IT IS WITH BOTH PRIDE AND HESITATION THAT I AGREED TO WRITE THIS ARTICLE ON phenomenology and logical analysis. John Searle and Bert Dreyfus are for me two of the paradigm figures of contemporary philosophy, so I am extremely proud to have been offered the opportunity to engage with their work. The editors of The Harvard Review of Philosophy, it seems to me, have shown a keen sense of what is deep and important in our discipline by publishing extended interviews with these two influential thinkers. At the same time, writing this article meant entering into a debate between Searle and Dreyfus about the priority of their respective philosophical methodologies, and this, I am afraid, is at best a no-win situation. My strategy, therefore, has been to try to engage as sympathetically as possible with the programs of each philosopher and to draw from their work lessons that seem to me important for any philosophical account of intentionality and social reality. I have not shied away from criticism; indeed the whole paper is an extended series of criticisms of the work of both philosophers. But I hope they will recognize this for what it is: an engagement with the work of each that is based on the deepest respect and admiration.

Before I jump into the fray, I should mention that I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Searle and Dreyfus as well. They were not only my two advisors in graduate school, but were the two main reasons I entered philosophy. Having become dissatisfied with the formal worlds of mathematics and computer science, their respective critiques of artificial intelligence and cognitivism showed me the rich possibilities of philosophy and struck me as a reason to become a philosopher. It is a difficult discipline, sometimes unforgiving; but I am glad I followed them into it.

§1. Phenomenology and the Analysis of Intentionality

ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS THAT ATTRACTED ME TO JOHN SEARLE’S WORK WAS THE Chinese Room Argument. Searle’s famous argument against the prevailing...
background assumptions of cognitive science—especially against the functionalism that most cognitive scientists took as a working principle at the time—seemed to me to focus in a clear-eyed and brilliantly straightforward way on exactly the right kind of issue: it emphasized the importance, and the deeply puzzling nature, of the first-person perspective. As I worked with Searle over the years, I came to appreciate that one of the striking characteristics of almost all his work is how, standing bravely against the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, he managed to highlight again and again the fundamental importance of the first-person perspective. This focus is essential to such canonical Searlean doctrines as the intrinsic intentionality of human mental life, the inadequacy of functionalism, the “internalist” account of meaning and of names, and many others.

Searle’s emphasis on the importance of the first-person perspective ought to make phenomenology a natural ally for him. It ought to make Searle a natural ally for the phenomenologists, too. And in a way it has. But alliances take many forms, and over the years this one has taken the form of a series of sometimes acrimonious debates. Since both parties agree that the first-person perspective is essential in some way or another to philosophical theorizing about the mind and world, these debates have focused on what role exactly it ought to play. Although they have often been rich and interesting, I have always felt that the debates between Dreyfus and Searle overplay the differences between their respective methodologies. My view is that both phenomenology and Searlean logical analysis are essential to any full account of intentionality and social reality. One goal of this paper, therefore, is to narrow the gap between them.

Sometimes the debates between Searle and Dreyfus have been based on misunderstandings. One of the latest rounds, which has centered on the ontological question of what there is, is a case in point. When one is deeply committed to the importance of the first-person perspective, as both Searle and the phenomenologists are, one runs the risk of falling into Idealism—the ontological view, roughly, that the only things there are are those things that are revealed from the first-person perspective. Searle has claimed recently that a crucial difference between himself and the phenomenologists is that they are, but he is not, committed to this kind of Idealism.¹ Now, there is no doubt that many great philosophers who have taken the first-person point of view seriously have also succumbed to the Idealistic itch. Berkeley endorsed perhaps the most radical version of Idealism, of course, but many phenomenologists have fallen into the trap as well. Husserl, for instance, was a kind of Idealist from the middle of his career forward and Merleau-Ponty was an avowed Idealist throughout. Despite this circumstantial evidence, however, there is no necessary connection at all between phenomenology and Idealism. Early Husserl was a committed Realist, and although Heidegger does, in some of his moods, seem to deny the independent existence of the universe, there is a healthy debate in the Heidegger literature about whether Idealism or Realism was his considered view. Since Dreyfus is well-known as the defender of the Robust Realist interpretation of Heidegger, this ontological issue actually turns out to be an area of agreement rather than of disagreement between him and Searle: both are committed to defending a Realist view about the nature of the universe.
One place where phenomenology and logical analysis may come more into conflict, however, is in the analysis of the contents, or as Searle calls them, the conditions of satisfaction, of various intentional states. Here I believe that the conflict is genuine, but it is every bit as much a conflict within Searle’s own work as it is a conflict between him and the phenomenologists. Fortunately, there is an easy way to resolve the conflict. Before I get to the resolution, however, let me begin by laying out the issues.

The easiest way to see the problem is to start with an example. In *Intentionality*, Searle argued that causal self-referentiality is one of the conditions of satisfaction of perceptual states. In order really to see an object in front of me, he argued, as opposed to merely seeming to see it, the object must cause me to have the visual experience I am having. For example, if I have a visual experience of a truck, but the truck I seem to see is not what is causing me to have that visual experience, then the conditions of satisfaction for the visual experience are not met, according to Searle. That is because, he claims, the world turns out to be different than my experience represents it to be.

This analysis of the conditions of satisfaction of perception buys into a certain bit of Grice’s causal theory of perception. In particular, it buys into the idea that when I am seeing an object, the object I am seeing is the one that I am in causal contact with. Searle builds this Gricean condition, or something like it, directly into the contents of the perceptual experience: among other things, if there is no object with which I am in causal contact, or if the object I am in causal contact with is different from the one I seem to see, then the world is not the way my experience represents it to be. The causal self-referentiality condition, therefore, is an essential part of Searle’s analysis of the contents of perception.

