

ECO-ETHICA

VOLUME 5

ABSTRACTS / RÉSUMÉS

Part I / Première partie

Natural Environment / Environnement naturel

Peter KEMP, *Utopie et dystopie. Eco-ethica dans la crise socio-environnementale*

This paper tries to show that, in our criticism of society today, it is not enough to presuppose an idea of utopia but also to integrate an idea of dystopia into our reflections. The first two parts consider two documents that analyze the socio-environmental crisis of our world today: (1) the fifth assessment report published by *the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* in 2014, and (2) the Encyclical Letter of Pope Francis on *Care of Our Common Home*, which argues that there are not two different crises but one single socio-environmental crisis that threatens all life on our planet, and calls for a new ethics. The next two parts confront two philosophers, Ernst Bloch and Hans Jonas. Bloch has provided a strong defense of the utopian thinking but in a Marxist context, whereas Jonas has rejected all utopian thinking and replaced it with the idea of responsibility for the present world. Both thinkers need a more fundamental idea of hope.

Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, *Environnement, éthique et droit*

The 21st International Climate Conference (COP21) demonstrated that a global consensus is possible among 195 countries. For this reason, we could say that climate change is a chance (perhaps the last) for humanity.

It is indeed the only area where worldly governance now seems possible, although it also is needed to fight, for example, against global terrorism or to regulate international migration. – Through the ongoing experience concerning climate policy, a triple dynamic, which would establish a genuine global governance, can be drawn: recognizing interdependencies, regulating contradictions, making actors aware of their responsibilities. It is therefore urgent we learn the lessons of the COP 21.

Tilman BORSCHKE, *(Wie) lässt sich ethische Verantwortung für die natürliche Umwelt begründen? / (How) Can ethical responsibility for our natural environment be justified?*

Nature doesn't need our care, the environment does. "Our" environment is a relational term implying surroundings that are inhabitable, allowing us not only to survive but to live good lives. For ages our "natural" environment was un-

derstood as that part of our environment that was given by nature and, therefore, not accessible to human actions as are our cultural and social environments. We had to accept it and adapt to it. Nowadays we are faced with the fact that more and more parts of our natural environment can be and are altered or prevented from altering by human manipulations. So ethical responsibility is extending beyond the traditional fields of social and cultural environmental conditions. We will have to find answers to the new question of what kind of nature we want to preserve, to cultivate, and to build, and for whom and to whom we are responsible.

Jacob Dahl RENDTORFF, *Responsabilité et l'éthique de l'environnement. Vers une responsabilité technique, politique et économique pour un développement durable de la nature et de la société / Towards a Technological, Political and Economic Responsibility for Sustainable Development of Nature and Society*

This paper demonstrates the importance of the concept of responsibility as the foundation of an ethics of the environment, in particular in the fields of politics and economics in the modern civilization marked by globalization and technological progress. We can indeed observe a moralization of responsibility going beyond a strict legal definition in the development of an ethics of the environment. Accordingly, the concept of responsibility for the environment and for sustainability is the key notion of international development in order to understand the ethical duty of a modern technological civilization.

Manuel B. DY, Jr, *An Environmental Ethics from teaism*

This paper is a modest attempt to derive an environmental ethics of Teatism from Kakuzo Okakura's *The Book of Tea* and Daisetz T. Suzuki's *Zen and Japanese Culture*, for as both authors assert, Teatism is not just aestheticism but also religion and ethics with regards to the whole point of view about man and nature. The first part presents the main features of the Teatism, its brief history, the tea room and tea ceremony, and the philosophies behind it. The second part applies Max Scheler's axiological ethics, particularly his notion of love as a movement towards the enhancement of the value inherent in the beloved to the love of Nature expressed in the tea ceremony. An environmental ethics from Teatism would then mean developing a habit of harmonizing, revering, purifying and being joyful in poverty before the ephemeral, the ever-changing and self-forgetfulness of Nature, including our human nature.

