ON March 7, 1277, Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued a massive condemnation of 219 propositions along with the threatened excommunication of all who taught or even heard these propositions being taught unless they presented themselves to him or to the Chancellor (of the University) within seven days. These were strong measures indeed, and one would assume that there were compelling reasons for the Bishop to take such action.

1. Introduction

For the sake of historical context, it will be helpful for us to recall that in the second half of the twelfth century and throughout most of the thirteenth century wide-ranging translation of texts both from Arabic and from Greek into Latin had made available to the Christian West a vast body of philosophical and scientific literature to which that world had previously not had access. The newly translated sources included practically all of Aristotle's works which are known to us, a series of classical commentaries on Aristotle, important pseudo-Aristotelian works such as the Liber de causis, philosophical writings originally written in Arabic by thinkers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes along with Moses Maimonides' Guide and Avicebron's Fons vitae, and a host of previously unknown scientific and mathematical works. Upon being faced so speedily with so much literature of non-Christian origins, Latin thinkers and Churchmen had to react quickly, and to try to determine how believing Christians should respond. Needless to say, their reactions varied considerably.

Thus early in the century some defensive measures were taken by ecclesiastical authorities at Paris in 1210 and 1215 for the newly founded University there. A council held in 1210 and new statutes for the Faculty of Arts promulgated in 1215 by the Papal Legate prohibited "reading" Aristotle's libri naturales, his Metaphysics, and Commentaries or Summae of the same. The expression "reading" as used in these prohibitions is to be taken in the sense of lecturing. The commentaries or Summae referred to were probably Avicenna's paraphrases and possibly some works by Al-Farabi. Private consultation of these works was not prohibited. Moreover, the prohibition did not apply to the Theology Faculty, but only to Arts.

Other warning letters were issued in the late 1220s and early in the 1230s by Pope Gregory IX, cautioning masters of Theology at Paris against relying too
heavily on philosophy in their teaching and continuing to prohibit Masters of Arts from using the *libri naturales* until they had been freed from every suspicion of error. Presumably many Masters in Theology were using the newly translated sources. In any event, the ban on lecturing on Aristotle’s *libri naturales* in the Arts Faculty appears to have been observed at least until ca. 1240; but by 1245 we know that Roger Bacon did lecture on them at Paris. And by 1250 Aristotle was firmly in place in both Arts and Theology at Paris, so much so in fact that the Statutes of 1255 for Arts required reading all of the known works of Aristotle.¹


³For the text of the synod of 1210 see *Chartularium* I, p. 70, n. 11; for the Statutes of 1215 see pp. 78–9, n. 20. On this see M. Grabmann, *I divieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX* (Rome: Typis Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1941), c. 1; Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie...*, pp. 82–9.

⁴For the letter from the Pope of July 7, 1228, warning the theologians, see *Chartularium* I, pp. 114–16, n. 59 (also in Grabmann, pp. 72–75). For the reaffirmation of the prohibition of the *libri naturales* until they were purged of every suspicion of error, see the Pope’s letter of April 13, 1231 (*Chartularium*, p. 138, n. 79). For the letter of April 23, 1231, establishing a commission charged with this task which was never completed, see *Chartularium* I, pp. 143–44, n. 87. On all of this see Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie*, pp. 93–101; Grabmann, c. 2, pp. 70–108. On Bacon see Van Steenberghen, pp. 130–34.


¹⁰For Siger’s pre-1270 views on unicity of the (possible) intellect see his *In III De Anima*, q. 9, in *Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Tertium de anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi*, B. Bazán, ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1972), pp. 25–30, see q. 11 (pp. 31–35) on whether the separated soul can suffer from fire. On his defense of eternity of the human species and hence, presumably, of the world, see his “Quaesitio utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal, nullo homine existente,” in *Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de logicque, de morale et de physique*, B. Bazán, ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), especially pp. 56–9.
During this period Albert the Great contributed greatly to winning a favorable reception for Aristotle. He served at Paris from ca. 1240 or 1243 as Bachelor of Theology and then as Master until 1248. And his student, Thomas Aquinas, would also do much for Aristotle’s cause. He served as Bachelor and then as Master of Theology at Paris from 1252–1259 and again as Master from 1269–1272. During the 1260s, however, another form of Aristotelianism developed within the Arts Faculty, known by some as Latin Averroism, but better styled, in my opinion, as Radical Aristotelianism.⁶

2. The Condemnation of 1270

Accordingly in December 1270 the Bishop of Paris condemned thirteen propositions and excommunicated all who would knowingly defend or teach them. At least four of these may be found in writings by the Arts Master, Siger of Brabant, which date from before the condemnation of 1270: (1) that the intellect for all human beings is numerically one and the same; (5) that the world is eternal; (6) that there never was a first human being; (8) that the separated soul does not suffer from corporeal fire in the afterlife.⁷ Of these, only the first, unicity of the intellect, is taught uniquely by Averroes. Closely linked to it, at least in the eyes of a Thomas Aquinas, is pr. 2 — which states that it is false or improper to hold that a, i.e., this individual human being understands — as distinguished from the separated possible intellect that would think in each of us. Personal immortality is rejected by pr. 7, and this, too, would seem to follow from Siger’s defense of unicity of the (possible) Intellect. Yet neither of the two last-mentioned propositions is explicitly present in Siger’s known surviving works.⁸

Other propositions would undermine freedom of choice whether by subjecting human beings to pure necessity (3), or by reducing the will to the status of a purely passive power that is necessarily moved by its desired object (9). Still others reject God’s knowledge of individuals (10), or of things other than himself (11), or divine providence (12), or belief in bodily resurrection (13).⁹

With this we may turn to St. Thomas’s involvement in the events of December 1270 and thereafter. Some time in the year 1270 he directed a special treatise — De unitate intellectus — against a specific movement in Arts to be sure, but also against a particular faculty member. In this tightly written work Aquinas argues that unicity of the possible intellect cannot be ascribed to Aristotle (his historical attack) nor can it be defended philosophically (his philosophical attack). The particular individual whom he appears to have in mind is Siger of Brabant.¹⁰

*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*
John F. Wippel

235
Moreover, it is well known that Aquinas defended the doctrine of unicity of substantial form in human beings. There seems to have been considerable opposition to this position within the Theology Faculty already in 1270, and also on the part of Stephen Tempier. Nonetheless, it does not appear in the 1270 list of prohibited propositions. Scholars have long wondered why.\(^\text{11}\)

Giles of Lessines directed a letter to Albert the Great, asking him to comment on fifteen errors which were being taught by leading Masters in Arts at that time. Of these fifteen propositions, thirteen are identical with the thirteen propositions condemned by Tempier in 1270. Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether this letter appeared before or after the 1270 condemnation (which seems more likely to me). But even more interesting is the suggestion made by some that the two additional propositions listed by Giles were defended by Aquinas, namely pr. 14: “That the body of Christ which lay in the tomb and which hung upon the cross is not or was not numerically the same in the absolute sense but only in a qualified sense”; and pr. 15: “That an angel and the soul are simple, but not by absolute simplicity nor by approaching composition, but only by receding from the supremely simple being.”\(^\text{12}\)

Van Steenberghen, who defends a post-1270 date for the letter, argues that pr. 14 has nothing to do with unicity of substantial form, but I am not completely convinced of this. Thomas does change his terminology in responding to questions related to this issue after the 1270 condemnation. Van Steenberghen also denies that pr. 15 is directed against Thomas, and correctly so in my opinion. If pr. 14 does reflect Thomas’s thought prior to December 1270, it could be that it was his great prestige that prevented unicity of substantial form


\(^{11}\)See A. Callebaut, “Jean Pecham, O.F.M. et l’augustinisme. Aperçus historiques (1263–1285),” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 18 (1925), pp. 445–47, where he reports on different letters written by Pecham in 1284–1285. In a letter of January 1, 1285, Pecham recalls that Aquinas held the view that there is only one form in a human being, but notes that he (Pecham) had personally heard Aquinas declare his innocence at Paris before the Masters (of Theology) and submit all of his views to their judgment and correction. And in a letter of June 1 to the Bishop of Lincoln, Pecham comments that when this position (unity of form) was being sharply attacked by the Bishop and Masters of Paris, including Aquinas’s own Dominican conferees, he alone stood beside him insofar as he could, until Aquinas humbly subjected all of his opinions to the Paris Masters. The event to which Pecham refers took place during Thomas’s second regency, presumably around 1270. On this cf. R. Hissette, “Étienne Tempier et ses condamnations,” *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980), p. 233 and n. 11.

\(^{12}\)For Albert’s response (including Giles’s letter and the list of propositions) see his *De XV Problematibus*, B. Geyer, ed., *Opera omnia*, Vol. 17, Pt. 1 (Cologne, 1975). See p. 31: pr. 14 (“Quod corpus Christi iacens in sepulcro et positum in cruce non est vel non fuit idem numero simpliciter, sed secundum quid”); pr. 15 (“Quod angelus et anima sunt simplices, sed non absoluta simplicitate nec per accessum ad compositionem, sed tantum per recessum a summum simplici”).
from being included in the List of 1270. It will be recalled that he was himself present in Paris until 1272. And if this position had not originally been targeted for condemnation, one wonders why Giles included it on his list.13

3. The Condemnation of 1277

Be that as it may, various signs indicate that the Radical Aristotelian movement was still very much alive in the 1270s as we move on towards 1277. In addition to Giles of Lessines’s letter to Albert (dating perhaps from ca. 1273–1276, according to Van Steenberghen), Giles of Rome’s De plurificatione intellectus possibilis seems to have appeared in the mid-1270s. It is another sign of continuing preoccupation with the theory of unicity of the possible intellect. Some anonymous Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima and Physics dating from this same general period also contain views which would be condemned in 1277.14

Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron of 1273 also illustrate his concern about various errors of Aristotle and those whom he calls the “Arabs.” These errors include Aristotle’s rejection of divine ideas, and, following from this, his rejection of divine knowledge of individuals, divine providence, and divine knowledge of contingents. Bonaventure also cites the Arabs’ defense of a necessitating fate, and Aristotle’s omission of reward and punishment in the life to come. Bonaventure is also concerned about defenses of eternity of the world and unicity of the intellect, apparently by his contemporaries, i.e., by certain members of the Arts Faculty of that time.15

On January 18, 1277, Pope John XXI, known to most today as Peter of Spain, wrote to Bishop Tempier and asked him to conduct an inquiry about dangerous doctrines which were reported to be circulating at the University. Stephen was to determine by whom and where these errors were being propagated, and to report back to the Pope as soon as possible.16 Instead, Stephen formed a Commission of sixteen theologians, including Henry of Ghent, and had a list of 219 propositions drawn up quickly. Without reporting his findings back to the Pope, he issued his condemnation of March 7, 1277, on his own authority.17

Much study has been devoted to this Condemnation, beginning especially at the time of its 700th anniversary in 1977, and continuing to the present. Important books have been produced by R. Hissette, L. Bianchi, and K. Flasch, along with many articles and book-chapters by others. Still, many questions remain to be answered.18

For instance, many of the prohibited propositions clearly attack orthodox

Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277
John F. Wippel

237
Christian belief. Nonetheless, other condemned propositions appear to us today to be perfectly orthodox and we wonder why they were prohibited. Indeed, a number of the latter have been thought by many to have been defended by Thomas Aquinas. So true is this that Godfrey of Fontaines, writing ca. 1296/1297, publicly defended Aquinas’s doctrine and memory and called for the then reigning Bishop of Paris to at least suspend the censure attached to those which

11For his argumentation for the post-1270 dating see Van Steenberghen, “Le ‘De quindecim problematibus’ d’Albert le Grand,” repr. in his Introduction à l’étude de la philosophie médiévale (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), pp. 454–55. On propositions 14 and 15 see pp. 450–53. As regards pr. 14, Van Steenberghen acknowledges that Thomas’s terminology changes after 1270. Thus questions related to this were directed at Thomas in quodlibetal disputations in Lent, 1269 (Quodlibet I, q. 4, a. 1), Advent, 1269 (Quodlibet II, q. 1, a. 1), Lent, 1270 (Quodlibet III, q. 2, a. 2), and after the December 1270 Condemnation, in Lent, 1271 (Quodlibet IV, q. 5, a. 1). Sufficient to note that in Quodlibet II, q. 1, a. 1, in replying to the question whether Christ was numerically the same man during the sacrament triduum as before, Thomas responds that, viewed from the side of his human nature, Christ’s soul remained numerically one and the same. His body remained one and the same by reason of its matter, but not by reason of its form. Hence we cannot say that it was one and the same in the unqualified sense (simpliciter), or that it was not the same simpliciter. Rather it was secundum quid not the same by reason of its form. But in Quodlibet IV, q. 5, a. 1 (after the condemnation) Thomas replies that in order to avoid two heresies he must defend both the identity of Christ’s body during its time on the cross and in the tomb by reason of its continued union with the divine suppositum, and the difference between the living and dead Christ. Still, because the unity under discussion is greater than the diversity, we must say that Christ’s body in the tomb and on the cross was numerically one and the same. Also see ST III, q. 50, a. 5. Cf. R. Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1951), pp. 487–88. Zavalloni describes this change as a verbal difference rather than a doctrinal one, but correctly notes that in Quodlibet IV Thomas insists more on the identity of the living and dead body of Christ. Cf. also J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires de Fribourg/Paris: Cerf, 1993), pp. 276–77. Hence I would now qualify my earlier acceptance of Van Steenberghen’s view in my 1977 article, “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277. . . ,” pp. 182–83, and am inclined to think that proposition 14 as cited by Giles could well have been directed against Aquinas’s pre-December 1270 formulation.

