In this paper, we suggest an updated idea about the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Its historical meaning is in the transition from metaphysics to transcendentalism, from the realistic model of the world to the postmodernist one. We demonstrate that transcendental phenomenology is a forerunner of structural and information revolutions. It developed the categories that appear speculative counter-parts of the conceptual apparatus of informationalism. The “keyword” of phenomenology is noema = a thing of consciousness = a mental consciousness thing, which is information about a thing. Transcendental-cognitive modelling turns all things into numbers. It results in a denial of humanity and their life-world by technoscience. Husserl seems to be the first ideologist and, at the same time, the first critic of the Transmodern era.

Keywords: transcendentalism, Husserl, phenomenology, noema, information, postmodern, subject, agent, digitalism.
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Предлагается обновленное представление о развитии философии в XX веке. Его исторический смысл в переходе от метафизики к трансцендентализму, от реалистической модели мира к постмодернистской. Показано, что трансцендентальная феноменология является предтечей структурно-информационной революции. В ней разрабатывались категории, которые можно считать спекулятивными аналогами понятийного аппарата информационизма. Ключевое «слово» феноменологии: нозма = вещь сознания = мысленная вещь есть информация о вещи. Трансцендентально-когнитивное моделирование превращает все сущее в количество. Это ведет к отрицанию технонаукой человека и его жизненного мира. Гуссерль — первый идеолог и одновременно критик эпохи транс-модерна.

Ключевые слова: трансцендентализм, Гуссерль, феноменология, нозма, информация, постмодерн, субъект, агент, дигитализм.

The name of the programmatic phenomenological article by E. Husserl “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” (Logos 1910) was translated into English as “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (the Russian version is quite close — «Философия как строгая наука»). This is obviously not a rigorous translation, however the original title in German may also be considered non-strict. Moreover, the word “rigorous” itself is a metaphorical concept, rather than a rigorous notion. Apparently, the “Philosophy as an exact science” would be a more adequate translation. The “exact” here means liberated from qualitative characteristics, raw sensory data, value parameters, and any externalist components referring to theoretical knowledge. The “exact” means pure, quantitative, formalizable and amenable to mathematization. As science moved from naturalism and empiricism to logicism, and new achievements were made in mathematics, that old dream of “exact knowledge” began to seem closer to implementation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, H. Cohen, P. Natorp and other Marburg’s neo-Kantians were striving for it. In the end, they suggested a radical solution, which found hundreds of supporters, – completely abandon the onto-
logical prerequisites, leaving solely epistemology, or knowledge as such. With that, everything seemed fine, though not completely. It turned out that, despite all efforts, the real-phenomenal world continued to tempest around that abstract-theoretical-mathematical ivory tower, repeatedly threatening to ruin it.

In such a context, Husserl faced the task to take into account and express the being of things in the process of knowing, while not leaving them as “things-in-themselves” (Kant), which means not to reject them as neo-Kantians do and, yet, not to break the theoretical purity of knowledge. In other words, to unite the ice of rational knowledge with the flame of the Living Being (with its aliveness and dynamism of everything and everyone) in the way that the first would survive and the latter – keep its high temperature, as magnetic fields would retain the energy of the plasma. Kant is a gnoseolog(ist) – Husserl is an ontological Kant. How did the latter manage to carry out such a philosophical “cold nuclear synthesis,” which physicists have yet to obtain?

For that matter, he needed to look at the human consciousness from a new angle and, thus, he saw that the latter per se possesses the property to embrace the Being, that it is intentional – directed towards the world and absorbs the world into itself. The human consciousness is always about something (aboutness), since we cannot touch anything without being aware of it. Just as the eye cannot help but see, the ear – listen, and the nose – smell, in case they are able to function, the same way our consciousness cannot help but embrace and reproduce reality. That being so, the world fell into the web / trap of our consciousness / thinking, ceasing to be a thing-in-itself and, yet, not soiling it with empiricism, for it lacks its subjective substratum. It is represented as the interaction of relations, i.e. “in the material of consciousness.” The world is enclosed in brackets, but acts as a term of the equation in the process of the awareness of the world and, by that, is included in the solution of all its problems. In fact, this meant that Husserl foresaw, in the speculative-philosophical manner, and, after F. Brentano, approached the future structuralists’ ideas (F. de Saussure, A. Bogdanov), and he did it in a more profound way. Furthermore, as we intend to demonstrate in our paper, Husserl also approached the idea of information, and implicitly began to rely on it in all his further approaches to the problems that confronted him, and in all his ideas about the structure of the world. Here, we refer to the information theory, which, in line with the general
tendencies in the evolution of co-knowledge, was originating at that moment and beginning to unfold on its own basis – within sciences, especially mathematics, which led, after 50 years, to the “revolution of the worlds” and the information age.

