A Rev-iew Article


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Introduction

A quotation from Hegel serves as a motif of Tyler’s book: ‘The learner always begins by finding fault, but the scholar sees positive merit in everything.’ It is a chief merit of Tyler’s book that, though he pursues an internal critique of Green’s philosophy, its aim (and result) is not simply to find faults, but, importantly, to uncover the ‘positive merit’ in Green’s philosophy. For, as Tyler correctly holds, ‘there is much to be gained from a return to the serious study of Green’s writings.’ (260) And there is much to be gained from Tyler’s serious study of Green’s writings.

Tyler’s study of Green displays a threefold strength: he takes seriously the interrelated nature of Green’s philosophy; not only does he pursue an internal critique of Green, but he also effectively defends Green against some major persisting criticism; and Tyler extends Greenian scholarship by connecting Green’s philosophy with contemporary issues.

Tyler takes seriously the interrelated and comprehensive nature of Green’s philosophy. This explains his systematic re-examination of the metaphysical and epistemological foundation of Green’s ethical and political philosophy. He first examines Green’s epistemological concerns, then his theory of will, followed by an extensive study of the common good, conscientious action and progress, his theories of rights, state and civil disobedience, and finally, his qualified justification of private property and capitalism. Taking the standpoint of a unified philosophical system, enables Tyler to assess the ‘fit’ of the various parts in the philosophical whole, thereby to examine the coherence...
and viability of the system. Thus, for example, though he argues that Green’s belief in the inevitability of progress is unjustified, Tyler, nevertheless, maintains that this weakness does not invalidate Green’s whole systems. (chapter four) Moreover, Tyler is right to hold that it is possible to gain a new appreciation and insight into the various aspects of Green’s thought if they are examined from their place in the system as a whole, something which, he maintains, is not usually recognized in the secondary literature.

One important result of this systematic approach is Tyler’s claim that there is an inconsistency in Green’s theory of will which, Tyler claims, lies at the core of Green’s philosophy. The inconsistency is between two mutually exclusive theories of will, voluntary and determinist, both of which Green defends. This inconsistency threatens the coherence of Green’s philosophical system and especially the viability of his ethical thought.

The second strength of Tyler’s study of Green lies with his effective and sustained defense of Green against some standard criticisms. Defending Green makes good Tyler’s objective, namely to ‘consider all of the most famous and potentially damaging criticisms which have been made against it (Green’s philosophy) in the literature ...’ (1-2) Tyler handles two sorts of criticisms: one sort concerns specific charges against various aspects of Green’s system. The other sort of criticism is more fundamental, and constitutes, I suggest, the third strength of his book.

With regard to specific criticisms, Tyler provides an effective defense of the ‘eternal consciousness’, and defuses charges levelled at the common good, namely that it is conceptually confused, that it runs the risk of endorsing authoritarian society, and that it is unable to recognize social fragmentation. Regarding the ‘eternal consciousness,’ Tyler holds that it can be best understood as ‘equating with human nature, or the human essence - rather than God ...’ (12) That is, ridding it of religious aspects, the ‘eternal consciousness’ becomes ‘the underlying structure of human consciousness.’ (33)

Tyler also offers a forceful defense against the three just mentioned criticisms of the common good. (123-37) He argues that the conceptual confusion charge depends on misunderstanding of the common good. He is quite right in that a great deal of the criticism levelled at the common good results from improper understanding of the nature of ‘common’ in the ‘common good.’ Clarity is gained, and therefore, also adequate defense, Tyler claims well, by,
first, understanding 'common' as 'a concrete, living culture' which embodies a set of substantive and normative judgements (124); and, second, by seeing that 'common' does not exclude the pursuit of private goals, but rather 'the pursuit of purely selfish development in the face of others' sufferings.' (125) Tyler defuses also the authoritarian charge by showing that the relational organicist (as opposed to holist organicist) structure of Green's argument rules out the possibility of societal repression of individuals. He emphasizes two elements of that argument. First, for Green, moral worth and development lies with the individual person and not with any collective entity. Second, Green insists on the 'moral significance of personal conscientious identification with social norms and values.' (128) Finally, to the charge that the common good cannot recognize differences, conflicts and social divisions, Tyler's reply is twofold. For one thing, the common good provides powerful critical tool by which to assess whether a particular society allows its members to find and develop a sense of personal identity from their interpersonal relations. Further, Green's insistence that individual life is constituted by a network of community memberships, recognizes conflicting memberships and the need for their complex balancing. Beyond these specific, though important criticisms, Tyler seeks to reject, as unsound, a more fundamental line of criticism. Herein lies the third strength of his book.

