Taking Husserl at His Word: 
Towards a New Phenomenology with the Young Heidegger

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ABSTRACT: For Husserl, the natural attitude — and hence any further explication of it — is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theorization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’ phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).


Symposium, IV, 1 (2000), 89-115
The phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger are, we shall see, "worlds" apart. However, we will not appreciate the project of the young Heidegger without recognizing it as nevertheless indebted while at the same time radically critical of Husserl's phenomenology — as still a "phenomenology" but in an entirely "new" sense. In the phenomenology of the young Heidegger, we see a **radicalization** of Husserl which is a **Destruktion** in its most positive sense, taking up and critically repeating Husserl's project, but in a different manner (a conceptual/methodological issue), and upon a different field (a question of phenomenology's topic or *Sache*). As such, we discern even a certain continuity: picking-up where Husserl left off, or perhaps saying what Husserl left unsaid. After all, Heidegger confesses, while "Luther and exemplary Aristotle" were companions in his search, and Kierkegaard was an "impulse," it was Husserl who "opened my eyes" (GA 63 5). Appreciating this Husserlian horizon will open up a hermeneutic for reading Heidegger's project, from the first Freiburg period up to *Being and Time*, as a *phenomenology of the natural attitude*; in other words, Heidegger sets out to explicate (*auslegen*) precisely what Husserl bracketed: "the natural attitude." This, of course, is just the project left unattended in *Ideen I*; as Husserl remarks,

> we do not set for ourselves now the task of continuing the pure description [of the natural attitude] and raising it to the status of a systematically comprehensive characterization, exhausting the breadths and depths of what can be found as data accepted in the natural attitude [...]. Such a task can and must be fixed — as a scientific task; and it is an extraordinarily important one, even though barely seen up to now. It is not our task here. For us, who are striving toward the entrance-gate of phenomenology, everything needed along that line has already been done (Id 52/56).

The natural attitude — and hence any further explication of it — is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological *epoché* (Id §§31-32), which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere; as Husserl continues, "the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard" (Id 60/68).

The project of the young Heidegger, I would suggest, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so
"extraordinarily important" by Husserl. Thus Heidegger effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As he indicates even into Being and Time, the task of the Daseinanalytik "is not without difficulties. A need is contained in this task which has made philosophy uneasy for a long time, but philosophy fails again and again in fulfilling the task: the development of the idea of a 'natural concept of the world' [eines "natürlichen Weltbegriffes"] (SZ 52/47-48). The result of this relocation and revisioning of phenomenology—a redirecting of its "theoretical regard"—is a careful correlational analysis of the natural attitude (especially in SZ I.iii-iv).

However, as Heidegger notes, this is precisely where we run into "difficulties" (SZ 51-52/47-48). Bracketing the natural attitude and dealing only with cognitive perception makes things easy—then we are only dealing with the "sphere of the same," that is, with theoretical consciousness, putting that which is incommensurate out of play—viz., the irreducibility of pretheoretical, factual life. By focusing on theoretical consciousness, Husserl’s phenomenology traffics entirely within the realm of the conceptually commensurate; cognitive, perceptual, and theoretical consciousness lends itself easily to conceptual determination, whereas pretheoretical experience (facticity) does not fit the categories of conceptual, cognitive thought. Heidegger thus takes up a phenomenological analysis of the natural concept of the world, the world which is the "fund" of pretheoretical experience; but this is not to suggest that Heidegger is saying we should not break with the natural attitude in some way; in other words, there is still a reduction operative in Heidegger’s phenomenology. What Heidegger suggests is that the "Being" of the being of the natural attitude (Dasein) needs to be questioned, calling into question Husserl’s theoretization of the pretheoretical sphere. Husserl, on Heidegger’s account, effects a "cognitivization" of pretheoretical experience which reduces factual life to that of theoretical consciousness, resulting in a leveling of the dynamics of facticity to mere cognitive perception—a subject "knowing" an object. The challenge of phenomenology—that which challenges the very project of phenomenological description—is the world of pretheoretical experience which is other-wise than theoretical and hence cannot be reduced to theoretical conceptuality. It is in this turn to the natural attitude or pretheoretical life (in the sense of Lebensefarhrung) that we hit upon the problem of incommensurability, viz., the incommensurability of cognitive, theoretical thought and pretheoretical experience. When phenomenology, as a mode of theoretical description, attempts to sketch or describe pretheoretical factual life, phenomenology runs up against a wholly otherwise, a way of being which cannot be captured by theoretical
description or traditional concepts. Sebastian Luft suggests that Husserl himself was not attentive enough to the incommensurability of life in the natural attitude and its theoretical description, even though the thesis concerning the natural attitude is one of the “great themes of Husserl’s phenomenology” whose “dominance can be seen by the fact that it ultimately acquires a late recognition and restoration in the Crisis.” For “[i]f the natural attitude is, as the name suggests, a title for our everyday life, then speaking about it means we have, in one way or the other, already superseded its boundaries on a methodic level. [...] A description of the natural attitude will therefore nolens volens stand outside it, occupy or speak in a different attitude.” As Heidegger suggests, what we grope for here is a “grammar” (SZ 39/34) a way of “putting-into-words” the richness of experience which exceeds and transcends theoretical consciousness. There is a radical incommensurability between pretheoretical life — the life lived in the natural attitude — and the “concepts” of phenomenological description, an incommensurability which threatens the very task of a phenomenology of the natural attitude.

This relocation of phenomenology, then, is precisely the challenge of phenomenology: how will it be possible to give a theoretical description of pretheoretical experience, without thereby reducing the texture of lived experience to the stilled life of conceptual thought? Could there even be a phenomenology of the natural attitude? Here we see why Heidegger’s early project demanded such sustained methodological considerations: the very task of his phenomenology depended on finding a way to “put into words” the texture of everyday life. Thus, the challenge becomes one of “concept-formation” [Begriffsbildung] (SZ 39/34 and GA 59): Heidegger’s new phenomenology, with its different site, requires a fundamentally different conceptuality, a kind of “concept” (and an employment of concepts) which attempts to do justice to the otherness of pretheoretical experience, honoring the incommensurability of conceptual thought and lived experience. This method — or “way-of-putting-into-words” — will come to be described as formale Anzeige, the formal indication, which is a way of pointing to factual experience, giving a sketch of its world, without claiming to seize it in a rigid concept. The formal indication is a new concept, a new use of concepts which announces, signals, and points to that which exceeds and is other-than conceptual thought, where the gaze of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can no longer “see”; indeed, the formal indication, we might suggest, operates “in the blind.”