The conflict I am interested in comes about when one recognizes a different, but also seemingly natural, condition on the content of perceptual experiences. For surely, one might think, what counts as the content of a perceptual experience ought to be tied in some close way to its phenomenology. If that is right, then we need to ask ourselves this question: Is it a part of the phenomenology of seeing things—is it, in other words, either what I am or what I could be conscious of when I have a perceptual experience of an object—that the thing I seem to see is causing me to have my experience of it? In their debate with Searle over this issue, Dreyfus and Dagfinn Føllesdal argued that it was not. After all, what would it be like, experientially, to see something to be causing the experience I am having of it? Perhaps we will say that I can see one billiard ball causing another to move by hitting it. This is contentious, of course, and a strict Humean theorist of causality, or even a strict sense-datum theorist of perception, would deny it outright. But even if we accept the possibility of seeing that kind of object causation, it does not seem possible even to conceive of the more complicated case in which I see something to cause the experience I am having of it. After all, what would the difference be, experientially, between a visual experience of the truck in which I did see it to be causing me to have the experience, and an otherwise identical visual experience of the truck in which I did not? If we take the phenomenology as a guide to the content, therefore, the causal self-referentiality condition does not belong in the content of perception.
One option at this point is to try to find reasons for believing that causal self-referentiality really is part of the phenomenology of visual experience. In personal communication, Searle himself has pressed this line. The way to focus on the phenomenology of causal self-referentiality is to consider the case of a person with an extraordinarily good visual imagination. The person in question is so good at imagining visual scenes that she can have an imagined visual experience of, say, a yellow Volkswagen that is equivalent in every visual detail to the experience of the yellow Volkswagen she would be having if she were actually looking at it. The vibrant shades of yellow, the shape of the car, the elements of the visual background, all of these are identical in the visual experience and the imagined visual experience. Still, Searle argues, there is an important difference between the two. Namely, it is part of the imagination, though not part of the visual experience, that I am causing this visual experience. The imaginary experience, in other words, lacks the causal self-referentiality. Since ex hypothesi this is the only difference between the two experiences, it shows that causal self-referentiality must be part of the phenomenology of normal visual experience.

I believe this is an ingenious, but flawed, attempt to save the causal self-referentiality clause. It is flawed because it does not give us any reason to believe that causal self-referentiality as Searle understands it is part of the content of visual experience. To see this, think again about the phenomenology of vivid imagination. Let us accept, at least for the purposes of argument, that imagined scenes feel as though they are caused by me. And let us even accept that visual experiences are such that they feel like they are not imaginings. Even giving Searle all this, the most one is justified in putting into the content of the visual experience is that the thing seen is not caused by me. In short, if visual experiences feel like they are not imaginings, and imagined scenes feel like they are caused by me, then visual experiences feel like they are not caused by me. But to say that the visual experience I am having is not caused by me is substantially weaker than to say that the visual experience I am having is caused by the object it is an experience of. The imagination case only justifies the weaker of these two claims.

Instead of arguing that causal self-referentiality is a part of the phenomenology of visual experience, therefore, Searle sometimes seems to accept that it is not. When pursuing this line of thought, however, he does not conclude that causal self-referentiality is excluded from the content of experience, but rather that phenomenology is impoverished. He argues that since causal self-referentiality is a part of the conditions of satisfaction of perceptual experience, and since this causal self-referentiality condition is beyond the reach of phenomenology, phenomenology is not sufficient for logical analysis. As he says in his interview with *The Harvard Review of Philosophy*, “[T]here is a whole area that is beyond the reach of phenomenological analysis” (p. 114).

If Searle’s project were merely a third-person analysis of the conditions that need to be met for something to be a perception, then this claim about the impoverished nature of phenomenology would be defensible. Grice’s own account was a third-person analysis of perception like this, and I believe it is true that if your only resources were phenomenological you would not be able
to generate Grice's causal theory of perception. The problem is that when Searle builds the causal self-referentiality constraint into the intentional content of perception, Searle's own commitment to the importance of the first-person perspective in analyzing intentionality creates an internal conflict. To see this we have to introduce a principle that makes clear Searle's commitment to the first-person perspective in the analysis of intentionality. This is what Searle calls the Connection Principle.

In arguing against the possibility of a “deep unconscious,” Searle articulates the Connection Principle: “all unconscious intentional states are in principle accessible to consciousness.” He is referring to the Connection Principle in the interview on p. 121 when, in response to the comment that “conditions of satisfaction are potentially conscious,” he replies, “That’s right. One and the same intentional content can be either conscious or unconscious.” Assuming this is a constraint on what it is for something to count as the content of an intentional state, as Searle seems to intend it to be, we can formulate the constraint this way: in order for a condition to figure among the conditions of satisfaction for an intentional state, that condition must be in principle accessible to consciousness. Now, what it is for something to be “in principle accessible to consciousness” is no doubt a contentious issue. But fortunately we do not need a deep analysis of this condition. For we have already seen that Searle agrees that the causal self-referentiality condition is not in principle accessible to consciousness. That is why it is beyond the reach of the phenomenologists. If we agree that the causal self-referentiality constraint is not in principle accessible to consciousness, however, then the Connection Principle dictates that it cannot be among the conditions of satisfaction for an intentional state. This goes against Searle's earlier claim that it is a part of the conditions of satisfaction, and therefore generates an internal conflict.

This was a particular example of how to generate the internal conflict for Searle, but we can do it for the general case as well. The general problem is that the Connection Principle is in conflict with the claim that the logical analysis of intentional content outruns the phenomenological facts. That is because the Connection Principle says that something cannot be part of the content of an intentional state unless it is in principle accessible to consciousness, and phenomenology is the study of those features of intentionality that are in principle accessible to consciousness. Once you accept the Connection Principle, therefore, in the study of intentional content there is nothing left but phenomenology and its analysis.

The main reason this conflict arises for Searle, I believe, is that there is a battle in his work between Fregean and Russellian intuitions. The Connection Principle is motivated by genuinely first-person, Fregean intuitions. It ties intentional content to what Searle calls “aspectual shape,” or what Frege calls “modes of presentation.” Nothing can be an intentional content, on this view, unless it presents its objects “under an aspect,” and nothing can do this, according to Searle, unless it is in principle accessible to consciousness. Searle commonly invokes the Fregean terminology of “modes of presentation” or the related phrase “aspectual shape” when he is discussing the Connection Principle, as he does in the interview on p. 121. Contrast with this, however, the motivations
for the claim that logical analysis extends beyond phenomenology. When Searle is defending a claim like this, the third-person approach of Russell is his model. As he says in the interview on p. 118, “What does the phenomenologist say about the utterance ‘The King of France is bald?’ The Russelian analysis is simply beyond the reach of Husserl, Heidegger, or Merleau-Ponty, because the conditions of satisfaction (in this case truth conditions) are not phenomenologically realized in the consciousness of the speaking agent. But why should they be?” If conditions of satisfaction are the same as intentional content, though, then Searle’s own Connection Principle seems to provide the relevant reason.