Information is the answer to the many fundamental questions posed earlier by Kant in his efforts to explain the interaction of sensuality and reason, as well as the nature of synthetic judgments, transcendental apperception, etc. Husserl, although not fixing the notion of information as such and, yet, using its semantic analogues, advanced much further in resolving long-standing philosophical problems. The basis for information theory is the provision that qualitatively diverse objects, as well as messages related to them, can be expressed in a common language and in a “strict” manner = quantitatively measured. By such a quantitative measure, we can compare any phenomena of being, regardless of the form in which they are clothed. Information is universal and apodictic. It enables us to approach the world from a single standpoint and create its holistic theoretical model, which would comprise the “content” and, at the same time, be pure and precise – in other words, formalized. Nowadays, the tendency to consider the transcendentalist Kant-Husserl theme by ignoring such a powerful and developed apparatus as the information theory, as if it never existed, seems at least unproductive and, for the most part, interesting only to scholars focused narrowly on Kant / Husserl studies, often zealously grinding their texts without correlating them to contemporary contexts. In the meantime, the information theory has already become “post-modern,” while Husserl is the forerunner of postmodernism. With that, postmodernism has to be understood not in a vulgar and superficial way, but rather as a culturological naming for the great twentieth-century information revolution. Postmodernism is informationalism.

When solving Kant's problem of achieving the apodictic = universally valid = universal knowledge, that is, the creation of a rigorous = exact = scientific philosophy, Husserl initially acts in defiance of Kant, as a radical anti-Kantian. He rejects his main principle of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, as well as the separation of consciousness from things-in-themselves. In doing so, Husserl calls to go “back to the 'things themselves’” [Husserl, 2001, p. 168] and, what is more, not just to things-substances with their primary qualities, but to things-phenomena, in all their completeness, i.e. back to being. Through intentionality, he re-
moves the a priori-a posteriori antithesis, synthesizing Kantianism and the Berkeley-Hume line; at the same time, he solves the problem of Cartesian dualism, combining extended “by definition” things and unextended “by definition” mind (thinking). In his approach, phenomena of consciousness are endowed with thingness, objectiveness, and factuality, while things – with consciousness, mentality, and essentiality. Thus, consciousness is also being, though encompassing things rather than being “purified” from them, as it used to be with the former idealists. The traditional a priori-a posteriori, sensually rational, material-ideal, subject-object opposition, which tormented the entire metaphysical philosophy throughout its history, seems to have been eliminated. For centuries, philosophers have longed to achieve the monism – and, thus, it has been reached. The solution seems truly brilliant, making Husserl the original pioneer of the new, post-metaphysical era.

Has the opposition, indeed, been eliminated? Has he provided the solution? Yes! Or ... better say, as though.

The point is that the solution has already been found in the “other world.” Hence, “for us,” an integral body-spirit person, it is as though: we are not talking about material (spatial, extended) things but about “things of consciousness,” “facts of thought.” To return “to things,” Husserl performs a transcendental-phenomenological reduction, suspending “the natural attitude,” i.e. the world of objects, and refers to phenomena as mental things, i.e. noemata. Back to the things themselves means back “to the noemata themselves” as nonsubstrate moments / units of consciousness (“noema,” from the Greek – thought, essence, form). Back to things unextended, not affected by space and time. Chairs might be broken, houses might collapse or be burnt, and humans might die – but their meaning, noema, essence, structure, and form – they will remain. Thought-forms = information about (from, after) them – will be preserved. Information is transcendental – “eternal,” while people and all flesh are mortal and finite.

The “things of consciousness” are Husserl's key invention, which enabled him to solve the problem of the relationship between the sensory and the mental by transferring it to the transcendental level of synthesis between the single and the general, realism and nominalism (speaking in terms of medieval philosophy). Things of consciousness = things of thinking = mental things = bodies of thinking = mental (consisting of thought) bodies. “Bodies” = (no) bodies = noemata. These, however, are not signs of bodies
existing somewhere but rather (no) bodies themselves. Speaking in other (contemporary) words, things and bodies as thoughts and noemata are information about things and bodies. Unlike Plato’s Ideas (Eidos), these are not images, since they are transcendental = “without psychology”; likewise, these are not Aristotle’s forms, since they are phenomenal = do not include matter / material. In place of things, there come the relationships, their intersections, and the nodes of the relationships, which, running ahead, would be defined as a structure in the 30s and bits in the 50s. In place of being of things, their objective reality, there comes the informational reality, the virtuality. In the Universe of information, being acts as thought and thought acts as being. Thus, Husserl approached, discovered and speculatively outlined the contours of the information theory. The contours of an unfamiliar world, since the notion of “information” would appear in encyclopedias later in the second half of the twentieth century. This is his greatest achievement, though still not appreciated. The philosophers’ respect for Husserl is global; however, the reasons for it and the gist of his discovery remain not clear enough, since nowadays he seems to be respected just for the sophistication and incomprehensibility.