As Tyler clearly shows, a widely accepted line of criticism is to depreciate in general the significance of Green's philosophy, to transform him 'from a figure of philosophical interest into a little more than a character in the history of philosophy.' (2) Tyler maintains that this depreciation is unjustified. Geoffrey Thomas has made a similar claim with regard to Green's moral philosophy, arguing that the latter possesses contemporary relevance. In a similar vein, Tyler argues that Green's political philosophy possesses relevance to contemporary political concerns and certainly has the philosophical resources to confront, and offer significant insights on, new moral ideas and practices. He provides two helpful examples. One is that Greenian basic principles are capable of justifying a multi-cultural state, not least because the common good is not oblivious to the fact of social fragmentation. (192-206) The fundamental point is that Green does not require strong commonality, such that only a homogenous society is allowed, but rather commonality is required only to establish mutual respect among members of society. The second example is that though Green's attitude to capitalism is 'over-friendly' (257), his ethical nor-
mative analysis of capitalism is capable of justifying radical criticism and reform of the capitalist market.

In the rest of the essay I take up two central issues from Tyler's study of Green and assess them in the same spirit of Tyler's own critical approach. That is, my aim is not simply to find faults in Tyler's study, but rather to show the possibilities of extending and completing his exploration of Green by uncovering more 'positive merit' in Green's philosophy. Hence, my aim is to support Tyler's claim that there is much to be gained from a serious study of Green's writings. The first issue I discuss needs no justification. It is Tyler's major criticism of Green, namely that he defends two mutually exclusive theories of human agency, voluntary and determinist. The second issue is his criticism of the substance of the common good, namely that Green assimilates self-realization to public service. There of course other significant criticisms, such as Tyler's criticism of Green's theory of rights for excluding from the possession of rights the severely mentally disabled and the irredeemably severely insane as well as animals. (188-92) I believe that the charge against the first two exclusions is not without a reasonable response, and at any rate, is not as potentially devastating as the charge against the substantive element of the common good, and especially since the common good is the very cornerstone of Green's ethical and political philosophy.

With regard to the first criticism - contradictory theories of human agency - I shall disagree with Tyler. As to the second charge - the social service account of self-realization - I am concerned to show that interpreting self-realization from Green's own non-confrontational view of morality enables us to gain a new insight and appreciation of the common good. I turn first to the first criticism.

First issue: Contradictory theories of agency

This is Tyler's claim: 'Green's metaphysics of agency is ... very important to his ethical thought. Unfortunately, he runs two contradictory theories of agency simultaneously in his writings on the nature of the will. I label these 'neo-Aristotelian' and the 'spiritual determinist' strands.' (35; see also, 54-6, 59-65) The full argument is this: Green's ethical thought is dependent on his metaphysics of agency. His metaphysics of agency embraces two contradictory theories of agency, voluntary and determinist. The determinist strand of agency,
Tyler claims, has devastating consequences for Green’s ethics (and politics) in that it entails the collapse of moral responsibility. This result is particularly damaging since Green himself levels a similar charge of determinism at the ethical naturalism of his day and since his ethical thought rests on a deliberate effort to rescue human agency (and action) from naturalist reductionism and determinism. It would, therefore, be both ironic and problematic to his own ethics if it can be shown that, after all, his account of human agency amounts to the same thing. To be sure, Tyler claims that since Green also defends a view of voluntary agency, which plays a major role in his ethics, the problem diminishes. But the problem, nevertheless, cannot be eliminated insofar as Green also defends a contradictory view of determinist agency. At best one can say, as Tyler does, that in his ethics Green plays up the voluntary agency and marginalizes the determinist strand of agency. At worst, however, which cannot be discounted, Green’s ethics, and hence, his politics rests on a fundamental contradiction that threatens both its coherence and viability.

In his forward to Tyler’s book, Peter Nicholson recognizes that insofar as Tyler’s critique is correct, it ‘threatens the heart of Green’s philosophy,’ but adds: ‘Whether this critique can be blunted or answered, remains to be seen.’ (viii) I claim that the critique can be answered. In support of my claim I take up Tyler’s challenge to anyone to reread, for example, sections 99 to 114 of the Prolegomena or sections 9 to 14 of ‘On the Different Sense of ‘Freedom’ as Applied to Will and to the Moral Progress of Man’ and retain their belief in the unproblematic nature of the neo-Aristotelian reading of Green. These passages can only be reasonably understood as what I have labelled ‘spiritual determinist.’ (72)