Now, as a matter of fact I think this is not a particularly deep problem for Searle, at least not for the particular case of perception that I have been focusing on. The solution is simply to talk a little bit differently than he does. For the Connection Principle seems to me at least on the right track as a principle for how to relate the contents of a perceptual state to its phenomenology. And the causal self-referentiality condition also seems to me a reasonable condition on perception. The problem is in thinking that every condition that must be satisfied for the perceptual state to represent the world accurately is a condition that belongs in the content of the state. Some conditions, like the causal self-referentiality condition, are conditions on what it is for something to count as a perception (as opposed to a hallucination, for instance), while some conditions are genuinely part of the aspectual shape under which the subject experiences some object, event, or state of affairs. The first kind of condition is a condition on what is sometimes called the “attitude” of the intentional state, while the second kind of condition belongs in the content. Searle’s generic phrase “conditions of satisfaction” seems to cover up the important distinction between conditions that accrue to the attitude of the intentional state and those that accrue to the content. If Searle were to invoke this distinction in the way I propose, however, then he could keep the Connection Principle, keep the major elements of his logical analysis of perception, and even formulate his critique of phenomenology. For the right thing to say about the way logical analysis outruns phenomenology in this area is that the logical analyst, but not the phenomenologist, has the resources to give a full account of the difference between the various attitudes.

§2. Phenomenology and the Analysis of Social Reality

There is also a conflict between the phenomenologists and Searle when it comes to their respective conceptions of social reality, and I agree with Searle that the differences here are distinct from and perhaps deeper than those in the case of intentional content. Searle’s central question in this domain, he says, is this: “How do human minds impose institutional status functions on objects and people in the world? For example, how do we get from the bits of paper to dollar bills?” (p. 106). Now, this really is a question about ontology—about what it is for something to be money, not just about what the intentional content of our mental states is when we interact with or have thoughts about or use money. So it might seem obvious, as Searle suggests, that the phenomenologists have no way of grappling with or even understanding this question.
This apparently obvious suggestion, however, becomes less obvious when we notice that social reality has an important and peculiar feature, one that distinguishes it from, for instance, physical reality. At a first pass, we can formulate this feature by saying that if there were no human beings, there would be no social reality; social reality, in other words, depends on human beings in some essential respect. Searle’s way of describing this is to say that social reality is observer dependent or observer relative. For Searle this does not only mean that social institutions like money depend on us because we create or invent them. This is true of course, but it is merely a contingent fact about the causal history of money. Social reality is dependent on human beings in a deeper way as well, according to Searle. For in addition to having created the institution of money in the first place, money is and continues to be the kind of thing it is precisely because we collectively impose its function on it.

When Searle says that we collectively impose a status function on bits of paper by virtue of which they count as money, he is not making a phenomenological claim. He is not saying anything, for instance, about what we think of when we use money or about how we experience money when we interact with it. Rather, Searle’s is a claim about the logical structure of an institutional fact. It is a particular version of the general claim that, as he says, there would be no social reality at all except for the “collective intentional imposition of functions on entities that cannot perform these functions without that imposition.” Such an analysis says nothing at all about the phenomenology of money-use, just as Russell’s analysis of the definite article as a unique existence claim says nothing at all about our phenomenology when we produce utterances involving “the.”

And yet, even if Searle’s claim is not itself phenomenological, there does seem to be a phenomenological issue lurking in the area. For Searle has said something about what it takes for money to exist: we must, as a society, collectively impose its function on it. The phenomenological question in the area is whether we could collectively impose this function if our experiences of paper always had, and continue to have, only thus and such phenomenological features. This, I believe, is where phenomenology does have something to say.

Consider the analogous case of promising. Promising, like money, depends upon the imposition of a function on something that otherwise would not have it. When I promise to meet you next Tuesday for lunch, according to Searle, I bind myself to performing a certain action in the future by imposing a function on my utterance and thereby imposing an obligation upon myself. Promises could not exist, on Searle’s analysis, unless people imposed such a function on their utterances. Now, this is a logical analysis of promising, and as Searle points out it does various kinds of explanatory work. For instance, it helps to explain how we can impose obligations upon ourselves that are independent of any desires we may come to have. As such, however, the logical analysis of promising makes no phenomenological claims at all.

Even so, there does seem to be a phenomenological issue in the area. For I could not impose the appropriate function on my utterance, according to Searle, unless, when I produced it, I had the right kinds of intentions. I must, for instance, fulfill a sincerity condition: if I do not sincerely intend to meet you
next Tuesday for lunch when I produce the utterance, then I will not succeed in performing the speech act of promising. Now, whether I have that intention or not may involve things other than my phenomenology when I produce the utterance. But certainly some phenomenological states undercut my having the intention. I cannot, for instance, consciously and sincerely be thinking, “Like heck I will!” at the time I produce the utterance. Phenomenology does not, in other words, by itself give the analysis of promising. But phenomenology does provide constraints on the circumstances under which the speech act can be performed. It figures in what Searle calls the “performance conditions” of the act.

The case of institutional facts is similar. Searle is certainly right that the logical analysis of money in terms of the imposition of status functions on bits of paper is an analysis that is independent of phenomenological claims. Still, the question remains, under what phenomenological conditions could we as a society collectively impose the right kinds of status functions on bits of paper? What, in other words, are the “performance conditions” for the collective imposition of status functions? The answer to this question, I believe, is interesting, and it helps to bring into constructive dialogue Searle’s logical analysis of social reality, on the one hand, and Dreyfus’s phenomenological description of our everyday activity in the social world, on the other. To see how, I need to introduce briefly the notion of an affordance.

One central phenomenological claim is that in engaged, skillful activity there is a “mode of presentation” of objects that is genuinely intentional but is not equivalent to any conceptually articulated understanding of them. When the rabbit is running away from the fox, for example, he does not experience the rabbit hole into which he runs as a hole, or as of a certain size, or as a place that has features that make it a good hiding place, or as anything that he could articulate conceptually at all (assuming, for the sake of argument, that the rabbit has the capacity for conceptually articulated intentional states). Neither is it right to say, however, that the activity of running into the hole is a mere non-intentional motor reflex on the rabbit’s part. After all, the skill of escaping a predator is a very flexible one that requires the rabbit to be sensitive to many different aspects of the situation. Rather, in the terminology of the psychologist J. J. Gibson, the rabbit, hole affords hiding. That is to say, the rabbit experiences the rabbit hole, in the context of escaping the fox, as something that pulls him immediately into a certain kind of activity—namely, the activity of running into it.

