In this essay we offer an interpretation of Alain Badiou’s theorisation of Paul the Apostle as a “universal singularity.” Our aim is to explore the extent to which Badiou’s articulation of political subjectivity provides a radically different locus and topos for the “political”—one that is rooted not in a concept of the abstract individual but rather in the material and generative process of individuation (“subjectivation”). Following Badiou, we explore the implications of the ontological shift that Paul represents—the shift from an external “body politic” (that of the polis, political crew or community) to an internal “body politic” (based on complicitous bodies, embodiments, incarnations—here a ‘body politic’ complicitous with the Christ-event). In this respect, Badiou’s reading of Paul establishes “the political” as “the subjective” precisely in the sense that the locus of the political is the complicitous subject as such rather than an externalised abstraction such as “the state.” Paulitics manifests itself in and as this subject subjected to the event—the “militant subject” that embodies and endures its “process,” its “truth procedure.”

There is a curious omission in Badiou’s account of Saint Paul. And it is a noticeable absence, given the fact that what is missing is not only glaringly apparent in Paul’s epistles but in many respects critical to Badiou’s own articulation of Paul as a “universal singularity.” Paul’s thought, quite simply, is eschatological. Every word that Paul declares is constituted not only by the “truth event” of anastasis (resurrection), but by the equally important apocalypsis eschaton (final revelation) without which there is no event or Pauline truth.

The event to which Paul is faithful (“subject to” and a loving “subject of”) is in fact a scissiparous one, at once anastasic and apocalyptic, incarnate and excarnate, physical and metaphysical, now-here and no-where (topos and outo-topos). The scissiparous event—the event’s schizogenesis—is a matter, then, of the known and the unknown, of fact and of faith, in a relationship of tense, intensive harmony (palintonos harmonia), which is at once, paradoxically (or, as we will argue, pa-ta-
"What then is Pataphysics?" asks Roger Shattuck in his "Superliminal Note" to the Grove Press Evergreen Review 4:13, May–June 1960, republished by Gerald Guinness and Andrew Hurley in Actor Ludens: Essays on Play in Literature (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1986). The term first appeared in print in Alfred Jarry’s Guignol in the April 28, 1893 issue of L’Echo de Paris littéraire illustré. “Pataphysics lies as far beyond metaphysics as metaphysics lies beyond physics,” he later explained, triangulating the (inter)relations between the physical, the metaphysical, and the pataphysical in the “Éléments de Pataphysique” of his Gestes et Opinions du Docteur Faustroll, Pataphysicien, suivi de L’Amour Absolu (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1980), 31–3; translated in Shattuck 1986, 11). In his “Superliminal Note,” Shattuck insists that pataphysics “has always existed, ever since a man first scratched his head to quell the itch of reflective thought, ever since Socrates demonstrated to Meno that his slave-boy had known the Pythagorean theorem all along, ever since the day Panurge defeated the English scholar in a disputation by signs, ever since Lewis Carroll established the equivalence of cabbages and kings. Not until the end of the nineteenth century, however, at a time when science, art, and religion were coming very close to bumping into one another in the dark,” was pataphysics actually called-out—i.e., named—as such (Shattuck 1986, 10). A very succinct definition of pataphysics arrived in the mail the day we submitted—or rather, were about to submit—the present essay, which happened to be the day we received our fourth issue of Collapse: The Journal of Philosophical Research and Development (Falmouth: Athenaeum Press, 2008). In an essay on the topic of Lorenz Oken’s Giovanni-Malfatti-like conception of universal mathesis (cf. footnotes 24 and 51 below), Iain Hamilton Grant sets out to describe “a physics of metaphysics, a science of the grounds of metaphysics in nature” (Grant, “The Mathematics of Protoplasm in Lorenz Oken’s Physico-Philosophy” in Collapse 1:4, 2008, 303): that is, “pataphysics” as such (which, without being mentioned, is linked to La nouvelle alliance—the “New Alliance”—of Prigogine and Stengers’ Order Out of Chaos). The agent of such an alliance is not so much ‘hero’ic as ‘zero’ic: one who undergoes “a ceaseless imitatio nihil.” (307) The node or point where things (physical and metaphysical) implode “is the mathematical nothing, the zero” and “the zero is ... the first and last in, and the principle of, all the extensions of its force,” all its different forcings. (291, 308) “Beyond pataphysics lies nothing,” explains Shattuck—“pataphysics is the ultimate”: the arché/eschaton (Shattuck 1986, 13); it rests “on the truth of contradictions and exceptions” and “is, in aspect, imperturbable.” (Shattuck 11, 12) “All things,” he concludes, “are [fundamentally] pataphysical, yet few men practice pataphysics consciously.” (Shattuck 1986, 12).
corporating the virtual in and as the actual; he lived the “end of days”—his philo-sophos (love and pursuit of wisdom) was a veritable pistis-sophia of (i.e., a decided and decisive act of faith) in the eschaton.

