hastily, assumed that Taylor avoids historical explanations according to class struggle because of this. It is on this assumption that Fraser criticizes Modern Social Imaginaries for its lack of explanation according to class struggle and lauds, in his sixth and final chapter, the work of Hardt and Negri who, by putting class struggle at the centre, provide a means of understanding how the conflicts of modernity, as identified by Taylor, can be overcome (177-178).

While one cannot doubt that Taylor’s thought does have a theistic dimension, one can wonder about the bearing that this has on Taylor’s historical explanations. In his works, Taylor is attempting to explain modernity in terms of the moral sources which have given rise to it and that continue to enliven it, but it is difficult to see how this kind of explanation is motivated by his Catholicism, as Fraser suggests, rather than by his desire to provide a more adequate and illuminating form of historical explanation. Fraser’s failure to address Taylor as an historian undermines his critique. Not only does Taylor criticize Marxist explanations, as Fraser has pointed out, but Taylor also criticizes neo-Nietzschean explanations that focus upon structures of domination and the means of overcoming them. Fraser gives no attention to Taylor’s criticism of neo-Nietzscheanism. In short, Fraser has criticized Taylor’s treatment of Marxism without taking into consideration its fuller and more far-reaching theoretical underpinnings.

Fraser has done much to show Taylor’s early debt to Marxist thought, but his critique is, in the end, unsuccessful because of its failure to investigate properly Taylor’s own historical method, a method that, quite independently of Taylor’s own religious views, is able to offer a powerful, alternative vision of modernity.

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Contemplating Woman in the Philosophy of Edith Stein
Maybelle Marie O. Padua
Manilla, Philippines: Far Eastern University Publication, 2007; 129 pages

Maybelle Marie O. Padua’s Master of Arts thesis in Philosophy at Far Eastern University of the Philippines earned the Atty. Lourdes L. Lontok-Cruz Award in 2006. This recognizes Padua’s intellectual achievement and hails her contribution to combating the historic and scholarly marginalization of female philosophers. Indeed, this study’s strengths and limitations reflect Padua’s rever-
ence for Edith Stein’s analysis of “woman” and determination to introduce Stein’s path-breaking philosophy to a public beyond Europe and the United States.

Padua is most successful in her clear, well organized textual exposition of Stein’s doctoral dissertation, *On the Problem of Empathy*, and Stein’s later eleven lectures posthumously collected as *Essays on Woman*. One wishes, however, that Padua had consulted a host of other primary sources in which Stein presents her views on women, e.g., her autobiographical and biographical writings and in her correspondence. Relying extensively on Marianne Sawicki’s and Emerita Quito’s scholarship, Padua provides a solid account of the impact of Husserlian phenomenology on Stein’s analytic assumptions and method. Padua also highlights the areas in which Stein disagreed with and expanded her thought beyond Husserl’s conceptions of personhood and empathy. The main contribution of this study is the reciprocity Padua discloses that links Stein’s phenomenological dissection of the question of empathy, of the intentional structure of emotions, and of womanhood.

Padua sets forth Stein’s view that individual women appear in three manifestations, as human beings sharing a basic universal human nature, as individuals with a unique and mysterious core, and as “woman” with a distinctively gendered inner form. As have other scholars, Padua contends that Stein’s interrogation of empathy and philosophy of women are intertwined. She elucidates Stein’s views of distinctive female propensities deriving from their potential for motherhood, tendencies presumably, though evident in men, more common to women than men, specifically women’s capacity for interpersonal sensitivity springing from their rich emotional center, too often derided and invoked to argue women’s inferiority but indispensable to empathy. Stein interwove those characteristics with women’s drive toward wholeness, as opposed to men’s more highly focused and specialized direction of their energies. Although Padua affirms a widespread essentialist view of women, that their biology enables “women [to] have a richer conception of persons and they can more easily imbue human relationships with care and affection” (61), she does present Stein’s view that women’s overactive interpersonal acuity leads to smothering others, intrusiveness in their private experience, superficial and irrational thinking, slavish self-denial. Stein held that a good education can offset this by developing a woman’s rational thinking and commitment to objective work. Women, Stein insisted, should be able to enter any sphere of labour and politics, thereby bringing to bear their enlightened empathy and holistic
orientation. In short, Padua endorses Stein’s view of complementarity of gender traits and roles in a world of equal rights for both sexes.