12On this see Van Steenberghen, Maître Siger, pp. 115–18. Also see Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l’âme d’Aristote, M. Giele, F. Van Steenbergen, B. Bazán, eds. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), pp. 15–16, for the date of the first work, which contains some views on the intellect which would be condemned in 1277. Also see an anonymous commentary on the Physics ed. by A. Zimmermann, Ein Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1968), pp. xiii–xiv for the dating, and pp. xxvii–xxix on its views and the Condemnation of 1277. Also see the anonymous commentary on the Physics edited under Siger’s name by Ph. Delhaye, Siger de Brabant. Questions sur la Physique d’Aristote (Les Philosophes Belges, Vol. 15. Louvain: Editions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1941), pp. 15–17, on the dating and this work’s relationship to the Condemnation of 1277.

13For the two reportationes of these Conferences which have survived see his Opera omnia, Vol. 5 (longer version), and S. Bonaventureae Collationes in Hexaëmeron et Bonaventuriana Quaestam Selecta, F. Delorme, ed. (Quaracchi, 1934). See especially Conference VI (Vol. 5, pp. 360–61, longer version, and Delorme, pp. 91–92). Also see Conference VII (longer version), p. 365. For more on this see Van Steenberghen, Maître Siger, pp. 102–11.

14Chartularium I, p. 541.
seemed to have been taken from his writings.\textsuperscript{19} Though this step was not taken then, in 1325, some nineteen months after Thomas’s canonization, the Bishop of Paris of that time revoked the condemnation of the Paris articles insofar as they “touched on or were asserted to touch on” Thomas’s teachings. One could hardly continue to condemn at Paris the views of a recently canonized saint!\textsuperscript{20}

One wonders, of course, why seemingly orthodox positions were condemned by Tempier, and especially, why some defended by Aquinas were. It seems clear that the condemnation of 1277 marked the triumph within the Theology Faculty of a highly conservative group of theologians who were uncomfortable with many of the new developments in philosophy and theology and who were only too ready to recommend them to Tempier for condemnation. Many of them probably belonged to what Van Steenberghen has styled the Neo-Augustinian group. It is also clear that Tempier himself had little brief for philosophical or theological novelties. Yet, one of Aquinas’s most controversial positions — unicity of substantial form in human beings — was still not included in this condemnation, even though it would be condemned only eleven days later at Oxford by Archbishop Robert Kilwardby, a Dominican. Some have suggested that this position was not condemned at Paris in 1277 once more because of Aquinas’s great prestige there. If so, why were other positions defended by him included on Tempier’s list? And why was unity of form included in another list of propositions drawn up by the theologians at Paris against Giles of Rome within the same month?\textsuperscript{21}

This leads us to the central question for this study. Were any of Thomas’s views explicitly and directly condemned and targeted by Tempier? Both in medieval times and in our day, many interpreters have thought so. For instance, contemporary critics of Aquinas such as William de la Mare were only too happy to cite the prohibitions against Thomas. On the other hand, some twenty years later Godfrey of Fontaines defended the legitimacy of defending those positions which seemed to have been directed at Thomas and called for the suspension of their censure. As we have just seen, in 1325, some nineteen months after Thomas’s canonization, the Bishop of Paris revoked the prohibition of those which touched on or were said to touch on his positions. And even before that time, ca. 1315/1316, John of Naples had defended Thomas from the prohibition of a number of these theses.\textsuperscript{22}

However, in his important book of 1977 and in subsequent articles, Roland Hissette has denied that Thomas himself was a direct target of this prohibition. Hissette is strongly influenced by the Prologue to Tempier’s Condemnation in which the Bishop notes that the views in question were circulating in the Arts Faculty at Paris. From this Hissette concludes that we should always look there
in attempting to find defenders of the prohibited propositions. He has concluded that most of the propositions which were previously thought to have been aimed at Thomas were in fact also defended by one or other Master in Arts, and hence that the latter, not Thomas himself, should be regarded as the direct target. He acknowledges that Thomas was indirectly involved because it happened that he, too, defended some of the prohibited propositions along with Masters in Arts. Hissette also acknowledges that Thomas’s defense of many of these views was

17See n. 1 above for the Chartularium and Mandonnet versions. While I shall follow the Mandonnet numbering here, one may find the same with some helpful emendations in Hissette’s book (cited in the following note).


20For the text of this decree issued by Stephen of Bourret, Bishop of Paris in 1325, see Chartularium II, pp. 280–81. On this see Bianchi, Il Vescovo . . . , pp. 28-30 and notes; Torrell, Initiation . . . , p. 475.


23In addition to his repeated defense of this view in his book (Enquete), Hissette has addressed this in detail in his “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin dans la censure Parisienne du 7 mars 1277,” in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 15 (1982), pp. 226–46, especially 235, 237–41, 246.

24See Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason, p. 27.

25For a helpful summarizing table of the propositions cited by William’s Correctorium, by the anonymous Declarationes (see note 27 below), by Godfrey of Fontaines and by John of Naples see Hissette’s “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin . . . ,” p. 232, n. 41.
known to Stephen’s Commission. But this does not mean that he was a direct target.23

Others, however, myself included, have expressed some reservations about this. To me it seems that, if the local Bishop and his commission knew a particular position was defended both by Thomas and by a given Master in Arts and condemned it nonetheless, it is very unlikely that they did not intend to target Thomas as well as that Master. As I have put it elsewhere, to me this seems to be a distinction without a difference. My own reading of Henry of Ghent, himself a member of the Commission, indicates that he was quite familiar with Thomas’s thought and did not hesitate to oppose it whenever he saw fit to do so. It is hard to believe that he would not have intended to target Thomas in proposing some of his well known positions for prohibition, or in approving their condemnation. The same is likely to be true of most of the other Masters in the Theology Faculty who served on Tempier’s Commission at that time and of Tempier himself.24

4. Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277

In order to examine this issue more closely, I propose to turn to some of the propositions allegedly defended by Thomas as drawn up by different medieval participants in this discussion in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, even as Hissette himself has done in a more recent study. I will concentrate on the Franciscan, William de la Mare, the secular Master, Godfrey of Fontaines, and will make some reference to the Dominican, John of Naples. As we shall see, each of these writers had different motives in mind in addressing the issue of Thomas’s implication in the condemnation. As we shall also see, there is little unanimity among them concerning which propositions were directed at Thomas himself.25

To begin, we may turn to William’s Correctorium fratris Thomae of ca. 1278. In this work William examines a number of Aquinas’s works and singles out from each of them propositions which he judges to be unacceptable from the standpoint of orthodox Christian teaching. Of the 118 objectionable positions he has identified, William maintains that thirteen were condemned by Tempier in 1277, thereby strengthening his case against Aquinas.26

(William’s Correctorium should not be confused with the much more abbreviated work edited by Pelster under the title Declarationes which has often mistakenly been attributed to William and which rejects sixty of Thomas’s positions and finds a still greater number of them (32) also condemned by Tempier.27)
A series of Dominicans quickly responded to William's *Correctorium* by writing lengthy refutations, known as *Corrections* of his *Corruptorium*, and identified by their opening word. The first of these, *Quare*, was most likely written by the English Dominican, Richard Knapwell, who also reproduced the

28 For William's text, along with a refutation of it by Richard of Knapwell, see n. 22 above. William draws up a list of 118 objectionable articles from the following Thomistic works: *Summa Theologicae* (48 from the *Prima Pars*, 12 from the *Prima Secundae*, 16 from the *Secunda Secundae*); *De veritate*, 9; *Disputed Question De anima*, 10; *De virtutibus*, 1; *De potentia*, 4; *Quodlibetal Questions*, 9; *In 1 Sent.*, 9.


26 See n. 22 above. On Richard as its likely author see Jordan, p. 294; Richard Knapwell. *Quaestio disputata De Unitate Formae*, F.E. Kelley, ed. (Binghamton, N.Y.: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), pp. 18–23 (for a strong defense of Knapwell as the author of *Quare*).

25 See Hissette, *Enquête*, p. 83, n. 2, for the following Thomistic sources for this position: *In I* (read: *II*) *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3; SCG II, c. 93; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8; *Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 3; *De ente et essentia*, c. 5 (also and especially see c. 4); *ST I*, q. 50, a. 4; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1. For William see Glorieux ed., p. 60 (art. 11, taken from *ST I*, q. 50, a. 4, and q. 75, a. 8).

24 See Glorieux ed. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"*, p. 60 (for his presentation of Aquinas's view and his reference to the Bishop and Masters of Paris), and p. 61 (for his reference to spiritual matter). He also refers to his fuller discussion of this below in his refutation of Thomas's *Quaestio disputata de anima* (see art. 88, pp. 365–68). Proposition 43 reads: "Quod quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, Deus non posset facere plures eiusdem speciei."

23 See *Enquête*, pp. 84–86. Note from Boethius's reply: "Respondeo tibi etiam quaerendo: Potestne facere Deus illud, quod non potest fieri nec esse? Ulterior quaeram: Potestne esse quod aliqua duo in illa essentia, quae est quodlibet illorum, sint unum per se et in eadem essentia etiam sint multa? . . . Quae autem specie distinguentur, non possunt esse sub una specie. . . . Unde rem aliquam potest Deus totaliter auferre, sed rei aliquid incompossibile facere non videtur posse. Et hoc dico salvo secreto divinae sapientiae, quam nemo novit." (*Opera omnia* VI.1, pp. 203–04). In the passages cited above in n. 29 Thomas repeatedly states that it is impossible for two angels to belong to the same species. Although he does not explicitly connect this impossibility with the question whether God could bring it to pass nonetheless, he holds that that which is impossible in the absolute sense, i.e., that which involves contradiction, cannot be done at all, and therefore cannot be done by God. See, for instance, *ST I*, q. 25, a. 3; *Quodlibet XII*, q. 2, a. 1; and for a specific application of this to the impossibility of God's producing matter without any form, *Quodlibet III*, q. 1, a. 1: "Dicere ergo quod materia sit in actu sine forma, est dicere contradictoria esse simul; unde a Deo fieri non potest." (Marietti ed., p. 40). Because Thomas rejects matter-form composition of angels, he flatly denies that it is possible for them to be multiplied in species. See, for instance, *ST I*, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1: " . . . multi autem angeli unus speciei omnimino esse non possunt." Yet, it is Boethius's text which explicitly connects this impossibility with the issue of God's power, as does proposition 43. Siger also makes this connection in the three passages cited by Hissette (pp. 85–86). As Hissette comments (pp. 84, 86), on this issue Thomas, Boethius, and Siger share the same view.
William was attempting to strengthen his case against Aquinas's orthodoxy by appealing to Tempier's condemnation. Given this, we should not be surprised to find him expanding the list of Thomistic positions which seemed to have been touched by the Paris prohibition, a tendency which is clearly carried to extremes in the subsequent anonymous Declarationes. Even so, it will be worth our while to turn now to the particular Thomistic positions which William alleges were also condemned by Tempier.