I spoke of this affordance as a “mode of presentation” of the rabbit hole, and in doing so I mean to invoke the Fregean metaphor. Perhaps the metaphor is not completely apt. But the important idea behind it, which is apt here, is to drive a wedge between the thing that is experienced—the rabbit hole—and the way in which it is experienced by the rabbit at the time. The way the rabbit experiences the rabbit hole when escaping the fox, or the way I experience the world when I am engaged completely in some kind of activity, is special and different. Phenomenology is devoted to describing this way of experiencing the world. One simple thing to say about it is that it is not equivalent to any conceptually articulated thought about the world. Frege’s own test of cognitive
significance is sufficient to show this since it would be informative to learn (imagining myself in the rabbit’s place) that the hole I just ran into is, for instance, fifteen inches wide. Phenomenology, of course, has much more to say as well.

The notion of affordances or solicitations is central to the phenomenology of everyday activity. The world often draws me to act in certain ways without my having any conceptually articulate representation at all of the things with respect to which I act. This is true about the world of social reality as well. Consider, for example, the phenomenology of money-use. It is a common observation that when one first sees foreign money, it does not look valuable. The first time I saw non-American money, for instance, it looked like it was not worth anything more than the paper it was printed on. I knew, of course, that this was false. I knew that the French franc went at 5.5 to the dollar, and I could do the conversion perfectly well in my head. So not only did I know that the franc was valuable, I knew exactly how much it was worth. Still, it looked worthless. As I became familiar with the franc, of course, as I used it to buy crepes and café crèmes and glasses of wine, it eventually came to look valuable as well. But when I first saw it the franc did not afford buying anything; I was not immediately drawn to use it in my everyday transactions. Rather, it looked like a worthless bit of paper.

Of course it was a bit of paper—Searle has got that right. And the only reason it counted as money at all is because we had collectively imposed a status function on it. I am perfectly happy to grant that part as well. But what is it, exactly, to impose a status function on something, and what do we have to do in order to succeed in this task? In particular, could we impose the function of being valuable on a colored bit of paper if, for instance, it always looked to all of us the way the French franc looked to me when I first encountered it? I take it that this question is analogous to the question of whether we could succeed in promising to do something while consciously and sincerely thinking, “Like heck I will!” It is not, properly speaking, a part of the analysis of what money is. But it does figure in the performance conditions that must be met in order for us to impose the status function on money in the first place.

Well, what of it then? Could we collectively impose a status function on a bit of paper—that status function in virtue of which it counts as money—if we did not ever experience value affordances? If, in other words, the bits of paper always looked like mere bits of paper? Well, there are a few issues to consider. First, let us suppose there is some pathological condition, call it the value-insensitivity condition, that you can get from a certain kind of brain damage. When you are value-insensitive, money looks like it is lacking value; it looks, in other words, the way the French franc looked to me when I first saw it. Now suppose that one person suffers from the value-insensitivity condition. Surely if that were the case, there would be no effect whatsoever on society’s ability collectively to impose the status function of being money on what are otherwise mere bits of paper. After all, I was value-insensitive when I first saw the French franc, and the French franc, value-wise, did just fine.

Let us imagine, then, a more extreme case. Suppose that a whole society of people is value-insensitive. Could that society, under those conditions, collectively impose the appropriate status function on bits of paper? Well, again,
there seems to be empirical evidence that they can. After all, presumably when the euro was introduced in France, most native French people had value-insensitive experiences of it. Nevertheless, it does seem right to say that the euro, on the day it was introduced, was valuable despite the fact that it did not look that way to anyone. At the time, if I remember correctly, it was worth exactly one dollar (ah, memories!).

Now, it is true, I suppose, that when the euro was first introduced, most French people understood its value in terms of the value of the franc. Even today, several years later, French credit card receipts give the price in both euros and francs. So perhaps we need to imagine a more extreme scenario still. Suppose that a whole society is value-insensitive with respect to the euro, and also with respect to all other forms of currency. In such a situation, could society collectively impose a status function on bits of paper in virtue of which they count as money? Well, I suppose the answer, again, is yes. After all, there was a time in the history of humankind when money was invented, and the system of currency exchange took the place of barter. At some time in the past, in other words, society collectively imposed on bits of paper, or perhaps on chunks of metal, the function of being as valuable as, say, two pounds of rice.16 What we are learning by this exercise, of course, is that the collective imposition of the status function “is worth a certain amount” always seems to take place against the background understanding that cultures already have of the value of certain kinds of things. At the most basic level, which can change from culture to culture, this already understood value of something is experienced as an immediately felt value affordance.

Well, then the final, and obvious, question arises. Suppose that a whole society is value-insensitive not only to all forms of currency but to all forms of stuff. In such a society no person prefers, in an immediately felt way, any one thing to any other. Perhaps it is impossible even to imagine such a society. How would they organize their activities? How would they form institutions? How could they even manage to get enough food to eat? I agree it is very difficult to imagine. But let us suppose for a moment that such a society could exist. And let us suppose further that despite never experiencing any immediate pull to value one thing over any other, they nevertheless come to agree — cognitively, so to speak, though not on the basis of anything else — that certain things stand in certain value relations to one another. They fill out the forms; they keep the books: two pounds of rice are worth twelve bales of hay. And so forth. Could the people of a completely value-insensitive society like this use such a formal system of agreed-upon relations alone as the basis for their barter or money system? Would the rules themselves, in other words, be sufficient for the society collectively to impose value on stuff?

It seems to me there are two kinds of claim one can make in response to such a question; one of them is empirical and the other a priori. First, as a matter of empirical fact I believe it is extremely unlikely that such a society would end up developing anything like the practices of barter or exchange. Put yourself in their situation. Perhaps you already know the feeling of going for the first time to a place with a foreign currency and finding you have spent far more, or maybe far less, but in any case far differently than you normally do. It is much
harder to keep track of the value of what you are spending when you constantly have to do the conversion instead of seeing the value immediately. Now imagine there is nothing to which you can convert it. You know that two pounds of rice are “worth” twelve bales of hay, but it is just the same to you, really, if the guy gives you twenty bales or even none. In the absence of immediately felt value affordances, what reason do you have to stick to the rules? So it seems very unlikely as a matter of empirical fact that a totally value-insensitive society would end up having consistent practices of exchange.17

But whatever the empirical facts, there is an a priori issue as well. And this a priori issue brings us right back to terrain that is very familiar to Searle. For the people of the value-insensitive society are not at all unlike Searle himself when he is stuck inside the Chinese Room. Recall that in the Chinese Room, JS, who knows no Chinese, is busy using enormous rule books to determine which output of apparently meaningless squiggles and squoggles he should send out of the room having received a certain input of squoggles and squiggles. (The squiggles and squoggles, unbeknownst to him, are actually Chinese sentences.) By putting ourselves into the position of JS we can see, according to Searle, that moving the meaningless squiggles and squoggles about in accordance with elaborate rules is not by itself enough to understand the meanings of the Chinese words. Syntax, as Searle famously said, is not sufficient for semantics. But the denizens of the value-insensitive society are stuck within their own version of the Chinese Room. That is because their practices of exchange are performed in accordance with a formal set of rules that operate on what is for them an equally meaningless domain. Not having any immediate sense whatsoever of the value of stuff, the rule that two pounds of rice is exchangeable for twelve bales of hay is just as meaningless and ungrounded as the rule that when the input tray offers squiggle squoggle, you put squoggle squiggle in the output tray. Acting in accordance with some pre-set rules about the “value” of things, in other words, is not by itself enough to have an immediately felt, first-personal sense of something’s being valuable.18 The comparison with the Chinese Room is therefore complete: just as syntax is not sufficient for semantics, status functions are not sufficient for value.