The task of this paper is to provide a sketch of the young Heidegger’s project as an explication of the natural concept of the world, or the facticity of Dasein. In order to do so, it will be necessary to explore the background or
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horizon in Husserl’s discussion of the world of the “natural attitude” (Ideen I), the “natural concept of the world” (Phenomenological Psychology), and the relation between the two (in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Erster Teil). This will then set the stage for considering Heidegger’s critique of the earlier Husserl and the need for a relocation of phenomenology to a different site and the corresponding demand for a new conceptuality, the formal indication.

I. Horizons: Husserl’s Phenomenological Worlds

a. The World of the Natural Attitude in Ideen I

With regard to Husserl’s understanding of the world of the natural attitude, the immediate horizon of Heidegger’s project from 1919-27 is limited to the First Book of Husserl’s Ideas, published in 1913, as well as his 1911 Logos essay, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft.” The most systematic development of the theme is found in the first chapter of Part Two of Ideas I, “The Positing Which Belongs to the Natural Attitude and its Exclusion” (Id §§27-32). In order to provide the horizon for Heidegger’s critique, in this section I will sketch the main lines of Husserl’s exposition.

a. Echoing Kant, Husserl begins by emphasizing that “Natural cognition begins with experience and remains within experience” (Id 7/5). What exactly “natural cognition” is, however, seems to be disregarded immediately, in order to consider “the theoretical attitude which we call the ‘natural’ <theoretical attitude>” (Id 7/5). This shift, in the first lines of the text, becomes decisive: the natural attitude to be considered is the natural attitude in what we might describe as its theoretical, or at least cognitive mode. In other words, I would suggest that it is important to recognize a duality of the natural attitude, even in Ideas I, which distinguishes between (1) “natural cognition” in the most originary, concrete sense of the natural attitude, and then (2) “sciences of the natural attitude,” which are a theoretical mode of the natural attitude and operate on the basis of a certain naivety insofar as they are not attentive to constitution. When Husserl turns to a more systematic consideration of the natural attitude in the next chapter, this first, originary level of the natural attitude has dropped from the scene, such that the exposition is more properly concerned with the world of the natural theoretical attitude (both, however, operate on the basis of a naivety regarding constitution). But even “natural cognition,” which is not theoretical, is still, for Husserl, natural cognition; in other words, for Husserl, the being of everyday life is a subject who cognitively grasps objects.
The way to phenomenology begins in the natural attitude, in which “I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it” (Id 48/51). I accept the world simply as it presents itself, as a world of things and animate beings, “human beings, let us say,” which are “there” for me in the immediacy of experience.

In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact, in relation to the world which remains one and the same, though changing with respect to the composition of its contents. It is continually “on hand” for me and I myself am a member of it. Moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world (Id 50/53).

These things are given, however, against the background of a “horizon” which makes their presentation possible and in which things become illuminated (Id 49/52). The horizon and objects which appear within it constitute my “surrounding world” or environment (Id 50-51/53-55).

While emphasizing that the natural attitude is “a ‘knowing of [the world]’ which involves no conceptual thinking” (Id 49/52) — indeed a “givenness...prior to any ‘theory’” (Id 52/56), nevertheless in the natural theoretical attitude, according to Husserl, the world presents itself primarily as a thing to be perceived. In other words, from the beginning we see a privileging of a cognitive construal of the natural attitude, such that the way in which I am in the world is primarily as a “conscious” subject (Id 48/51) — “embraced by the one Cartesian expression, cogito” (Id 50/54). And while the “world” of the natural attitude is “the natural world” — the “world of ‘real actuality’” (Id 51/54) — it nevertheless is construed as a world of objects. In Husserl’s sketch of the natural attitude, which he leaves at this point, ‘I’ live as a conscious subject encountering objects to be perceived. Any further analysis of this attitude, though “extraordinarily important,” is not the task of Husserl’s phenomenology (Id 52/56).

In fact, the “meditations” (Id 48/51) on the natural attitude are undertaken only to indicate the attitude which will be “excluded” or “bracketed” by the phenomenological epoché (Id §§31-32). “Instead of remaining in this attitude,” Husserl remarks, “we propose to alter it radically” (Id 53/57). The positing of the natural attitude, whereby the world is “accepted” as it presents
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itself, is “put out of play,” not in the sense of a denial or negation, but in the sense that “we make ‘no use’ of it” (Id 54-55/59). The purpose of this bracketing or phenomenological epoche is “to discover a new scientific domain” (Id 56/60); that is, this epoche discloses a field which will now become the site for phenomenological analysis. As such, Husserl’s phenomenology brackets “the whole natural world which is continually ‘there for us,’ ‘on hand,’ and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an ‘actuality’ even if we choose to parenthesize it” (Id 56/61). The epoche, Husserl always emphasizes, does not skeptically question the existence of the natural world (Id 56/61); rather, it simply means that the world of the natural attitude will “disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68; cf. 52/56).

Where, then, is the “theoretical regard” of phenomenology directed? To this new domain or “Object-province”, the field of the ego as “pure consciousness” which, as intentional, also includes its “pure ‘correlates of consciousness’” (Id 58/64). So then, rather than directing our gaze (cp. French regard16) toward the world of ordinary, worldly experience, “we shall...keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of consciousness” (Id 58-59/65) which now becomes “the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology” (Id 59/66). The task of phenomenology is an analysis of the phenomenological ego, comprised of noema and noeses which are, properly speaking, irreal and therefore do not exceed or transcend theoretical (i.e., phenomenological) description; rather, they are wholly commensurate with it. By effecting the phenomenological epoche, Husserl makes things easy, reduces the field to a sphere of sameness without being challenged by the transcendence of the world of the natural attitude and thereby bracketing that which exceeds experience. In other words, as Lévinas and Marion have argued, it would seem that what appears (the phenomenon) is always already playing the game by the rule of the cognitive, constituting ego.17

b. The Natural Concept of the World in Phenomenological Psychology (1925)

It is important to recall here that our consideration of Husserl’s exposition of the natural attitude has been undertaken in order to sketch the horizon for Heidegger’s project as a phenomenology of the natural attitude. One of the indications for this is found in Being and Time (noted above) where Heidegger suggests that the task of the analysis of Dasein is “the working out of the idea of a ‘natural concept of the world [eines “natürlichen Weltbegriffes”]’” (SZ 52). However, the natürlichen Weltbegriff is not discussed in the early section of Ideas I, whose focus is rather the natürlichen Einstellung, the natural attitude.18 Why, then, would we suggest that the task
Heidegger has set for himself would be linked to Husserl’s discussion of the natural attitude?