Every Pauline proclamation proclaims the pli (the complication, implication, supplication, and passionate application) of scissiparity, subjecting itself erotically, philially and agapically (body, soul and spirit) to the telos qua entelechy of the end (eschatos, eschaton) from the outset, in a kind of ehyeh asher ehyeh (“I am that which I will be” and/or/as “I will be that which I am”) the poesis of which found its recent resurrection in the mathesis of Badiou’s second favourite Paul: the mathematical “forcing” of Paul Cohen. Every Pauline proclamation enacts a kind of Cohenian (never mind Freudo-Lacanian) durcharbeiten—a “working through—in terms of the concept of forcing,” which Badiou admits he

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2 As A.N. Wilson notes in Paul: The Mind of the Apostle (New York: Norton, 1997), 20: “[T]he significant ‘event’ is the conversion or apocalypse, as he calls it, of Paul: his discovery of the Living Christ. It coincides with a period when other Jews, among them those who knew Jesus, and those who did not, were also proclaiming a number religious experiences relating to Jesus, or a number of Scripture-interpretations of the End of Time which relate to Jesus... [T]he story is not (as it would be for a modern reader of the New Testament) a story which starts with the birth of Jesus, or even a story which starts with the old prophets. It starts with their own anticipation of the End of Time.” In his “Eschatological Mystic,” Albert Schweitzer directly connects Paul’s eschatology to the mystic-al element of Pauline thought (The Writings of St. Paul, ed. Wayne Meeks, New York: Norton, 1972, 387–95). In contrast to this, however, Badiou takes great pains to distance Paul’s declaratory stance as the proclaimer of the event from mystical discourse “whose substance consists in unutterable utterances.” (Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, tr. Ray Brassier, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, 52) We will argue that for Paul, the Christ-event is necessarily two-fold, a “temps plié” defined by the immanence of the initial resurrection and the final revelation—as Alenka Zupančič argues with respect to the “Nietzsche-event,” it is the moment in which One turns into Two (The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 8). As such, we will not disagree with Badiou so much as suggest a rethinking of his position on the Christ-event. But it is also worth mentioning that we do not adopt an Agambenian line of argumentation which would distinguish between “messianic time” and “eschatological time.” (“The Time that is Left” in Epoché 7:1, 2002, 2) This is for two principal reasons: first, since we agree with Badiou that the real novelty of Paul’s discourse consists in his abolition of both Greek and Jewish logoi, and second, because it is not “time” itself or “temporality” that is the focus of this analysis, but the process of “subjectivation” initiated by the pure event.
takes directly from Cohen’s mathematical work.3 “Forcing is the point at which a truth, although incomplete, authorises anticipations of knowledge concerning not what is but what will have been if the truth [ever] attains completion.”4 “As a result, a truth operates through the retroaction of an almost-nothing and the anticipation of an almost everything.”5 Paul’s proclamations are anticipative (of the end) and retroactive (from the end) in each and every [re]instantiation, [re]itera-tion, [re]surgence, [re]surrection.

As Christian Bök—formerly Christian Book (apt nomen)—explains in his study of Pataphysics, we are dealing here with statements proclaiming “not what is, but what might have become”6—or rather, more forcefully, statements proclaiming, as Badiou himself points out, “what will have been.”7 In this manner, the Pauline proclamation “inhabits the tense of the future perfect, of the post modo—a paradoxical temporality in which what has yet to happen has already taken place.”8 This paradoxical temporality is one that we shall call the temps plié (enfolded time) of Paulitics, the problematic—Paulemic—temporality of a passion enfolding ἔρος, φιλία and ἀγάπη (which are crossed upon the Cross from Paul’s perspective).9

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3 Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. and tr. Nina Power and Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2004), 127.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Badiou, Theoretical Writings, 127.
8 Bök, Pataphysics, 8.
9 Deissmann identifies this “crossing upon the Cross” with the quintessential “Pauline formula”: “Christ in Paul, Paul in Christ” (Adolph Deissmann, “The Christ-Mystic” in The Writings of Saint Paul, ed. W. Meeks, New York: Norton, 1972, 375). Against those who misinterpret Paul as having taken the position that affirms the Christ that is “raised especially above suffering,” Deissmann suggests that Paul enactsthe Passion of Christ: “since he suffers in Christ, his sufferings are to him the “sufferings of Christ” or the “afflictions of Christ.” It is not the old Paul who suffers, but the new Paul, who is a member of the Body of Christ, and who therefore ... experiences all that that Body experienced and experiences.” (Deissmann, 386). The Passion of Christ is Paul’s (erotic, carnal, incarnate, bodily) “forcing” of philia and agape, both in terms of social membership in the church, and mystical experience of the Body of Christ in faithful love (1 Cor 12).
The passion of Christ (his crucifixion/resurrection) embodies the end: this is key for Paul. To think anastasis without apocalypsis, and vice versa—to consider Paul’s apocalyptic agapē (which is not just spiritual, metaphysical) in the absence of its impassioned ēros (which is not just corporeal, physical) and indeed their paradoxical (pataphysical) double-bind via philia—is to elide the very scissiparity of the Pauline event. The Pauline subject is itself this fold or pli—a temps plié (sounding, or rather presounding here, of the future templiers, naisse-pas!); and more to the point, Christ’s subjection to crucifixion and resurrection (his undergoing what Nietzsche would have called a “going under”\(^{10}\)) was its very implication, inauguration, initiation, incarnation for Paul. The physis of the crucifixion/resurrection (Paul’s agonizing archē) is the embodied force of the eschatological metaphysis. Hence the archē becomes the eschaton and the eschaton the archē.