The upshot of all this is that in order collectively to impose a function on bits of paper in virtue of which they count as money we must live in a society in which people are already value-sensitive. This value-sensitivity takes the form of people responding immediately to what I have called value affordances. The phenomenology of value affordances is their central defining feature: responding immediately to the value of the dollar bill was essentially different for me than knowing, but not immediately being solicited by, the value of the French franc. Because value-sensitivity is phenomenologically characterized, in other words, and because the presence of value-sensitivity is a pre-requisite for collectively imposing the kinds of status functions that characterize money, the phenomenological facts play an essential role in giving the logical analysis of this aspect of social reality. Therefore, far from being irrelevant—as Searle suggests—phenomenology provides constraints on the circumstances in which the collective imposition of the relevant status functions can occur.
So far I have argued for two general claims about the relationship between phenomenology and logical analysis. First, although I disagree with Searle about the details, I agree with him that there are things logical analysis can do that phenomenology cannot (like give the causal conditions on something’s being a perception). Nevertheless, I have claimed, phenomenology plays an essential role in the logical analysis of the content of perceptual states, and various other intentional states as well; Searle’s own Connection Principle ought to be sufficient to make this point. But second, I disagree with Searle’s strong claim that phenomenology is irrelevant to the logical analysis of social reality, indeed that phenomenologists “can’t even hear the question” that Searle is interested in. This is not because phenomenology by itself reveals the logical structure of social reality, but rather because it provides a constraint on the conditions in which a whole society can collectively impose various kinds of status functions.

Having established that phenomenology is one of the essential methods for analyzing intentionality and social reality, however, the question remains what the right phenomenological story about these domains is. Here I turn to Dreyfus’s important work.

§3. The Phenomenology of Everyday Engaged Activity

As with my introduction to Searle, one of the first things that attracted me to Dreyfus’s work was his criticism of artificial intelligence and cognitivism. Because of Dreyfus’s historical and hermeneutic approach to philosophy, however, learning the motivations behind his critique involved mastering his interpretation of the central texts of two extremely difficult and obscure philosophers—Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although he probably does not know it, I spent four full years as a graduate student working almost daily with Dreyfus on these texts before I felt I understood them well enough to form the belief that they were worth studying seriously. Because of Dreyfus’s expert tutelage, I finally learned enough to decide they were.

Dreyfus’s approach to phenomenology has always focused on the first-person phenomenon of everyday absorbed activity—activity in which we find ourselves engaged even though we are not noticing that we are engaged in it. His important project has been to retrieve from the difficult and obscure work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty a rich and detailed story about the everyday skillful coping practices that form the basic level of our being-in-the-world. It is no exaggeration to say that the Heidegger who has entered twenty-first-century Anglo-American philosophy is really Dreyfus’s Heidegger, or Dreidegger, as he has come to be known. Among other important innovations, Dreyfus is the first to have seen the important connection between Heidegger’s analysis of the “ready-to-hand” mode of being and Gibson’s notion of affordances. Furthermore, Dreyfus’s account of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “conditions of existence,” which he discusses in his interview with The Harvard Review of Philosophy on pages 142–3, is very similar to the account of the performance conditions for social facts that I was arguing for in the previous section.19
Despite his essential contributions to phenomenology, however, it seems to me that Dreyfus has both missed an important aspect of the phenomenon of everyday engaged activity and also, and related to this, overstated the problem with logical analysis. In what follows, I will try to spell out these claims.

In counterbalance to Searle’s claim that phenomenology is an impoverished methodology, Dreyfus often claims that logical analysis covers up essential phenomenological facts. As Dreyfus says in the interview, “logical analysis . . . turns out to cover up the . . . structure of the phenomena” (p. 135). Just as I think Searle’s position underplays the importance of phenomenology, however, I believe that in this claim Dreyfus overstates the problem with logical analysis. For there does not seem to me to be anything in principle about Searle’s first-person analytical method that requires him to miss the phenomenological facts. It is true as a matter of fact, I believe, that Searle misses aspects of the phenomena of intentionality and social reality, and as I have argued for the cases of perception and money already, the phenomenological facts are essential to the logical analysis of these domains. Dreyfus misdirects his critique of Searle, however, because he himself misses the central fact about the phenomenology of everyday engaged activity.

Why does Dreyfus think that logical analysis covers up the structure of the phenomena of engaged activity? In the interview he gives at least two different reasons. First, he suggests that the phenomena are in some essential way unclear or vague, so the crystalline clarity of logical analysis is inappropriate for them. As he says on page 127, “You can’t turn Merleau-Ponty into analytic philosophy, but you can make his work as clear as you can, and then show how the indeterminacy of the phenomena just can’t be grasped any more clearly.” And on page 140, when the interviewer asks whether he is “suggesting that background coping has a special kind of vagueness,” Dreyfus responds “Yes. It is not directed at any specific object or affordance.” In addition to its vagueness and lack of clarity, Dreyfus suggests also that there is something about the particularity of the phenomena that resists the generality for which analysis aims. The logical analyst, according to Dreyfus, if he is to talk about absorbed coping at all, can only “say in retrospect that you have achieved this particular goal, pointing at the very specific goal in all of its contextual particularity” (p. 141).

In contrast to Dreyfus’s version of the story, I believe that lack of clarity is not an essential feature of the phenomenology of absorbed coping at all and that the particularity of this phenomenon only hints at what is truly important about it. Rather, I believe, the essential feature of skillful, absorbed coping is that it is a way of engaging normatively with the world instead of a way of describing it.