**a. Multiplication of Angels (Intelligences) within the Same Species**

William cites Thomas's denial that two (or more) angels can belong to the same species. There is no doubt that Thomas defended this position throughout his career. William protests that this view appears to be contrary to Catholic faith since it detracts from divine omnipotence. Because any multiplicity or unity of angels results not from nature but from an exercise of divine power, to say that it is impossible for two angels to belong to the same species is really to say that God could not or cannot have done this; but this has been condemned by the Bishop and Masters of Paris. Indeed, prohibited proposition 43–81 (Mandonnet number given first) reads: “Because intelligences do not have matter, God could not make many of the same species.” William adds that he himself holds that angels have spiritual matter, and that their matters are distinguished from one another by a multiplication of their ability to be numbered. In this way he would account for their multiplication within species.

In refuting William, Richard Knapwell in his Correctorium denies that Thomas's position is against the faith or that it detracts from divine power. To say that two angels cannot belong to the same species no more detracts from God's power than to say that things which differ in species cannot belong to the same species. By reason of the fact that angels are simple forms and without matter, it is clear that they differ by formal diversity alone, and this results in diversity in species. As for their (William's) claim that this has been condemned by the Bishop and the theologians at Paris, Richard comments: “With all due respect for them, they (William) do not speak the truth; for all the doctores agree that things pertaining to different species cannot belong to the same species if their natures remain.”

Hissette readily grants that this position was espoused by Aquinas; but he points out that the same view is defended by Boethius of Dacia in his Topics (IV, 3), though Boethius does add a qualification about the need for one to have due respect for the mystery of divine wisdom which no one can fathom. Boethius's
argumentation recalls a point made by Aquinas in other contexts. To ask whether God can make two separate substances belong to the same species is to ask whether God can do that which cannot be done, i.e., that which would involve contradiction. Neither Thomas nor Boethius would admit that God could do this. As Hissette also points out, the same view was defended by Siger of Brabant on different occasions, e.g., in his *De anima intellective*, c. 7 and in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (III, 13), and in qu. 24 of his *Quaestiones super Librum de causis*.

After recalling again the introduction to Tempier's condemnation in which he refers to "some Masters in Arts at Paris who were exceeding the limits of their faculty," Hissette concludes that it is likely that Boethius and Siger are direct targets for the prohibition of pr. 43 (and the related pr. 42–96) and that Thomas is not.

I must say that I am not persuaded by this. Because Aquinas had defended the opinion that angels or separate substances could not be multiplied within the

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33See *Enquête*, p. 84, where he observes that it is possible that Thomas was envisioned by the censure of pr. 43 (and pr. 42), but as an "accomplice" of certain Masters in Arts, according to the Prologue. It is likely, he continues, that Boethius and Siger are "les premiers visés" by these two propositions. For the reference in Tempier's Prologue see Mandonnet version: "... quod nonnulli Parisius studentes in artibus propriae facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et exsecrabiles errores, immo potius vanitates et insanias falsas ... quasi dubitabiles in scholis tractare et disputare praesumunt. ..." (p. 175). For the same view see Hissette's "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin . . . ," passim.

34See Hissette, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin . . . ," p. 235. There he attempts to defend himself against the charge of using as an *a priori* working principle his assumption that the Condemnation (directly) envisions only teachings coming from the Faculty of Arts. In my opinion his actual procedure, especially in his book but also in this article, undercuts his defense. He repeatedly reasons that if he can find a prohibited position defended by a Master in Arts as well as by Aquinas, the Prologue justifies him in concluding that only the Master of Arts was directly and primarily targeted. But it is that very assumption that is called into question both by the content of the prohibitions and by the testimony of contemporaries such as William and, as we shall see, Godfrey. In addition to Thomas's obvious influence on different works by Siger of Brabant, especially on the latter's *Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, mention should be made of two letters written by the Rector and Master of Arts to the Dominicans, one after Thomas's recall to Italy in 1272 in which they asked that he be returned to Paris, and the other written May 2, 1274, which asked that his body be returned to Paris along with some unfinished writings and translations and offers a beautiful tribute to him. Only the second survives. On these letters see J. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought and Works*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), pp. 294, 332–33.

35See *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet II*, R. Wielockx, ed. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), q. 9, p. 67 (for his reference to himself as a member of Stephen Tempier's commission: "In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus. . . ."). On the dating (Advent, 1277) see p. xiii, n. 4. For q. 8, see p. 35: "Utrum possint fieri a Deo duo angeli solis substantialibus distincti." See p. 42 for his reference to *nostri philosophantes*.

same species since the early 1250s until the end of his career, his name was closely associated with this view. If this position was also defended by certain Masters in Arts such as Siger and Boethius in the late 1260s and 1270s, it does not seem very likely that in condemning it Tempier and his associated theologians did not intend to target Thomas but only Siger and Boethius. Indeed, I would suspect that the fact that the position was common to all three gave Tempier and his associates the perfect opportunity to target Thomas as well as the others. The reference by Tempier in his Prologue to members of the Arts Faculty should not be applied restrictively as a kind of a priori principle that precludes direct intent on the part of Stephen and his Commission to condemn others such as Aquinas who, while not being Masters in the Arts Faculty, were highly regarded and highly influential there.\(^\text{34}\)

At the same time, it is worth noting that one member of Stephen’s Commission, Henry of Ghent, addressed this same issue in his Quodlibet II, q. 8, of Advent 1277. In the course of defending his view that God can multiply angels or separate substances within a species and his criticism of Aristotle on this matter, he refers to nostri philosophantes who hold the opposite position.\(^\text{35}\) Presumably by these he has in mind Latin Masters in Arts such as Siger and Boethius. Henry argues that they should then follow Aristotle not only in maintaining that because separate substances lack matter they cannot be multiplied within species, but also in holding that every separated form is a god and hence a necessary being. Henry is well aware, of course, that this would put them in flagrant opposition to the faith. Or else they should admit that separated forms are created by God and therefore that they can also be multiplied within species by God.\(^\text{36}\)

Interestingly, Henry also rejects the attempt by some of his contemporaries (recall William de la Mare, for example) to resolve this by positing spiritual matter in angels. In this way they would account for the multiplication of angels within species. According to Henry this solution would concede the position that form cannot be multiplied except by reason of matter. But that view has been condemned by three of Tempier’s prohibited propositions including pr. 42–96 (“That God cannot multiply individuals within one species without matter”); pr. 110–191 (“That forms are not divided except through matter. — This is an error unless it is understood of forms educed from the potency of matter”); and pr. 43–81 (discussed above).\(^\text{37}\)

It is interesting to observe that Henry does not restrict his rejection of spiritual-matter form composition of angels (and its implied defence of the three condemned articles) to Masters of Arts. Indeed, this view was not defended by Siger or Boethius or, so far as I know, by any of the Radical Aristotelians. It was

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*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*

John F. Wippel

245\end{flushright}
defended by some theologians such as William de la Mare. And Henry himself, one of the best known members of Tempier's Commission, is quite willing to apply to them, i.e., to other Masters of Theology, the prohibition of the view that forms can only be divided and multiplied within the same species by reason of matter. This is only a few months after the March 7 Condemnation itself. This suggests that Tempier may also have had the same approach in mind and, therefore, that we need not accept as a working principle Hissette's restriction of the Condemnation of March 7 to Masters of Arts as its primary and direct targets.

Godfrey of Fontaines, in his Quodlibet XII of 1296–1297, cites as seemingly directed against Aquinas both pr. 43 and the closely related pr. 42 where, as he reports and as we have seen, it is condemned as erroneous to hold that God cannot multiply many individuals under one species without matter. All parties, Hissette included, agree that this position also was defended by Thomas. But again the same question arises: Since it was not defended uniquely by him, was its prohibition directly aimed at him or only directly at certain Masters in Arts?

Godfrey's discussion of this occurs as part of his answer to a question raised in his Quodlibet XII, q. 5: "Whether the Bishop of Paris sins by failing to correct certain articles condemned by his predecessor." Although Godfrey is writing almost twenty years after the 1277 prohibition, we should remember that he was a student in the Theology Faculty in 1277, and that he was very familiar with the writings of Thomas, Siger, Boethius of Dacia and Henry, and with the events of 1277. Godfrey begins his reply with a syllogism. That which impedes the progress of students and which is an occasion of scandal among them and which works to the detriment of useful teaching should be corrected. But such is true of the present situation, i.e., of the continuing condemnation of

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37Ed. cit., p. 45. Henry cites the view that form cannot be multiplied except by reason of matter as another false presupposition. Against this he cites pr. 42–96: "Quod Deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia;" pr. 110: "Quod formae non recipiunt divisionem nisi per materiam. — Error, nisi intelligatur de formis eductis de potentia materiae;" pr. 43–81: See n. 30 above. He immediately adds that if this view is erroneous, those err greatly who hold that there is matter in angels so that through matter each angel has its individuation, and that by the multiplication or division of matter angels are distinct from one another within species: "quasi sine materia illa nec individuatio nec distinctio huismodi fieri posset, cuius contrarium sententiam iam dicti articuli."

38For Godfrey see Les Philosophes Belges V, p. 101.


41"Sunt etiam aliqui qui videntur contradictoria implicare, nec potest inveniri modus descendendi in talibus, quo ab intellectu possint capi, et sic impeditur intellectus a notitia veritatis circa illos. Item sunt aliqui qui secundum quod superficies literae sonat, videntur omnino impossibiles et irrationabiles, propter quod oportet illos exponere expositione quasi violenta et extorta." Ibid.


43P. 102.
some of the prohibited articles.  

In supporting the major of this syllogism Godfrey maintains that when some subject is so undetermined as regards its truth that either side may be defended without danger to faith and morals, to force all parties to accept one side is to impede our search for truth. In such cases this is better provided for by permitting disputation of all sides by learned and qualified scholars so that through this process it may become clearer as to which position is more in agreement with right reason.  

As regards the propositions condemned in 1277, Godfrey comments that there are many among them (plures) about which it is perfectly legitimate to hold different opinions. Indeed, the condemnation of some of them seems to involve contradiction, so much so that no intelligent way can be found to maintain them all in one’s teaching. Still others, at least when taken literally, seem so impossible and irrational that they can be defended only by quasi-violent and distorted interpretations.

Godfrey then offers as examples a series of eleven prohibited propositions to illustrate his complaint, beginning with our prr. 42 and 43. He notes that these two seem to be defensible as opinions since they have been both expressed and written down by many Catholic doctores.

After completing his listing of propositions, to which we shall return for other examples, Godfrey supports his case for the need to correct such prohibitions by developing his argument that the condemnation of the same has been an occasion for scandal among studentes including both teachers and hearers. For some students, not understanding the efforts of their teachers to expound certain propositions in a way which is neither opposed to truth nor against the intention those should have had who condemned them even though it may be opposed to a superficial reading of the same, feel that they must delate such professors as excommunicated to the Bishop or the Chancellor.

To make his point that these prohibitions work to the detriment of effective teaching, he cites the very useful teaching of Brother Thomas which has been unjustly defamed by these prohibitions. He notes that both the articles he has mentioned explicitly and many others (quam plures alii) seem to be taken from this great Doctor’s writings. Because such articles are rejected as erroneous, Thomas’s doctrine is also regarded as suspect by simpler minds, and they then turn away from it to their own great loss. Godfrey adds to this a beautiful tribute to Aquinas’s teaching. He also sharply criticizes those who would fall back on the prohibition of such propositions to defend their own positions when they can find no better arguments to support their views.

This tells us, of course, that other Masters were doing this very thing, or in
other words, that they were using the prohibitions against Aquinas. To cite but one, William de la Mare obviously did so with a vengeance, but so, too, in my opinion did others such as Henry. From Godfrey’s testimony, therefore, we may conclude that prr. 42 and 43 were included among those which were thought to be drawn from Thomas’s writings. Godfrey’s remarks do not support Hissette’s claim that these prohibited articles were not directly aimed at Aquinas but only at certain Masters in the Arts Faculty.45

b. Angelic Presence and Operation in Place

With this we may now move on to William’s attack against Aquinas’s ST I, q. 53, art. 2. There Thomas holds that the motion of an angel may be continuous or not continuous. When its motion is not continuous, it is possible for an angel to pass from one extreme to another without passing through any medium, though not when its motion is continuous. Thomas argues that this capacity belongs to an angel but not to anything corporeal because the substance of an angel is not subject to place as something contained by place, but rather is superior to place as that which contains it. Wherefore it is within an angel’s power to apply itself to place as it wills, either through a medium or without a medium.46

Against this William protests that from this one of the condemned errors follows, namely that at some time an angel is simply not in place. In fact pr. 53-218 reads: “That an intelligence, or an angel, or the separated soul is not in place...”

