Experience and Language

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1.

The topic of our meeting this year is one that is at the center of the Christian theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When theology as the pronouncement of the meaning of Scripture lost credibility, Protestants turned to religious experience as the ground for theology. Here Schleiermacher is the key figure. Schleiermacher and those who followed him assumed that religious experience is experience of the divine reality, and that through it something about the divine reality is known.

Based on his understanding of the universality of religious experience, Schleiermacher began the tradition of interpreting Christianity as one religion among others, one way among others of bodying forth the common religious experience. Of course, those in this tradition went on to claim a superior, or final, place for Christianity as the ideal religion or the fulfillment of religion. Paul Tillich is the last great theologian to adopt this approach, but the general notion of a universal religious experience, with diverse particular manifestations, underlies a great deal of what still goes on in religious studies, in philosophy of religion, and in interreligious dialogue.

The dogmatic theology, which this one was designed to replace, has repeatedly reasserted itself. Karl Barth is the greatest example in the twentieth century. For him Christianity is not one religion among others. It is the witness to what God has done. In Barth’s view, the act of God is not the generation of religious experience but the salvation of the world. Although there may be religious experiences among Christians as among others, these are natural phenomena like any other, and thoroughly ambiguous in light of Jesus Christ.

Another great alternative was offered by Hegel. For him the horizon for the understanding of Christianity is that of the spiritual history of the human race or, more precisely, the history of Spirit. In this approach there is no interest in a religious a priori or in a common religious element in all experience. The differences of cultures are in view. Again, as in Schleiermacher, the diverse cultures are so ordered that the Christian one appears as the culmination of the history of Spirit.

In the twentieth century the Hegelian claim to the demonstrable superiority of Christianity has broken down. Troeltsch was the first to announce its collapse. It has been superseded by a thoroughgoing relativism or historicism. There is much more tendency simply to describe diversity
without assigning relative values. For theologians, this can be combined with a confessional approach derived from a modified Barthianism. Recognizing that Christianity is but one among many ways of being in the world, the theologian’s task is not to demonstrate its superiority in terms of some supposedly neutral criteria, but simply to articulate its vision for believers. If there is a mainstream in contemporary Protestant theology, it is probably best described in some such terms as these. On the other hand, Catholic theologians in general continue to be interested in religious experience as universal.

The historical relativism, expressed in the Protestant mainstream, could be taken to intend that there are multiple ways of responding to common elements in reality. It was, therefore, open to the possibility that in all religious traditions the one divine reality is experienced. In this limited sense, historical relativists could accept a universal element in religious experience, even though they could not use this as a starting point for inquiry or as a source of norms for the evaluation of the several religions. The fact that the ways of apprehending reality are diverse, and no universal religious experience can be detected in them, does not entail that there is no common reality to which they all attest.

But as a result of idealism in general, and of the linguistic turn in particular, this qualification of relativism has been challenged. To whatever extent languages themselves constitute the worlds in which people live, rather than referring to a nonlinguistic world, the elements of language refer to one another and have their meaning only in their interconnection. Hence, differences of language are differences of reality. The possibility of communication between people belonging to different communities of discourse becomes a mystery. Sometimes the possibility is simply denied.

Increasingly, theologians are adopting the notion that religious communities are cultural-linguistic systems. To be a Christian is to use a certain language in appropriate ways. One’s world is that cultural-linguistic system.

I see many problems for Christian faith and theology in the position I have described, but it seems to me to be even more evidently unacceptable from the Buddhist point of view. Buddhists are keenly aware of the great power of language to shape the lived world. But this does not lead them to take as their goal the socialization of people into a particular cultural-linguistic system, namely, the Buddhist one. On the contrary, the goal is to become free of the control of every cultural-linguistic system so that things may be experienced just as they are. Whereas the present tendency in this country in both theology and religious studies seems to be to deny that there is any such thing as non-linguistic experience, or even a distinguishable non-linguistic component in any experience, Buddhists must affirm, it seems to me, a dimension of “pure experience,” untainted by language.
The current scholarly polemic against “pure experience” does not have the Buddhist experience in mind. Wayne Proudfoot’s book on religious experience, for example, assumes throughout that religious experience has a subject-object structure. Buddhists could agree that any experience that retains this structure cannot be “pure.” They could also see language as inextricably involved in all this experience. Hence, even if Proudfoot is essentially correct, Buddhist affirmations can emerge unscathed. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how different the context of discussion has become! It is not easy to talk about pure experience with those who are committed to language as the horizon of being!