What happens in such a circumstance? Is this an anarchic condition? synarchic? telarchic? If, as Badiou suggests, “the subject who binds himself” to the discourse of the Christ-event (“the law of the spirit”\(^ {11}\)) does not advocate anarchy, this is only because “love names a nonliteral law”—“one that, addressing the truth to everyone, universalizes the subject.”\(^ {12}\) “[That to which] Paul gives the name [of] ‘love,’ agapē,”\(^ {13}\) is addressed to a community of neighbours (1 Cor 10:24) which, as an entelechic and eschatological brotherhood or neighbourhood, is an embodiment (a physical manifestation or incorporation), individually and collectively (universally), of the impassioned Christ.\(^ {14}\)

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\(^{11}\) Badiou, Saint Paul, 86–7.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 87.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) We will later take up this idea with reference to Gilles Deleuze’s late-1940s distinction between the community constituted by “complicity” versus that formed as a “crew.” “For the crew is the real-isation of a common world whose universality cannot be compromised or fragmented, and such that in the process of this realisation the substitution of crewmembers becomes both possible and indifferent” (Gilles Deleuze, “Mathesis, Sci-
“Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it,” writes Paul in 1 Cor 12:27. For Paul, agapē is a term that must carry both the bodily and brotherly—in addition to the otherly—dimensions of love; hence the crossing of ēros, philia, and agapē (“love” in its personal, social and sacred dimensions) that operates in Pauline proclamations, the latter (agapē) conjoined with the former (ēros) by way of philo-sophia (philia). And yet for all his philo-sophia Paul is not a philosopher, or not simply a philosopher. The philia at the crux of the Pauline conjunction of ēros and agapē (the physical and the metaphysical) is itself crossed—one might say double-crossed, philosophically—by pīstis and elpis (faith and expectation, fidelity and anticipation). Paul’s philo-sophia (“wise love,” “universal love,” “love” as mathesis universalis), is also an elpīstis-sophia (the wisdom, wit and witnessing—the mathesis, again—of faith and expectation, fidelity and anticipation). “So remain,” therefore, for Paul, “faith [pīstis], hope [elpīs] and love [ēros, philia and agapē], these three; but the greatest of these is love” (1 Cor 13:13); “agapē” here (“the greatest of these”; an agapē inclusive of ēros and


Badiou makes a similar point when he says that “Paul is an antiphilosophical theoretician of universality. That the event (or pure act) invoked by antiphilosophers is fictitious does not present a problem.” Badiou, Saint Paul, 108.

Christian Bök notes in his endnotes (as we two do too) that if “each letter can become a variable for the value of its position in the alphabet” (the elements of poēsis thereby [pataphysically] being elements of mathesis), “just as each word can in turn become a relation for the sum of these values,” then (for example—and note here the example[!]) “the word “faith” can be expressed as the operation ‘6 + 1 + 9 + 20 + 8’, whose total value, ‘44,’ can be expressed as the operation ‘8 + 15 + 16 + 5’—the cipher for the word “hope.” The [utter] unlikelihood that two words of equal value might also be (proving mathematically that “faith” does indeed equate with “hope”) only lends credence to our “faith” that, behind the uncanniness of coincidence, there probably exists the secret agenda of a [pataphysical] system.” Bök, Pataphysics, 89. Dost thou love the uncan, good reader?
philia, an all-encompassing agapê enfolds the former twofold “pistis” and “elpis” (which are conjoined, as such, as an e[lpistis], and constitutes a loving, faithful, hopeful wisdom (philo-sophia, pistis-sophia, elpis-sophia).

“Faith” (pistis, or as we have it here e[lpistis]) is defined by Badiou as “pure subjectivation,”17 and the “path of faith” qua piste d’e[lpistis]18 (its law, legêin, logos) is “love”; together they form a “living unity” or “universal power.”19 It is in this sense, explains Badiou, that “love” is the fulfilling of the “law” (the nomos of Romans 13:10) and the foundation of universalism (mathesis universalis). Love and faith, philo-sophia and pistis-sophia, are the manner in which the subject binds itself (submits, subjects, itself) to the Christ-event (anastasis and apocalypsis); this “bind” or “double-bind” maintains the process (truth procedure) of the passion—its mathesis or e-ducere.22 The subject in this sense endures the process (again, the truth procedure) of the passion—an endurance the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche defined as the art of “the political” (“political,” “amorous,” “aesthetic,” and “mathetic,” according

17 Badiou, Saint Paul, 87.
18 The French word piste means “track” or “path,” hence, “the path of faith” would be (in French) la piste d’e[lpistis] (a word-play or word-theatre not present(ed) in Badiou’s Saint Paul, but implicit—we would argue—in the work(s) of Paul himself). Badiou does, however, point out that elpis (hope), and e[lpistis] as such (anticipation and fidelity, faith and expectation), is “[the] principle of tenacity, of obstinacy” which “pertains to endurance, to perseverance,” Ibid., 93) in the subject’s trajectory of truth. Hope (elpis, e[lpistis]) thus refers to the obstinate and perseverant process of working out (e-ducere), the passionate path (the piste qua “path or track” of trials and tribulations) precisely of a pathêin mathêin (a learning-through-suffering, an educative undergoing). In Romans 5:3–5, Paul says that through the grace conferred by Christ’s passion “we glory in tribulations also; knowing that tribulation [(the Greek thlipsis, which literally means pressing together: an implosion, compulsion, complication or complicity)] works through [(katergazomai)] patience, and patience, experience; and experience, hope.”
19 Ibid., 88.
20 Ibid., 86.
21 Ibid., 86.
22 The Greek mathesis (the process of learning, of education) and the Latin educere (education, literally a leading or conducting “out”—here, for instance, along the so-called piste d’e[lpistis] are cross-linguistic synonyms (pun intended.)
to Badiou\textsuperscript{23}: “[t]he political,” Nietzsche writes, “[i]s the art of enduring the tremendous tension between differing degrees of power.” (WP §719) In the Pauline case, “the tremendous tension” or \textit{palintonos harmonia} is precisely that between the crucifixion/resurrection and the apocalyptic/revelation—namely, the Christ-event. Paulitics is the art of enduring the event as such; or rather, the art/science (the general \textit{mathesis}, the \textit{mathesis universalis}) of such an endurance.