(Ed. cit., pp. 102-03. Note especially: “Quia articuli supra positi et quam plures alii videntur sumpti esse ex his, quae tanta doctor scripsit in doctrina tam utili et solemnii” (p. 102). He concludes his tribute to Aquinas’s teaching with these words: “Quia per ea quae in hac doctrina continentur quasi omnium doctorum aliorum doctrinae corriguntur, sapiadae reduntur et conduntur; et ideo si ista doctrina de medio auferretur, studentes in doctrinis aliorum saporem modicum invenirent” (p. 103).

See the first text cited in n. 44 above. It indicates that not only the articles Godfrey has listed but a number of others seem to be taken from Thomas’s writings. Immediately before that sentence Godfrey also had written: “Sunt etiam in detrimentum non modicum doctrinae studentibus perutulis reverendissimi et excellentissimi doctoris, scilicet Fratris Thomae, quae ex praedicis articulis minus iuste aliqualiter diffamatur” (p. 102).

Note especially: “Sed substantia angeli non est subdita loco ut contenta, sed est superior eo ut continens: unde in potestate eius est applicare se loco prout vult, vel per medium vel sine medio” (Leonine ed., Vol. 5, p. 33).

For William see Glorieux ed., art. xvi, pp. 72–73. See condemned proposition 53–218: “Quod intelligentia, vel angelus, vel anima separata nusquam est.”

See the text cited in n. 46 above.

See Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 872: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc non repute inconveniens quod angelus sine loco possit esse et non in loco, quando nullam operationem circa locum habet: nec est inconveniens ut tunc nusquam vel in nullo loco esse dicatur. . . . .” Also see De potentia, q. 3, a. 19, ad 2. Hence my remark concerning this in “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277” at p. 189, n. 48 needs to be qualified. Thomas’s view that an angel might not be in place does seem to be targeted by pr. 53.

See Enquête, pp. 105–06. For the references to Aquinas see p. 105, n. 7. For Siger’s Quaestiones in III De anima see Bazán ed., q. 11, p. 34:77–78. In this question Siger is grappling with the question whether the separated soul can suffer from fire.

248
place (\textit{nusquam}).”

While it is clear that William is closely following Thomas’s text in this discussion, especially from the end of the corpus of article 2, the question remains as to whether he is correct in concluding from this that according to Aquinas an angel might not be in place at all. Thomas’s remark that it is within an angel’s power to apply itself to place as it wills, either through a medium or without a medium, would seem to imply that an angel might not wish to apply itself to place in either way and, therefore, that it would then not be in place. This view, of course, is condemned by the prohibition of pr. 53. Indeed, in his earlier Commentary on I Sentences, d. 37, q. 3, art. 1, ad 4, Thomas makes this very point explicitly. There he replies that he does not regard it as unfitting for an angel to be capable of existing without place and without being in place when it performs no operation with respect to place. Nor is it unfitting then to say that it “\textit{nusquam vel in nullo loco esse dicatur}.” This language, of course, is very close to that of pr. 53.

Nonetheless, Hissette pays relatively little attention to Thomas’s discussion apart from noting that prohibited propositions 53 through 55 recall his constant teaching, and giving a number of references. Instead Hissette assumes that the condemnation more directly envisions Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and an anonymous text edited by Delhaye. In the case of Siger he cites one text from the latter’s \textit{Quaestiones in tertium de anima}. There Siger refers to the separated soul as being united to the body as what is \textit{locatum} is united to place, because it operates in it.

As a more explicit possible source Hissette cites Siger’s \textit{Questions} on the \textit{Liber de causis}, qq. 32 and 33. The first question is directed to determining whether an intelligence enjoys being in place. Siger’s presentation is remarkably close to Aquinas’s discussion of an angel’s presence in place in ST I, q. 52, aa. 1–2. In brief, Siger replies that an intelligence is not present in place in the strict or proper sense — i.e., so as to be contained and measured by the place and to be touched by the place through quantitative contact. But, he goes on to remark, an intelligence may be said to be in place according to its improper meaning, which is for the intelligence to touch the place by virtual contact or by its motive power, and to contain the place without being contained by it. By noting in ST I, q. 52, a. 1 that presence in place applies only equivocally to angels and to corporeal things, Aquinas had already made the same point.

In q. 33 Siger explicitly addresses the related issue, whether an intelligence moves (\textit{moveatur}) in terms of place. Siger refers to and rejects the view of some who hold that an intelligence might move instantaneously from being in one place to being in another. His description of this theory almost literally...
reproduces Thomas’s reference to the same position in ST I, q. 53, a. 3. And like Thomas Siger rejects this view out of hand.\(^5\)

As Thomas had already done, Siger now explicitly makes the point that if an intelligence is said to be in place only equivocally with the way bodies are, so too, if intelligences happen to change in terms of place, this will also be true only in an equivocal sense. Just as an intelligence is in place by virtual contact (i.e., by contacting place through its power), so too, for an intelligence to move in terms of place would be nothing other than for it to have a succession of contacts through its motive power with different places or corporeal things. Such succession or motion would be possible to an intelligence if by reason of its choice it could be applied to different mobile things and could do this either continuously or not continuously by passing from one extreme to the other either through a medium or without a medium. In this way the intelligence would be moved in continuous or noncontinuous time. Until this point the similarity with Thomas’s position in ST I, q. 53, aa. 1–2 is striking.\(^9\)

\(^5\)See *Les Quaestiones super Librum de causis de Siger de Brabant*, A. Marlasca, ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1972), p. 125. Note especially: “Esse tamen in loco quantum ad hanc rationem et impropriam essendi in loco secundum quam esse in loco intelligentiam est eam attingere locum contactu virtuali, sua virtute motiva, et continere locum, non contineri, sic intelligentia potest dici esse in loco. . . .” Compare with Aquinas, q. 52, a. 1, especially: “. . . aequivoce tamen dicitur angelus esse in loco, et corpus. . . . Per applicationem igitur virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque, dicitur angelus esse in loco corporeo. . . . Similiter etiam non oporet propter hoc, quod continetur a loco. Nam substantia incorporea sua virtute contingens rem corpoream, continet ipsam, et non continetur ab ea.” Also, note that Siger (*ibid.*) and Thomas both deny that an intelligence (or angel) can be in different places simultaneously (see ST I, q. 52, a. 2), and both reject restricting the presence of an intelligence (or angel) in place to that of a point in a continuum.


\(^9\)For Siger see p. 129:74–78. Contrast this with ST I, q. 53, a. 2: “unde in potestate eius est applicare se loco prout vult, vel per medium vel sine medio.”

\(^5\)See *Enquete*, p. 107, n. 12.

\(^9\)For Siger see the text from Boethius’s Commentary on the *Physics* (III, 26 and III, 33). For the text from the anonymous Commentary on the *Physics* see pp. 109–10. Both passages admit that in some equivocal sense separate substances are in place *per accidens* insofar as they operate in place. Again, this position is rejected by the first part of proposition 55, but the second part of that proposition fits Aquinas’s position much more clearly.
But, unlike Aquinas, Siger also rejects this way in which an intelligence might move in terms of place, improperly speaking, and this because according to Siger each intelligence is applied to a determined mobile thing as the final cause of that thing’s motion and cannot be applied to another. So not even this kind of change in terms of place can be assigned to an intelligence.54

Indeed this invites us to consider the position condemned in pr. 55–204 (“That separate substances are in place by their operation, and that they cannot move from one extreme to another, or through a medium, except insofar as they can will to operate either in the medium or in the extremes — This is an error, if it means that without operating a [separate] substance is not in place nor does it pass from place to place.”) Siger rejects local motion of intelligences even by reason of their operating in different places. Hence, the position condemned by pr. 55 is less extreme than the view defended by Siger, but clearly covers Aquinas’s position. Which author, therefore, is more likely to be its direct target — Thomas or Siger? To me the answer is clearly Thomas.55

However, Hissette has also cited Boethius of Dacia’s Commentary on the Physics where this Master in Arts rejects any kind of presence in place for an intelligence, even though its actions may occur in place. This view would also be rejected by the prohibition of prr. 53 and 55, as Hissette points out; but the absence of literal agreement between Boethius’s text and the condemned propositions argues against our assuming that Boethius’s texts are a direct source, again according to Hissette. Hissette also cites an anonymous Commentary on the Physics (ed. by Delhaye), according to which the separated soul and separate intelligences are not in place per se, even though they are in place in an equivocal sense per accidens insofar as their operation is received in some place. This general view, too, is rejected by the prohibition of articles 53 and 55. Nonetheless, I see no reason to regard this as a more obvious direct target of these prohibited propositions than Thomas himself, other than the fact that he was not a Master of Arts. To my way of thinking that is not enough. It is most likely that Thomas was directly targeted by the prohibition of pr. 55, and probably by that of pr. 53.56

This view is at least partially confirmed by Godfrey of Fontaines’s remarks in Quodlibet XII, q. 5, since he includes pr. 55 in his list of condemned propositions which appear to be taken from Aquinas’s writings. However, Godfrey goes on to single out the incompatibility of the simultaneous prohibition of pr. 55 and of pr. 54–219, which he also includes in his list. According to the latter, to say that separate substances are not in place (nusquam) according to their substance is condemned. This is an error if it is taken to mean that their substance is not in place. But if it is taken to mean that their substance is the
reason for their being in place, it is correct to say that they are not in place according to their substance. 57

Godfrey counters that if it is correct to hold that separate substances are not in place by reason of their substance, how can it be erroneous to hold that they are in place through their operation, and are neither in place nor pass from place to place without operating? But all of this is excluded by the condemnation of pr. 55? According to Godfrey there is no middle ground between saying that the substance of an angel is not its reason for being in place, and that its operation is not. 58 This problem continued to perplex him, as is clear from his comment a year or so later in Quodlibet XIII, q. 4. In replying there to an objection, he notes that it is difficult to determine whether an angel is in place, and how, because of the condemned articles concerning this, which seem to be contrary to one another. Because of the danger of excommunication, he adds, he wishes to say nothing against them. 59

Reconciliation of the simultaneous condemnation of both of these propositions had already been recognized as being extremely difficult by Henry of Ghent in his Quodlibet II, q. 9 of Advent 1277, and hence only a few months after the March 7 condemnation. There Henry was responding to the question whether an angel in terms of its substance is in place without operating therein. Henry argues at length to show that an angel’s substance cannot be the reason for its being in place or, as he prefers to put it, in situ, in accord with the prohibition of pr. 54. In seeking to find some principle which does account for this, he then turns to the angel’s powers of intellect and will. He acknowledges that the substance of an angel is in place by reason of its applying its power to that place when it produces some effect in a corporeal or situated substance. But

57Ed. cit., pp. 101–02. Pr. 54 reads: “Quod substantiae separatae nusquam sunt secundum substantiam. — Error, si intelligatur ita quod substantia non sit in loco. Si autem intelligatur quod substantia sit ratio essendi in loco, verum est quod nusquam sunt secundum substantiam.”

58Godfrey comments: “Hic etiam apparat contradicio quia non bene potest assignari medium inter ista duo, scilicet quod nec substantia angeli sit angelo ratio essendi in loco nec etiam eius operatio, quia si substantia angeli non sit ratio essendi in loco, eadem ratione nec potentia angeli vel quaecumque proprietas eius in ipso formaliter existens poterit esse ratio essendi in loco” (p. 102).

59Les Philosophes Beiges, Vol. V, p. 221: “Hoc etiam est difficile determinare propter articulos circa hoc condemnatos, quia contra rii videntur ad invicem; et contra quos nihil intend o dicere propter periculum excommunicationis.” Evidently the force of the Condemnation was still being felt in 1297/98, the date of Quodlibet XIII. One wonders whether Godfrey’s discussion of the Condemnation during the previous year had resulted in some warning or reprimand from the Bishop or Chancellor. Perhaps, but we do not know.

60Ed. cit., q. 9: “Utrum angelus secundum substantiam suam sine operatione est in loco” (p. 58). See pp. 61–65 for Henry’s efforts to show that an angel’s substance cannot be the reason for its being in place or in situ. For his discussion of the angel’s powers of intellect and will as the possible explanation see pp. 65–67.

61Ed. cit., 67–72. See p. 70: “Sed quid sit illud, per quod angelus ita sit in loco, et quid sit in eo, ratione cuius ita sit in loco, sive ipsa naturae limitatio, sive aliquid aliud, re vera nescio.”