Having reread those sections I wish to claim that Green defends not two contradictory conceptions of agency, but rather a single coherent conception of agency. This should not come as a surprise given his rejection of dichotomous discourse. His single conception of agency is, as Tyler holds, determinist, but contrary to Tyler, it is consistent with human freedom and moral responsibility. In order to establish my claim, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of determinism, hard and soft. Whereas hard determinist agency will be detrimental to Green in the very way that Tyler claims, soft determinist agency will not. I claim that Green defends a single coherent conception of soft determinist agency; hence, what appears at first blush to ‘threaten the heart of Green’s philosophy,’ turns out not to be so.
First, however, it is necessary to be clear on what Tyler’s spiritualist determinist account of agency consists in. I believe that Tyler’s account really embraces two versions of determinist agency that, though may be connected in Green’s account as Tyler presents it, are nevertheless distinct. Distinguishing them will help assessing Tyler’s charge more effectively. One version concerns the claim that human agency is a reproduction of the eternal consciousness. I refer to it as the metaphysical version of determinist agency. The second version is that human action is the necessary result of the interaction between character and circumstances, or of character which the agent has not chosen. I label it the character version of determinist agency. I discuss the metaphysical version first.

The metaphysical version of determinist agency has to do, according to Tyler, with the relation between reason and desire which ‘is related to Green’s theory of human nature and, hence, the eternal consciousness in a manner which necessarily excludes the elements of voluntarism which the new-Aristotelian approach just as necessarily entails.’ (60) It is ‘this contention,’ Tyler claims, that ‘I will defend.’ (60) What does the defense consist in? It is premised on the understanding of human action as consisting in the self distinguishing itself from his desires, and then adopting one or the other as sources of self-satisfaction. Tyler’s charge is this: ‘Green’s point is that increased knowledge of an object can transform a potential desire into an actual desire, but this is achieved by, in a sense, ‘showing’ Desire that the object could exist. In this way, Intellect uncovers the specific contents of particular agent’s Desire ... it is not a matter of choice, but of automatic reaction.’ (61)

The difficulty here is threefold. For one thing, it is unclear what both ‘showing’ and ‘automatic reaction’ are. What is reacting to what? Relatedly, Green’s own language, in contrast to Tyler’s interpretation, emphasizes explicitly the deliberative (and hence non-automatic) activity of the intellect. ‘The real agent called intellect is the man as understanding, as perceiving and conceiving;’ (Green, 1906, 129) and so it is in connection with desire: ‘the common characteristic of every ... desire is its direction to an object consciously presented as not yet real ... ’ (Green, 1906, 131; see also, 132) It appears, then, that rather than ‘automatic reaction’ (by the intellect) or “showing” (by the intellect) that the object could exist, Green insists on the ‘formative power of thought:’ the ‘object (is) consciously presented’ to desire by the intellect. Finally, notwithstanding Tyler’s claim that he relies on the same sources that
support the voluntary strand of agency, his determinist interpretation seems to receive no textual support from Green himself. and nor does Tyler appear to offer any. Thus, for example, Tyler’s quotation of the Prolegomena, sect. 129 (60) does not, as such, establish the ‘automatic reaction’ case. It does establish Green’s unitary account of human action which he advances in criticism of the one-sided accounts of both Hume and Kant.

The weakness of the metaphysical strand of determinist agency notwithstanding, Tyler may still advance the character version. That version, I suggested, can be defended independently of the metaphysical version of determinist agency. This is just what Sidgwick does and whose criticism Tyler regards as ‘The most powerful objection,’ which was shared by other contemporary critics, such as A.E. Taylor and C.E.M. Joad (Thomas, 1987, 220) and which Tyler quotes at length. Sidgwick complains: ‘It thus seems to me that Green’s use of the term ‘freedom’ (cf. free effort to better himself (Green, 1906, 112)) and ‘self-determination’ is misleading: since any particular man’s effort to better himself, as its force depends at any moment on his particular past, is not ‘free’ or ‘self-determined’ in the only important sense.’ (Quoted in Tyler, 66) Tyler claims that ‘the essence of Sidgwick’s critique is perfectly correct.’ (67) I wish to claim that it is not. But how can this critique be met? One possibility is Hudson’s response.

