

of a « consciousness of solidarity with the destiny of mankind as a whole » (p. 548) a reason for hope that mankind can move towards recognition of the « essential basic values of general human validity which can provide the basis for an innermost encounter and not only for technical cooperation » (p. 548).

That von Rintelen's book of 1932 may be looked upon as the first comprehensive history of the philosophical problem of values is wellknown. This new work of 1972, enhanced by its systematic over-all conception, by a universal way of seeing the problems and by exactness in their solution, by completeness of the literature covered and sources referred to and by a complete revision in accordance with changes in the philosophical situation, may be classified as one of the standard works of philosophy of values in the enlightenment of its description and judgment.

Landau/Pfalz

HEINZ JANSON

PAUL GOCHET, *Esquisse d'une théorie nominaliste de la proposition*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1972, pp. 244.

Professor Gochet adopts a methodological nominalism; that is he will admit abstract entities only if they have explanatory power. As his test of ontological commitment he adopts Quine's criterion — 'to be is to the value of a variable'. The aim of his book is to present a theory adequate to the demands of syntax, semantics and pragmatics, without ontological commitment to *propositions*.

His strategy, in general, is to consider those purposes for which appeal to propositions has been thought necessary, and to show *either* (i) that these purposes can be as well or better achieved by quantification over entities of a nominalistically more acceptable kind, such as sentences, or (ii) that the appeal to propositions can be rendered ontologically neutral, to involve the term 'proposition' only in predicate position. The first manoeuvre is used for instance in considering the role of propositions as truth-bearers, the second in considering their role as objects of belief.

(1) Professor Gochet argues, for instance, that propositions are not needed in syntax; the letters 'p', 'q' etc. can be treated as schematic letters, and need not be construed as propositional variables. Strawson's objection, that a definition of logical truth cannot be given without an appeal to the concept of proposition, he answers by an ingenious argument which distinguishes the concepts of univocity and synonymy, and suggests that it is only the first, and not, as Strawson supposes, the second, for which a need has been shown. Again, Professor Gochet argues that Tarski's theory, in which 'true' is language-relative, requires us to take sentences, rather than propositions, as truth-bearers.

(2) As a nominalistically more acceptable alternative to the theory according to which belief is to be treated as a relation between a subject and a proposition, Professor Gochet proposes an analysis, derived from Quine in *Word and Object*, according to which

(i) A believes that p
is construed as

(ii) A believes true the proposition which we express in English by 'p' where the referential opacity is to be explained by the occurrence of quotation marks; and the occurrence of the word 'proposition' is to be construed syncategorematically, i.e. as part of the predicate, and hence free of ontological commitment.

This is a very thorough and instructive book. Professor Gochet recognises the crucial role which the concept of proposition has played in diverse philosophical

argument, and examines each of those arguments with care. And he draws not only on arguments in philosophy, but also on arguments from linguistics.

Sometimes, however, he seems rather too indulgent of weakness in his own theory, weaknesses of a kind for which he has criticised alternative views. We take one example, the analysis of belief sentences. If Professor Gochet's analysis could be construed as

(iii) $(\exists x)$ (x is a proposition and x is expressed in English by 'p' and x is believed-true by A)

it would presumably carry ontological commitment to propositions, which is precisely what it is intended to avoid. So

— believes-true the proposition which we express in English by 'p' must be taken as an unanalysable predicate. But now it is hard to see how Gochet's theory improves on Scheffer's, of which, however, he writes 'Il est cependant difficile de voir dans cette analyse autre chose qu'un brillant exercice de style', (p. 194). Again (although admittedly Gochet is presenting his analysis in a condensed form) it is unclear both exactly why he thinks that 'existential exportation' should hold for belief sentences, and exactly how he thinks his analysis yields this consequence.

There are other points at which more argument is needed. For instance, to Bar-Hillel's suggestion that we need to appeal to statements, as distinct from sentences to avoid the Liar paradox, Professor Gochet replies that we can perfectly well allow that not all sentences are either true or false. Unfortunately a new version of the paradox is liable to arise after this concession is made. The sentence

This sentence is either false or truth valueless

is true if false, false if true, and true if truth valueless. This is not, of course, to claim that Bar-Hillel's distinction is after all an acceptable means of avoiding the paradox; only that Gochet's alternative is not obviously adequate.

There are also some objections to Gochet's views which are ignored or treated rather lightly. For instance, Chomsky and Scheffler's criticisms of Quine's ontological criterion are not discussed; and Church's argument, against analyses of belief sentences in which quotation marks figure in the *analysans*, is given rather short shrift. In each case we are sympathetic with Professor Gochet's standpoint; but we consider that the counterarguments merit more serious consideration.

There are some bibliographical inaccuracies: KÜNG, G., *Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language*, is referred to as *Ontology and the Logical Analysis of Language* (pp. 159, 232); CARNAP, R., *The Logical Syntax of Language*, is referred to as *The Logical Syntax of Logic*, (pp. 91, 230); LINSKY, L., is referred to as LINSKI (pp. 207, 208, 216, 238); and HAACK, R. J. and S., as HAAK (p. 218).

University of Warwick

SUSAN HAACK

HERVÉ J. THIBAUT, S.S.S., *Creation and Metaphysics: A Genetic Approach to Existential Act*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, xii and 87 pp., including a selected bibliography and indices. Guilders 16, 20.

In his Preface, Father Thibault states that his study is limited to the early works of St. Thomas Aquinas, adding that « By the time of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, he had reached the key positions of his metaphysics » (ix). The professed aim of the volume « ... is to seek, especially in the early works of St. Thomas, a link between creation and existential act » (xi). He adds:

« This work is neither an historical nor a textual study of St. Thomas. Our task is limited to presenting one approach — a genetic approach — to existential act. A genetic method starts with *esse commune* and not with *ens in communi*.