As we will consider momentarily, Husserl discusses the “natural concept of the world” most thematically in his 1925 lectures *Phenomenological Psychology* (§§10-11). However, the link between the “natural attitude” and the “natural concept of the world” is established much earlier, in 1910/11 lectures on the “Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” the first chapter of which is devoted to “Die natürliche Einstellung und der ‘natürliche Weltbegriff.’”19 There he indicates their relation, calling for “philosophical interest in the higher dignity of a complete and general description of the so-called natural concept of the world, that of the natural attitude.”20 The natural concept of the world is the concept included in the natural attitude which is “the pervasive attitude which pertains distinctively to the natural concept of the world.”21 Thus the “natural concept of the world” is the way in which the world is understood or constituted in the natural attitude.

In the lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology*, Husserl returns to this prescientific experiential world in order to trace the origins of scientific concepts such as “nature” and “mind”22 — concepts which do not exist beforehand but “are formed only within a theoretical interest” (Ps 55/40). In this way, the world of pretheoretical experience is taken to be the “origin” and “substratum” of theoretical articulation; we are returning from scientific concepts such as “nature” and “mind” back to “the world which precedes all sciences and their theoretical intentions, as a world of pre-scientific intuition, indeed as a world of actual living which includes world-experiencing and world-theorizing life” (Ps 56/41).23 “It is taken for granted,” then, “that we are remaining in the natural attitude” (Ps 56/41) where we accept the world as it gives itself, as existing actuality.

Husserl recognizes that there is a sense in which “our opinions which stem from our theoretical or practical activities clothe our experience over, or clothe its sense with new layers of sense” such that what passes for simple experience of the world, upon closer inspection shows itself to be sedimented with “previous mental activities;”24 thus, “it is questionable whether an actually pre-theoretical world can ever be found in pure experience,25 free from sense-sediments of previous thinking” (Ps 56/41). However, even most of these sediments, Husserl argues, can be traced to actual, originary experience. Having noted this sedimentation, then, we may still retain a fundamental distinction between pretheoretical and theoretical experience; that is, the contrast between “[1] what gives itself to us in each case as immediately perceived, as passively experienced, as existing bodily, which we grasp by merely looking at it itself, and [2] as its opposite, the thinking which we exercise upon it and the thoughts which are formed concerning these things,
thoughts which may very well cling to them afterwards and present themselves in subsequent experience as belonging to the experienced thing itself” (Ps 57/42). The world of originary experience ([1]) is always there for us and, despite changes in itself and our apprehensions, is always “one and the same world.” It is the “raw material” for later reflection, the origin of all sciences of the world, “the final substrata of all thought and of all other ideal formations which grow out of mental activity” (Ps 58/43). Any assertions or predicative determinations concerning this world or objects drawn from it are “theoretical formations, existing in the realm of the irreal,” though they concern this pretheoretical world. Here, we seem very close to just what the young Heidegger was pursuing.

The radicality of this return to the world of pretheoretical experience seems to be curbed or dulled in two ways, however. First, when Husserl turns to a closer consideration of the experiential (i.e., pretheoretical) world, it becomes a question of perception: “In perception, the perceived gives itself as quite immediate and as itself presently existing;” in lived experience things appear “without any contribution from us” (Ps 58/43). This originary experience, then, is characterized by a fundamental passivity, though there is a sense in which (passive) perception can be more attentive, implying a certain kind of “activity.” In this mode of “actively accomplishing perception,” “we direct our attention to such and such objects of our perceptual field, grasp them and progressively take cognizance of them.” However, this is to be distinguished from “all naming, predicating, theorizing activity, as well as any other activity which would burden the experiential object with any novel sense” — that is, activities where the perceiving ego would contribute something (Ps 59/43). But while Husserl distinguishes pretheoretical and theoretical experience, emphasizing the integrity of the experiential world, he nevertheless always tends to reduce this experience to one of perception, which still seems to betray a privileging of theoretical consciousness.

The second way in which the radicality of the turn to pretheoretical experience is deflected is in Husserl’s search for essences; that is, the so-called return to pretheoretical experience is only a means to disclosing the apriori structures of the experiential world by means of “intuitive universalization” (or imaginative variation). For if the sciences find their origin in the experiential world, then their distinctions must be grounded by tracing them back to this world (Ps 64/47); that is, “every particular scientific province must lead us back to a province in the original experiential world.” If this world has a certain universal apriori structure and forms (e.g., space, time), “then an all-inclusive science which refers to this all-inclusive world structure...would have to grow up” (Ps 64/48). Thus, “we must ask what can be asserted of the world quite universally in its total consideration, purely as
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a world of simple experience, whenever and wherever we consider experience as experience of a world;” that is, what are the formal structures of the experiential world? To achieve this description, we must refer back to intuition, which requires an immersion in experience of this world; look at it intently; and then determine what carries the weight of universality within our experience. This will require bringing “empty horizons to intuition” either by means of further experience or imaginative variation. We then “lift out just that universal feature which...will presumably remain for every arbitrary transformation of experience into possible experiences.” This process will yield universal properties which are common to all inner-worldly realities without exception (Ps 66-68/49-50). For instance, no matter what variations we imagine, if it is to be a “world,” it must be structured by space, time, the law of causality, etc.; for example, the world can never be non-spatial. It is just the task of a science of the natural concept of the world to disclose these essential, a priori structures.

Far from being a consideration of the particular or singular events of pretheoretical experience, Husserl’s phenomenology quickly makes its way back to the comfortable a priori world of the Eidos, seeking, in fact, to put out of play the facticity which characterizes pretheoretical life. This, then, is just what Husserl means by a “natural concept of the world”: “the invariant essence of the already given world of very possible experienceable world” (Ps 70/52). Thus the natural concept of the world is an essential world, the essential structures of the experiential world disclosed by ideation.