62Ed. cit., p. 58.
this, he adds, is not to be in place taken in the strict sense, but rather for the angelm to be in some thing which itself is being moved. Indeed, he also notes that God is in place in this sense. But he distinguishes a second way of being in place for an angel, in habitu, or when the angel actually produces some act in something other than a corporeal entity, in other words, when the angel does not operate in place. In this case it is difficult for Henry to see why the substance of the angel is more determined to be in place (situs) by reason of its powers than by reason of its substance. And the condemnation of pr. 55 prevents him from saying that an angel cannot be in place or cannot pass from place to place without operating there. 

He also reaffirms his acceptance of the prohibition of pr. 54, and hence affirms that even though the substance of an angel is in place, its substance is not its reason for being in place. Indeed, he notes that all the Masters of Theology who had gathered to consider this, i.e., Bishop Tempier’s Commission, of which he himself was a member, unanimously granted that the substance of an angel is not the reason for the angel’s presence in place. But he also now grants that if an angel does not apply its power to place by operating therein, its power, i.e., its intellect or will, cannot be the reason for its then being in place, unless, he adds, perhaps its powers are less removed from place (and position) than its substance. This final possibility he cannot decide. But if, perhaps, the power of an angel is not the reason for its being in place, which for the present he does not determine or sustain or defend, something else must be. Concerning this he prefers to listen to others and to acknowledge his ignorance rather than to say anything on his own or to speak indiscreetly. He considers the possibility that the explanation may be found in or follow from the limited nature of every creature, including angels, which would require them to be in place. But again, he acknowledges that he does not know whether this is the case. In short, he does not know what it is that accounts for the fact that an angel may be in place without operating there.

Finally, if we wonder whether Henry sees any of these as being directed against Aquinas, it is worth noting that in the opening argument he presents for the view that an angel can be in place in its substance without operating there, Henry refers to the opinion that an angel is not in place except by its power, and by applying that power to its place. The language of this argument reminds one of Aquinas’s terminology in ST I, q. 52, a. 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Henry</th>
<th>Thomas</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angelus autem non est quantus nisi virtute. Ergo non est in loco nisi per applicationem suae virtutis. Illam loco non applicat, nisi quia operatur in eo.</td>
<td>Per applicationem igitur virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque, dicitur angelus esse in loco corporeo.</td>
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Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277
John F. Wippel

253
In rejecting this position, and in recognizing that it falls under prohibited pr. 55, Henry's text makes it appear likely that in his view Thomas is indeed targeted by the condemnation of this proposition.62

Godfrey's list of articles that seem to have been drawn from Thomas's writings does not include pr. 53, although this is listed by William. We have suggested above that it probably was directed against Aquinas as well as against others in the Arts Faculty.

c. Whether Angels Undergo Change

In discussing ST I, q. 62, a. 9, ad 3, where Thomas holds that the blessed angels do not merit any accidental rewards, William counters that this position seems to favor three errors condemned at Paris, namely, pr. 44–71: "That no change is possible in separate substances; nor are they in potency to anything because they are eternal and free from matter;" pr. 48–76: "That an angel understands nothing de novo;" pr. 51–78: "That sempiternal substances separated from matter have the good which is possible for them when they are produced, and that they do not desire anything they lack." As Richard Knapwell points out, in this discussion Thomas in fact holds that the blessed angels may indeed increase in joy over the salvation of those who are saved through their ministry; but this increase in joy is an accidental reward which, Thomas thinks it better to say, is not merited by the blessed angels in the strict sense. It rather follows from the (strength of the) beatitude which they possess

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62Pr. 44: "Quod in substantiis separatis nulla est possibilis transmutatio; nec sunt in potentia ad aliquid, quia aeternae et immunes sunt a materia;" Pr. 48: "Quod angelus nihil intelligit de novo;" Pr. 51: "Quod substantiae sempiternae separatae a materia habent bonum quod est eis possibile, cum producuntur, nec desiderant aliquid quo carent." For William's text see ed. cit., pp. 95–96.

6For Richard's text see ed. cit., pp. 99–100. See especially p. 100: "Unde non cesso mirari qua fronte dicere potuit istam doctrinam sanam praedicis erroribus favere, cum acquirere gaudium illud ex virtute beatitudinis prout docet frater Thomas antecedat ad contradictorie opposita omnium illorum, ut patet ex dictis." For further discussion of pr. 44 see William's art. XXV (p. 107), and Richard's refutation (p. 108).

6For William's discussion of ST I, q. 64, a. 2, see ed. cit., p. 106. See p. 107 where Richard quickly points out that Thomas means that the apprehensive power moves the appetitive power, including the intellective appetite, in the first sense accepted by William and not in the second way. "Quoniam frater Thomas intendit quod vis apprehensiva (Glorieux: appetitiva) movet appetitum primo modo et non secundo. . . . planum est quod iste modus ponendi non est cavendus. . . ." For Glorieux's citation of the four propositions see p. 106, n. b. For William's discussion of ST I–IIae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, see p. 232. For Godfrey see Quodlibet XII, q. 5, p. 102.

6Pr. 161–135: "Quod voluntas secundum se est indeterminata ad opposita sicut materia; determinatur autem ab appetibili sicut materia ab agente;" Pr. 165–158: "Quod post conclusionem factam de aliquo faciendo, voluntas non manet libera, et quod poenae non adhibentur a lege nisi ad ignorantiae correptionem et ut correptio sit aliis principium cognitionis;" Pr. 164–159: "Quod voluntas hominis necessitat per suam cognitionem, sicut appetitus bruti." For discussion of each of these see Hissette, Enquete, pp. 253–54, p. 257, n. 2; pp. 256–57. For Hissette's later treatment see "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin. . . .," p. 237.
Thomas clearly does allow for change in such angels (and hence is not touched by prr. 44 or 48). And if an angel’s joy can increase because of the salvation of someone, this implies that it must know something de novo. Finally, this also implies that Thomas does not think that every angel possesses every good that is possible to it from the first instant of its existence (see pr. 51). Hence it is difficult to take seriously Williams’s claim that Thomas is really touched by any of these three propositions. One can also understand something of Richard Knapwell’s frustration with William when he comments:

Wherefore I do not cease to wonder on what ground he (William) could say that this sound doctrine favors the aforementioned errors, since to acquire such joy from (the strength of) their beatitude as Brother Thomas teaches leads to the contradictory opposite of each of those (articles).^4

Understandably, none of these articles is mentioned by Godfrey nor, for that matter, by John of Naples in his defense of Aquinas from the prohibitions.

**d. Freedom of the Will**

William also cites ST I, q. 64, a. 2, where Thomas remarks that the appetitive power is proportioned to the apprehensive power by which it is moved, as something moved is proportioned to its mover. William comments that if Thomas means by this that the appetitive power desires or rejects nothing unless the corresponding apprehensive power first apprehends and manifests it, this is true. But if Thomas means that the apprehensive (Glorieux: appetitive) power determines the appetite to one thing in every case by necessitating and determining it, this is an error publicly condemned at Paris; for neither the sensitive apprehensive power nor the rational apprehensive power determines or necessitates the will to one thing. William’s editor cites prr. 161, 165, 164, 163. And the last three are again cited tentatively by William himself in his discussion of ST I-IIae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3. Pr. 163 is also included by Godfrey in his list of articles which seem to be taken from Thomas. Hence we shall consider each of these in turn.^^

Pr. 161–135 holds “that the will itself is undetermined with respect to opposites like matter; but it is determined by its appetible object even as matter is determined by its agent.” With Hissette I agree that this extremely deterministic view was never defended by Thomas. Pr. 165–158 maintains that once a conclusion has been reached that something is to be done, the will is no longer free, and that penalties are employed by the law only to correct ignorance and so that such correction may serve as an example (lit. a principle of knowledge) for others. Again, there is little reason to think that this is really directed against

*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*
John F. Wippel

255
Aquinas. Pr. 164 is another statement of a determinist position ("That the will of a human being is necessitated by its knowledge just as is the appetite of a brute"). As Hissette points out, since Aquinas submits the judgment of practical reason to the control of the will, this proposition does not reflect his position. Yet in a later article he does include it along with pr. 163 among those which indirectly, perhaps incorrectly, touch Thomas. Hence none of these should be regarded as correctly or as directly aimed at Thomas.66

Pr. 163–163 maintains that the "Will necessarily pursues that which is

66Pr. 163–163: "Quod voluntas necessario prosequitur quod firmiter creditum est a rati­one: et quod non potest abstinere ab eo quod ratio dictat. Haec autem necessitatio non est coactio, sed natura voluntatis." For Hissette’s presentation of this see Enquete, pp. 255–56. There he remarks that no text espousing such psychological determinism and originating from the Faculty of Arts has yet been found, and refers back to his discussion at pp. 246–50 of the views of Siger of Brabant and two anonymous Commentaries (all of which stress the role of reason in the act of choice, but a role which itself is subject to the will). He notes William de la Mare’s connecting pr. 163 with Thomas’s ST I–IIae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: "... homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum." He counters that there is nothing heterodox (or deterministic) in this position, again because Thomas here is referring to reason in its ultimate practical judgment. He refers back to his fuller treatment of Thomas at pp. 244–46 for fuller discussion of the distinction between reason’s theoretical judgment and its ultimate practical judgment. There Hissette draws heavily upon O. Lottin’s discussion of the same in various texts of Aquinas. See In I Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 1; In II Sent., d. 25, q. 1; De Veritate, qq. 22, 24; SCG II, cc. 47, 48; ST I, q. 80, a. 2; q. 82, a. 2, a. 4; q. 83, a. 1. For texts after the Condemnation of December 1270 see ST I–IIae, q. 9 and 10; q. 17, a. 1, ad 2; De malo, q. 6. For Lottin see especially his Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIe siècles. T. 1: Problèmes de psychologie (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1942), pp. 226–43, 252–62. Also see D. Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite," Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991), pp. 559–84, for a helpful discussion of many of these texts.

For Henry’s dependence in this discussion on Thomas’s texts from ST I, qq. 80–83, see Lottin, op. cit., p. 276, n. 2. For Henry see Quodlibet I, q. 16, in Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet I, R. Macken, ed. (Leuven University Press/Leiden: Brill, 1979), especially pp. 98:90–101:54. The textual similarities are quite remarkable. Henry concludes from his exposition of Thomas’s position that he would say that if a greater and a lesser good are presented by reason’s judgment, the will cannot choose the lesser good but must choose the greater good. Precisely because Henry fails (or refuses) to acknowledge that Thomas maintains that reason’s ultimate practical judgment is itself subject to the control of the will, he reads him in a deterministic way. See, for instance: "Ut sic sit tota <vis> liberi arbitrii penes rationem et nihil ex parte voluntatis nisi quatenus voluntas a ratione dependent, ut non possit velle nisi cognitum et modo quo est a ratione iudicatum...." (pp. 100:51–101:54). For Henry’s vigorous argumentation against this position see the rest of q. 16 (pp. 101–13). See especially p. 103 where he attempts to show that in effect this theory should lead to the conclusion that there is no more freedom in the human will as distinguished from the human intellect than in the appetite of a brute. He is especially concerned that from this theory it follows that the will can be compelled by reason to act. On this also see Lottin, pp. 276–78. See p. 280 where he regards it as probable that in addition to certain Masters in Arts, Tempier had also intended to target Thomas through his prohibition of a number of propositions concerning free choice. He denies that the prohibition really attacked Thomas’s authentic position. Also see in this same series Lottin’s T. III: Pt. 2, Vol. 2: Problèmes de morale (1949), pp. 652–57 for a more general discussion of Thomas’s alleged "moral intellectualism."
firmly believed by reason; and that it cannot withhold consent (lit. abstain) from that which reason dictates. But this necessitation is not coercion, but the nature of the will." As mentioned above, Godfrey also cites this proposition among those that appear to be directed against Thomas. Be that as it may, Thomas would not defend this unless one applies it to reason's ultimate practical judgment, which judgment itself is, according to Thomas, subject to the control of the will. This is clear from his discussions of the difference between the will and sensitive appetite and of the intellect's role in the act of choice from the beginning to the end of his career. So understood, it would not lead to determinism.67

