

Killing And Not Preventing Death

By Judith Jarvis Thomson

1. HERE'S A STORY THAT'S FAMILIAR FROM THE LITERATURE OF MORAL THEORY:

(FOOTBRIDGE) Alfred is on a footbridge over the trolley track. An out of control trolley speeds toward five track workmen, and a heavy weight dropped into its path is the only thing that can stop it in time. Alfred is too light to stop it by jumping down into its path, but there's a heavy enough man near him on the footbridge. Alfred can knock him over the railing, but doing that will kill him, so Alfred's alternatives are these: *kill the heavy man*, in which case the heavy man dies by the trolley but the five workmen don't, or *don't kill the heavy man*, in which case the five workmen die by the trolley but the heavy man doesn't.

MOST PEOPLE WHO HEAR OR READ THIS STORY SAY THAT ALFRED OUGHT not to kill the heavy man. Others object. One kind of objection draws attention to possibilities. For example, that it's consistent with FOOTBRIDGE that the heavy man himself caused the trolley to be out of control, with the intention of killing the workmen, or that if Alfred doesn't kill the heavy man, then more than the five workmen will die - indeed, all of China will go up in smoke. The objector may say that if either of those possibilities is actual, then Alfred ought to kill the heavy man; and that if we don't know that neither of them is actual, then we aren't really entitled to say that Alfred ought not to kill the heavy man.

Some of those who react to the story by saying that Alfred ought not to kill the heavy man are unmoved by that kind of objection: they insist that FOOTBRIDGE entails that Alfred ought not to kill the heavy man. Others agree that FOOTBRIDGE doesn't entail that conclusion, and cast about for a way of expanding it so as to ensure that the result of expanding it entails that conclusion. Still others do something more interesting. They brush those possibilities aside as mere nuisance. They say that whether or not FOOTBRIDGE, or some expansion of it, entails that Alfred ought not to kill the heavy man, it remains the case that FOOTBRIDGE entails that *other things being equal*, Alfred ought not to kill the heavy man. Or, as I take them to mean, and will express their view:

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(FOOTBRIDGE CONDUCE TO OUGHT-NOT) FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred ought not kill the heavy man.

I have to bypass the good question what exactly “conduces” in this context should be taken to mean, but I think it clear enough for present purposes anyway that what people who assert the FOOTBRIDGE CONDUCE TO OUGHT-NOT thesis are expressing is that whether or not the information supplied by FOOTBRIDGE entails that Alfred ought not kill the heavy man, it does necessarily support, or contribute to, that conclusion.

FOOTBRIDGE is of course only one of many stories in which an agent must choose between killing one and thereby preventing five deaths on the one hand, and on the other hand, not killing the one in which case the five deaths occur. Let’s call the people who believe that those stories conduce to its being the case that the agent ought not kill the one the Believers. Our question then is: Aren’t the Believers right?

2. “NO,” SAY THE CONSEQUENTIALISTS I’LL BE REFERRING TO. THEY SHARE A VIEW I’LL call Bare Consequentialism:

(BARE CONSEQUENTIALISM) A ought to φ just in case the possible world

that will be actual if he φ -s is on balance better than the possible world that will be actual if he doesn’t φ .

Bare Consequentialism is intuitively very plausible, for how could it sensibly be thought that a person ought to do a thing though the world will be better if he doesn’t?

Most Bare Consequentialists accept further theses about what would make one possible world be better than another. For example, Utilitarianism is the result of adding to Bare Consequentialism a thesis to the effect that possible world PW-1 is on balance better than possible world PW-2 just in case PW-1 is better for the sentient creatures in PW-1 than PW-2 is for the sentient creatures in PW-2. Utilitarianism is also intuitively plausible.

It is pretty obvious that Utilitarianism makes trouble for the Believers, for it is pretty obvious that FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that the possible world that will be actual if Alfred kills the heavy man is on balance better for the sentient creatures in it than the possible world that will be actual if he doesn’t kill the heavy man is for the sentient creatures in it. But then if Utilitarianism is true, FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred ought to kill the heavy man.

We should be clear, though, that even Bare Consequentialism makes trouble for Believers - given how Believers typically try to make their case.