II. Critique: Heidegger’s Factual World

a. Relocating Phenomenology: Explicating the Natural Attitude

α. While being ultimately ontological in its aims, on its way to this end — and as part of its very method of explication — Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit seeks to raise the question of being by unpacking Dasein’s preunderstanding of being which it always already possesses. In other words, the very question of being proceeds from a prior, “average, everyday understanding of being” as its presupposition; thus, rather than seeking to eliminate all presuppositions as Husserl, Heidegger’s task is an explication of those presuppositions in order to raise the question of being (SZ § 2). Heidegger understands this to be an “elucidation” (SZ 6/4) of an “understanding” (Verständnis) which is more primordial or elemental than “knowing”: “We do not know [wissen] what ‘being’ means. But already when we ask, ‘What is being?’ we stand in an understanding [Verständnis] of the ‘is’ without being able to determine conceptually what the ‘is’ means” (SZ 5/4). This understanding, then, is more primordial than theoretical or cognitive knowing;
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it is a kind of “knowing” which “cannot be fixed conceptually” (ohne daß wir begrifflich fixieren könnten) precisely because it is prethematic, which is precisely why its phenomenological elucidation (Auslegung) is so difficult. This difficulty — the difficulty of philosophy, raising the question of the very possibility of philosophy — this difficulty, I am arguing, is traced to the incommensurability of conceptual determination (begrifflich fixieren) with pretheoretical “life.”

And is not this difficult task precisely that described later as “the development of the idea of a ‘natural concept of the world’” (SZ 52/48)? It seems to be the case; thus we find Heidegger’s project in Sein und Zeit to be an elucidation of that which Husserl put out of play — the being of the Being of Dasein as a being-in-the-world, prior to any theoretical articulation of subject and object. The “one basic issue” which distinguishes Husserl and Heidegger, István Fehér remarks, is “the delimitation of the specific field of research of phenomenological philosophy itself, in other words, the self-concretization of phenomenological philosophy out of its initial principle or maxim. The basic issue is whether and how phenomenology gets access to and comes to delimit its own field of research, [and] whether the procedure thereby employed is phenomenologically coherent or not.” 30 At stake, then, is the very “field” of phenomenology and a “method” which correlates with that field. As Heidegger learned from Aristotle, the method must fit the topic. 31

This core project of the Daseinanalytik is the result of a trajectory established much earlier in Heidegger’s work, dating back to key breakthroughs in his first tenure at Freiburg from 1919 to 1923. Indeed, the rigorous methodological reflections which were the focus of the young Heidegger are largely submerged in the “final draft” (Kisiel) of Sein und Zeit. 32 Thus, we can better appreciate Heidegger’s critique and revisioning of phenomenology in the earlier lecture courses and extant publications in which he effects a relocation of phenomenology. Here he grapples with the question of how it will be possible to conceptually describe “factual life experience” (faktische Lebenserfahrung), a mode of being-in-the-world which is radically incommensurate with theoretical description. Heidegger’s answer to the question is found in the methodological strategy of “formal indication” (formale Anzeige), first sketched in his “breakthrough” 33 semester of 1919 in which he develops his own unique answer to the question, “What is philosophy?”

In the 1919 course on “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews” (GA 56), Heidegger engages the neo-Kantianism of his day (and his former teachers) via an inquiry into the nature of philosophy as science, seeking to answer Husserl’s call to philosophy as “strict science” in a more radical sense. 34 While both neo-Kantianism and phenomenology seek to disclose the nature of philosophy as science, even as originary science
Heidegger seeks to demonstrate that they diverge inasmuch as they have radically different starting points (Ausgangspünkte). Heidegger effects a fundamental difference between philosophy and the other sciences by defining it as a pre-theoretical originary science—Urwissenschaft als vor-theoretische Wissenschaft (GA 56/57 95). And that, he argues, is phenomenology. So what are we to make of this proposal for a “pre-theoretical originary science?” Is this a science which is itself pretheoretical? Or is it a science of the pretheoretical? The genitive, we will discover, is somewhat ambiguous.

The question is opened by a displacement of the phenomenological gaze from theoretical consciousness (Husserl’s focus) to what Heidegger variously describes as Leben (in his more Diltheyan moments), Faktizität, and most fully, faktische Lebenserfahrung. In factical experience, we do not find the encounter between a subject and an object — which is a derivative experience found in theoretical consciousness. Rather, factical experience is characterized by a certain immediacy such that the subject is not yet rigidly distinguished from the object, but rather finds itself imbedded in its world, its environment (GA 56 73-75). “I” am imbedded in “life,” and any distillation of “I” or the “world” as distinct components is always already a derivative mode of being-in-the-world. Now, it is certainly possible for pretheoretical life itself to become impacted and shaped by theoretical consciousness, such that theoretical constructs become “sedimented” in everyday experience (as Husserl later recognized in the Krisis). Thus, one of the tasks of Heidegger’s new phenomenology will be a Destruktion which (as much as is possible) takes us back to a non-theoretized experience — back, that is, to “the things themselves.” What he is trying to do is restore the autonomy and primacy of pretheoretical, factical life in relation to theoretical, cognitive consciousness. It is a matter of liberating facticity from the strictures of a cognitivization and exploring it as it is, on its own terms.

But here we are confronted with the methodological problem: how will it be possible to philosophically (i.e., theoretically) consider pretheoretical, factical experience “on its own terms” with the tools of conceptual description? In other words, is a philosophy of factical life at all possible? Indeed this raises the question of philosophy itself: can factical, pretheoretical life be apprehended by the theoretical attitude? Can we have a “concept” of “life?” Would this not be imposing something foreign upon facticity, requiring it to speak in terms other than its own? This is why the question of “philosophical concept formation” is not an ancillary question, but an issue at the heart of philosophy, for it is a question about the possibility of philosophy itself (GA 59 §1).

The problem with Husserl’s phenomenology, as Heidegger (rightly) sees it, is that Husserl “objectifies” and “theoretizes” pretheoretical experience,
reducing factical experience to a form of perception, and failing to appreciate both the primacy and uniqueness of a pre-perceptual being-in-the-world (GA 56 91). The challenge, then, is to develop a phenomenological method which does not engage in such objectification or theoretization of factical life. For theoretical description tends to treat life as an “object,” stilling its flux and leveling its dynamism by conceiving it in terms of cognitive determination. But for Heidegger, the topic of phenomenology — “life” or the “experienceable as such” (GA 56 115) — is not, properly speaking, an “object.” To consider it as such is already a fundamental violation of its being, which is other-wise than theoretical. Thus the question, as Kisiel summarizes, is:

How is the non-objectifiable subject matter of phenomenology to be even approached without already theoretically inflicting an objectification upon it? How are we to go along with life reflectively without deliving it? For reflection itself already exercises an analytically dissective and dissolving effect upon the life stream, acting as a theoretical intrusion which interrupts the life stream and cuts it off.\[38\]

It would seem that the relocating of phenomenology’s topic to the site of factical life would also signal the death of philosophy — its limit and impossibility.