Unfortunately, Padua does not provide us with a critical study of Stein’s ideas. At no point does she point out contradictions or inadequacies in Stein’s approach to gender. She does not wrestle with Stein’s avoidance of complex and difficult issues in the relationship between human, individual and female forms, nor does she consider such entities as the Nazi or Ku Klux Klan mother, nurturant, interpersonally sensitive and empathic with her own offspring and with people who share her values, but decidedly not with others. Although Padua’s discussion of empathy includes the key matter of how values orient one’s empathic directions, she fails to connect it to her romantic treatment of Stein’s views on women.

Moving to Padua’s biographical and historical discussion, we come upon a mix of reliable and skimpy, often erroneous, information. Nowhere had Stein claimed that Jewish services, which she occasionally attended with her mother even after her conversion, involved “a cold gathering of people” (8). In general, the account of Stein’s conversion is most misleading. Further, had Padua read Karen Offen’s *European Feminisms, 1700-1950* (2000) she would not argue that “There was no ground, however, for the support of both emancipation and gender differences” (19). She would have realized that a belief in gender differences was the dominant stream of European feminist thought and politics as well as of conventional societal institutions.

In one of numerous sweeping generalizations, Padua invokes psychoanalysts and other experts to support her view that women’s capacity for motherhood fostered a more ready empathy, but by not stressing some psychoanalysts and experts, she effaces the great number who dispute this view. Likewise, Padua leaves the term “feminism” muddy and conflates “woman” and women, using these references interchangeably. She suggests that all women with an educated heart and mind will define a given landscape as beautiful and experience it as awe-inspiring. Often, theorists with minimal historical training fail to untangle the culturally and socially constructed nature of our values, of our selective empathy, of our assumptions about biology and sexuality. Though some of Padua’s cited scholars share her views on gender difference, most of them base these differences in cultural and social learning and political reinforcement.

Especially in Chapter Six, Padua exceeds Stein in drawing contemporary political and religious implications to Stein’s approach to gender differences. Stein does not claim a stem cell is a human being, as Padua implies. Nor
does Stein, reared by her mother after her father died when she was two, state that a child requires a mother and a father to develop as a whole being. Nor does Stein oppose gender role reversals within the family. Padua’s conservative Catholic convictions shape her inferences.

Of less importance, though reflective of a seeming haste in publishing this book, an array of technical defects appear, e.g., including multiple errors in the Bibliography (e.g., Stein is credited with authoring an essay by Mary Catharine Baseheart), misspellings, and typos. If Padua and her publishers had taken more time before bringing out this book, the strengths and contributions of Padua’s study to Stein scholarship would then not be so sadly compromised.

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Deleuze and Space
Eds. Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005; 245 pages.

Deleuze and Space is a collection of papers that take up Deleuze’s concept of space in philosophical, political, architectural, geographical, cinematic and literary terms. The collection is a qualitative mixed bag.

Gregg Lambert’s “What the Earth Thinks” deals with Deleuze’s political space. Lambert convincingly argues that Deleuze’s geo-philosophy is different from other political, specifically Marxist, philosophies, by developing remarkably well Deleuze’s concepts of the Earth, the socius and deterritorialization. The paper also does a great job of clarifying without oversimplifying the barrage of Deleuze’s other political concepts (e.g., the primitive-territorial machine, the State-form). Tamsin Lorraine’s “Ahab and Becoming Whale: The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space” approaches Deleuze’s space in philosophical and literary terms. The paper is an excellent discussion, encouraged by many clear examples, of the nomadic subject’s different experience of space. The paper also explicates well the meaning of and the relationship between smooth and striated spaces, the virtual and the actual sides of the real. Branka Arsic’s “Thinking Leaving” discusses Deleuze’s space in relation to his concept of thought. The paper argues that Henry David Thoreau’s work is an expression of Deleuze’s spatial thought—thought understood as a multiplicity not of some elements, but a pure multiplicity, that is, a multiplicity that is prior to and constitutive of all elements, ‘a staircase with no floors.’ The paper