Perhaps, after all, because of the vague understanding that today we actually live in the “Husserl’s world” – the world of noemata, – millions of people, by overcoming the “natural attitude,” are engaged in “phenomenological reduction,” “noesis” – they translate things in the information state. People maintain and serve computers. They make things-in-themselves essences as things-in-consciousness, units of meaning, things of consciousness. They make them thought-forms, virtuals, concepts, characters, and singularities. They make them simulacra. All this happens in practice when we become the “office plankton,” ¹ transforming into a tool and gradually into the material of (for) the new informational reality, its sub-data. Transcendental phenomenology considers phenomena of consciousness as things-entities and facts-ideas. It raises their status to existence. This, however, is the existence of the other, second world. Furthermore, under our very eyes, this second world is developing into the first, meanwhile the first, both material and ideal, both natural and transcendental, is passing into the second. There is a universal cry that the great information revolution has occurred, that we are living in the information world and have en-

¹ The pejorative term referring to office employees especially those having little or average skill and/or knowledge.
tered the information society. This, hurray or alas, is a substantial, substantial-phenomenological, existential truth. The truth of the self-apocalypse of the human lifeworld happening in full view of all those who are witnessing its decomposition. We are witnessing its degradation in the new.

Noemata or nous, the noumenal, mental world has always been opposed to the phenomenal world. The peculiarity and trickery of Husserl's “ontology as though it were” is that he redefined noumena as phenomena. Put differently, phenomena that earlier have meant something sensual, exactly real, and anthropomorphic, are acquiring the abstract status of noumena. Intelligible things are couched as actual, while the artificial – as the natural. Hence, the sensually objective world is sublimed into the noumenal, in other words, the transcendental, and, at once, rendered as the phenomenal. The “old” phenomenal world of things no longer exists, not necessary any more either as a substance or as a phenomenon. The same is true with regard to ideas-images and the whole “psychology.” The noumenological = noemological reduction is pictured and referred to as phenomenological, completely embracing being (the being of objects). Contemplation contemplates the essence as an essential being but does not contemplate and does not consider existence in any sense [Husserl, 2001, p. 214] – this might be accentuated as the key position of Husserl's philosophy = a pitfall, which the anthropomorphic empirical reality is falling into. Essence has being but existence does not. This is an upside-down displacement of the worlds along the Möbius strip! By this way, Husserl is a herald of artificial reality and the notorious constructive realism, while the transcendental phenomenology is the first (philosophical) expression for the emergence of digital scholars, zombies, cyborgs, robots, etc. – to the end of our world.

At the new point of the assemblage of the world (or the point of assemblage of the new world), on the other side of the “Möbius band,” the transcendental appears as real, which means that the other, pure, beyond-(post)- human appears as if it were “ours.” Accordingly, secondary phenomena, not possessing their own being-existence, are now embracing not only “secondary qualities” associated with the subjectivity of perception but everything that has been considered a substance, including Kant's contemplation of space-time, that is the entire substrate physical Universe! The first world is being absorbed by the second – the process that in practice is still taking place. Our life reality is experiencing the process of self-negation (from the destruction of the external nature to the decomposition
of the inner one, including even sexuality). At the same time, two worlds are still considered existing, though already in Husserl only one remained, positioned as unified, unique and true. Solely true, universal and eternal, like structures in structuralism and information in informationalism. The world as a “Big Computer,” though, to be exact, without “hard-ware” – its soft, the Matrix. In other words, it is what different advanced (self-) killers are dreaming about – virtual worlds, information landscapes and other forms of transforming the Earth into a dead planet. The transcendental phenomenological idea is a structural-functional-constructive-information-digital-robotics idea (coming in place of the natural metaphysical idea – substrate-substantial-real-onto-anthropo-semantic).