Hudson holds that Sidgwick has a point only to the extent that Green’s argument is independent of metaphysical presuppositions; but this is not the case since ‘at the heart of Green’s conception of an agent there was the thought of him as self-distinguishing and self-seeking. By definition for Green, an agent can step back from his disposition and society—even though they are himself—and ask himself whether what they bid him choose is his own greatest good.’ (Hudson, 1980, 50; emphases in the original) The metaphysical account which serves Tyler’s determinist argument, underwrites, for Hudson, the very possibility of self-determination. Hudson’s point, though, is that divorced from its metaphysical underpinning, Green’s account of agency is vulnerable to Sidgwick’s criticism; that is, on its own, Green’s character account of agency does defend determinist agency. Indeed, Hudson holds that without the metaphysical underwriting, Sidgwick’s determinist charge can stick insofar as the Greenian agent is ‘so completely conditioned by his disposition and his society...’ (Hudson, 1980, 50) Tyler, then, can still uphold his criticism, and maintain that Sidgwick ‘is perfectly correct.’ Again: I wish to claim that he is not.
To establish my claim, it is necessary to understand what is at stake here. It is the old debate over determinism and human freedom or determinism and moral responsibility. The main question is this: If determinism is true, does it follow that the person is neither free nor responsible? Three answers are possible and have been offered: hard determinism, soft determinism, and self-determinism. (Frankena & Granrose, 1974, 265-94) Hard determinism holds that determinism is incompatible with human freedom and responsibility; hence, freedom of contra-causal kind (free actions are uncaused actions) is among the conditions of moral responsibility. Soft determinism rejects contra-causal freedom and hence holds that determinism is true but is compatible with human freedom and moral responsibility. This is because soft determinism insists that the causes of an action must be internal, not that the action must be uncaused. Self-determinism rejects both the indeterminism and determinism (both hard and soft determinism) as incompatible with freedom. Instead, self-determinism maintains that it is the self that causes one to act but the self is not determined to act by any cause, event, not even by beliefs or desires.

I argue that Green’s account of agency rests on soft determinism and hence is entirely immune to Tyler’s criticism. For Tyler’s determinist charge to work, he must establish not simply that Green defends determinism. That, as we have just seen, is not the issue, since soft determinism is fully compatible with human freedom and moral responsibility. Rather, the issue is to show that Green defends hard determinism, the kind that depends on freedom of the contra-causal kind. Tyler claims that Green fails to defend freedom because the Greenian agent cannot, in the first place, choose his own character or even his self-reflection. (p.63) This claim indicates that Tyler’s criticism must presuppose hard determinism, since soft determinism denies that actions (including our character) must be uncaused.

To appreciate Green’s defense of a soft determinist agency, is to see how the essential argument of soft determinism is Green’s own core argument. This is precisely the argument which occurs in the sections that Tyler challenges anyone to reread as a proof to the contradictory determinist and voluntary conceptions of agency that Green defends. My response to that challenge is that the text Tyler points out to does not support his claim, but does support my contention that Green defends a single coherent account of agency in terms of soft determinism. Essential to the soft determinist argu-
ment is a twofold claim: rejecting hard determinism (contra-causal freedom) and embracing an internality account of actions. Action are caused but the causes must be internal to the agent. This twofold claim is not accidental but essential to Green’s conception of human agency. Moreover, Green clearly situates his defense of human agency within the determinism-freedom debate.

Central here are sect. 14 in ‘On the Different Senses of ‘Freedom’ as Applied to Will and to Moral Progress of Man,’ and sect. 102 in the Prolegomena to Ethics. The two sections have to be read in conjunction since in the former (sect. 14) Green refers the reader to the latter (sect. 102). In both he argues that two claims he makes with regard to agency, and which appear contradictory, are really compatible. One claim states that ‘the individual has power over the determinations of his will in that the determining object is determined by the man;’ or, equally, that the individual (agent) determines the object which (in turn) determines his will. (Green, 1986, 14 and 1906, 102, respectively.) The other claim is that ‘the state of the man ... is a result of previous states ...’ (Green, 1986, 14 and 1906, 102.) The two claims appear contradictory in the way Tyler suggests as between, respectively, voluntary and determinist agencies. Appearances aside, however, Green holds that the two claims are compatible. Establishing their compatibility reveals an account of a single coherent agency justified by soft determinism.

The reason Green gives for the compatibility of the two claims is that ‘all these states (first claim) are states of self-consciousness from which all alien determination as from outside - all determination except through the medium of self-consciousness - is excluded.’ (Green, 1896, 114; emphasis added) This statement captures the twofold claim that underpins the soft determinist argument. Green recognizes that one’s state of character (which determines one’s object of pursuit) is caused by previous states, but the causes, he insists, are internal to the agent and hence the relevant actions are free.