I have suggested several options in relating language and experience, with special reference to religious experience. One is to find that dimension of all experience which is the relation to the divine or to ultimate reality. This dimension can be distinguished from all other aspects of experience, although it never occurs apart from them. It is itself not linguistic, although language is used to point to it and to articulate the nature of divine reality as known in it.

A second option is to hold that there is no experience, and no distinguishable element in experience, that is not linguistic through and through. Hence there can be no dimension of experience that informs us of a divine reality. What is known as divine is a function of the use of language within a cultural-linguistic system.

A third option is the Buddhist one as I understand it. One can agree that there is no nonlinguistic experience of a divine object, that all subject-object experience is linguistic, and that all linguistic experience has this structure. One can then affirm that this structure can be broken through precisely as the power of language is overcome. Thus there can be realized a pure experience which is always there, underlying the linguistic one.

2.

It is now my task to discuss a Whiteheadian view of language and experience against the background of these schematically indicated options. It is quite different from any of them, although I think that a full development of a Buddhist view and a full development of a Whiteheadian one may converge in many respects. That is for us to explore.

Perhaps a useful point of beginning will be to say that for Whitehead many features of the relation of experience and language are best thought of as dialectical. Suppose that there is a tree in my field of vision. I may be thinking about other things, so that I am not verbalizing to myself the presence of the tree, but it is still part of my experience. This part of my experience can be distinguished from my linguistic experience at that
moment, but does that mean that the experience of the tree is non-linguistic? No. Even the visual experience that I am having is different because of my earlier experiences which have included naming this kind of entity a tree. I connect the present tree with past ones that I have seen in ways that have been made possible and necessary for me through the use of language. Seeing the tree arouses expectations, not linguistically articulated in this case, that it would not arouse apart from the influence of a particular language. The emotions that are connected with seeing the tree are deeply affected by my past linguistic experience. Thus the apparently nonlinguistic aspects of my present experience are what they are because of language in general and because of the distinctive experience I have had with language in particular. In all these respects, those who emphasize how language is pervasively constitutive of human experience are correct.

Unfortunately, these thinkers often fail to emphasize how experience is also constitutive of language. What I think and say about trees is not merely the result of the general structures of the English language and what I have heard others who use that language say about trees. It is also influenced by my very particular experience. Furthermore, the language would make no sense to me if, even when words were for me nothing more than noise, I had not already had sensory experience of some sort. The language ordered something that preceded it. It did not produce the world of sensory phenomena out of nothing. Even after some initial ordering occurs through language, I may have sensory experiences that cause me to question that ordering. I may struggle to find a better ordering through changing the language in some way.

Although I hope this simple example will communicate what I mean by calling the relation dialectical, I should add that it is not fully dialectical. In a fully dialectical relation, the two dialectically-related entities have identical or at least comparable ontological status and neither can exist apart from the other. This is not the case here. For Whitehead the use of the term “language” can be misleading in this respect. It gives the impression that there is such a thing as either language in general or a particular language. It substantializes and reifies language. But in fact language exists nowhere other than in the people who use it. It is an abstraction from these more concrete entities. A great deal can usefully be said about this abstraction, but when its abstract character is forgotten, and especially when it is assigned causal force, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness has been committed.

For Whitehead, matters are quite different when the talk is of experience. Of course, experience in general is an abstraction, too. But it is an abstraction from what is alone concrete, namely, experiences or, as Whitehead likes to put it, “occasions of experience.” The locus of language must finally be in such occasions of experience, and what is present in such occasions is not language as such or, even a particular language, but linguistic activity and
linguistically informed feelings. When we speak of the relation of experience
and language, we are finally speaking of the relation of the totality of an
occasion of experience to its linguistic aspects. There are occasions of
experience, even in human life, before there is any direct presence of
linguistic elements. (I say “direct,” because the environment of the infant is
pervaded by language and its effects.) But there cannot be any language at
all apart from occasions of experience.

To this strong statement of the priority of experience over language it can
be replied that by experience one means human experience, and that human
experience is linguistic experience. In this view, the infant becomes human
only as she or he enters into language. Similarly, as we consider our
evolutionary ancestry, we would consider the emergence of the human to be
identical with the emergence of language.