In the first third of the twentieth century, that idea was floating in the air grasped somehow by a variety of theoretical movements. In the social sciences and humanities it became apparent mainly in structuralism, structural and functional methodology, while in the Natural and Formal sciences it manifested as diverse theories of information, organization and management. Instead of things, there came systems (the empirical level of complexity) and structures (the theoretical level of complexity). The era of “noemata” was beginning – as units of structure in cybernetics, genetics, computer science, etc. In any capacity, it was the reality of pure relations, the transition from identity to difference (qualitative level), and then to “discernment” (quantitative level); from substrateness and substantialism to functionalism (fictionalism) and potentialism, when “first comes the flight, and then the bird”; first comes the function, the number and the action, and then the thing, the object and the result. All things are the number. The numeral! That is the ideal comprehension of being, as claimed by science in the twentieth century. It was the beginning of the emerging nootechnosphere, a design and constructivist paradigm and a practice of producing the artificial world, right up to the artificial (finally, beingly pure!) mentality as the precursor of artificial intelligence. The transcendental phenomenological idea of philosophy as a rigorous science was still a rather inexact speculative-philosophical premonition and expression (reflection) of it. Yet, in fact, quite an adequate reflection. Husserl is the first philosopher to “make a throw” in the twenty-first century. The great herald of the Death of the human race, its replacement by artificial forms of existence. Whether he knew it or not, whether he wanted it or not – now, by
entering the Fourth industrial revolution aimed to replace people with technology in all spheres of life, we are able to judge about it in a better way.

It is generally accepted that the “late” Husserl abandoned the task of constructing a universal, precise, and mathematized philosophy. The concept of the lifeworld is kind of an acknowledgement that the idea of transcendentalism is impossible to implement; it is also a return to the natural attitude, to the acceptance of things-in-themselves. The situation, though, seems more complicated. His focus shifted towards the problem of intersubjectivity of consciousness that was quite consistent with the shifts in the development of science. He sought the answer to the old philosophical question – how to combine the objective apodicticity of knowledge and the individual subjectivity of human consciousness without falling into solipsism or relying on non-knowledge preconditions – on a new, “post-metaphysical” path. Since he was ahead of his time, Husserl considered and reconsidered, by trial and error, sometimes painfully, almost all the great rationalist movements. In search of their Absolute (along with the lifeworld), he finally turned ... to “The Monadology” by Leibniz.

In the context of our interpretation aimed at the historical meaning of the transcendental phenomenology, this seems quite logical. Quite justified and natural. Leibniz is a philosopher-mathematician, an inventor of the differential calculus and the first experimenter on the creation of digital machines. The history of computer science starts from Leibniz, whose ontology represents the world as a plurality of monads. Monads are simple, non-spatial, incorporeal substances, indivisible, insular, not having “windows” and “devoid of a soul.” All this closely resembles noumenal essences, phenomenological units, noemata, introduced for the philosophy as a rigorous science. In the 1930s, Husserl began to treat his phenomenology precisely as a transcendental monadology and became a “Leibnizian” [See Savin, 2009].

Like Leibniz, he faces the fatal problem of connecting such insular, isolated from each other elements of this transcendental reality. How do they interact and how, in this case, should we constitute the single, universal, shared world? Leibniz found a way out in postulating a pre-established harmony, some kind of a remnant of the appeal to God. Husserl did not want, and could not substantiate the unity of the world by God, since he lived in the twentieth century and, furthermore, such substantiation engenders a non-knowledge factor; it is an “impurity.” The rigour, accuracy and
necessity for a quantitative modelling the world are violated here. Instead, Husserl postulates or accepts the possibility of some “intentional intertwining” of monads, when the consciousness of each monad is directed at every other and thereby encompasses them all. It results in a universal relationship between them, kind of a peculiar plurality in a unity, a functioning integrity. Has the solution been found? Nearly yes but it needs some strengthening. For this, the existence of a specific First Monad is postulated, which specifies the type and ways, triggers and directs the process of such intertwining. The interaction “becomes animated,” the interlacing starts functioning. Here, any historian of philosophy can say that the First Monad resembles the old metaphysical “arché,” a creative substance, which again threatens transcendental phenomenology with a violation of its theoretical-noumenological rigour. However, if we take a look not back into the history but forward into the present / future, this retrospective monadology begins to resemble something more than promising ...

Husserl “came close to,” but did not know and did not utter the magic word, which would easily solve all his difficulties in explaining the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. This word is communication. Communication is what binds many different elements into a whole. It is about awakened (flustered), activated, pulsating, transmitted back and forth, and “clicking” information, its “live,” functional hypostasis. Communication is an anthropologized state of information through which it is being subjectivized, revealed to humanity, getting closer to us. Along with it, intrinsically, they are the same thing. In the information world, communication is no longer seen as a link between things, bodies and subjects, i.e. a way of transferring the content. It is being ontologized: as H.M. McLuhan enunciated at the end of the twentieth century, media is message. The place of God or matter is now being occupied by Communication. In the information world, it proceeds axiomatically, like the air we breathe, and does not need further justification. In the digital world, Communication represents the Being-in-itself.