When I use the terminology of normativity I do not, of course, intend to invoke any full-blown kind of ethical or moral norms. Rather, the affordances that solicit me to act when I am absorbedly coping with tools or obstacles or escape routes are normative in the sense that they draw a certain action out of me; escaping over here feels “right,” like it is the thing that is “called for,” like it is what I am “drawn” to do. To describe properly the phenomenology of these kinds of activities, I cannot but use a vocabulary that is rich in normative
significance. By first invoking the Gibsonian notion of affordances in his description of the phenomena, Dreyfus implicitly recognizes this normative dimension. But he never manages to nail it down.

Of course, Searle's first-person logical analysis misses the normativity of absorbed coping as well. But unlike the essential “vagueness” or “lack of clarity” that Dreyfus says characterizes the phenomena, there is no reason in principle that the first-person logical analyst could not account for this phenomenal fact. To do so, however, requires a new kind of analysis, one that goes beyond the tools and categories already in Searle's analytical toolkit. One of the best ways to see what is important and interesting about the normativity of absorbed coping, therefore, is to see why this new analysis is required. As always, it is best to start with an example.

To a first approximation, at least, skillful, absorbed coping is what one is engaged in when one performs activities without paying attention to the fact that one is performing them. So for instance, when I am walking along with a friend, lost in a philosophical conversation, I nevertheless am able skillfully to reach out, grasp the doorknob, and open the door; without even noticing that it is happening, my hand forms itself naturally to the shape of the knob. The Gibsonian way of talking about this is to say that the doorknob affords or solicits grasping. Phenomenologically we can say that a certain grasp is called for, and my body is drawn into forming it. What should the logical analyst say about such a case?

To begin with, the logical analyst could try saying that there are standard conditions of satisfaction for the activity—that the action of reaching out to grasp the doorknob represents the knob as being of a certain shape and that if it turns out to be some other shape, then those conditions are not satisfied. This is a start, but I do not think it gets the full story right. To see this, notice first that there are lots of ways of representing the doorknob to have a given shape. A seventeenth-century Dutch realist painter represents the doorknob to have a certain shape by looking at it and deciding how to paint that shape. Even if the painter represents the doorknob as having the same shape that my unreflective grasping hand represents it to have, however, these experiences of the doorknob are very different. They may represent the very same feature of the doorknob—its shape—and the two representations may even agree about what shape the doorknob is. But the detached attitude of painting and the engaged attitude of grasping represent the same shape in very different ways. By giving them identical conditions of satisfaction, our logical analyst has missed this important distinction. Using the standard terminology we can say that conditions of satisfaction like this are extensionally adequate but leave out the Fregean “mode of presentation.”

Modes of presentation are, of course, a central tool in the first-person logical analyst’s kit, so the need for them ought not to be a particular concern. But the way in which we understand an object when we are unreflectively engaged in acting with respect to it—that is certainly a special and strange way of understanding the thing. What is the mode of presentation of the doorknob, then, when I am unreflectively engaged in reaching out to grasp it? For obvious reasons this is a hard question to answer. After all, the point of the activity is
that I am *unreflectively* performing it, that I am reaching out to grasp the doorknob *without paying attention to the fact that that is what I am doing*. To describe how I experience the doorknob when I am not paying attention to the fact that I am acting with respect to it—that sounds like a difficult task indeed. But it is the task of phenomenology, and we have managed a bit of progress with respect to it.

The most important step is to notice that in such an unreflective activity, although I do not explicitly *notice* the doorknob (ex hypothesi), it nevertheless *directs* or *leads* my grasp. The doorknob solicits my hand to form a certain shape. Of course, it does so by figuring in my experience, at least in a marginal way; if it did not figure in my experience at all, I would constantly be shocked to discover that my body was engaged in any activity at all, the way I am constantly shocked to feel my foot going up when the doctor taps on the patella tendon. But I am not shocked to discover, at least not usually or in that way, that my body has reached out to grasp the doorknob, has sidestepped or avoided the obstacle, has optimized the distance between people in an elevator, and so on. My body is constantly taking care of these coordination issues for me, and although I do not explicitly notice that it is doing so (indeed paying attention to what my body is doing for me can easily mess it up), nevertheless there is a marginal way in which the sense that my body is responding efficiently to its environment informs my overall experience of the world.

Now, I have said that this marginal sense is properly described using normative vocabulary. In unreflectively reaching out to grasp it, the doorknob *draws* a certain grasp formation out of my hand. This normative issue is very different from the issue of particularity that Dreyfus emphasizes. It is true, of course, that the shape of my grasp is very particular, so that what grasp formation is called for will change as the shape of the doorknob changes, as the angle of approach changes, as my own perceived sense of my strength changes (and this perceived sense can be affected by my mood), and so on. But this kind of particularity is built into language as well—properly understood, it is the characteristic feature of demonstrative as opposed to descriptive utterances. What is really important about engaged activity, what distinguishes it both from any characterization of the world using language and also from any detached perceptual experience of the world, is that the content of my engaged activity is not a *description* of the world, even one that uses bare demonstratives; rather it is a *response* to the world’s demands.

If this normativity really is essential to the phenomenology of engaged activity—if it is a central feature of the mode of presentation of objects when I am unreflectively engaging with them—then how might our logical analyst account for this phenomenon? Well, if the phenomenology of engaged activity involves an immediate response to the world’s demands, then perhaps the logical analyst should treat it as a case in which the world performs a speech act that is like a command. This is an odd suggestion—after all, the world does not perform speech acts—but at least it is one that is articulable using the standard analytic tools. This approach is inadequate to the phenomenology as well, however, and it is extremely instructive to see why this approach is doomed to fail.
Directives like commands tell us how we ought to act, at least in some sense of ought, and so their analysis is attentive to the relevant kind of normativity. Consider the following example: it is bad for one’s health to smoke, so a smoker who knows this might formulate the policy for himself, “Don’t smoke!” The characteristic feature of this command, in Searle’s terminology, is that it has world-to-word direction of fit: when there is a mismatch between what the utterance commands and what the agent in the world does, then the agent in the world is in some sense wrong. Declarative utterances, by contrast, have word-to-world direction of fit. If I say, “It is snowing,” but it is not snowing, then it is my utterance rather than the world that has gone astray.

Now, the important thing about direction of fit is that it tells us which party is responsible—roughly speaking, the subject or the world—when there is a mismatch between them. And we have known since Plato that in the case of commands such as “Don’t smoke!” there will often be a mismatch; akrasia is a common phenomenon. The reason, of course, is that knowing what one ought to do is no guarantee that one will do it. But this is not the way affordances work. Even though responding to an affordance is in some way like responding to a command—the doorknob solicits a certain grasp the way the command demands a certain activity—there is nevertheless an important difference between them: genuine solicitations to act cannot go astray. Without the possibility of a mismatch between what activity is afforded and what activity is performed, the whole idea of direction of fit, which is at the root of the standard analysis of directives, falls by the wayside. Even so, the normativity of affordances, the fact that in engaged activity the world is experienced directly in terms of the activity it draws out of me, is essential to their phenomenological structure.