Just as, in his passion, the incarnate Yeshua (corporeal Christ) submitted to the excarnate Yahweh (incorporeal Godhead) and expired in this submission (only to inspire once again, stresses Paul), so too, in the Pauline mathesis (Paul’s universalism), “[a]t the very moment when unity is affirmed, this unity breaks apart and destroys itself. But in being broken apart, […] unity finds its true sense, reforming on another plane, where it finds its true meaning … in the very name of concrete life.”\textsuperscript{24} In his early essay, “Mathesis, Science and Philosophy,” Deleuze defined that aspect which Badiou saw in Saint Paul—the universal, the \textit{mathesis universalis}—precisely as the “mode of affirmation” of the \textit{pli} (the “fold” qua complication, implication, supplication, and passionate application)

\textsuperscript{23} These are the four theatres of truth, according to Badiou: artistic, scientific, political and libidinal (see \textit{Being and Event} (London: Continuum, 2005), 18, 333, 340). Or rather, truth sets the stage in these four possible ways. Hence his statements with respect to “the truth of the entire situation.” (Ibid., 339) “As such,” he explains, “love, art, science and politics generate—infinitely—truths concerning situations.” (Ibid., 340) “The ultimate effect of an event-caesura … would thus be that the truth of a situation, with this caesura as its principle, \textit{forces the situation to accommodate it},” writes Badiou. (Ibid., 342) “A truth would force the situation to dispose itself such that this truth … be finally recognized as a term, and as internal. A faithful generic procedure renders the indiscernible (truth) immanent.” (Ibid., 342)

\textsuperscript{24} This latter quotation is drawn from an early and thereafter “repudiated” essay (one which does not appear in official bibliographies of \textit{oeuvres complètes}) by the formative Gilles Deleuze, namely, his introduction to Christien Ostrowski’s 1946 translation of Giovanni Malfatti’s 1845 \textit{Studien über Anarchie und Hierarchie des Wissens} (\textit{Études sur la mathèse, ou anarchie et hiérarchie de la Science}, 142). The latter text was the inspiration for Dan Mellamphy’s Master’s thesis, \textit{Le pas sage: a mathesis} (London, University of Western Ontario, 1992) and for Christian Kerslake’s recent studies, most notably his doctoral dissertation, published as \textit{Deleuze and the Unconscious} (New York: Continuum, 2007); it finds its ‘resurrection’ once again in this present essay.
“defined [moreover] as complicity.”

“The definition of mathesis,” he concluded, is therefore “twofold,”

a kind of symbolon, a throwing (or folding) together—“the double depth of the symbol.”

In “the symbol, the symbolizing agent is now the sensible object, and the knowledge which it symbolizes is totally identified with it”: its “very incarnation.”

“[T]he symbol, the incarnation of knowledge, [is] the movement of mathesis”, as such, “mathesis situates itself beyond the opposition,” as far beyond it as metaphysics is beyond physics and pataphysics beyond metaphysics.

Physics and metaphysics, the sensible object and the object of thought, are complicit—indeed, comploded—in Pauline pataphysics (Paul’s mathesis universalis).

Conducting oneself (body, soul and spirit) into this complosion—which, in The Shortest Shadow, Alenka Zupančič calls an “implosion”—is an act (an act of faith and an act of love) which Deleuze in his early essay called complicity. “In complicity,” explains Deleuze, “there is ... a common world”—a universalism—“but one whose community comes into effect ... through each member realizing it for himself.”

To quote Paul, again, “Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it” (1 Cor 12:27). Subjection (subjectivation) to the event (anastasis/apocalypsis) affirms, according to Badiou, a “power that had fallen onto the side of the law” and “turns life itself [—this power that had fallen on the wayside—] into a universal power.” “Life exists only through these [subjects], each of which realises it on its own account .... that is to say that universality, the community of life, denies itself, gives itself to each living being as a simple outside... At the very moment when the living being closes in upon itself, defining the universality of life as an outside”—for Paul, the moment in which Christ proclaims his aban-
Donoment: the lema sabachthani (Matt 27:46, Mark 15:34), which is already (archēo/eschatologically) the insurrection of the tam ve’nishlam (Greek tetelestai; cf. John 19:30)—[at this very moment] “it did not see that it had, in fact, interiorized that universal: realized the universal on its own account.”36 “[T]here is a plurality of men, yet each one must in the same way assume his life for himself ... on his own account; thus the universal is immediately recuperated. And in this sense life will be defined as a complicity as opposed to a crew. For the crew is the realization of a common world whose universality cannot be compromised or fragmented, and such that in the process of this realization the substitution of crewmembers becomes both possible and indifferent.”37 “What characterizes complicity is precisely the fact that it can be ignored, denied, betrayed,” abandoned, forsaken38; it “endures” abandonment, betrayal, forsakenness, oblivion (what Nietzsche calls annihilation). Enduring this abandonment, betrayal, forsakenness, oblivion and/or annihilation is a Paulitical act (of faith and love, πιστις-φιλοσοφία), an act of complicity philically conjoining the ēros and the eschaton, the passion and its apocalypsis, as a single scissiparity qua schizontology/schizontogenesis.