To understand the nature of internality, it is useful to look at Aristotle’s conception of agency, since it is based on soft determinism. (Frankena, 1973, 72) Aristotle claims that the cause must be in the individual (i.e. internal to the individual.) This claim requires him to explain ‘individual’, by which he means an essentially rational agent; hence, ‘in the agent’ means ‘in the rational agent.’ Otherwise it will be only accidental to the individual, since one of the non-
essential features of the individual will be the origin of the action. Green's claim - that except through the medium of self-consciousness, all determinations are excluded - should be similarly understood. Hence: 'In truth there is no such agency beyond the will ... not elsewhere than in the man, not outside him, for the self-conscious man has no outside.' (Green, 1896, 13; emphases in the original)

This account of internality informs Bosanquet's defense of Green's conception of agency against Sidgwick's criticism. Hence, 'what the self is there for and consists in - to convert externality into inwardness ...' (Bosanquet, 1927, 326) This inwardness-account of self lies at the heart of Bosanquet's own conception of agency which, he claims, is 'derived directly from Green.' The agent, Bosanquet holds, is 'not a necessary agent ... because nothing but the agent determines the act, ... In other words we may say that nothing past, nothing external, is operative in the agent's choice. It is all gathered up and made into the agent himself, and its remodelling in him is one with his creative production of a new deed.' (Bosanquet, 1927, 355; emphasis added) The internality account, then, ensures that soft determinism is consistent with freedom and moral responsibility.

Indeed, some soft determinist holds that if freedom is indeterminist - actions are unmotivated and uncaused - such freedom will result in complete lack of responsibility. Thus, not only is determinism compatible with moral responsibility, but moral responsibility presupposes determinism and it is really indeterminism that is incompatible with morality. (Baylis, 1974, 287-8) Green could not agree more which furnishes more evidence for his soft determinist position: 'If, and so far as, in the past and present of individual men ... this desire (to be better) is operative, the dependency of the individual's present on his past, so far from being incompatible with his seeking or being able to become better than he is, is just what constitutes the definite possibility of this self-improvement being sought and attained.' (Green, 1906) I now turn to the second issue.

Second Issue: The Substance of the Common Good

Tyler examines the Common Good 'in depth in terms of (i) its formal structure, (ii) its inherently non-competitive nature, and (iii) substantive element.' (73) Then he refutes the notion that the notion of a 'common good' is concep-
tually confused as well as Berlin’s claim that his theory could justify authoritarianism.

My main concern, however, is with Tyler’s analysis of the substance of the Common Good, and especially with assessing his criticism of the substantive element. What is the criticism? Its core claim is this: though the substance of the Common Good is self-realization, Green identifies self-realization with social service, public service or citizenship broadly understood. Self-realization, then, is assimilated to social service, such that the latter is the central account of self-realization. Accordingly, I refer to the criticism of the substance of the Common Good as the social service account of self-realization, or, and interchangeably, the social service criticism of self-realization.

That social service criticism is embedded in Tyler’s initial claim: ‘An indispensable aspect of Green’s position is that a man is only properly self-governing when he freely seeks to help others.’ (112) Drawing on Bellamy, Tyler’s concluding remarks reveal the full charge. If Green claims that

the moral agent can only actualize his true good by performing his role as a citizen - in other words, by directly aiming to realise the highest potentials of all other members of his cultural groupings. If this is indeed what Green is arguing, then Richard Bellamy is correct to portray the Common Good as entailing the identification of ‘self-realisation with self-determination, and both with self-abnegation’ in the sense that only the individual’s capacities for helping others are given proper recognition by Green’s theory. (121)

Having found this flaw in Green’s substance of the Common Good, Tyler seeks to mitigate the problem. This he does by endorsing Gordon’s and White’s partial defense of Green. Gordon and White maintain that ‘Green puts more emphasis on the vocation of social reformer than on the vocation of scholar or artist only because of the age in which he lived.’ (122) Tyler finds that defense persuasive but not conclusive. It is persuasive in that Tyler agrees that personal self-development in face of intense injustice is ‘simply self-indulgent and immoral;’ hence, the ‘alleviation of misery’ should take priority over ‘purely personal development.’ That defense, however, is not conclusive because if Green identifies self-realization with self-abnegation, Tyler argues, there is inconsistency between the form and the substance of the Common Good. To be sure, he does not quite put it that way, but this is, nevertheless, clearly implicit in his claim that

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... if this truly is Green’s position, he is not being honest enough to his Kantian and Hegelian roots (which, for Tyler, provide the form of the Common Good.) The ideal community is a community of fully developed agents. ... For this reason, it is a conceptual requirement that all members of this kingdom fully realise all of their truly human potentials. Consequently, the individual should seek to develop himself as well as other people. ... The development of the agent’s character ... requires him to reform actions which purely cultivate his own self as well as those actions which serve the development of other people. (121-2; emphases added)