I have said that genuine solicitations to act cannot go astray, but one needs to be careful in evaluating this claim. Of course it is true that my grip can fail to match the shape of the doorknob. Of course it is true that I can bump into obstacles. Of course it is true that someone can stand too close in a conversation. The claim that solicitations to act cannot go astray is not the claim that things can never go wrong. But when things do go wrong it is never because my body has performed some activity that does not match with the activity afforded. That kind of mismatch can never occur. The reason for this is simple: being solicited to grasp the doorknob in a particular way is not like knowing that I ought to do it; the gap that exists between knowing what I ought to do and doing it does not exist between affordances and absorbed activity. When I know that I ought to do something, there is always the possibility of not doing it anyway. Plato once thought that this was not the case—he thought that knowledge of the good was intrinsically motivating—but if that were right then akrasia would not be possible; since it is not only possible but prevalent, Plato was forced to rethink his account. But even if knowledge of the good is not intrinsically motivating, solicitations to act in a certain way are.

To say that solicitations are intrinsically motivating is to say that there is no room for slippage between what the solicitation calls for and what my body is motivated to do. To see this, note first that a subject is in no position to resist the pull of an affordance unless he explicitly notices the effect it is having.
on him. I cannot keep my hand from reaching out to grasp the doorknob, for example, or form a grip other than the one solicited, unless I notice what my hand is doing and try to make it do something else. But the very act of noticing what my hand is doing at the same time breaks the spell that the world had over it. Solicitations to act, in other words, always and necessarily happen at the margins of awareness, they occur in the background of my experience; for once I pay attention to the shape of my hand or to the features of the doorknob, instead of remaining engaged in the activity of responding to the affordance, the solicitation to form a certain grip disappears. The conditions for comporting myself differently from the way I am solicited to, therefore, are sufficient to undermine the solicitation itself.

The main claim I am making, therefore, is that there is no room for slippage between affordance and activity. There are two kinds of problem cases for this claim that it is important to deal with appropriately. First, you might think that affordance and activity can come apart in cases in which the activity misfires. For example, consider the case of a touch-typist who accidentally types a g instead of an f in the word *food*. Surely, one might think, this happens sometimes even when the situation solicits the activity of typing an f. Have not the affordance and the activity therefore come apart? It is easy to think they have come apart since in this situation the typist might say explicitly, after the fact, “Darn, I intended to type the word *food* instead of the word *good*!” Certainly it is true that the typist can recognize that her activity has misfired in this way. But why should we think, just because she can recognize after the fact that she has done something wrong, that when she was engaged in the actual activity of typing the g she was intending or trying or hoping to type an f? To say this would be to read back into the unreflective, absorbed activity an intention that she has only after the activity has been performed. If the activity is really absorbed, if it is genuinely unreflective, then there is no room in the subject’s experience for such an intention. For in genuinely absorbed activity there is no space between what I am doing and what the world solicits me to do.

There is a strong temptation, of course, to read back into the absorbed activity this intention, but I believe that one must resist the temptation. The motivating principle behind this temptation, I believe, is that whenever a subject can recognize that his activity has misfired, then the subject must have had the intention to perform a different activity all along. This motivating principle is an application of what might well be called “The Refrigerator Light Hypothesis.” For just as the child assumes that the refrigerator light must always be on, since it is on every time he looks, so too our proposed analyst has claimed that since the intention to type an f is explicit when the subject is paying attention to his activity, so too it must have been among the conditions that characterized the content of the activity even when he was not paying attention to it. This is a bad principle in the case of absorbed activity, just as in the case of refrigerator lights.

A second kind of problem case arises when the affordance comes apart from the way the world really is. For example, when standing in front of a trompe l’oeil painting I might genuinely be solicited to walk through a door, even though there is nothing in front of me but a painted wall. In this case it is once again true that the activity is not satisfied. When I bump into the wall
instead of going through a door I notice immediately that something has gone wrong. Indeed, I might very well say, “Darn, I thought there was a door there!” But once again one must be careful not to read into the engaged activity the conditions of satisfaction on the activity that are understood only once one is detached from it. One must beware of the Refrigerator Light Hypothesis. In general, it is not part of the affordance that the activity I am motivated to perform has to be appropriate to objective reality. For once inside the engaged activity there is no position from which to say that what your body is doing might not work.

The upshot of all this is that it is in principle impossible to be solicited to act in one way while actually doing something else. The reason is that in order to do something other than what I am solicited to do, I have to step outside of my engagement with the world in order to notice what I am doing and bring about a change; once I disengage myself from my activity, however, I am no longer solicited by the affordance to act. To bring the story back to akrasia, it would be as if the very act of smoking a cigarette were itself sufficient to undermine my knowledge that smoking is bad. If this were the case then akrasia would indeed be incoherent: I could not both know that smoking is bad and at the same time smoke a cigarette. And so it is in the case of engaged activity. The very act of noticing what I am doing is sufficient to undermine the affordance to do it. For this reason there is no possibility of slippage; the world’s directive cannot go unheeded, or if it does then it is no longer the world’s directive. As a result the notion of direction of fit has no place at all in the analysis of engaged activity.

The central idea here is that engaged activity is normative in a special sense: it involves a kind of solicitation in which the world is intrinsically motivating for the agent, an agent who is unreflectively engaged with it. This idea seems to me absolutely essential to any account of everyday engaged activity. In emphasizing vagueness or lack of clarity, as Dreyfus does, it seems to me that he has missed this essential aspect of the phenomena. And although he is right to say that which activity a given situation affords will differ depending upon the particularities of the situation, this dependence on the situation is not their central feature either. Dreyfus has understood the deep importance of absorbed activity, and he understood it early on. But in missing out on the essentially normative structure of absorbed coping, he has failed to recognize how different things look from within the engaged attitude than from without it. When I am engaged with the world, background phenomena like affordances gear me directly into the environment by motivating me immediately to act in certain ways.