Let us recall our project and concern here by understanding Heidegger’s methodological challenge in terms I have suggested previously: the difficulty for a phenomenological analysis of factical life lies in the fact that faktische Lebenserfahrung (as pretheoretical) is incommensurate with the strictures of theoretical concepts which are employed to define and determine its “essence.” While the concept traffics on the high road of universality, factical experience is lowly and singular; while the concept is abstract and schematic, “life” is concrete, rich, and dynamic; while the concept is detached and aloof, factical life is engaged and involved; while the concept is a product of theoria, experience is a matter of praxis.\[39\] In other words, factical life is other-wise than theoretical and therefore resists and exceeds conceptualization — and to objectify it is to submit it to the conditions of theoretical thought, thereby violating its autonomy. Here it is important to appreciate the way in which the young Heidegger’s concerns in fact anticipate (influence?) Lévinas’ own critique of phenomenology: by subjecting the other to “a third term,” the concept violates its alterity, forcing it to appear in terms of the constituting ego, rather than on its own terms. The tool of philosophy — the concept — is in fact a weapon of domination.\[40\]
Or as he describes in the context of the Jaspers review, the phenomenon can be subsumed under philosophy's "technique:"

When objects are approached by way of a specifically oriented mode of apprehension, and when this mode of apprehension is, whether explicitly or not, understood and used as a technique, i.e., basically as a means of defining these objects that is not, however, restricted to them, it might turn out that these objects become lost for good by being forced to conform to a particular type of apprehension that is alien to them (JPW 8-9).

This then constitutes the heart of his critique of Jaspers, who objectifies "life" and treats it as "a thing-like object" (JPW 9) based on submerged preconceptions and the technique employed. Behind Jaspers method is an assumption that "life" is something which can be grasped in its totality, as a result, "[e]very attempt to understand life is forced to turn the surge and flux of the aforementioned process into a static concept and thereby destroy the essence of life, i.e., the restlessness and movement [...] that characterize life's actualization of its ownmost qualities" (JPW 16). In particular, Jaspers's "technique" imposes an assumption upon factic life which is in fact foreign to it, viz., that the subject-object split is primordial (JPW 17-19) — which for Heidegger is a perfect example of the way in which philosophy imposes theoretical constructions upon factical lived experience, conceptualizing that which is pre-conceptual.

But if the tools of philosophy are concepts, and concepts violate the otherness of factical lived experience, would that not mean that a philosophy of factical life is impossible? The problem can even take on syllogistic form:

\[
P_1 \text{ Philosophy employs concepts to describe and define its topic.} \\
P_2 \text{ Concepts violate the nontheoretical character of factical life.} \\
C \text{ Therefore, there cannot be a philosophy of factical life.}
\]

Heidegger, however, challenges the argument and takes on the problem by questioning whether we must employ "concepts" in a philosophy of factical life. Or rather, must we employ traditional, objectifying concepts which reduce factical life to a leveled cognition, or could there be a "new" concept, a different kind of non-objectifying concept which could be employed? Since philosophy must remain in some sense reflective (requiring a reduction), Heidegger does not as much challenge \( P_1 \) as he does \( P_2 \); that concepts are inherently objectifying. At stake in the answer to this question is, on his account, the very possibility of philosophy. And as he goes on to show, this
is primarily a problem of language — a matter of finding a non-objectifying language and conceptuality.

b. A Logic of the Heart and a Critique of the Primacy of Theoretical Consciousness

And so we hit upon the heart of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl: like the dominant tradition in philosophy, phenomenology remains implicated in a privileging of theoretical consciousness which construes human being-in-the-world in terms of cognitive models, such that “everyday” experience is painted with a theoretical brush, denying the richness thereof. In Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger contends, the self’s being-in-the-world is always already taken to be a modality of (cognitive) knowledge (Wissen, Erkenntnis), especially perception, as considered above in Ideas I and Phenomenological Psychology. “The phenomenon of being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar — knowing the world (Welterkennen)” (SZ 59/55). As a result of this primacy of theoretical consciousness, “knowing has been given this priority,” reducing factual being-in-the-world to mere cognition — and thereby reducing the self to a “subject” and the world to an “object.” Heidegger’s project, in contrast, is to explicate a more originary way of being-in-the-world, to elucidate an understanding which is precognitive, pretheoretical, and prethematic. This he describes as “understanding” (Verstehen) — which in fact founds “knowing” or cognition; in other words, Husserl provided a phenomenological analysis of a derivative way of being-in-the-world, viz., perception, which is itself grounded in understanding (Verstehen, SZ §31), as “being-in-the-world” (SZ 61/57). “Knowing,” he concludes, “is a mode of Da-sein which is founded in being-in-the-world. Thus, being-in-the-world, as a fundamental constitution, requires a prior interpretation” (SZ 62/58).

It is here that we hit upon one of the Augustinian motifs in the work of the young Heidegger, noted as such in the lecture course of summer semester 1925 (GA 20). Engaged in an exposition of Husserl’s account of intentionality,42 Heidegger criticizes his mentor for construing the intentional relation as primarily cognitive and thus understanding Dasein’s relation to its world primarily as one of knowing (GA 20 160). But this privileging of the cognitive is nothing new: “The priority which has always been granted to cognitive comportment from ancient times is at the same time associated with the peculiar tendency to define the being of the world in which Dasein is primarily in terms of how it shows itself for a cognitive comportment” (GA 20 163). In this way, the relation between Dasein and its world is reduced to the relation between a subject and an object — “a relation between two entities which are on hand [vorhanden]” (GA 20 160). But this, according to
Heidegger, is to construe as primordial that which is in fact derivative. It is not
the case that in “knowing” Dasein first establishes a relation to the world, nor
is such a relation “first ‘produced’ by a cognitive performance” (GA 20 162).
Rather, “knowing” in the cognitive sense is possible only because Dasein is
always already involved with a world, related to it more primordially. Instead
of founding, cognitive knowing is founded in a non-cognitive, pre-theoretical
mode of being in the world. As such, “[k]nowing is nothing but a mode of
being-in-the-world; specifically, it is not even a primary but a founded way of
being-in-the-world, a way which is always possible only on the basis of a
non-cognitive comportment” (GA 20 164). This non-cognitive relation to the
world, labeled Verstehen in SZ, is the condition of possibility for (cognitive)
“knowing” (erkenne). What Husserl’s phenomenology provides, he
suggests, is a close analysis of cognitive perception which, as far as it goes,
Heidegger does not question. But what Husserl failed to appreciate was the
being of Dasein — that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is primarily a matter of the
heart.