Patrice CANIVEZ, *Éthique et environnement chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau*

This paper deals with the relationships between ethics and the environment in Rousseau's thought. The concept of environment is understood in its various dimensions. What is at stake is the natural, as well as the social and political, environment of human beings. The notion of ethics is also understood in a broad sense. We do not set ethics, understood as the search for happiness (or for the good life) against morality, understood as the fulfillment of duty. However, we take up two main questions. The first question concerns the influence of the

environment, both natural and social, upon the ethical development of human beings. The second question concerns the responsibility of human beings towards nature. We examine what Rousseau teaches us regarding these two questions. Finally, we envisage liberty from the point of view of the relationships between nature and the political order. Human liberty is a matter of rights. It depends upon the republican nature of the state. However, liberty is also a sentiment that is intimately related to the living experience of nature. In order to understand what Rousseau means by liberty, we must grasp this intimate relationship between nature and politics.

Bernard REBER, *Garder ouverte la question de la technique pour penser l'éthique environnementale*

Environmental ethic depends on technological ethics. We must therefore think of the technique with all its virtualities and not merely as an instrument. Heidegger's approach to technique avoids this reduction. Brought closer to the language it questions its essence. With modern technology that essence does not advance production but provocation, by which nature is ordered to deliver an energy that can be extracted for maximum utilization and lower costs. The way of producing poetry remains open yet. This article reads again this difficult text, indicates some limitations, and tries to take the better of its wealth for contemporary debate crossing environmental and technological ethics.

Part II / Partie II

Cultural Environment / Environnement culturel

Noriko HASHIMOTO, *Between Dehumanization and Nosism. Environmental Philosophy on Technology and Human*

The characteristic feature of modernized systematic environment is realized by one little, thin box named a smart phone or iPhone. By touching the surface, it can open various kinds of technologically magnified internet environment, and bring us into so-called world-wide information society. Our surrounding world is changed to a "technologically developed imaginary world", virtual reality, where we can live and enjoy. Through this instrument we will be an "anonymous person" for helping people but we may hurt another person's dignity. It is possible to hide one's own "self" behind the technological tool. People always look at the surface of smart phone and concentrate upon outer world without consciousness. It is the crisis of "self", because of a lack of thinking. Unfortunately, dehumanization will occur. But for solving transnational problems, for example global warming, refugees, etc., we must change our ethical attitude from *nosism* without any responsibility to an awakening consciousness or living together as "world citizens".

Peter McCORMICK, *Ethics and the European Cultural Environment: Emerging Collective Ethical Values Today?*

Moral naturalism in Europe and elsewhere today is the view that only the natural sciences can satisfactorily analyze the ethical value of persons. Many thoughtful people appear still to believe that the natural sciences can “reduce” the distinctive ethical value of persons ultimately to microphysical terms. Such an apparently widespread belief in part of the EU cultural environment today, however, raises serious questions. – In this EU context and in the Symposium contexts of Tomonobu Imamichi’s (1922-2012) eco-ethical concerns about “a new ethics for our new times,” I would like to offer here two sets of critical observations in support of non-naturalistic accounts of the ethical value of persons. The first group comprises reasons why even some impressive contemporary forms of scientific ethical naturalisms of the person continue to be surprising. And the second, briefer set comprises several elements only of what a non-naturalistic ethics of the person might require.

Pierre-Antoine CHARDEL, *Quand la communication perd la parole. Lecture d’Emmanuel Lévinas*

If Emmanuel Lévinas does not develop a criticism of audiovisual technologies, sometimes even granting them hermeneutical virtues, he remains mindful of the risks incurred by societies that are increasingly determined by these technologies. In this article we want to underline the fact that, for Lévinas, considerable distraction can be generated by information technology, which risks neutralizing the experience of living speech. Compared to these risks, a certain ethical urgency must serve as a reminder that, if the responsibility is not just a figure of speech, it demands we question the way in which we understand images in our societies that may be fully configured by the flow of information, and the way we understand how the other is revealed to us through screens.