The problem is threefold. Though the social service account of self-realization is justified in time of intensely unjust social order, it is still the case that one has to forsake one’s own ‘purely personal development’ because moral concern for the welfare of others takes priority. If social injustice persists over a long time, one is likely to lose any chance of personal self-development. A recent writer presses the very same point. Norman Care discusses self-realization in the context of contemporary society which, he holds, is ridden with ‘staggering inequities.’ (Blum, 1993, 173-97) Because this situation requires securing others the bases of self-realization, the individual must forsake once and for all any hope for realizing his or her own central projects. It is this sort of personal loss that the social service criticism of self-realization seeks to highlight.

Second, the problem of loss of ‘purely personal development’ becomes more acute inasmuch as the social service account of self-realization is not restricted to times of injustice. As Gaus maintains ‘... more than any other modern liberal, Green believes that even in normal times social service often requires some sort of self-sacrifice that demonstrates highly praiseworthy devotion to the common good.’ (Gaus, 1983, 105) This is because Green’s theory of the individual ‘postulates a significant communal devotion....’ (Gaus, 1983, 105)

Third, all this clearly raises liberal anxieties, since what appears first as self-realization turns out to be others-realization. The development and cultivation of one’s own personal potential and central projects becomes morally subordinated to service to others. Clearly, the liberal sense of individuality is depreciated.

Given the centrality of the Common Good in Green’s thought, it seems that, coupled with the criticism of Green’s contradictory theory of human agency, the social service account of self-realization threatens the integrity and viability of Green’s theory of the good society. With regard to the former criticism,
I claimed that it can be answered. This is not my claim with regard to the social service criticism, nor is it my intention to directly and explicitly answer it. (Although this may be the result.)

My strategy is different. I suggest that critics who advance the social service charge are predisposed to do just that because of the way they frame their interpretation of the Common Good. Essentially, the social service account of self-realization depends on a dualist (hence, individualist) framework of interpretation which, since it is not Green's own, must result in some sort of interpretation which is not really Green's own; therefore, the social service account of self-realization cannot be, in an unproblematic way, Green's own account. To appreciate what Green's own account is, and at any rate to see what he was really up to, it is necessary to have a good handle on his non-dualist framework of morality.

Somewhere else I suggested that relational organicism captures Green's (and most other British Idealists') non-dualist (neither holist nor atomist) societal and moral ontological map. (Simhony, 1991: 515-35) Rejecting the dichotomy of holism and atomism, the non-dualist map captures the terrain of social and moral connectedness which lies at the heart of the Common Good. Since Tyler frames his discussion of the Common Good in terms of relational organicism, and since he employs that framework to reject the authoritarianism charge against the Common Good, I suggest that he could have beneficially extended the explanatory and justificatory force of relational organicism to defuse another standard criticism of the Common Good - and at any rate gain a fresh appreciation of the problem - namely the social service account of self-realization.

How so? From the point of view of relational organicism, the social service account of self-realization is holist and hence unacceptable. To be sure, 'purely personal development,' which Green describes as private good, is unacceptable too, because it is atomist or individualist account. The point of 'relational' is to reject as one-sided both holist and atomist accounts of self-realization. That the relational societal map is of connectedness intends to capture the moral domain in which individuals' developments are intertwined in many important ways. From within that non-dualist map the proper and central account of self-realization may be described as joint realizability or mutual self-realization. The social service account of self-realization is incompatible with the joint realizability account.
Two questions need answering in order to advance this argument: what is the nature of the non-dualist morality which lies at the centre of the Common Good? and what does joint realizability look like? First question first. Sidgwick's own social service criticism of the Common Good provides an effective entry into the first question. This is because Sidgwick viewed Green's Common Good ethics as the main alternative to his own utilitarian ethics.

Sidgwick disputes Green's claims that the Common Good is non-competitive: 'so long as the material conditions of human existence remain at all the same as they are now, the achievement of different people can conflict.' (In Hurka, 1993, 67) In response, Hurka holds:

Here Sidgwick is clearly right. ... Green's absolute claim of non-competition cannot be sustained. But a weak claim may still be true and important. *Although Sidgwick's problem of scarce material resources is but one source of conflict in utilitarianism, it seems the only serious source in perfectionism ... if there was no competition for material resources, what further competition would there be?* (Hurka, 1993, 67; emphases added)

My concern here is with the italized statement. Apart from competition for material resources, there is no serious source of conflict in Green's ethics, but there is in Sidgwick's utilitarian ethics: the dualism of practical reason, namely the tension between egoism (concern for one's own good) and benevolence (concern for the good of others), both of which Sidgwick considers as equally rational. From the vantage of his dualist moral map, Sidgwick was prevented from fully and appropriately appreciating the non-dualist ethics of the Common Good and hence the possibility of joint realizability. I suggest that Tyler, Bellamy, Gaus, and other critics who advance the common social service charge against self-realization presuppose the same sort of dualist moral framework, though not necessarily deliberately and explicitly.