This is not to say, however, that some member of the Commission might not have read Thomas in a deterministic sense, even though this reading would have been unfair. Henry of Ghent had done that precise thing in his discussion in his Quodlibet I, q. 16, of 1276: "Whether when a greater and a lesser good are proposed, the will is unable to choose the lesser good." There Henry is clearly following Aquinas's texts, especially ST I, q. 80, a. 1; q. 82, a. 2; q. 83, a. 1, and misinterprets him so as to lead his position to determinism.68 Given this, one strongly suspects that Henry was still thinking in the same vein a few months later in 1277 when he served as a member of the Commission, and that he may have been responsible for the inclusion of pr. 157. If so, even though it is not specifically assigned to Thomas by William or by Godfrey, this proposition may also have been aimed at Aquinas, albeit unfairly so. It reads: "That if two goods are proposed, that which is stronger moves more strongly. — This is an error, unless it is understood insofar as this pertains to the side of the moving good." In any event, it is quite likely that Godfrey is right in seeing pr. 163 as directed against Aquinas, even though he would not defend it without some qualification. To return to the point made above, if Henry had misread Thomas in a deterministic way in his Quodlibet I, q. 16 of 1276, one would expect him to do the same again a few months later as a member of Stephen's Commission.69

Although pr. 166–130 is not cited explicitly by William in his Correctorium, it is included in Godfrey's list and is also included in those mentioned by the Declarationes. It reads: "That if reason is right, so is the will. — This is an error, because it runs counter to Augustine's Gloss on this text taken from the Psalm: 'My soul has desired to long...' (see Ps. 118:20) and because according to this, grace would not be necessary for rectitude of the will, but knowledge alone, which is Pelagius's error." As Hissette has pointed out, if this is applied to theoretical reason, as Tempier's Commission assumed, it would lead to determinism. But if it is applied to practical reason in its ultimate practical judgment regarding a particular act to be performed, the proposition

Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277
John F. Wippel

257
can be given a perfectly orthodox and nondeterminist meaning.70

Aquinas would defend the first part of this position ("If reason is right, so is the will") when taken in the latter sense because he always maintained that reason's ultimate practical judgment is subject to the control of the will itself. Hissette recognizes this, and also observes that the same reading can and should be given to Siger of Brabant's discussion of the same, as for instance, in his Quaestiones morales.71

Moreover, we also know that after the 1277 condemnation, but probably still in March 1277, the Masters in Theology granted the truth of this proposi-

6Pr. 157–208: "Quod duobus bonis propo-
sitis, quod fortius est, fortius movet. — Error, nisi intelligatur quantum est ex parte boni moventis." The similarity between this position and that considered and refuted by Henry in Quodlibet I, q. 16 is clear. See Hissette, Enquête, pp. 241–46 (Henry and Thomas), and pp. 246–50 (where he attempts to find similar views in Siger and in two anonymous texts emanating from the Faculty of Arts). However, the textual similarity between Henry's Quodlibet I, q. 16 and Thomas's discussions in ST I, qq. 80–83 remains, thereby strongly suggesting that Henry, both in this text and in his role as a member of the Commission, had Thomas Aquinas in mind first and foremost. There is some similarity in doctrine between the anonymous text edited by Delhaye and Thomas's ST I, q. 82, a. 2, but the textual similarity between this text and Thomas's (and Henry's) is not as great as between those of Thomas and Henry. See Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote, P. Delhaye, ed. Les Philosophes Belges XV (1941), pp. 118–19.

77For an important early discussion of this see E. Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome," Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 4 (1932), pp. 47–51. Hocedez placed the meeting of the Masters in Theology at which this proposition was granted in late 1285 or early in 1286, as did Hissette when writing in 1977 (see Enquête, p. 258). However, subsequent investigation by R. Wielockx has led him to date this meeting in March 1277, but after the March 7 Condemnation of 219 propositions. See his Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III.1 Apologia (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1985), pp. 77–81, 105–10. For Godfrey see Les Philosophes Belges IV, pp. 165–66. His text clearly implies that the proposicio magistralis was granted by the Masters in Theology after they had drawn up their list for the March 7 condemnation. In fact, Godfrey refers to certain "articles" which were condemned by the Bishop before the approval of this proposition and which seem to be contrary to it. He has in mind pr. 166 and probably pr. 169–129 (see n. 74 below).

77In addition to the passages already cited above from q. 16, see especially pp. 105:59–106:62: "Libertas ergo principaliter est ex parte voluntatis, ut si velit, agat per electionem sequendo iudicium rationis, vel contra ipsum sequendo proprium appetitum." Also see p. 113:22–23: "Dicendum igitur absolute quod bono et meliori proposito potest eligere minus bonum voluntas."
tion: "There is no malice in the will unless there is error or some kind of ignorance in reason." Even though in granting this the Masters were most likely concerned with their process against Giles of Rome, their action was also an acknowledgment of the defensibility of Aquinas's position, or as Hissette puts it, a ratification of his axiom that there is no sin without error. In his Quodlibet VIII, q. 16, of 1292/1293, Godfrey would argue that this *propositio magistralis* should be used to control pr. 166, not *vice versa*.72 Nonetheless, it is clear that Henry of Ghent sharply opposed this view that if reason is correct, so is the will in his Quodlibet I, q. 16 of 1276. Hence, it is not unlikely that he and the others did have in mind Aquinas and perhaps Siger and other Masters such as Boethius when they included pr. 166 in the condemnation of 1277. To say that this article was directed against an incorrectly understood Aquinas is not to say that it was not directed against him.73

In his Quodlibet XII, q. 5 Godfrey also cites pr. 169–129 as seeming to have been directed against Aquinas. It reads: "That when passion and particular knowledge (judgment) remain actualized, the will cannot act against them." Hissette acknowledges that he has not found this particular passage among the writings of the Arts Masters, and that since medieval times, as witnessed by John of Naples' reaction, this article has been linked with Thomas's ST I-IIae, q. 77, a. 2.74 There Thomas is explaining how a correct judgment on the part of reason can be overcome by a contrary passion. He notes that since a person is directed to act rightly by two kinds of knowledge, universal and particular, a deficiency on the part of either is enough to impede rightness of the will and of action. Thus someone may know in universal fashion that fornication is not to be done, but not recognize in a particular case that this action which is fornication is not to be done. This would be enough for the will not to follow a universal judgment by reason. Or it may happen that one has habitual knowledge that a particular act is not to be done, but fails to think of this actually here and now. Once again such a person may act against the habitual and individual knowledge he possesses. In developing this second situation, Thomas notes that at times one may fail to consider in actuality that which one knows habitually because of a lack of attention to that knowledge. But sometimes it happens that a person does not now consider something which that person knows habitually because of some hindrance, e.g., an external preoccupation perhaps, or perhaps some physical infirmity. In this way it may happen that someone who is subject to deep passion does not consider in this particular case what that person knows in universal fashion.

Passion can impede such consideration in three ways, continues Thomas:

*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*
*John F. Wippel*

259
(1) by serving as a kind of distraction which hinders such consideration; (2) by inclining one to the opposite of that toward which one’s universal knowledge points; and (3) by a kind of physical change by which reason is in some way bound from freely acting, as sleep or drunkenness can bind one’s use of reason. So true is this that when one’s passion is intensive enough, an individual may totally lose the use of reason, as with those who are completely consumed with love or anger. In this way, concludes Thomas, passion can lead reason to judge in a particular case against the knowledge (scientia) it possesses in universal fashion.\(^{75}\)

Hissette rightly notes that this position does not lead Thomas to determinism, since the particular judgment which binds the will is itself the ultimate practical judgment over which the will has control. But unlike Hissette, I do not take this as implying that the proposition was not directed at Aquinas by

\(^{75}\)Pr. 169: “Quod voluntas, manente passione et scientia particuli in actu, non potest agere contra eam.” For Godfrey see Les Philosophes Belges V, p. 102. See Enquête, p. 262. For John of Naples see Jellouschek ed. (cited above in n. 22), pp. 93–98. John also notes the similarity between this proposition and pr. 163. In brief, John also turns to ST I–IIae, q. 78, a. 1 to support his contention that in q. 77, a. 2, Thomas does not mean to deny that someone may choose to act against the judgment of reason indicating that a particular act is right (or wrong). Only in the case where reason indicates that, after due deliberation and all factors have been considered, this particular act is to be chosen as better for the agent here and now, must the will choose accordingly. And, maintains John, Thomas’s understanding of this is not covered by the condemned article(s).

\(^{76}\)On pr. 169 see Hissette, Enquête, pp. 262–63: “Ainsi comprise, la proposition censurée n’est pas déterministe et c’est ainsi que la comprend Thomas d’Aquin.” On these pages Hissette does not explicitly deny that this proposition was directed at Thomas, but this follows from the general thesis of his book (see pp. 315–16, and n. 45 where he lists pr. 169 among those which do not really accurately record Thomas’s thought). See p. 314 and nn. 26, 27, 32, and 33 for Hissette’s list of those which directly and certainly, or at least probably envision Siger and Boethius. With-
Tempier’s Commission, even if unfairly. Hence Godfrey’s testimony should be
given serious consideration. Moreover, this raises a serious question about
Hissette’s methodology. He readily assumes that in the case of Aquinas, if a
prohibited proposition applies to his teaching only unfairly, it was not really
directly aimed at him by Stephen and his Commission. Yet in the case of Siger
of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia he has offered many instances in which the
same thing happened; and he has not concluded from this that those propositions
were not directly aimed at Siger or at Boethius. Why not do the same in the case
of Aquinas? Indeed, if Henry of Ghent unfairly interpreted Aquinas in a
deterministic way in Quodlibet I, q. 16, as we have seen above, we should not
assume that he and his colleagues did any better when they served on Tempier’s
Commission.76

On the other hand, Godfrey also cites pr. 101–160: “That no agent is
undetermined with respect to different objects, but (every agent) is deter­
mined.” This statement is so unequivocally determinist and so far removed
from Aquinas’s actual words and doctrine that I agree with Hissette in seeing no
reason for thinking that it was aimed at Thomas. Hence in this case I, too, would
reject Godfrey’s testimony.77

\[\text{e. Differing Degrees of Perfection in Human Intellects}\]

Having concluded our discussion of William’s and Godfrey’s lists of
prohibited propositions concerning human choice which they cite as directed or
seeming to be directed against Aquinas, we may now return again to William’s
Correctorium. In commenting on ST I, q. 117, a. 1, William criticizes Aquinas
for holding that all human intellects fall on the same level (gradus). Against this
William cites condemned pr. 147–124: “That it is unfitting to hold that some
intellects are nobler than others because, since this diversity could not come
from the side of bodies, it must come from the side of intelligences; and thus
noble and ignoble souls would necessarily belong to different species, just as do
intelligences. — This is an error, because then the soul of Christ would not be
nobler than the soul of Judas.”78

That this proposition was thought to have been directed against Aquinas is
confirmed by Godfrey of Fontaines and by the anonymous author of Pelster’s
Declarationes. It is also explicitly considered by John of Naples in his effort to
show that Thomas was not really implicated by the 1277 prohibitions.79 It might
well be examined in connection with prohibited pr. 146–187 even though this
one is not explicitly mentioned by any of our four medieval sources with the
exception of John of Naples. This proposition reads: “That the fact that we
understand in worse or in better fashion arises from the passive intellect, which

*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*

John F. Wippel

261
he says is a sensitive power. — This is an error because it implies either that there is one intellect for all (human beings), or else equality among all souls.”

While the Averroistic theory of unicity of the possible intellect was certainly not defended by Aquinas, one may ask whether he defended equality of human souls. 80

In ST I, q. 85, a. 7, Aquinas attempts to account for the fact that one human being may understand the same thing better than does another. This may happen because one intellect is more perfect than another. Thomas comments that it is evident that insofar as the body is better disposed, a better soul results as well. This is clearest, he adds, in things that differ in species. But he also applies this

80Pr. 146: “Quod nos peius aut melius intelligimus, hoc provenit ab intellectu passivo, quem dicit esse potentiam sensitivam. — Error, quia hoc ponit unum intellectum in omnibus, aut aequalitatem in omnibus animabus.”


Ibid., Note especially: “. . . illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposta, sunt melius disposti ad intelligendum.”