There are technical problems with this approach. One would have to ask
whether it entails that no other animals have language. If they do, does that
make them human also? If it is replied that no other animals have human
language, two further difficulties arise. First, is not the definition circular?
Second, since some chimpanzees have learned to use significant elements of
our language, does that make them human?

Setting aside all such problems, there is no reason to question the extreme
importance of language in constituting human beings as human, despite the
ontological priority of experience. Whitehead himself once commented that
it would be difficult to say whether language created the human soul or the
soul created language. In a Whiteheadian context, that means that the mode
of connectedness between successive human occasions of experience that
constitutes them as a soul, or a “living person,” came into being in
conjunction with language.

3.

However much a Whiteheadian agrees with others who emphasize the
constitutive role of language in all distinctively human experience, the
ontological priority of experience remains. This means that there are
foundational aspects of human experience that are requisite to there being
any language at all and that do not depend on language. Indeed, a major
part of Whitehead’s project is to identify structures that are exemplified in
all occasions of experience whatever, human and not human, living and not
living. The product of this inquiry is his categorial scheme. This is not the
place to spell that out, but it may be useful to indicate the kind of thing that
Whitehead believes to be universal to occasions of experience.

Most important is that every occasion of experience includes in its
constitution other occasions of experience. Every occasion is a concrescence,
and every concrescence is an instance of the many becoming one. It is the similarity between this and the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination that makes the studies of the differences in the total positions so interesting. With fundamental agreement as to what things are, that is, instances of dependent origination, where do the divergences arise? I have come to the conclusion that they begin with the continuation of the phrase, “the many become one and are increased by one.” This is, for Whitehead, “creativity.” “Increased by one” introduces the note of cumulative process, which, at least as an emphasis, is not prominent in most forms of Buddhism. Also, in the analysis of concrescence, Whitehead speaks of the supplementary phase, dependent on the entry of ideal possibility into the occasion, and culminating in a “decision.”

The point here is that inclusion of the past, and a decision about just how to respond to the past, are characteristic of all occasions of experience whatever. They occur whether or not there is language, and are indeed preconditions of the emergence of language. Once language emerges, the past that is included changes, and the decision is among different options. Concretely, nothing remains the same, but the pattern illustrated in new ways is not changed.

None of this makes sense if experience is identified with consciousness. The pattern of which I have spoken is rarely consciously experienced. The vast majority of the occasions of experience of which Whitehead writes are not conscious at all, and in his view, the vast majority of human experience at any moment is not conscious, even when consciousness is generously interpreted. Actually “consciousness” is another dangerous term. It tends to substantialize and hypostasize. It is better to stay with the adjective “conscious.” The question is then, in dealing with human experience, how much of it, and which parts of it, are conscious. Whitehead’s answer is that only the most complex aspects of experience are conscious.

These most complex aspects, including what we usually call sense experience, are also the parts most inextricably bound up with language. But even in the case of conscious experience, experience is chronologically prior to language. Even in the experience of animals to which we have no reason to attribute language, there are conscious feelings. And human babies are conscious of their bodily condition and environment before they learn language. This can be sensibly denied only by restricting conscious experience to objectifying experience. Objectifying experience may, indeed, be a function of language. But in ordinary language we can distinguish between when the baby is conscious and when not. Whiteheadians use “conscious” in this broad sense and do not restrict it to objectifying and self-conscious modes.
The main difficulty with getting acceptance for much of what I have said here is that it presupposes realism. Realism is much out of fashion. Since Kant it has been widely assumed that language cannot refer to a reality beyond the mind or experience in which it arises. Although there have been many and brilliant responses to this assumption, they share an aversion to the view that indeed language does refer beyond itself and beyond the speaker. Many of the twists and turns of recent thought can only be understood as responses to the abandonment of the referential use of language. This is crucial also to the understanding of the relation of experience and language.

The critique of referential use of language is strong when it stays with the examples reflection on which brought it into being. These were chiefly analyses of what is given in sense experience. To illustrate, one may begin the analysis with the statement, “I see the table”. There seem to be two objective entities connected by seeing. But, of course, the matter is not so simple. If I analyze my sensory experience, I discover that what I see is a complex patch of colors. I suppose that these exist external to me in an object. But on further analysis I realize that the colors are there only in my seeing them. And I can form no notion whatsoever of an object out there in which they inhere. Hence, the notion that when I say “The table is brown,” I am referring to some object in my environment separate from my experience, is confused. I have no way of referring to that which is not experienced. The meaning of the sentence must be found in another way.