This is why Heidegger suggests that his own disclosure of the
primordiality of Dasein’s non-cognitive relation to the world is also not really
anything new: it is simply “the ontological fundament for what Augustine and
above all Pascal already noted” (GA 20 165) — a “logic of the heart” (PIA 369).
Attentive to a more primordial mode of being-in-the-world, “[t]hey called that
which actually knows not knowing but love and hate” (GA 20 165). In other
words, for Augustine, intentionality is not primarily cognitive, but rather
erotic, or at least affective. The “world” is constituted not by cognitive
perception, but as that which is “loved” — either rightly (caritas) or wrongly
(cupiditas), for we must not forget that there is a “right order of love.”
(DC 1.27.28). Invoking an Augustine of existential lineage, in SZ Heidegger
includes Scheler along with Augustine and Pascal in his development of the
analysis of Befindlichkeit, which involves a disclosure more primordial than
knowing. Indeed, “the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition fall
far short of the primordial disclosure of moods” (SZ 134/127) since “mood as
a primordial kind of being of Dasein [is that] in which it is disclosed to itself
before all cognition and willing and beyond their scope of disclosure” (SZ
136/128).

Heidegger’s account is, by his own confession, a repetition of an
Augustinian theme, one also taken up in Pascal. Dasein’s heart, Pascal would
tell us, has reasons of which reason knows nothing. Following the lead of
Jansenius, author of (the heretical) Augustinus, Pascal points to an irreducible
(even paradoxical) heart-knowledge which cannot be reduced to the registers
of reason since it is a kind of “knowing” which is felt rather than deduced.
“We know the truth not only by means of reason,” he argues, “but also by
means of the heart. It is through the heart that we know the first principles,
and reason which has no part in this knowledge vainly tries to contest them." And in the same way that Heidegger argues that Verstehen finds Erkenntnis, so Pascal argues that those “first principles” which we know by heart are the condition of possibility for that which we know by reason, for “it is on this knowledge by means of the heart and instinct that reason has to rely, and must base all its argument.” As a result, reason is characterized by a certain “powerlessness” which “ought to be used only to humble reason.”

The same Augustinian insight is repeated, as Heidegger suggests, in Scheler, particularly the seminal essay “Ordo Amoris.” There, Scheler locates the “being” of the self in the heart — the ordo amoris (“order of love”) which indicates the values-complex of the individual. And it is in this logic of the heart that the self is unveiled, for “[w]hoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man himself. […] He sees before him the constantly simple and basic lines of his heart running beneath all his empirical many-sidedness and complexity. And heart deserves to be called the core of man as a spiritual being much more than knowing and willing do.” This “value structure” — the ordo amoris — constitutes the preunderstanding of the self which shapes its “environment” and so constitutes its world in a most primordial sense. And so before “knowing” the world, Dasein has already affectively constituted the world as an object of love (or hate): “The goods along the route of a man’s life, the practical things, the resistances to willing and acting against which he sets his will, are from the very first always inspected and ‘sighted,’ as it were, by the particular selective mechanism of his ordo amoris.” This is what Heidegger will later describe as Dasein’s preunderstanding and the prior (affective) interpretation of the world.

What makes Heidegger’s task so difficult is that by committing himself to an elucidation of the pre-theoretical, non-cognitive mode of being-in-the-world of Dasein, his phenomenology is really attempting to disclose a paradoxical logic of the heart — to theoretically describe how Dasein pretheoretically discloses its world (GA 20 162). It is this “prior interpretation” (SZ 62/58) of being-in-the-world which Heidegger takes up in SZ I.3, providing what we might describe as a correlational analysis of the natural attitude — a being in the world which is more primordial than cognitive perception. Here, “the nearest kind of association [Umgang] is not mere perceptual cognition [contra Husserl], but rather, a handling, a using, a taking care of things which has its own kind of ‘knowledge’” (SZ 67/63). The intentionality of perception, privileged in Husserl’s phenomenology, is founded in care (Besorgen), a more originary meaning of the world whereby the world is not constituted as a collection of objects to be perceived, but as things (pragmata) to be used within an environment (SZ 68/64). Indeed, for a thing to be perceived as an “object,” there must be a certain breakdown within one’s environment; that is, what phenomenology has taken as the exemplary relation to the world is in
a certain sense abnormal: “When we just look at things ‘theoretically,’ we lack an understanding of handiness” (SZ 69/65).

This question of the theoretical attitude is significant, I think, since what is at stake here is the possibility of philosophy — which is theoretical in a certain sense; that is, philosophical descriptions must be somewhat reflective. But there is also a sense in which I would say that the theoretical attitude is in a way unnatural, a modification of and abstraction from everyday naïve experience. Or as Kovacs puts it, “the theoretical attitude is not the rule but the exception in living.” Thus, when Heidegger traces the genealogy of the theoretical attitude, we find that “science” or theory is a derivative mode of being-in-the-world (SZ 357/327): “circumspect taking care of things at hand changes over into the investigation of things objectively present found in the world.” The “change-over” from the natural to the theoretical attitude is not a move from praxis to theory (since science itself is a praxis), but rather a changing of the horizon upon-which one projects beings, such that the tool in circumspection is now thematized as an “object” with properties to be analyzed (SZ 361-363/330-332). A change of attitude is effected by transforming the “understanding of being” which functions as the horizon against which things appear; thus, the object “shows itself differently” when that horizon is modified. The world is opened or “released” in a new way. However, this is only possible as a transformation of a previous understanding of being, a modification of being-in-the-world (SZ.364/332-333).