A dualist moral framework counterposes one's concern for one's personal development and moral concern for the well-being of others, such that the possibility of non-contingent connection between the two personal and moral concerns is entirely excluded. Green's ethics of the Common Good rests on affirming just such a possibility: 'the distinction commonly supposed to exist between considerate Benevolence and reasonable Self-Love, as coordinate principles on which moral approbation is founded, is a fiction of philosophers.' (Green, 1906, 232)
In a manner not unsimilar to Green’s claim, and hence helpful in understanding his moral perspective, Raz rejects the commonly accepted view of ‘asymmetry between people’s concern for their own interest and concern to do what is morally right.’ This ‘very misleading picture’ informs what Raz describes as ‘the confrontational view of morality which pitches a person’s own interests and goals as not only occasionally in conflict with his obligations to others but as deriving from independent and fundamentally different sources ...’ (and hence essentially individualist) (Raz, 1986, 216) This is a ‘a very misleading picture’ because it overlooks the way in which both one’s concern with one’s own personal goals and one’s obligations to others are aspects of one and the same conception of value.’ (Raz, 1986, 216) That is, there is one source of both concerns: the values that are embodied in the available stock of social forms. Learning what makes for valuable life is at once a process of understanding one’s pursuits and goals and one’s obligations to others. This could well make sense of Green’s claim that ‘the idea (of true good) does not admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others.’ (Green, 1906, 236)

Similarly, Lawrence Blum criticizes the personal/impersonal dichotomous framework within which moral issues are commonly analyzed, and which is clearly a version of the self-interest and morality - egoism and benevolence - opposition. The problem with such a dichotomous moral framework is that it is incapable of capturing the moral terrain in which one’s and others’ goods are non-contingently interwoven. Green’s Common Good ethics aims to capture just that terrain. Blum argues that Norman Care - whose claim that concern for the well-being of others should take priority over personal self-realization I mentioned above - fails to recognize the moral terrain of connectedness because he ‘frames his concerns in terms of opposition between two mutually exclusive and seemingly exhaustive desiderata - a personal good and impersonal morality.’ (Blum, 1993, 176) Care views self-realization as a personal and purely private concern and service to others as impersonal moral concern; hence, the dichotomous picture of the two as mutually exclusive.

Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason fits nicely into such confrontational view of morality, since he views egoism and benevolence as mutually exclusive because they are derived from ‘independent and fundamentally different sources,’ that is divided human nature. The individual is divided between, on the one hand, being ‘a whole in himself’ (justifies egoism) and, on
the other hand, being 'a part of a larger whole' (which justifies benevolence.) (Schneewind, 1977, 369)

It is this sort of dichotomous or confrontational view of morality which, when employed to frame the analysis of Green's Common Good, must yield the social service account and criticism of self-realization. Why so? Because framing the issue of self-realization in a confrontational way which pitches, as mutually exclusive, one's concern with one's interests against one's moral concern with others is capable of generating only either holist account (forsaking personal development for service to others) or individualist account (purely personal and private development excluding concern for others.) We have just seen that Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason captures the confrontational view of morality.

Such confrontational view of morality also propels Gaus' assessment of Green's self-realization, not least because Gaus maintains that although Sidgwick partly misses the reconciling force of the Common Good, ultimately, he has a profound point against Green insofar as his moral thinking cannot overcome the foundational counterposing of one's interest in one's own development and one's interest in the development of others. (Gaus, 1983, 63, 105) Hence, Gaus's critical comment 'that social service may very well call for courses of action inconsistent with the maximization of one's own individual development ...' (Gaus, 1983, 105) Though the confrontational view of morality is not as explicitly stated by Tyler, it nevertheless clearly informs his claim that Green's individual is required 'to perform actions which purely cultivate his own self as well as those actions which serve the development of other people. (121-2; emphases added) This clearly implies that one's own development and serving others are regarded as mutually exclusive.