The subject in this sense—subjected to “life” as the pataphysical conjunction of the universal and its annihilation (“that reality wherein the

35 Lema (also Lamma) sabachthani: “why hath thou forsaken me?” (Matt 27:46, Mark 15:34). Tam ve’nishlam (Greek tetelestai): “it is accomplished” (John 19:30). Jesus utters the first phrase in Aramaic and the second one in Koinē (common/colloquial) Greek—tetelestai, in John 19:30, is his actual utterance; tam ve’nishlam is, in fact, the Hebrew translation. These are, “[re]translated” into Hebrew, the first and final stanzas of Psalm 22 (conjoined upon the cross via the personare that Nietzsche calls “The Crucified”). Tetelestai (“it is finished”/“it is accomplished”) is also the opening enunciation of Endgame, Beckett’s follow-up to Waiting for Godot (see Dan Mellamphy, “A Look Anew at Beckett’s Other Pegg” in Modern Drama 49:4, 2006, 490-500); as mentioned in the present essay itself, Andrew Gibson has suggested in his Beckett and Badiou that “there are moments at which Badiou seems to come close to conflating Paul and Beckett.” (Andrew Gibson, Beckett and Badiou: the Pathos of Intermittency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 73; tetelestai would be—and is—a good beginning and/or end(game): one such moment of concrescence, in other words.

36 Deleuze 1946, xii, xiii; 2007, 144, 145.
37 Ibid., xii; 2007, 144.
38 Ibid., xiii; 2007, 145.
universal and its proper negation are one”—affirms a power that would fall upon the wayside (the “power that had fallen onto the side of the law”), affirms what is otherwise rejected, affirms (as such) the stone the builders rejected (Psalm 188: 22, 1 Peter 2:7, Matt 21:42, Mark 12:10, Luke 20:17), which is the very cornerstone of Paulitics (the philosopher’s stone of the apostle Paul). This stone, moreover, is akin to what one might call the cailloux Meillassoux: the cornerstone calx qua psēphos enphilosophos of Badiou’s former student Quentin Meillassoux, who (in a recent study entitled Après la finitude (After Finitude) introduces his own version and vision of the archē-qua-eschaton—the missing element, missed dimension, in Badiou’s Saint Paul—which he calls the “archi-fossil.”

What we are here calling the gap or lack in Badiou’s Saint Paul—the temps plié, complicité, complosion or conscrescence of the archē and the eschaton, anastasis and apocalypse—is described by Meillassoux as that which is “inscribed in a temporality ... anterior” and “ulterior” to any possible human sensation: the event or the advent (the event qua advent) of a temporal (co)lapse (“un décalage temporel”). Whereas Meillassoux understands this temporality (this chronological (co)lapse as “[une] dia-chronicité,” we would posit/deposit that the proto-pataphysics of Paul is in fact more faithful (plus fidèle) to the (co)lapse or complication (complicity) involved (invoked) in such a temporality (such atemporality or end-of-time/time-out).

The time-out/end-of-time of Paul’s eschatology is altogether untimely (Unzeitgemässe) and, as such, uncanny (Unheimliche); untimely and uncanny by dint of immanence. [T]he necessity that an event be immanent to what it revolutionizes or subverts is one of the essential components of ... what Badiou refers to as ... ‘archi-politics’,” Zupančič astutely observes.

39 Ibid., xiii, 2007, 145.
40 Badiou, Saint Paul, 87.
42 Ibid., 155.
43 Ibid., 156.
44 Zupančič, 7.
force/forcing (qua conjunction and complicity) of individual/incarnate ēros and metaphysical/excarnate agapē. This archēo-/eschato-politics situates itself on the archē of the eschaton “which is lacking” (as Badiou himself states in “Casser en deux l’histoire du monde.”) Rather than a positive incapacity, through the force of “forcing” (a kind of negative capability) that which is lacking (the eschaton) becomes the principle of action—indeed the very theatre, stage, or setting (set) of any political process. What is curious is the fact that Badiou does not say of Paul at and on this particular point what he says of Nietzsche in “Casser en deux l’histoire du monde” (Nietzsche, whose amor fātī—the pre-Socratic concrescence of ēros, philia and agapē—harmonises the discordance of an ever-divisive/chaotic cosmos), namely (here using Zupančič’s paraphrase), that his proclamations “function against the background of the presumption that it is, in and of itself, already the event per se. Or more precisely, the presumption … that the event is not external to the declaration” or Pauline proclamation, “but is, rather, something that the declaration carries within itself”—for this does indeed define the pataphysics of Paul’s proclamations, which are, as such [ou](topo)phoric (bearers and “guardian[s] of a utopian trace” or “utopian dimension,” to use a phrase from Andrew Gibson). The burden of archēo-/eschato-fossil (“the greatest weight” of the apostle Paul) is the cornerstone of every Pauline architext.