Naïve realism supposes there is a world out there that, in itself, apart from human experience, has the basic character that is attributed to it in human experience. Philosophical analysis has shown that naïve realism is wrong. Most philosophers have moved from that to the theoretical rejection of all realism, while in fact assuming a good deal of realism in the process. The problem is not that realistic assumptions fail to appear in their writings. The problem is that because the basis for these realistic elements is not thematically considered, realism is rejected at other points where it would help us out.

The rejection of realism is based on analysis of our relation in sense experience to the physical world. But that does not exhaust our relationships to that which is not identical with present experience. There is also, for example, the relationship of my present experience to my past experience. Further, there is the relationship of my present experience to events in my body. Whitehead believed, and I agree, that these relations are more fundamental than those to stones and tables.

Although there are real problems in supposing that “the table is brown” realistically refers to an object independent of my experience, it is not so
hard to suppose that “I thought you said you were hungry” refers to a thought I had a few moments ago, that the thought referred to someone else’s speech-act, and that the speech-act, in turn, referred to bodily feelings. Slightly more difficult, perhaps, is to suppose that when I refer to what Whitehead thought, I am actually referring realistically to the person Whitehead who died some years ago. Yet philosophers who reject realism have impassioned debates about what other philosophers said or intended by what they said. There are very few who have in fact given up this kind of realism. The situation would be considerably improved if it were made clear that most of those who reject realism are not denying that language can refer to other people, their thoughts and their feelings, in a quite realistic way. What is actually being denied is that language can refer to the physical world external to our bodies. The old dualism is at work!

Whitehead rejected that dualism and hence the limitation of realism to human experiences. He believed that there are other experiences besides human ones, those of other animals, in the first instance. But he went much farther than that. He believed that everything that is, is an event, and that a human experience is an instance of an event. He believed that we can discern the most basic structure of human experience as the structure of events in general. That means that all events are inclusions of other events. Furthermore, he analyzed this mode of inclusion in human experience into both an objective and a subjective pole, and he speculated that all events have this di-polar character. He tested this hypothesis and found it fruitful for the understanding of the physical world generally. He found no place to draw a sharp line separating one species of events, known to be experiential in character, from another species that is not. Hence he argued that all events are occasions of experience.

The importance of this point here is that this removes the obstacle to referential language about the natural world. To something that is fundamentally nonexperiential we cannot refer because we can have no notion whatsoever of what we are referring to. But to occasions of experience we can refer, whether they are human or not. This does not justify us in naively thinking that what we ordinarily mean by a brown table is really there, independent of our experience. It is not. But it does justify our asserting that there is a complex field of events there, which indirectly impact our brains in such a way that we are led to see a brown patch. That, too, is a realistic assertion.

The argument is, of course, circular. If language does not refer to a real world, there is no way of developing such theories. On the other hand, with such theories, it becomes plausible to hold that language is referential. If it is, then many moves are open to us as thinkers that recent theology generally has denied itself. In relation to our present topic, we can say that
language has its actuality as an aspect of experience and it refers finally to other experiences, human and nonhuman.

Although I have tried to avoid too much technical discourse, there is one point too important to neglect. One main reason for rejecting the claim that some language has a referential element is that it seems to entail the correspondence of something linguistic with something nonlinguistic. One could call that a category mistake. Whitehead dealt with that problem in some detail.

Where the referential use of language is involved, the function of language is to express and elicit to attention what Whitehead calls propositions. A proposition is not a linguistic entity. It is rather the way something in the world may be. Its subject is some actual entity or set of actual entities. Its predicate is some condition that may or may not be exemplified in that entity. When, as a result of hearing some sentence, a possibility of this sort is evoked for me, I may judge whether it corresponds with the actual condition of the entity in question. The correspondence that is required for the referential use of language is between this way the entity may be and the way it is.

5.

I have spoken several times of prelinguistic experience. From a Whiteheadian point of view there is a great deal of that. But is there also postlinguistic experience? The question is important, because this seems to be what Buddhists are calling for.