I said above that two questions need answering. The first one concerned the nature of a non-dualist moral framework which justifies joint realizability account of self-realization. We have now seen that the non-dualist moral framework denies the confrontational view of morality and affirms the inseparability of one's personal well-being with moral concern for others. Framing the interpretation of the Common Good in terms of opposition between two mutually exclusive personal and moral concerns forecloses the possibility of taking seriously the joint realizability account of self-realization as a valid alternative to the social service account. Framing the Common Good in terms of the inseparability view of morality allows us to focus on mutual self-realiza-
tion as the substance of the Common Good which Green was searching for. But what would joint realizability look like? This is the second question to which I now turn.

What would joint realizability look like? Tyler describes the Common Good in terms of Raz’s idea of ‘inherent public good’, and accordingly as ‘a culture of cooperation for mutual moral improvement.’ (106) The idea of ‘inherent public good’ - which Raz describes as ‘collective good’ - is bound up with rejecting the confrontational view of morality. ‘If collective goods such as membership in a society are intrinsically valuable, then it is to be expected that they provide the source both of personal goals and obligations to others,’ and hence overcome the dualism and individualism of the confrontational view of morality. Similarly, insofar as the Common Good - a cooperative social scheme for the mutual development of all - is essential to, and constitutive of the possibility of everyone’s self-realization, then membership in the sense of supporting such social order is mutual service for one and others. Indeed, helping others to become effective members of the co-operative order (or, which is the same thing, making the social order an inclusive co-operative order) is not simply opposed to one’s concern with one’s own development, since such action is for a goal which is not instrumentally related to the individual, not something externally added to the pursuit of one’s own ends.

Raz’s view of the inseparability of morality and well-being suggests another aspect of joint realizability. He holds that people’s well-being depends on personal goals which in turn depend on social forms; if those social forms are morally sound then joint realizability follows because ‘(i)n their careers, personal relations and other interests, they will be engaged on activities which serve themselves and others at the same time.’ (Raz, 1986, 319) The italicized words capture the basic characteristic of joint realizability as neither holist (social service account) or individualist (‘purely personal cultivation of one’s self.’) This is how Green describes common-cum-joint nature of self-realization: ‘a good ... of which the pursuit by any individual is an equal service to others and to himself.’ (Green, 1906, 283) That is, mutual service is quite possible and unproblematic in normal time.

Equal (mutual) service may be achieved by ‘service vocation,’ which Blum puts forward in response to Care’s confrontational view of morality. Service vocation has the potential of forging ‘an intimate link between the service aspect of some life work and the self-realization aspect.’ (Blum, 1993,
This is because vocation is not seen as personal, private good in the sense that it is chosen or looked upon 'from the perspective of its impact on the purely individualist, or personal, aspect of the person's good.' (Blum, 1993, 196)

Both Raz's and Blum's notions of joint realizability as captured in mutual service may be extended to, and certainly are compatible with, the idea of the morality of social roles. The morality of social roles rests on non-confrontational view of morality and hence gives content and effect to joint realizability. The morality of social roles is central to Geoffrey Thomas's interpretation of Green's moral philosophy. (Thomas, 1987, 282-7) Tyler complains that Thomas simplifies Green's complex understanding of social life by associating a social role with only one practice. (89-90) This criticism notwithstanding, Thomas is quite right to claim that the morality of social role has the potential to give effect to joint realizability. This potential gains reality to the extent that one can choose one's social role, that the range of choice is meaningful, and to the extent that social roles are, to recall Raz's point about social forms, 'morally valid.'

MacIntyre maintains that the dichotomy of egoism and altruism emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the emergence of individualism. (MacIntyre, 1967, 462-6) To that extent, the confrontational view of morality, which rests on that opposition, is essentially individualist, as Raz indeed holds. The possibility of altruism arises as an issue only because an egoist view of the individual and social life is assumed (as Hobbes does and Aristotle does not). Inasmuch as social life is viewed as co-operative and not competitive, it gives rise to a single interest which does not admit of the dichotomy of egoism and altruism. Not admitting that dichotomy, however, does not have to necessarily result in assimilating either side to the other. Another option is to reveal the inadequacy of the dichotomy itself by taking seriously the terrain of (non-contingent) connectedness as Raz and Blum do. And so does Green by grounding the Common Good in the non-confrontational view of morality, which in turn, justifies joint realizability as the substance of the Common Good.

Let me conclude with my initial claim. The above discussion in no way detracts, but rather completes, Tyler's serious and highly scholarly study of Green. Scholars of Green and late nineteenth century British political thought should welcome Tyler's book and find it enriching.
Bibliography

All references to Green's writings are to sections, rather than pages; all other references are to pages.


Green, T.H., Prolegomena to Ethics, A.C. Bradley, editor, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1906 (1883).