It seems to me that Dreyfus is also wrong to claim that logical analysis by its very nature covers up the phenomena of engaged activity. It may be true as a matter of fact that the standard categories available to the logical analyst are inadequate to account for the phenomena. I have tried to give a start on this claim, and one could certainly go further here. For instance, although I have not argued for it, I believe that the phenomena of engaged activity are not assimilable to any other kind of intentional act either, including various speech acts like exclamations, which have no direction of fit, and promises, which bring
about the fit between the world and the utterance by their very successful performance. But even if none of the existing categories is sufficient to characterize engaged activity, there is nothing in principle that keeps the first-person logical analyst from uncovering their essential structure. Indeed, the very act of differentiating engaged activity from other kinds of intentionality is itself an application of the method of logical analysis. It is logical analysis, however, that is applied to the phenomenological facts.

§4. Conclusion

The ability to be geared directly into the world, to find oneself motivated immediately to act in response to its solicitations, seems to me one of our most fundamental abilities. Indeed, focusing on this ability seems to me the most promising way to close the puzzling gap between us and the world, a gap that makes the intentional directedness of higher level cognitive states like belief and desire seem to be almost magical. Searle, whose Chinese Room Argument shows so cleverly how difficult it is to close this gap, ought to recognize the need for such a grounding capacity. And Dreyfus, whose arguments against AI depend on the idea that our basic bodily engagement with the world is essential for closing the gap, ought to recognize that there is more to this engagement than vagueness and lack of clarity. Still, by paying attention to the importance of the first-person perspective it seems to me that Searle and Dreyfus both have made deep and important strides in bringing these issues to the fore. All further work in this area will have to build on the progress they have made.

I have sometimes heard Searle say that the right philosophical methodology is to use whatever methodology works. That seems to me a sane and sensible principle. In the areas of intentionality and social reality, of course, special considerations apply. For all right-thinking people recognize that sensitivity to the first-person perspective is essential to any full and proper account of these domains. It is because Searlean analysis and Dreyfusian phenomenology have this sensitivity built firmly into their motivating principles that they have both turned out to be philosophical methods that work. Whatever more can be said about these important issues will be the result of a profitable engagement between the methods that Searle and Dreyfus have pioneered. φ

Notes

3 Searle claims that he has long made use of the following argument, though it was new to me and I cannot find any place in the literature where he has developed it. This is not to say that there is no such place, just that I have not been able to find it.
4 Searle pursues a line like this with respect to memory and its causal self-referentiality condition in his interview with The Harvard Review of Philosophy, cited in footnote 1. Searle,
“Toward a Unified Theory of Reality,” p. 114. All subsequent citations to this interview will be made in-text.

5 John Searle, *Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 156. The original targets of this criticism were theorists like Noam Chomsky and David Marr, each of whom posited a level of mental content that was not, even in principle, accessible to consciousness.

6 The interviewer seems to be onto this internal tension in Searle’s account when she suggests, on p. 121, that there is a tension between Searle’s claim that his own logical analysis goes beyond phenomenology and his criticism of the “deep unconscious” views. In response Searle says that the two cases are different, but does not explain how.

7 What counts as phenomenology, of course, is also a potentially contentious issue. I have said that phenomenology is the study of what is in principle accessible to consciousness, and I think this is, generically speaking, a good start. But ought phenomenology to include, for instance, Husserl’s method of eidetic variation? (Eidetic variation, roughly, is the method of holding onto a phenomenological essence of, for example, the noema for a particular perceptual experience, and then imaginatively varying all sorts of its features to see whether the noema remains the same.) If the technique of eidetic variation is already a part of phenomenology, then the gap between phenomenology and logical analysis may be narrower still.

8 Strictly speaking, of course, “modes of presentation” are restricted to conceptually articulable ways of understanding an object. Christopher Peacocke introduces the phrase “manners of presentation” to broaden this Fregean idea to non-conceptually articulated ways such as, one might think, are characteristic of non-linguistic intentional states like perception. For the sake of brevity, I will use the original Fregean terminology, but will assume that it applies in Peacocke’s broader sense.

9 My own view is that the Connection Principle may be a good start for a story about the relation between phenomenology and content in the case of non-linguistic intentional states such as perception, memory, and action, but it is probably not as appropriate in the case of language. Searle’s actual formulation of the principle suggests that it applies to all intentional states, and therefore may be overly broad. It is probably not a coincidence, however, that when he is invoking the Russellian methodology he tends to use linguistic examples.

10 As Searle says in the interview, “Phenomenologists typically cannot hear that question and they cannot hear the answer, because they have an impoverished philosophical apparatus. They think I am asking a phenomenological question, because they have no other apparatus to deal with the question. They think I am asking, How does it seem to us? But typically how it seems to us does not reveal the underlying logical structure” (p. 116).


12 One might argue that I nevertheless incur a social obligation in such a circumstance. After all, no matter what internal dialogue I am having with myself when I utter the words “I promise to have lunch with you on Tuesday,” you will certainly have a right to be angry at me if, for no good reason, I fail to show up.

13 Better: the rabbit’s experience of the hole consists entirely of being drawn to escape into it.

14 Indeed, it would be informative to learn any fact about it.

15 I do not actually know whether there is a condition that has this kind of phenomenology. There are various kinds of social deficits that occur from damage to the pre-frontal cortex, however, and patients with these kinds of deficits are often peculiarly bad at betting games. One possibility is that the money they are betting with does not look valuable to them.

16 When I say this happened at some time in the past, of course, I do not mean to indicate that it happened at some particular moment. No doubt the transition from the barter system to the currency system was gradual.

17 Perhaps it will turn out that acting in accordance with the rules, if done long enough, will by itself make people sensitive to the value affordances. This is like Pascal’s idea that simply by acting like a Christian, by performing all the Christian rites and rituals, a person may thereby be able to attain the phenomenology of faith. Maybe that is right. It would be no criticism of my view, however, if a society like that could develop the practices for barter or exchange. After all, my claim was about the value-insensitive society, and we are now imagining a society that has become value-sensitive.
19 Again, we must be careful here. It may be, Pascal-like, that the practices will give rise to value-sensitivity. That is an empirical question that is neither here nor there for this discussion. What is important is that in the absence of value-sensitivity the practices are not themselves sufficient for a society collectively to impose on something the function of being worth a certain amount.


20 The third-person method of Russell, by contrast, is guaranteed almost by definition to miss the phenomenological facts. As I have already argued, this third-person approach—as good as it may have been for the analysis of definite descriptions and other linguistic phenomena—is not appropriate for the analysis of the content of non-linguistic intentional states.

21 I have written further about this idea in “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty” in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 74–110. The neuroscientific work of Melvyn Goodale and A. David Milner seems to me to buttress the formulation I have outlined here. Their work is summarized in The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). I have written about their work in various places, including an unpublished paper called “The Logic of Motor Intentional Activity.”