It is important for us to appreciate here the derivative character of the theoretical attitude — which, Heidegger contends, is precisely that which Husserl, for the most part, was concerned. More generally, by privileging cognitive perception as primordial, we might suggest that Husserl effected a certain theoreticization of the intentional relation. While a phenomenological analysis of theoretical consciousness and cognitive perception is certainly possible (as in Husserl), it fails to sketch the being of “life” in its fullness, insofar as the “reduction” reduces the field to only perceptual consciousness. In this way, phenomenological description is concerned only with the “same,” with a field which is completely commensurate with theoretical description. Husserl’s bracketing of the natural attitude effects what the young Lévinas (following the early Heidegger) described as a “neutralization” of life:

But by virtue of the primacy of theory, Husserl does not wonder how this “neutralization” of our life, which nevertheless is still an act of our life, has its foundation in life. [...] Consequently, despite the revolutionary character of the phenomenological reduction, the revolution which it
accomplishes is, in Husserl’s philosophy, possible only to the extent that the natural attitude is [construed as] theoretical.\textsuperscript{54}

Phenomenology, so long as it is concerned only with a theoreticized experience, a cognitive consciousness, is not challenged by anything other than itself, by anything different. It is only when phenomenology seeks to elucidate the excessiveness and irreducibility of pretheoretical “life” that it is confronted by the problem of the incommensurability between pretheoretical experience and theoretical description. Since that is precisely the project taken up the young Heidegger, we must consider how such a phenomenology will be possible. For have we not run up against the limits of phenomenology, even philosophy? Could there be a philosophical description of precognitive experience? What could be said?\textsuperscript{55}
Abbreviations

The following works are frequently cited and abbreviated in the text as indicated.


2. Earlier, Hubert Dreyfus and John Haugeland suggested a similar heuristic, in “Husserl and Heidegger: Philosophy’s Last Stand,” in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Michael Murray, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, p. 222-238. While my reading has received an impetus from their interpretation, I would suggest that Dreyfus and Haugeland’s analysis is lacking in two ways: (1) they fail to problematize the relation between the “natural attitude” of *Ideen* I and the “natural concept of the world” which Heidegger refers to in SZ, p. 52; (2) they too quickly equate Husserl’s natural attitude with Heidegger’s “everydayness.” This should not be considered a rejection of their thesis, but only an attempt to follow it up with more careful analyses.

3. Merleau-Ponty suggests the same in his Preface to *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. vii-viii, where he remarks that “the whole of *Sein und Zeit* springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the ‘natürlicher Weltbegriff’ or the ‘Lebenswelt’ which Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified as the central theme of phenomenology.” Whether this task is taken up by Husserl later (e.g., in the *Krisis*), will be briefly considered below.

4. In Husserl’s own marginal comments dating from ca. 1929 (post *Sein und Zeit*), here he notes “Heidegger says the opposite.” This must refer only to the final clause: that the task “has been barely seen up to now.” As we will see below, Heidegger considered this to be a “task which has made philosophy uneasy for a long time” (SZ 52/48).

5. By referring to “pretheoretical experience,” neither I nor Heidegger mean to suggest some kind of “pure,” uninterpreted experience; rather, it refers to a more fundamental, *non-cognitive* mode of being-in-the-world which is not representational, but rather what we might describe as “affective.” The Pascalian insight that “the heart has reasons of which reason knows nothing” captures the notion well (and indeed, Pascal was an influence on the young Heidegger). My thanks to Amos Yong for pushing me to articulate these matters more clearly.

6. The issue of continuity and connection between Husserl’s notions of the “natural attitude” (*die natürliche Einstellung*) and the “natural concept of the world” (*der natürliche Weltbegriff*) will be considered below.
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7 Difficulties which, we will see below, Husserl himself came to appreciate (see *Krisis* IIIA). See also John Scanlon, “Husserl’s *Ideas* and the Natural Concept of the World,” in *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*, ed. Robert Sokolowski, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1988, p. 223.

8 Not a “wholly other” in the sense of Lévinas’ “Other” or Marion’s “God,” but rather an incommensurable.

9 See Luft, “Husserl’s Phenomenological Discovering of the Natural Attitude,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 31 (1998), p. 153-154. It is just these matters, I am suggesting, that were the central focus of the young Heidegger’s methodological considerations.


11 Heidegger, of course, was deeply affected by the earlier *Logical Investigations*, particularly the development of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation. However, with regards to the question of the world of pretheoretical experience, the *Logical Investigations* do not play a significant role for Heidegger’s project.

12 John Scanlon also suggests that “we can discern essentially different attitudes within the overall natural attitude”: the first would be the concrete experience of the interested, involved participant (what I have linked to “natural cognition”); the second is a disinterested, theoretical attitude. Scanlon points to *Ideas* II for the further development of this distinction. See Scanlon, “Husserl’s *Ideas* and the Natural Concept of the World,” p. 229-231. Notice, however, that already the more primordial mode is described as *cognition*.

13 This privileging of perception is seen already at Id 7/5: “the <natural> experience that is presentive of something *originarily is perception*.”

14 That is, the objects of the natural world of real actuality, as opposed to the irreal world of, e.g., pure numbers, which I am ‘in’ only in the “arithmetical attitude” (Id 51/54). The natural world, however, is *always* there for me “as long as I go on living naturally.”

15 As John Scanlon perceptively asks at this point, “What has happened to the friend reaching out to shake my hand? [cf. Id 48/51]” Scanlon, “Husserl’s *Ideas.***’, p. 228.

16 At stake here is a whole thematics of the “gaze”, of theoretical “regard” (Rücksicht), and the matter of “seeing” (criticized by Foucault’s “archaeology of the medical gaze [regard]” in *Birth of the Clinic*). By effecting the phenomenological reduction, Husserl’s phenomenology reduces its “world” to what phenomenology can see. What Heidegger is
interested in, I would suggest, is how one gives an account of what cannot be seen so clearly, what lies beyond sight, where the theoretical gaze/regard can no longer penetrate. Here one would proceed not by sight, but by a certain faith, entrusting oneself to the wholly-other-than-phenomenological-sight, viz., factual life. One could then read Derrida’s *Memoirs of the Blind* as a critique of the phenomenological gaze, pointing out its “blind spots,” which are structurally invisible, can never appear as phenomena. See esp. *Memoirs*, p. 51-54.