Much of modern philosophical literature on language and experience links the two so closely that a human nonlinguistic experience seems to be ruled out. Obviously, Whitehead’s view of language and experience is not so closed. That there should be experience in which the inner chatter is silenced is certainly not incredible. But the Buddhist claim seems to go far beyond that. It seems to entail an experience in which the whole impact of the past use of language falls away, so that the way I see the tree is no longer affected by language at all. Whitehead’s view of the way the present contains the past makes me somewhat sceptical that this could happen.

However, I do not think that the real point has to do with total elimination of the influence of the past. In that case the end sought would be the return to an infantile state. The enlightened Buddhist is far from infantile. The goal is, instead, breaking with one central way in which language has structured experience, the objectifying, dualistic mode. It is the realization that we are not subjects distinct from objects but instances of dependent origination. If I can realize that, not merely conceptually, but existentially, then the whole
way in which the past now informs me is transformed and my perception of
the tree is altered. I can let the tree be just what it is.

That this is possible is something that can only be known from its
occurrence. No one minimizes the difficulty of attaining this reorientation,
least of all Buddhists. But the history of Buddhism testifies that many have
attained it in some measure, and some in a measure that is quite full.
Whitehead had nothing to say on this point, but Whiteheadians have no
reason to deny the possibility, or question the value, of this profound
liberation.

Christian experience has centered not on the realization of dependent
origination but on the grace of God. This grace has been understood not as
freeing us from the power of language in general, but as setting us free from
determination by the past, bringing to us new possibilities, calling us to
fulfill the best of these possibilities, opening us in love to the neighbour,
guiding our efforts in history, and assuring us that we are known and loved.
In a Whiteheadian theology, this grace is nothing other than God’s living
presence in every moment of experience.

Does that mean that religious experience in the tradition of Schleiermacher
is important for Whiteheadian theologians? I think not. The experience in
question is that of ontological and moral freedom and responsibility,
neighbour love, discerning God’s purposes in history, and fundamental
assurance that life has meaning. This is not what is usually meant by
religious experience. Furthermore, these are not the features of experience to
which those who are seeking a universal commonality turn. It may be that
there is a universal sense of the sacred that can be detected in all cultures.
This is interesting and important. But it is a minor feature in Christianity
and in what relates it to Buddhism and differentiates it as well.

Does this mean that the characteristic interests of Buddhism and
Christianity respectively are specific to particular cultural-linguistic systems,
a function of their languages? A Whiteheadian answer is that in one sense
this is correct. But this agreement is contingent on a referential view of
language that changes the whole significance of this agreement.

This issue gives me an opportunity to clarify what I think is the most
important contribution of a Whiteheadian understanding of the relation of
language and experience for understanding the great religious traditions. It
returns us to the dialectic with which I began. The language we use deeply
influences us by directing attention to particular features of reality. Indeed,
this is the major function of language. When I speak or write, my hope is to
elicit in you attention to aspects of your own experience or of the world that
have not been prominent before you hear me. It is my hope that when you
attend in this way you will see some of the things that I have found
important or useful to see.
Buddhist language leads those who hear it to think deeply about the ultimate structure of their existence and to seek to realize existentially what that is. Christian language does not do that. It encourages people to think about whether their motives are pure and their actions appropriate in light of the fact that they should love their neighbours as themselves. It causes them to seek forgiveness for their failure to love and assurance that their lives are meaningful even in the midst of their failures. It does this by the way it speaks of God. At its best it depicts God’s grace as constitutive of human life and of that grace as nothing other than the presence of God.

From a Whiteheadian point of view the issue is not who is right and who is wrong. There need be no mutual exclusion of the two views of reality. We are instances of dependent origination, and it is evident from Buddhist history that realizing this fact is of utmost value, both for the one who realizes it and for others. But it is also the case that there is a divine element in the world that makes for freedom and love. Ordering life through attention to that element and what it means both for human receptivity and for human activity can also have very positive effects for those who do so and for others. Considering the radical differences of starting point, it is surprising how much overlap there is in the outcome. But there are also differences, and that is what makes the dialogue important.