‘Paulitics’ never comes down to a politics of competing presences or present[ed] particulars, but is constituted instead by an archēo/eschatological “process”—a “procedure” founded and grounded on an archēo/eschatological schizontos (the scissiparous anastasic/apocalyptic event). The scissiparous anastasic/apocalyptic event (el)pistiphilosophically founds and grounds the subject-position or subjective disposition from which and through which every Pauline proclamation (his “militant discourse” resounds (per-sonare). “The subject is subjectivation” as Badiou rightly notes; the scissiparous event ad-

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46 Zupančič, 10.
47 Gibson, 4, 152.
49 Ibid., 52, 67, 88.
50 Ibid., 81.
advances under the mask (persona, per-sonare) of its subject—larvatus prodeo, as the young René Descartes once said (in the days of his explicit use of and/or reference to the idea and phrase mathesis universalis).\footnote{“The Cartesian case is all the more interesting in that Descartes never renounced ... the mathesis universalis,” wrote the young Gilles Deleuze in an essay he himself later “renounced.” (1946, x; 2007, 142) “And it is intriguing to see how the latter is situated on the theoretical plane,... [a]t the very moment where unity is affirmed, this unity breaks apart and destroys itself. But in being broken apart ... unity finds its true sense in reforming upon another plane, where it finds its true meaning. In so far as the theoretical disunion of thought and extension is affirmed, so too is the fact of their practical union, as a definition of life.” (1946, x-xi; 2007, 142–3) References to the Cartesian larvatus prodeo and mathesis universalis (i.e., the early works of René Descartes) are all to be found in volume X of the Adam and Tannery edition of his collected works (Oeuvres de Descartes, X, eds. C. Adam & P. Tannery (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1956), 213–4, 368–80).}

Taking a cue from Zupančič’s theorisation of the event in Nietzsche’s thought, one could say that the Pauline declaration “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (1 Cor 11) is “already the event per se,” or “more precisely, the presumption [...] that the event is not external to the declaration but is, rather, something that the declaration carries within itself.”\footnote{Badiou quoted in Zupančič, 12.} The event ‘states’ itself (‘proclaims’ itself) through the very person and per-sonare (‘stating’ or ‘sounding’ through) of the proclamative Paulitical subject. It literally (verbally, wordedly) “I m’explode in the ego sum (per-sonare) of such a subject—an implosion in and as the declarative/proclamative “I am’ of “I am... Christ” (1 Cor 11). The “I am... Christ” is the concrescence, complicity, complication, implication, and indeed application (enfolded embodiment and enunciaton or articulation) of the Christ-Cross (anastasis/apocalypsis) in all its scissiparity/schizology. Availing ourselves of a statement from The Shortest Shadow, then, this scissiparity is “not so much ... an expansion” as it is “[an] implosion”\footnote{Zupančič, 8.}: the archê and the eschaton ‘contract’ here, contract anew (a new contract, new covenant), folding or [col]lapping in upon the person (every person) qua subjection/subjectivation. Paul’s discourse is the implosion of Jewish and Greek discourses, and it is at “the inner limit, or inherent impossibility, of [these] given discourse[s]”\footnote{Ibid., 8.} that im-
plodes or complodes them, that the novelty of the Pauline proclamation is constituted. In other words, the implosion or complosion of the Jewish, Greek, Roman, and other discourses (“[these] given discourse[s]”55) constitutes the concourse, if you will, for a truly novel discourse.

Saint Paul, in a manner not entirely unlike Badiou’s text-writing touchstone Samuel Beckett, proceeds upon the path of *pataphysics* and of *aporia* (“[i]nterestingly,” writes Gibson in a study entitled *Beckett and Badiou*, “there are moments at which Badiou seems to come close to conflating Paul and Beckett. He articulates the Pauline imperative, for example, as ‘I must go on’, […] [and] [t]he young Paul shares the young Beckett’s—and the young Badiou’s—will to *pistiphilosophical* destruction”56): it is from a kind of crucifixion (a crossing-out), a passionate de[con]struction (*pathēin mathēin*) to the point of annihilation (i.e., utter abandonment), that novelty—the ‘new’, the ‘novel’—concresces. In the wake of this annihilation, the “vacuum is the privileged place from which it becomes possible to create, as well as to see or perceive what has been created.”57 This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (previously quoted), in which Paul’s declaration of the Christ-event is structured not as if the declaration was external to, but as if it were complicit with (complosive of) the very event itself, as if to say “I, the event, am speaking.”58 Take for instance Paul’s address in 1 Cor 12:31–13:13 (which Wayne Meeks, in his editorial commentary to this passage of Paul’s epistles, compares to Plato’s ‘praise to Eros’ in *The Symposium*59). Paul’s address intensively implicates not only its inherent “you”logy (“you are the body of Christ and individually members of it”; 1 Cor 12: 27) but indeed the further “I”plosion of an “I ani” (“and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I

55 “For Paul, the emergence of the instance of the son is essentially tied to the conviction that ‘Christian discourse’ is absolutely new… That it is the son, not the father, who is exemplary, enjoins us not to put our trust any longer in any discourse laying claim to the force of mastery. That discourse has to be that of the son means that one must be neither Judeo-Christian (prophetic mastery), nor Greco-Christian (philosophical mastery), nor even a synthesis of the two. The opposing of a diagonalization of discourses to their synthesis is a constant preoccupation of Paul’s.” Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 43.
56 Gibson, 73.
57 Zupančič, 8.
59 Meeks, 41, footnote 6.
am nothing’; 1 Cor 13:2) and finally the innermost and most intense/intensive implosion/implication: that of love itself (‘love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things’; 1 Cor 13:7). Rather than merely the ‘delineation of a third figure,’ Paul’s proclamations proceed from the ‘the inner limit, [the] inherent impossibility,’ and ultimate implosion or complosion of Jewish, Greek and Roman discourses—the inner limit (etc.) that is declared as the very palintonos harmonia of ‘you,’ of ‘I,’ and of ‘love.’