Robert BERNASCONI, *Islamophobia as a Racism*

The distinction between xenophobia and racism is sometimes used to deny that Islamophobia is a racism. I challenge this strategy by tracing that distinction back to the formation of the term *racism* by Franz Boas, Julian Huxley, and Ashley Montagu, that culminated in the UNESCO Statement on Race in 1950. By showing the connection between their understanding of racism and the deployment in this context of further distinctions, such as that between race and religion, or that between nature and culture, and by recalling the ideological purpose the use of these distinctions were intended to serve, I deploy a genealogical approach to show that Islamophobia is a racism. Racism cannot be identified through the use of analytically established distinctions when what is at issue is the discriminatory behavior which is at its heart. Antiracism needs to learn to be as flexible in its thinking as racism appears to be.

David RASMUSSEN, *The Pragmatic Turn in Democratic Theory*

The pragmatic turn away from epistemology could mean a number of things for the definition of the future of political theory. First, political liberalism would mark a distinct departure from comprehensive liberalism that is based solely on epistemological justification of fundamental liberal notions. Second, the pragmatic turn would cause Rawls to modify his long-time emphasis on constructivism, moving from Kantian constructivism to political constructivism, and implicitly adopting more substantive approach. Third, the fact of pluralism would radically open up the question of the foundation for consensus, which would lead to an emphasis on constitutionalism. Fourth, this move, innovative as it was, would lead to the establishment of an association between constitutional interpretation and public reason. Finally, this set of moves associated with the pragmatic turn would essentially set up a series of constraints when it comes to evaluating public reason from an international perspective.

Part III / Partie III On Paul Ricœur / Sur Paul Ricœur

Bengt Kristensson UGGLA, *Coping with Academic Schizophrenia*

The aim of this article is to cope with the academic schizophrenia and the anthropological deficit of contemporary social theory by a comparative investigation of Christian Smith and Paul Ricœur. Two interrelated “gaps” are identified: the “external” gap, which has to do with the brutal, yet seldom recognized, contrast between the naïve, uncritical praise of humanism in public life, and the theoretical anti-humanism of the strong versions of the predominant poststructuralist and postmodern epistemologies within human and social sciences – and the “internal” gap associated with the academic schizophrenia of scholars who systematically disconnect scholarly theory and personal experience, description of facts from normative convictions. In order to provide resources to cope with these challenges, the author turns to Smith and Ricœur, considered as two different versions of contemporary personalism.

Richard KEARNEY, *‘Between Flesh and Text: Ricœur’s Carnal Hermeneutics’*

This essay explores how Paul Ricœur analyses the body as both flesh and text. Beginning with a phenomenology of embodiment and life in his early philosophy of the will, after his hermeneutic turn in the 1960s he concentrated more on the mediation of flesh through textual interpretation and language. This led Ricœur beyond Husserl and Levinas and closer to the work of Merleau-Ponty. His later writing opens horizons for rethinking the ‘flesh of the world’ in new ontological and ethical ways.

Jean-Luc AMALRIC, *L'articulation de l'éthique et du politique dans l'horizon d'une philosophie de l'acte* (Deuxième partie) / *The Articulation of Ethics and Politics in the Perspective of a Philosophy of the Act* (2nd part)

The aim of this paper is to show the anthropological resources of Ricœur's philosophy of the act, in order to elaborate a living articulation of ethics and politics that avoids the deadlock which represents the idea of a complete divorce between moral idealism and political realism. In this second part, it defends the thesis that the reconquest of an "ethical-political teleology" is only possible to the extent that, in Ricœur, the reappropriation of the "ethical originary affirmation" takes a radically critical form. Then it tries to show how this critical approach is likely to lead to a release of the mediating power of social imaginary, which always complements and precedes our acts.

Johann MICHEL, *On Narrative Substitution*

The aim of this paper is, first, to test the hypothesis whereby narrativity constitutes an *existential* in the Heideggerian sense. Second, the author renews his appeal for a pluralism of possible modes of self-employment, without presupposing any separation between pre-narrative experience and narrative experience. Finally, he devotes some time to a discussion with Strawson and Ricœur on the limits of narrative or, more accurately, to limit-narrativity as a form of narration impeded as a result of traumatic experiences. The article then introduces the concept of narrative substitution in highlighting the role played by others and by *third-person narrators* who substitute themselves for the inability to self-employ. – Key-words: narrativity, Ricœur, Strawson, traumatic experiences, self-employment.