I have made the complementarity of Christianity and Buddhism seem too easy. My intention is only to say that the deepest insights of the two traditions need not contradict each other. If in the development of these insights nothing more were added, especially, if no negations had been involved, the complementarity might be readily manifest. But of course that is not the case. True insights usually give rise to polemics against competing views rather than only positive affirmations of what has been seen. Much is said that is not merely different but also contradictory, and to many of these sayings people grow attached. It is very easy to view differences as oppositions, even when they need not be. Hence the task of showing that at heart one can be both a Buddhist and a Christian is an ongoing one requiring profound thought and spiritual exploration.

My point is not that this is easy. It is not. But it matters a great deal how one views the difficulties. If one sees Buddhism and Christianity as two cultural linguistic systems, then seeking to learn from one another is pointless. There is no common reality about which to learn. At best one can learn about one another and cooperate on projects justified by both systems separately. But if, instead, we see both as systems of thought and life that have developed out of different but complementary insights into that infinitely rich totality in which we are all immersed, then the task of sorting out what is contradictory and what is simply different can begin. And when one finds sheer reformulations of the opposing ideas that do justice to their
positive intention but avoid the strict mutual contradiction found in their initial statements.

In short, language does create our worlds. But it does so by highlighting features of a common world that, in its totality, is so rich and complex that no language will ever encompass it all. Different languages highlight different features. Communities order themselves to the features highlighted in their language, neglecting others. But the neglected features are still there, and they still function even when they are not thematized. When communities that have developed quite differently interact, each may learn about features of its own experience that it has neglected and thus expand its own grasp of reality. This is, today, the experience of the West in its encounter with Buddhism.

6.

A final word about Whitehead’s view of language and experience. He knew that our inherited language leads to a view of the world as made of substantial things. It reifies the self and objectifies all that is given in experience. It has misdirected philosophical inquiry and led to scientific theory that has been discredited. It still distorts the thinking and exploration of scientists. The Buddhist critique of language and conceptuality is vindicated in the actual languages that we use.

But Whitehead’s response differs from the usual Buddhist one. The usual Buddhist response criticizes language, points to the need to be liberated from its distorting power, and then directs us to use it without being sucked back into the way it structures experience. The mountain is a mountain. The mountain is not a mountain. The mountain is a mountain. The implication or assumption is that language and concept are inherently objectifying and reifying and thereby in conflict with reality. We have no choice but to continue to use them anyway.

Whitehead undertakes, instead, to develop a new conceptuality that is more appropriate to reality. This is an immensely complex task, and of course it requires a great struggle with existing language. In that struggle, Whitehead is not always successful. His intuitions outran his ability to articulate. But he did make real progress, dramatic progress if we compare him with other figures in our century.

Now the question is, is this enterprise worthwhile? Certainly, if measured by results to date, it is not successful. Only a few care enough to wrestle with Whitehead’s proposals. Most, when they cannot readily translate his new language back into the conceptuality with which they are familiar, dismiss it as eccentric and perverse, complaining of the new language they are asked to adopt. Even those who have been most influenced by him tend
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to interpret his philosophy in ways that reduce the full force of his move. It is striking and troubling that the secondary literature is far more substantialistic in its language than Whitehead himself. Precisely where he went furthest in capturing the new vision, his followers have had the most tendency to reconstruct his thought. Especially as we try to explain his ideas to those who have not been captivated by them, we almost inevitably translate them back into more familiar patterns. Instead of advancing his project, we reverse it. Perhaps the case is hopeless.

But I do not think so. Things change, new generations may be more open to new language and thought forms. Imperfect as it is, I have found Whitehead’s conceptuality immensely liberating and fruitful. Even though I have no Buddhist experience of realization of dependent origination, I think I have profited personally and existentially from thinking about myself in a more Buddhist way because of my appropriation of Whitehead’s conceptuality. Anti-intellectuals are wrong when they suggest that how we think has no effect on what we are. I would like to encourage Buddhists, many of whom have so much deeper a realization of how things are, to share in the work of reconstructing language.

I do not mean to say that nothing has been done. In fact, Buddhists from the very beginning have altered language in order to point to what they realized. They have made language work against itself and also constructed new terms to express new insights. My objection is only that there is too much tendency to treat all this as only skillful means and not as a less inaccurate way of understanding what is. I believe that less inaccurate ways of understanding what is are sorely needed, and that compassion for the world should draw Buddhists into the task of constructing them, not only for the sake of leading a few forward on the path to full enlightenment, but also for the sake of orienting the many, less dangerously and destructively, to the world.

Notes

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