82On pr. 146 see Hissette, Enquête, p. 226. Hissette cites a text from an anonymous Commentary on the De anima edited by Giele, and concludes that the doctrinal identity between the anonymous Master’s view and condemned pr. 146 is complete (p. 227). For this text see M. Giele, F. Van Steenberghen, B. Bazán, Trois Commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l’âme d’Aristote (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), p. 72:47–56. Note: “. . . indiget enim corpore in intelligendo ipsa anima sicut objecto et regit corpus in multis actionibus. . . . idem quantum ad hoc, naturalem conjunctionem habet cum corpore, nam ex phantasmatis corporis intelligit et secundum diversitatem phantasmatum in bonitate et malitia diversimodo reguntur homines per intellectum, ut quidam melius, quidam peius. Et propter hoc dixit Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia quod meliora sunt phantasmatum ius­­torum.” While this text indicates that the (separate) soul needs the phantasms of the body in order to understand, its point is that by reason of diversity of phantasms in terms of bonitas and malitia, different men are ruled differently by the intellect, some better, some worse. The emphasis here appears to be not so much on differences in intelligence (as in the condemned proposition) but on differences in virtuous action, as is also suggested by the anonymous text’s reference to phantasmatum iustorum in the citation from Aristotle. For Hissette’s effort to find a source from the Arts Faculty for pr. 147 see Enquête, p. 228.

By the first part of pr. 146 I have in mind: “That the fact that we understand in worse or in better fashion arises from the passive intellect, which he says is a sensitive power.” See Hissette, Enquête, p. 225, n. 1, where he cites ST I–IIæ, q. 51, a. 3: “In apprehensivis autem potentis, considerandum est quod duplex est passivum: unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis, aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.” Hence my remark concerning pr. 146 and Thomas in “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris,” at pp. 191–92, n. 53 should be corrected.

Hence he does allow for equality of different souls in terms of their nature since all belong to the same species. But he allows for lesser but important differences between them by reason of the different bodies for which they have been created. These differences allow for greater or lesser intellectual capacity or perfection among them. It should be noted that in the text from SCG II, c. 81, Thomas is concerned with accounting for the continuing multiplicity and individuation of souls after they are separated from the body.
to different individual human beings. As he puts it, the reason for this is that act and form are received in matter according to the capacity of the latter. And since some human beings have better disposed bodies than others, continues Thomas, they receive souls with greater intellective capacity. In support he cites a remark from Aristotle’s *De Anima* II, c. 9 (421a 25–26) to the effect that we see that those whose flesh is soft are mentally well endowed.81

As a second way of accounting for different intellectual capacities in human beings Thomas comments that such diversity arises in another way from the side of the lower (sensitive) powers, in that those with better disposed imaginative and cogitative and memorative powers are better disposed to understand.82 Indeed, Hissette comments that the relationship of this teaching with condemned pr. 146 (and 147, I would add) is striking (*eloquente*), but he again insists on finding the direct target of the prohibited propositions elsewhere, i.e., in texts from the Arts Faculty. He does this with questionable success in the case of pr. 146 (see an anonymous Commentary on the *De anima* edited by Giele), and with even less success in the case of pr. 147. But if the connection with Aquinas’s position is so evident in the case of pr. 146, why not admit that it was directed at Thomas as well as at the anonymous Arts text? And why not admit this in the case of pr. 147 as our medieval witnesses do?83

For my part, I would now conclude from this that the first part of pr. 146 is directed against Thomas as well, and possibly also against others such as the anonymous text edited by Giele. For Thomas certainly accounts in one way for different perfection in intellectual operations on the part of different people by appealing to differences in the perfection of their internal sensitive powers (in the *Summa*) or, to use the language of the proposition, to differences at the level of the “passive intellect.” And as Hissette correctly points out, Thomas permits one to use this terminology to refer to what he calls “ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.”84

As for the second part of pr. 146, Thomas does defend a specific or essential equality between human souls, but appears to allow from some diversity insofar as more perfect souls are created for more perfectly disposed bodies (see his first proposed explanation in ST I, q. 85, a. 7). Hence the second part of the proposition does not so clearly apply to him, since he clearly rejects the other proposed alternative — unicity of a separated intellect for humans. Thus in SCG II, c. 81, while discussing the fact that separated souls remain distinct from one another, he comments that not all diversity between forms results in diversity in species, but only that which involves different formal principles, or different defining rationes. Thus the substance of this separated soul is different from the substance of that separated soul, not because they are defined differently, but

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*Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277*

John F. Wippel

263
because the relationship (*commensuratio*) of this soul to its body is different from the relationship of another soul to its body. These different *commensurationes* remain in souls even when their bodies perish.\(^5\)

Finally, while pr. 147 was probably also directed against Aquinas (and others), he would not have supported it without some qualifications. One human intellect will not be *essentially* different from or *essentially* nobler than another, but some diversity in perfection will obtain between them because they were created to be the forms of different bodies. Yet they remain one in species or in level (*gradus*) to use Thomas’s language in ST I, q. 117, a. 1, and as Richard Knapwell brings out nicely in his response to William.\(^6\)

**f. God and the Effects of Secondary Causes**

In commenting on Thomas’s Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1 (“Whether God can make matter exist without [any] form”), William criticizes him for denying that God can do this because, according to Aquinas, it would involve contradiction. William counters that Thomas’s position is prejudicial to the doctrine of the Eucharist according to which God makes an accident continue to exist without its subject. If God can do this, he can surely also make matter exist without any form. After developing this argumentation, William adds that Thomas’s view seems to support prohibited proposition 69–63: “That God cannot produce an effect of a second cause without that second cause itself.”\(^7\)

\(^5\)See ST I, q. 117, a. 1, where Thomas writes: “... quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unus gradus in ordine naturae....” It is against this statement, of course, that William protests, and against which condemned prr. 146 (equality of souls) and 147 appear to be directed. For Richard’s response to William see *ed.*, cit. p. 196.

\(^6\)For William see *ed.*, cit., pp. 409–10. Pr. 69 reads: “Quod Deus non potest in effectum causarum secundariae sine ipsa causa secundaria.” In Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1, Thomas reasons that because (prime) matter is pure potency, for it to enjoy any actuality in itself is repugnant to its nature as matter. Hence it cannot exist in actuality except insofar as it participates in act, i.e., in form. Therefore to say that matter could be (or is) in act without any form is to hold that contradictories are realized simultaneously. It would have and would not have a form. But this cannot be brought to pass by God. In replying to an argument for the contrary view, Thomas notes that an accident depends on its subject as upon a cause which sustains it. Because God can produce all of the acts of secondary causes without using those causes themselves, he can keep an accident in being without its subject. But matter depends for its actual existence on form because form is its very act. Hence Thomas rejects the parity between the two cases.

\(^7\)See *Les Philosophes Beiges II*, pp. 7–8.

*For Henry see Quodlibet I, q. 10 (Macken *ed.*, pp. 62 [see opening argument], 66–67). Also see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, pp. 272–74, and the references in nn. 45 and 46. As I indicate there, since William de la Mare refers to Thomas’s position as erroneous, Godfrey may well have William in mind as well.

*“Divina autem virtus potest producere effectus quorumcumque causarum secundarum sine ipsis causis secundaris.... Unde et effectus causarum secundarum conservare potest in esse sine causis secundis.” Ed. *Leonina Manualis*, SCG IV, c. 65, p. 528. Also, see Thomas’s Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1, reply to the *In contrarium*, for the same point.*
Interestingly, in his Quodlibet I, q. 4 of 1285 Godfrey of Fontaines refers to some who attack the fruitful doctrine (of Aquinas), whose memory should be held in honor. They attack him on many points and proceed against his views by defaming his person and by heaping opprobrium on his teaching rather than by offering reasoned arguments. Godfrey adds that they say that Aquinas’s rejection of the possibility of matter’s existing without any form is not only false but erroneous, and they appeal to the case of accidents in the Eucharist to support their cause. Henry of Ghent presents a similar argument against the denial of the possibility that matter can be kept in existence without any form in his own Quodlibet I, q. 10 of 1276, and Godfrey clearly has Henry’s q. 10 in mind as he develops his own views on this issue.

It is clear that Aquinas did not defend the view that God cannot produce the effects of secondary causes without using such causes. Hence William’s charge that condemned pr. 69 is directed against Thomas is unfounded. See, for instance, SCG IV, c. 65, where Thomas comments that the “divine power can produce the effect of any secondary causes without those causes themselves... Wherefore he can also conserve in existence the effects of secondary causes without those causes.”

g. Souls, Demons, and Hell

In commenting on ST I, q. 64, a. 4, William criticizes Thomas for holding that there is a twofold place of punishment for demons, one in hell, and another, because of their work in testing humans, which is the dark air (atmosphere). William also objects to Thomas’s remark in his reply to objection 1 to the effect that a place is not penal for an angel or a soul in the sense that it affects it by altering its nature. Rather a place may affect its will by causing sorrow for it since the angel or soul is then aware that it is in a place which is not in accord with what it wills. William counters that Thomas’s position seems to foster an error condemned on another occasion at Paris by Bishop Stephen, i.e., “that the separated soul after death is not afflicted by nor does it suffer from corporeal fire.” Contrary to what William’s editor (and Hissette) indicate, William’s remark seems to be a reference not to pr. 219–19 of the 1277 Condemnation (“That the separated soul in no way suffers from fire”) but to pr. 8 from the list condemned by Tempier in 1270 (“That the soul in its state of separation after death does not suffer from corporeal fire”). If this is so, the proposition condemned in 1270 appears to have been directed against Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in III De anima, and pr. 219 from the 1277 Condemnation probably also was. Neither should be regarded as aimed at Thomas.
h. Human Knowledge of God

We may now complete our survey of propositions thought by William and by Godfrey to have been directed against Aquinas by turning again to the latter. In addition to those we have already examined, Godfrey includes pr. 9-36 ("That in this mortal life we can understand God through his essence") and pr. 10–215 ("That concerning God we can only know that he is, or his esse"). Godfrey himself makes the point that the condemnation of these two proposi-

9For William see ed. cit., pp. 110–11. Note in particular: "Unde haec positio videtur favere errori alias condemnato Parisiis a Domino Stephano, Parisiensi episcopo, qui est quod anima separata post mortem non affligitur nec patitur ab igne corporeo." From the 1270 Condemnation see pr. 8. "Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo" (Chartularium I, p. 487). Cf. pr. 219–19 from the Condemnation of 1277: "Quod anima separata nullo modo patitur ab igne." William's usage of alias as well as the closer verbal similarity both suggest that he has in mind the 1270 proposition. See His­sette, Enquete, pp. 311–12 for pr. 219 and Siger of Brabant. See his "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin . . . ,", p. 232, n. 41, for his assumption that William is thinking of pr. 219 when he assigns this to Aquinas. One may consult the careful study by R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur Siger de Brabant #1. Siger en 1265," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 67 (1983), pp. 217–26, for a helpful illustration of Thomas's influence (In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, q1a. 3) on Siger's discussion of this issue in his Quaestiones in III De anima, q. 11. Their answers, however, differ (see p. 226).

9Pr. 9: "Quod Deum in hac vita mortali possumus intelligere per essentiam;" pr. 10: "Quod de Deo non potest cognosci nisi quia ipse est, sive ipsum esse." For Godfrey see Quodlibet XII, q. 5, p. 101: "Sed in istis videtur esse contradictio; quia inter cognitionem de aliquo quia est et quid est vel per essentiam medium non videtur." Also see his remark concerning this in Quodlibet VII, q. 11 (Les Philosophes Belges III, p. 386). In the same question Godfrey has already developed his own rather complex explanation of an imperfect kind of quid est knowledge of God which we can reach in this life. See my The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, pp. 110–15, for discussion.