Husserl “came close to,” but did not know and did not utter the other magic word, which should take the place of monads. This word is an agent, or concept, singularity, personage. Agents-concept-singularities-personages are active, however, not laden with the “internal.” Thus, they are subjective without subjectivity; they are functions of the resident, while the resident is the agent of another resident, and all together, they form actual “interlacing
intentionalities” – the Network! That is the third magic word characterized in Husserl as “an interlacement” (which could be translated as a “web”), though not uttered. Individuals forming society are transforming into agents, bloggers and digital scholars living in an intentional web = a network. The Network, the Internet, the inteLnet – what are these if not the interlacing meanings of consciousness articulated through agents! Agents might be alive and not alive, actual and possible. Their interaction in the network is not by virtue of the pre-established harmony but is intentional and directional. Where and how – this is determined by the Program, which is the next magic word, an analogue of the First Monad, non-existent at that time either. A program is an “order of writing,” an alternation of traces and differences (according to Derrida), or, speaking in terms of science, – a bit of information. It defines the type and methods, organizes and launches interactions between monad-agents. The principle of the world universally programmed by the First Monad says, “It’s all from bits”. The program of programs is the Matrix, once an egg and now arché, God, etc. The Matrix is the God of the Information Age. The ontology of communication, concepts, network, program, matrix, a priori of communication by K.-O. Apel, the transcendental empiricism by G. Deleuze, Derrida’s grammatology and many other words unprecedented in metaphysics are genetically rooted in the ideas, approaches, and descriptions of the phenomenological philosophy. All of them have found their justification in science of the second half of the twentieth century, the time when the theory of information and communication, cognitivism and virtuality studies emerged. Transcendental phenomenology is a philosophy of the information-communication revolution and the postmodern era.

As befits philosophy with its cultural-historical mission, transcendental phenomenology ideologically envisaged, “foresaw” the latter, which is primarily due to Husserl. Addressing the main question of philosophy – “what is life?” – by all his ideas he answered: “to exist means to be possible” [Husserl, 1950, p. 114]. In other words, he tackled it in favour of potentialism and virtualism, and, eventually, non-existence, since Nothing possesses an infinite number of possibilities. In Husserl, being is nothing, and nothing as potency is non-being, other-being, being = phenomenon, the status of which is presently attributed to virtual realities, which are gradually taking the place of our being, Sein and Dasein, having crossed it out, and turning it into nothing, while they themselves are featured as a substance
and “genuine being.” Although in the Husserlian model of the world, the information being, which he actually discovered, appears as being as such, incorporating any of its forms, this substitution is innocent, a self-deception, since at that time the new reality had yet to emerge. The posthuman world of virtualism was barely visible. Even now, instead of recognizing the objective nature of a techno-information communication as a condition for the transcendence of modern cognitive science, such communication is being explained through the general significance of intersubjective communications of living people. While preaching death, the old transcendentalists did not want to die themselves, and even now not everyone writing on the intersubjectivity is ready for this [Pavlenko, 2012]. An incoherency is evident here.

A(n) (un)conscious struggle with traditional being and being in general was led by the next generations of the information revolution ideologists, the heralds and “thunderbirds” of its escalation into the higher “positive” phase of digitalism and cognitive-constructive meonism, as the formation of the being of the Other. The “after us” world. One can observe an increasing number of necrophiles, ideologists of the “death of humanity” (a postmodernism brand) and our replacement by immortal intelligent artifacts, robots with artificial intelligence (a transhumanism emerging brand) or, broadly, by kind of a post-vital “informational” field which the planet Earth will be rapidly growing into [See Cheklecov, 2010]. We might also expect an uprising of technoids or a “mutant revolution” against nature and life. The decisive stage here is, apparently, going to be the Fourth technological revolution that comes after the agricultural, industrial, and information ones. This revolution involves the exclusion of humanity from economic activities and our replacement by various artificial systems. First, from economics and then, from other domains. Exclusion from the lifeworld. Making us unnecessary. Parasites. Yet, after losing their master, parasites would not live long. Everything is going to be replaced by the virtual-communication Internet of Everything (cheerful anticipations of all technocrats) and the Subject Technos. Husserl is a genial herald; first, an apologist, and then, in parallel, an author of the philosophy of the lifeworld, a critic of the scientogenic, practical-technological self-apocalypse of earthly existence occurring in step with humanity entering the era of transmodern [See Kutyrev, 2005]. Indeed, he is a Philosopher of the other (our) time.
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