When the eschaton is the archē and the archē is the eschaton—when eschaton and archē are immanent, indeed ‘the speculative principle of declaration’—or again, when the physical and metaphysical are taken as a singular pataphysical principle, two consequences ensue: on the one hand, the proclamation of the event takes on the force of nomos (of ‘law’), and on the other hand, this nomos cannot be distinguished from the event itself, which breaks [with] the law (i.e., runs counter to all nomoi) ... “Whence a highly characteristic militant [palin]tonality” (a palintonos harmonia or harmony-in-tension, a palintropos harmonia or harmony-in-opposition) in Pauline proclamations, each one “charged with a remarkable intensity” and “combining the appropriation of particularities with the immutability of principles, the empirical existence of differences with their essential nonexistence.” This palintonos/palintropos harmonia qua pataphysics (‘Paulitics’) “is the reason why Paul, apostle of the nations, not only refuses to stigmatize differences and customs, but also undertakes to accommodate them so that the process of their subjective disqualification might pass through them, within them.” ‘Paulitics’ in this sense of bridging differences, past, present and future, is synonymous with Nietzsche’s description of the “task” of “genuine philosopher[s]” in Beyond Good and Evil: “with a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their ‘knowing’ is a

60 Badiou, Saint Paul, 43.
61 Zupančič, 8.
62 In his commentary on Chapter XIII of 1 Corinthians, Wayne Meeks explicitly refers to this particular Pauline passage as being remarkably “un-Pauline” precisely because, as he says, “Jesus Christ is not once mentioned.” Meeks, 41, fn.6.
63 Zupančič, 9.
64 Badiou, Saint Paul, 99.
65 Ibid.
creating, their ‘creating’ is a legislating, their ‘will to truth’ is—will to power” (BGE §211).

“Philosophizing with a hammer” (here, ἐλπιστικός) requires taking the persona as the arena of polemos—becoming subject to (and the subject of) a battleground or the path qua piste of ἐλπίς and πίστις, hope and faith). “Against the classic judicial eschatology, Paul seems instead to characterize hope as ... a principle of tenacity, of obstinacy” which “pertains to endurance, to perseverance” in the subject’s trajectory of truth. Passionate perseverance along the forking path (piste) or crossroad (battleground) of personal/polemical trials and tribulations is a ‘working through’ of Pauline ἐλπιστικός (‘Paulitics’): “we glory in tribulations,” writes Paul, “knowing that tribulation (the Greek θλίψις, which literally means pressing together: an implosion, complosion, concrescence or complicity) works through

[66] In Nietzsche et la critique de la chair, Barbara Stiegler also points out that Nietzsche considers Paul’s “thought of thoughts” (referring to the abolition of the law by the ‘Crucified’ on the Cross; Daybreak §68) to be that which makes him a legislator (the abolisher of the old law who is at once the inventor of a wholly new law) around whom history revolves. “En s’efforçant d’inventer un ‘sens’ pour l’événement extreme de la Croix, tout se passe donc comme si saint Paul avait repris en première personne la tâche tragique d’exposer l’ensemble des schemes au ‘paradoxe effrayant’ de ce qui advient”; “C’est son activité temporalisatrice—le fait qu’après saint Paul, plus personne ne temporalisera comme avant—qui lui vaut sa place cruciale et centrale dans ‘l’histoire.’” (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005: 327–8; 333) In fact, that Paul is a legislator is an enduring aspect of Nietzsche’s [mis]interpretation of Paul (if we are to follow Badiou, Saint Paul, chapter 5). If we accept (as Nietzsche does when he sardonically remarks in Daybreak) that “if the writings of Saint Paul had been read, not as the revelations of the ‘Holy Spirit,’ but with a free and honest exercise of one’s own spirit and without thinking all the times of our own personal needs—really read, that is to say (but for fifteen hundred years there were no such readers)—Christianity would long since have ceased to exist” (§68), then Nietzsche makes a solid historical point insofar as Paul never intended to found religion nor a discourse called “Christianity.” According to those such as A.N. Wilson (and as we have argued here), Paul considered the “End of Days” to be immanent in his own lifetime. (15) It is only by the time of Clement of Rome’s epistles to the Corinthians that doubts arose about the coming of the “End of Days.” See Clemens Romanus, First Epistle 23:3, Charles Hoole tr., 1885 (ca. 95 AD): www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/1clement-hoole.html, retrieved May 5, 2008).

[67] Badiou, Saint Paul, 93.
((katergazomai)) patience, and patience, experience; and experience, hope’ (Romans 5:3–5). Paul’s “hope” here is a working out (by trials and tribulations) or a working through (in the sense of Freudian-Lacanian durcharbeiten) precisely in the manner of pathēin mathēin (a learning-through-suffering, an educative undergoing): it is, again, the Chris[t]-Cross[ing] of a physical and metaphysical (pataphysical) passion. “Whence [the] highly characteristic militant tonality” that Badiou finds in Paul: his is a militantly polemical subject[ion], the subject as an implosive/compressive battleground—one whose ‘freedom’ consists precisely in its palintonic/palintro-pic intonations and implosions:

For though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to all, that I might win the more. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews; to those under the law I became as one under the law—though not being myself under the law—that I might win those under the law. To those outside the law I became as one outside the law—not being without law toward God but under the law of Christ—that I might win those outside the law. To the weak I became weak, that I might win the weak.

