the identity, or the essence, of the actualised individual organism. While respecting the work of Bergson, she ultimately rejected his concept of the *élan vital*, for she regarded the idea of an autonomous, self-creative force to be untenable. Her investigations led her to identify God as the Being which, transcending all natural genera, sustains all that exists and lives. Ales Bello then turns to a discussion of how Edith Stein’s own concern with the nature and ground of life was reflected in her early investigation of the lived experience (*Erlebnis*) of empathy—the title of her doctoral dissertation was *Das Problem der Einfühlung* (*The Problem of Empathy*)—which she then proceeded to extend to the examination of our lived experience of community with others. In 1922 she published *Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*, in which she examined at length numerous forms of “living together” (*Zusammenleben*), describing community as a form to be distinguished from society and as based

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35 Our English term “spiritual” is a notoriously inadequate translation of the German “geistlich.” The German term applies equally to what we refer to in English as the domains of the spiritual, the mental and the psychological, and the essential ambiguity of the term often connotes a fundamental identity or affinity among them.


37 This was published in the *Jahrbuch*. It has been republished as *Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften – Eine Untersuchung über den Staat* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970) and translated by Marianne Sawicki and Mary Catherine Baseheart as *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (Washington: ICS Publications, 2000).
on empathy. Discussing some of the same topics dealt with by Ales Bello in another context, Timothy Martell, in “Edith Stein's Political Ontology,” examines the manner in which Stein's analyses of the Erlebnis, or “lived experience,” of community reveal how such experience may in fact be a creatively communal one. As Martell explains, Stein describes how the individual’s experience of community with others is in fact a shared—and indeed, intersubjectively constituted—Gemeinschaftserlebnis, a lived experience of a community that is itself constituted as the essence of the life of the individual community members themselves. Martell then proceeds to argue that the analyses Stein offers in her political ontology compare favourably with the views of John Searle, who wrote in 2005 that previous political philosophers had failed to address questions of ontology, then offered his own answers to "the more fundamental questions: 'What is a society in the first place?' and 'What sort of power is political power anyhow?'"

When Husserl left Göttingen for Freiburg in 1916, Ingarden was the only member of the Göttingen Circle to accompany him. Edith Stein followed them to Freiburg in the fall of 1916, and she served as Husserl’s assistant until Heidegger took over that role in 1919. Stein had been in Freiburg for not quite a year when Gerda Walther arrived to study under Husserl, having left Munich after studying with Pfaender for one year. (And Walther returned to Munich the following year to continue her studies with Pfaender.) As Husserl’s assistant, Stein taught numerous introductory courses in phenomenology—which she referred to as her “phenomenological Kindergarten” classes—and Walther was one of her first students. A spiritual orientation and deeply religious motivation is evident in the work of both thinkers. That Stein has been accepted into mainstream religion would be something of an

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38 For an excellent introduction to this work, see Antonio Calcagno, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), esp. Chapter 2, “Stein’s Phenomenology of Community: Individual and/or Superindividual?”


41 Heidegger had moved to Freiburg as a Gymnasium student in 1906; he completed his PhD under Heinrich Rickert at the University of Freiburg in 1913 and he habilitated there in 1915, whereupon he was appointed Privatdozent. He was appointed Professor Extraordinarius (Associate Professor) at the University of Marburg in 1923.
understatement: She was beatified as a martyr in 1987 and canonised as a saint in 1998. Walther, on the other hand, remains on the fringe of institutional and academic respectability, and this is doubtless due to her willingness to commit herself to the study of the still academically unrespectable areas of parapsychology and mysticism. Her *Phänomene- nologie der Mystik (Phenomenology of Mysticism)* appeared in 1923,[42] and it established the reputation for which she would achieve fame over the decades to come. In the same year, however, she also published *Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften* (in volume 6 of the *Jahrbuch*), and in this work we find a careful, detailed series of reflections that culminate in a novel interpretation of Husserl’s analyses of the passive synthesis of “communalization” (*Vergemeinschaftung*, the constitution of community). In “Gerda Walther: On the Possibility of a Passive Sense of Community and the Inner Time Consciousness of Community,” after briefly discussing Walther’s analyses of the passive structure of habit (*Gewohnheit*) and the lived experience of community, Antonio Calcagno suggests a manner in which we might employ Walther’s analyses in the construction of a new model of community based upon the analysis of communal inner time consciousness.

As the Göttingen Circle was destroyed by the outbreak of World War I, it is fitting that this collection conclude with a previously unpublished work of a member of the Göttingen Circle who remained a prisoner of that War from its outbreak to its conclusion. Winthrop Pickard Bell, a Canadian, studied under Husserl from 1911 to 1914, and those years of study afforded him the facility with Husserlian phenomenological procedure necessary for the construction of an outline of phenomenological sociology that promised to replace that being developed by Scheler. In his Editor’s Introduction to Bell’s essay “The Idea of a Nation,” which Bell presented as a lecture to his fellow prisoners at the Ruhleben prison camp, Ian Angus identifies the distinctly Canadian character of Bell’s thoughts on education, society and politics, and then illustrates how Husserlian phenomenology informed Bell’s analysis of the essence of a nation. For Bell, as Angus observes, “The nation is...a value-laden entity that confers value on objects in the surrounding world,” and while Bell did not explore the concept of value at any length in “The Idea of a Nation,” Angus recounts how Bell did present a brief phenomenological analysis of value in another

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[42] It was published by M. Niemeyer, in Halle; a second, revised edition was published by Verlag Otto Walter, in Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau in 1955. The work has not yet been translated into English. Gerda Walther died in January 1977, just a couple months shy of her 80th birthday.
lecture he presented at the prison camp around the same time (in 1915). In this lecture, titled “The Work of Philosophy,” Bell spoke of the shortcomings of both sensualistic and formal (e.g. Kantian) value theory, arguing that only the essential intuition provided in phenomenological investigation can provide a proper foundation for value theory. And in his “Ruhleben Notebooks on the Philosophy of Value,” as Angus also records, Bell established a connection between the nation, as a cultural unity embodying particular value-characters, and history, maintaining that history, if it is to be more than a mere “table of names and dates,” must always concern “processes of development in entities which are in part value-constituted.” As Angus rightly concludes: “It is this still under-developed focus on history through the phenomenology of value, based in the spiritual-cultural analyses of the Göttingen period of phenomenology, which justifies the attempt to restore Bell’s role in the history of phenomenology by bringing the archival manuscripts, beginning with this lecture, before the public.”

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43 Bell’s critique of formalism in ethics might also be compared with Scheler’s.