18 The phrase “natural concept of the world” is in quotation marks in SZ; thus, it seems clear that Heidegger has a specific source in mind, though no reference is given, nor is one provided in the GA edition. At issue here is just what the reference would be. My suggestion is that, though Heidegger refers to the *natürlichen Weltbegriff*, he seems to be aiming much more at the *natürlichen Einstellung* of *Ideen I*. He does tell us that he had access to Husserl’s unpublished materials (SZ, Int.II, n. 5 and I.I, n. 2); however, given the fact that he would already be in Marburg, it seems unlikely that Heidegger would be familiar with the 1925 lectures.


22 The task of this lecture course is the development of a phenomenological psychology, thus Husserl emphasizes the role of the “mental” and is most interested in provided something of a genealogy for the psychological concept of “mind.”

23 Anthony Steinbock, in *Home and Beyond*, describes this as Husserl’s “regressive” procedure, as opposed to the “progressive” procedure of the later *Krisis*.

24 Cp. Husserl’s analyses in Part II of *Krisis* which consider just such a theoreticization of experience after Galileo.

25 Cp. here his earlier engagement with Avenarius’s critique of “pure experience” in *Hua*. XIII, 1910/11, Nr. 6, § 10, p. 131ff.

26 The method is unpacked in *Phenomenological Psychology*, §§8-9. I would argue (but cannot do so here) that Heidegger’s formal indication, once
filtered through a (Kantian) transcendental turn in Marburg, begins to effect the same operation, whereas in its earlier moments, the strategy of formal indication would only disclose what we might describe, following Foucault, as “historical aprioris.”

27 Ibid., p. 66-68/49-50.

28 Space does not permit me to here consider a third important question: having considered the role of the natural attitude in Ideen I, and the natural concept of the world in Phenomenological Psychology, it would then be necessary to consider their relation to and continuity with the Lebenswelt of the later Krisis. My project does not here permit that consideration, since the Krisis text, nor Husserl’s later work generally, did not exert an influence on Heidegger’s early work which is my focus. However, we might ask whether the later Husserl and the early Heidegger were not concerned with similar problems. Indeed, Husserl’s later “return” to pretheoretical life is much more attentive to just the kinds of problems Heidegger was concerned with, particularly the radical incommensurability between theoretical description and pretheoretical experience. Thus he asks, “How are we to do justice systematically — that is, with appropriate scientific discipline — to the all-encompassing, so paradoxically demanding, manner of being of the life-world?” What this calls for, Husserl concludes, is a “new science.” A new phenomenology? I hope to return to this matter in another context.

29 The method being that of a “hermeneutical circle,” elucidating the presuppositions of Dasein (SZ §63). As Heidegger emphasizes, however, this is not a vicious circle because it is not a matter of deduction, but rather elucidation (aus-legen).


31 Nichomachean Ethics, I.iii. For Heidegger’s analysis, see GA 61.

32 As I have suggested above, it seems that the traces of the early Freiburg period which can be glimpsed in SZ are largely overwhelmed by a neo-Kantian transcendental turn which characterized Heidegger’s Marburg and post-Marburg lectures (1924-1927).

33 As described by Theodore Kisiel, “Heidegger (1920-21) on Becoming a Christian: A Conceptual Picture Show,” in Reading Heidegger From The Start, p. 177.

34 A line of inquiry also taken up in Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24), §§ 1-3.

35 For a close analysis of this notion, see George Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science in Heidegger’s Courses of 1919,” in Reading Heidegger
Elsewhere I have argued, following Heidegger, that this “theorization” is particularly found in religious communities which “theologize” religious experience. See my “Liberating Religion From Theology: Marion and Heidegger on the Possibility of a Phenomenology of Religion,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* [forthcoming]. The same theme, I would suggest, is found throughout Kierkegaard, and is alluded to by Heidegger in GA 59, p. 21.

37 See GA 59, p. 23: “Man sieht heute nun mehr oder minder klar, daß die bisherige Erforschung der Erlebnisgestalten entweder sehr roh oder durch das Vorwalten der theoretischen Einstellung und ungeprüfter Voraussetzungen schief war; allenthalben befriedigen solche Versuche philosophisch nicht mehr. Sofern aber Philosophie — also jeder ins Werk zu setzende Versuch, diesem Ungenügen abzuhelfen — irgendwie rationale Erkenntnis sein soll, erhebt sich für sie die Frage, ob überhaupt eine Betrachtung des Erlebens möglich ist, die es nicht sofort und notwendig theoretisch verunstaltet. Diesen Einwand hat die Philosophie selbst gegen sich erheben müssen.”


39 This is also why Heidegger finds an impetus for these methodological reflections in Aristotle’s *Ethics*, which is very attentive to the inadequacy of conceptual determination in matters of practical life. (My thanks to Jack Caputo for his formulation of these matters.)


41 One enthymeme is at work, what I think is an ethical assumption: “Reducing factual life to theoretical or cognitive terms is wrong.”

42 Heidegger is not calling into question intentionality as such, but the cognitivization of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology.

43 The same is suggested by Patrick Gorevan in describing that which is common to Heidegger and Scheler: “both thinkers sought to thematise the problem of philosophy from an integrally human viewpoint. In their rejection of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, both opt, instead, for an affective route to human existence in the world, avoiding the emphasis on intellectual intentionality which they found in Husserl.” Patrick Gorevan, “Heidegger and Scheler: A Dialogue,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 24 (1993), p. 279.

44 *De doctrina christianae*, 1.27.28. This is very helpfully expounded in Hannah Arendt’s recently translated dissertation. See Arendt, *Love and
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45 As opposed to the metaphysical, substantialist Augustine we inherit from Descartes. For a helpful study of this relation, see Stephen Menn, *Descartes and Augustine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Heidegger appropriates an Augustine mediated not by Descartes, but Pascal and the Jansenist tradition.


48 *Ibid.*, p. 35 [fragment 142]. He goes on to show that this is why skepticism (“Pyrrhonism”) is ineffectual. Much that we know we know not by reason, whereas the arguments of the skeptics can only call into question that which we have deduced in the order of reason.


53 As Heidegger notes, he is not concerned with the ontic, historical development of the sciences, but rather “the *ontological genesis* of the theoretical mode of behavior” (SZ 357/327). What this aims at is an *existential concept of science.* For an earlier consideration of the “genesis of the theoretical,” see GA 56/57, pp. 84-97.


55 For an answer offered, with Heidegger, to these final questions, see my, “Finding Words For Facticity: ‘Formal Indication’ as a “Grammar” of Philosophy,” *Continental Philosophy Review* [forthcoming].”