I have become all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. I do it all for the sake of the gospel, that I may share in its blessing. (1 Cor 9:19–23).

Paul admits, in the above quotation, that he is a man of many faces, many guises, many twists and turns; he is, as such, palintonically palintropos and polytropos (polypalintropos): an individual individually enfolding—implicating, complicating, applying—manifestations (an “internally manifold” man, in the words of Friedrich Nietzsche), most of them in conflict (antagonistic) with one another.

68 Ibid., 99.
69 See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §212, Will to Power §972 and §976.
70 In fact, A.N. Wilson argues that this quality of being polytropos was not specific to Paul only: “The paradox becomes most striking in the writings of Paul, who tried in his own person to be a contradiction in terms (1 Cor 9:22): a good Jewish citizen of the Empire who wished to admit Gentiles into his new-found faith. But the nature of the paradox is much bigger than Paul’s divided selves. All the first-century Jews had to struggle with it; all the emperors in deciding what to do about the Jewish question, and later with the growth of Christianity, had to face it. Philo, Josephus, Agrippa himself, were all in
Hence, again, the polemos of his persona: under the mask (persona, personare) of his subjective disposition is the ‘battleground’ or ‘battlefield’ of ‘being’. Paul’s very ‘being’ is the ‘battleground’ upon which (and, indeed, in which) manifold manifestations disjointedly conjoin (complode).

One particularity of this embodied conjunction or incarnate complosion—this personal polemos or agonistic subjection—is precisely the fact that the battle is waged at the “subjective” rather than “state” level: it is ‘subtracted’ from state prescription and description.71 “The subjectivity corresponding to this subtraction constitutes a necessary distance from the state and from what corresponds to the state in people’s consciousness,” explains Badiou; “[its] truth is of itself indifferent to the state of the situation—to the Roman State for example.”72 It is interesting, on this note, to observe that Badiou does not make mention of the fact that Paul—whom Badiou calls “our contemporary” and moreover compares to Lenin73—just as George Bernard Shaw, at the turn of the century, had likened him to Marx74—never advocates a revolt against the Roman state-apparatus. Instead, “the militant apostle” urges his brethren “to aspire to live quietly, to mind your own affairs” (1 Thess 4:11) and “be subject to the governing authorities” (Romans 13:1-2). The battlefield/battleground is not, for Paul, that of the governing state, but rather that of its generative subjects. The subject is the locus/ground/foundation of Paulitics.

Being a disjunctive conjunction or discordant concordance (a palintonos harmonia), the subject is also by definition a scissiparous (schizological) foundation: a microcosmic analogy of the macrocosmic paralogy archē/eschaton. The person of Paul, always also Saul of Tarsus and yet not Saul of Tarsus, is again a great example (symbolon) of this; the diagon disjunctively conjoining Saul/Paul—Psaul?—articulates a separation (“necessary difference” as Badiou says) and yet also a complication, an implication, an inevitable complicity (“complicity” as the

their differing ways responding to the new political realities of the first century, to an unfolding tension which had its own inexorable logic.” (Wilson, 100–1)
71 Badiou, Saint Paul, 15.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 2.
“twofold” and/or “the double depth of the symbol”\textsuperscript{75}). Paulitically speaking, Paul is always ‘Psaul’—Saul/Paul—in that he is and is not both Roman and Jew, Jewish and Greek, enslaved and yet free, lawful yet an outlaw, enfeebled yet full of astonishing force (1 Cor 9:19-23). It is not a matter of rising up and revolting against Rome or Judea, Roman Law or Jewish Law, the discursive regimes of Hebrew, Greek or Latin codes—these are not the proper battlefields (the battlegrounds of Paulitics). Political revolution, for Paul, is no longer relevant; no longer relevant by dint of the eschaton’s immanence—indeed its status is forged as the archē of Paulitics (“archi-politics”). In the end of days (in the immanence of the end of days—from the perspective, in other words, of Pauline eschatology), normative politics and normative political action (including political revolution) is of no [Paulitical] consequence. This radically distinguishes Paul, in fact, from the other Jewish militants of his day. His war, his revolution, his polemos, takes place on an entirely different—and as Badiou says, an utterly universal, universally applicable—plane: that of the individual (philosophical) subject itself. This is the ground of Paulitical (rather than Political) action: action in the time-and-place of the end-of-time and out-of-place (the exceptional time and place definitive of a space-time faithful to the event). Hence the import and the implication Paul’s message to the Thessalonians:

> But as to the times and the seasons, brethren, you have no need to have anything written to you. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night [...] and there will be no escape [...]. But, since we belong to the day, let us be sober, and put on the breastplate of faith and love, for a helmet the hope of salvation.” (1 Thess 5:1–9)

The times (the end-of-times) are such that the eschaton is not only imminent but well-nigh immanent: we belong to its day and it belongs to our day (i.e., the end-of-days). The task at hand, when the end (eschaton) is at hand, when the eschaton is the principle—the archē—of action, is to be/become the subject of (hence subject to) the archē/eschaton, to be/become oneself, as the most famous student of

\textsuperscript{75} See Deleuze 1946, xvi, xiii, xxiii, xxiv; 2007, 146, 144, 154, 155.
Paracelsus (Gerhard Dorn) once said, “living philosophical stones”: to endure, like the lapis exilis that became the cornerstone, the crushing weight of the anastasis and apocalypsis eschaton, enfolded (complicated, implicated) in, on, and as the ἐπιστημονικός (Paulitical) subject itself.

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