9From SCG I, 30, note Thomas's conclu-

ing remark: "Non enim de Deo capere possu-

mum quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum . . . ." For discussion of Thomas's views on this see my Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, C. IX ("Quidditative Knowledge of God"), pp. 215–41; and more recently, my "Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know About God," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1992), pp. 279–97. Godfrey was one who found Thomas's stress on the via negativa too restrictive. See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, p. 111, comment­ing on Quodlibet VII, q. 11, especially pp. 383–84. On p. 383 Godfrey clearly refers to Aquinas's theory as set forth in ST I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2, though without naming him: "Et ideo aliui videtur dicere quod solum de Deo scitur si est, loquendo non de esse quo Deus in se ipso subsistit, sed de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus sive quod vera est propositio qua dicitur Deus est, quod quidem potest etiam sufficienter ex divinis effectibus demonstrari." Here again I differ with His­sette who, in spite of the similarity between pr. 10 and Thomas's position and his own failure to find this position in writings from the Arts Faculty, does not want to admit that the propo­sition was aimed at Aquinas. See Enquete, pp. 33–34; "Albert le Grand . . . . ,", pp. 234, 235. We agree that pr. 9 is not directed at Thomas.

tions is incompatible.\textsuperscript{92}

One would be hard pressed to find any support for pr. 9 in the writings of Aquinas, since he insists throughout his career that when it comes to our knowledge of God in this life, we can know that he is and what he is not, but not what he is. See, for instance, SCG I, c. 30. On the other hand, it is likely that pr. 10 does envision his position, a position which was viewed by some as being too restrictive or too limiting as regards the knowledge of God we can have in this life whether by reasoning from effect to cause or through revelation.\textsuperscript{93}

As for pr. 9, I assume Godfrey has simply listed it because of its apparent incompatibility with the prohibition of pr. 10. A likely target of pr. 9 seems to be Siger of Brabant, in a passage from his Questions on the \textit{Metaphysics} III, 1. There he observes that some deny that it is possible for us to have essential knowledge of the First Cause and of separate substances, but that Averroes defends the opposite position. Siger concludes that someone who is well versed in philosophy can reason from knowledge of the First Being’s effects to knowledge of its essence. According to the testimony of Agostino Nipho, Siger also defends this view in his lost \textit{De intellectu} and his lost \textit{De felicitate}. And in his Questions on the \textit{Liber de causis}, q. 28, after offering arguments for both sides of this issue, he leaves the question undetermined.\textsuperscript{94}

To return to pr. 10, if we acknowledge that it is directed against Aquinas, which Hissette is reluctant to do, we must also remember that he allows for and develops a theory of our knowledge of the divine attributes. While much of this knowledge is negative, to be sure, it is not totally so.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{i. Death}

Evidence has been offered by R.-A. Gauthier to show that pr. 213–178 directly envisions a \textit{Tabula Ethicorum} (an alphabetical listing of positions) drawn from Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} and from Albert’s Commentary on it by a secretary under Aquinas’s direction. The condemned proposition reads: “That the end of things to be feared is death. — This is an error, if it excludes the terror of hell, which is the extreme.” The \textit{Tabula} contains this statement: “That death is the end of things to be feared and to be feared the most because it is the terminus.”\textsuperscript{96} In ST II–IIae, q. 64, a. 5, ad 3, where he is clearly speaking in his own name, Thomas restricts this remark to the present life (“ultimum malorum \textit{huius vitae} et maxime terrible est mors”). Hence there can be no question about its orthodoxy there. But rather than admit that the prohibition of pr. 213 directly envisions Aquinas’s \textit{Tabula}, Hissette has proposed that perhaps some Master of Arts had used the \textit{Tabula} and copied this

\textit{Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277}

John F. Wippel

267
statement from it in an unknown writing which was targeted by the Commission without its members being aware of its Thomistic origins. To me this is an extremely forced way of trying to sustain the thesis that none of the prohibited propositions was directly aimed at Aquinas.

5. Conclusion

Although a number of other propositions have been proposed by various modern scholars as having been directly aimed at Aquinas, limitations of space preclude my examining them in greater detail here. I will conclude by summing up my points of agreement and disagreement with Hissette. We agree that the authors of the 1277 Condemnation knew quite well that a number of the

97See the references to my two studies and to Hissette as given in n. 93 above.

98Pr. 213: “Quod finis terribilium est mors. — Error, si excludat inferni terrorem, qui extremus est.” For the text from the Tabula see Leonine ed., Vol. 48, p. B 126: “Quod mors est finis terribilium at terribilissimum, quia terminus.” For Gauthier’s discussion of this see pp. B 49–B 55.


9Quodlibet XII, q. 5, p. 103.

10Jellouschek ed., pp. 88–89, for John’s statement of his purpose: “Videtur salvo meliori judicio, quod nullus articulus parisius pro errore damnatus sit contra doctrinam fratris Thomae beatissimi et per consequens, quod possit licite eius doctrina doceri parisius sicut alibi tanquam catholicca nihil contra fidem aut contra bonos mores continens et probabiliter vera.” John’s consideration of pr. 46–79 is interesting, especially since it is not cited by our other witnesses: “Quod substantiae separatae sunt sua essentia, quia in eiusmodem est quo et quod est.” John takes this as referring to the relationship between nature and supposit and notes that Thomas usually identifies them in separate substances, even though in Quodlibet II, q. 4 he distinguishes supposit from nature because the supposit includes or adds esse to nature. For an effort to resolve this difficulty in determining Thomas’s definitive view on this, see my “Presidential Address: Substance in Aquinas’s Metaphysics,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 61 (1987), pp. 11–15. In any event, John replies that if one holds that Thomas really intended to hold that nature and supposit are the same in separate substances, one should interpret the condemned article as rather maintaining that “substantiae separatae sunt sua essentia,” taking this to mean that they exist of or by their essence and hence are not efficiently caused, a view, adds John which was defended by some members of the Faculty of Arts (p. 89). On the other hand, one could just as easily conclude that Stephen and his Commission intended to condemn the view that in separate substances nature and supposit are not really distinct, a position usually defended by Thomas but also by Boethius of Dacia and Siger (cf. Hissette, Enquête, pp. 92–94).
censured propositions were common to Masters of Arts and to Aquinas, and hence that the condemnation struck at a number of his positions. We disagree, however, in that Hissette insists that we should not conclude that Thomas was directly targeted by any of them.99

To me it is clear that, as William and Godfrey and John of Naples indicate in their different ways, a number of these articles were thought by contemporaries to have been aimed directly at Thomas. William was attempting to support his general challenge to Thomas’s orthodoxy and, therefore, may have been guilty of expanding his list unduly. But in a number of cases we have concluded that his claim that Thomas is targeted is indeed well grounded. Godfrey was much more interested in addressing the justification or lack thereof for the continuing condemnation of a number of articles which seem to have been taken from Thomas’s writings. He makes it clear that his list of such articles is not intended to be exhaustive. With two exceptions we have also found his claims justified. Rather than deny that these propositions were aimed at Thomas, Godfrey argues that they should be corrected. Because the current Bishop of Paris (1296/1297) is not too skilled in theology even though he is an eminent canonist and civil lawyer, Godfrey notes that he would have to depend on the advice of theologians if he were to correct the articles. And since they are in disagreement about some of the articles in question, Godfrey grants that the Bishop can be excused in some way for not correcting them. Even so, Godfrey does think he could and should at least suspend the condemnation (sententia) attached to them, even though he does not dare condemn him for not doing this.100

Finally, John of Naples makes a studied effort to show that none of the prohibited articles he considers (prr. 43, 46, 53, 74, 79, 146, 147, 162, and 169) really expresses Thomas’s teaching, and therefore that Thomas’s doctrine can be safely taught at Paris. This shows that still in the second decade of the fourteenth century the articles he cites were thought to be directed at Aquinas. Perhaps I should also note that, while limitations of space will not permit me to detail his discussion of each article, his efforts to show that they do not really touch Thomas are often forced.101

In sum, since a number of these articles were thought to be aimed at Thomas by informed contemporaries such as William and Godfrey and apparently in some cases, Henry of Ghent, I am inclined to take their testimony very seriously. In a number of these instances the propositions in question were known by Stephen and his Commission to have been taught by Thomas and in many cases also by one or other Master in Arts. Stephen and his Commission condemned them nonetheless. Hence it seems clear enough to me that in those cases they intended to condemn Aquinas’s doctrine directly, not merely indi-
rectly. This is only one, of course, of a number of events which show that Aquinas's views were far from being universally accepted, especially by his colleagues in the Theology Faculty at Paris, during his lifetime and in the decades immediately following upon his death.102

Appendix

Before concluding the present study, I would like to note briefly the valuable addition to our knowledge of some of the events surrounding the 1277


See Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III.1 Apologia (cited above in n. 72), cc. 1, 2 on the content and the date of Godfrey's copy of this work, and c. 3 for the text (pp. 49–65). See c. 4 for a detailed study of the date of Giles's censure, and pp. 91–96 for a helpful chronological résumé of these events.

See pp. 69–71 on the results and unanswered questions following from earlier research concerning Giles's condemnation. Even though it has now been surpassed, all due recognition must be given to the extremely important study by E. Hocedez, “La condamnation de Gilles de Rome,” Recherches de Theologie ancienne et médiévale 4 (1932), pp. 34–58.

See Wielockx, Apologia, pp. 92–96, 215–24; and for an excellent statement of his reasons for maintaining that the inquiry and process directed against Aquinas was distinct from the other two, “Autour du procès de Thomas d’Aquin,” in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 19 (1988), pp. 413–38.

Wielockx seems to assume that Hissette's position on this is correct. See, for instance, Apologia, pp. 114, 96 (where in n. 76 he acknowledges that in one or other article the March 7 censors may have envisioned Thomas more directly, as for instance with pr. 157–208). Also see his “Autour du procès de Thomas d’Aquin,” pp. 437–38, with a similar qualification in n. 126.

In the studies cited above Wielockx offers three major pieces of documentary evidence to support his proposal that a third and separate inquiry had been envisioned and initiated by Tempier and the Theologians against Aquinas: (1) a letter from Archbishop John Pecham of Canterbury to the Chancellor and Regent Masters at Oxford of December 7, 1284, referring back to Pecham’s knowledge while he was Lector at the Sacred Palace in 1277 that Tempier had been ordered by some Cardinals of the Roman Curia not to proceed as he was thinking of doing with an investigation of certain articles defended by Aquinas during the vacancy in the papacy caused by the accidental death of Pope John XXI on May 20, 1277, until he was instructed otherwise (Charteriarium I, n. 517, p. 625); (2) the testimony of Henry of Ghent in the first version of his Quodlibet X, q. 5 of 1286 where he refers to a meeting held some ten years earlier by the Masters of Theology at Paris, regent and non regent, who had been summoned by Bishop Stephen and the Papal Legate (Simon of Brion), to examine certain articles, at which the theory of unicity of substantial form in human beings was rejected as false by all, with two exceptions (Macken ed., p. 127, critical apparatus); (3) a remark by William de la Mare in his Correctorium to the effect that Thomas's view on unicity of substantial form was rejected by the Masters (ed. cit., p. 129). Wielockx's way of accounting for these three pieces of evidence — by proposing a third and separate inquiry against Aquinas — may be the most satisfactory explanation and appears to me to be highly plausible. Nonetheless, on another occasion I would like to explore this issue more fully.
condemnation recently made by another Belgian scholar, R. Wielockx. He has both discovered and edited Godfrey's *reportatio* of Giles of Rome's defense of 51 articles for which he was cited by Bishop Tempier and his theologians at about the same time, that is to say, in March 1277, but after the Condemnation of March 7 and prior to March 28. This defense includes Giles's listing of the 51 articles and brief defenses of many of them. Hence they constitute a true Apologia on Giles's part, and it is under this title that Wielockx has edited them. According to Wielockx's findings, because of Giles's refusal to retract his contested positions, he was condemned, i.e., he was denied the license to teach and in effect was exiled from the Theology Faculty at Paris until he would be reinstated after the intervention of Pope Honorious IV in 1285. Although we previously had some knowledge about Giles's condemnation and exile, it was only with Wielockx's discovery that the actual text of his Apologia and many more details surrounding his condemnation have come to light.

In addition to casting much light on the process against Giles, Wielockx has also offered evidence to show that Tempier had initiated still a third inquiry in March 1277, this time against Thomas Aquinas. This process was suspended, however, because of directions Tempier received against moving forward with it from some Roman Cardinals during the vacancy in the Papacy caused by the accidental death of Pope John XXI on May 20, 1277. If a third and separate process was indeed intended against Aquinas, this might explain why more of Aquinas's contested views, especially those with theological consequences such as unity of substantial form in human beings, were not included in the list of March 7.

Interestingly, Wielockx also points out that on at least seven occasions the March 7 Condemnation prohibits positions which had also been defended by Giles of Rome. In six of these instances Giles had defended these views in his Commentary on *Sentences*, which is also the source for the 51 articles cited in his individual condemnation. But, as Wielockx also notes, none of the propositions from his Commentary on *Sentences* which were also prohibited by the March 7 Condemnation reappears among the 51 cited in his personal condemnation. To me this does not indicate that in those cases Tempier and his Commission did not intend to target Giles directly in their March 7 list (as well as others, presumably), as Wielockx maintains. It rather suggests that because Tempier and the theologians realized that they had already condemned those positions on March 7, there was no need to do so again in their special process against Giles. Consequently, if for the sake of this discussion we grant that a third and separate inquiry was planned and initiated against Aquinas later in March 1277, this does not imply that he had not already been targeted by the prohibition of certain
propositions in the March 7 list. It does suggest that, if the separate process against Aquinas had been carried through, Tempier and the theologians would not have needed to repeat the condemnation of those Thomistic positions they had already condemned on March 7.