3. IT IS TYPICAL AMONG BELIEVERS TO TRY TO MAKE THEIR CASE BY JUSTIFYING THE IDEA that doing harm is worse than allowing harm. Or more narrowly, that killing is worse than letting die. Or to avoid a difficulty as to what allowing and letting die are, that killing is worse than not-preventing death. Much worse - thus that killing one is worse than not-preventing five deaths.

Believers who try to make their case in this way plainly do so out of a commitment to a very commonly held, and no doubt intuitively very plausible, thesis about the connection between evaluatives and directives, namely:

(BETTER ACT \rightarrow OUGHT Thesis) A ought to ϕ if and only if, and because, his ϕ -ing would be on balance better than his not ϕ -ing.

But how are they to show that FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred's not killing the heavy man would be on balance better than his killing the heavy man?

Well, it's plausible enough to suppose that killing one is intrinsically worse than not preventing the deaths of five - under what seems a plausible way of understanding "intrinsically worse than". That is, A's killing one entails the death of one person, whereas A's not-preventing five people's deaths doesn't entail that anyone dies - for the deaths might be prevented by someone else. So it might be for that reason, that a Believer might claim that A's killing one is intrinsically worse.

But how are Believers to get from relative intrinsic value to relative on balance value? There's the hard problem.

A relatively restrictive account of the on balance value of A's ϕ -ing yields that it is the sum of the intrinsic value of A's ϕ -ing and the intrinsic values of all and only the things that A's ϕ -ing would cause. On any view, that omits too much. That is because the fact that five people will die if and only if A doesn't prevent their deaths doesn't entail that if A doesn't prevent their deaths, he will thereby cause them, and yet a Believer - like anyone else - would surely claim that if A can easily prevent five deaths, and doesn't bother, then the badness of those deaths is inherited by his not preventing them.

A non-restrictive account of the on balance value of A's ϕ -ing yields that it is the sum of the intrinsic values of all and only the things that will exist or occur or obtain if A ϕ -s. This is insufficiently restrictive for the Believers' purposes. For suppose they opt for it. Presumably one possible world is better than another just in case the sum of the intrinsic values of the things in it is greater. So it follows that the Believers are committed to:

(BETTER WORLD \rightarrow BETTER ACT Thesis) A's ϕ -ing would be on balance better than his not- ϕ -ing if and only if, and because the possible world that will be actual if A ϕ -s is better than the possible world that will be actual if A doesn't ϕ .

But then since the conjunction of those two theses entails Bare Consequentialism, the moral conclusions Believers are entitled to are all and only those licensed by Bare Consequentialism.

Indeed, a person might be a Bare Consequentialist precisely *because* he believes both of those theses.

Now there's room for a Bare Consequentialist to join the Believers in saying that acts such as killings and not preventing deaths, have intrinsic disvalue, and that killings in particular have much greater intrinsic disvalue than not

preventings of deaths, so much greater as to conduce to its being the case that the on balance disvalue of a killing of one is greater than the on balance disvalue of a not preventing of five deaths, and therefore that the FOOTBRIDGE CONDUCTES TO OUGHT-NOT Thesis is true.

But this peace between Bare Consequentialist and Believer doesn't last long - Bare Consequentialism makes trouble for Believers in respect of a familiar kind of variant on FOOTBRIDGE that we get if we add a person:

(FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN) Alex is on a footbridge....The trolley is out of control because a repairman damaged it with the intention of killing the five workmen....

Believers believe that adding the repairman makes no moral difference as to what the agents ought to do: they believe that FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN conduces to its being the case that Alex ought not kill his heavy man just as FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred ought not kill his. But if they accept the BETTER BEHAVIOR → OUGHT thesis, and the non-restrictive account of the on balance value of A's φ -ing, then they - like the Bare Consequentialist - are committed to believing that Alex's not killing his heavy man would inherit the great intrinsic disvalue of the repairman's killing the five, and therefore that FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN conduces to its being the case that Alex ought to kill the heavy man.

In sum, Believers who try to make their case by justifying the idea that doing harm is worse than allowing harm - out of a commitment to that very plausible BETTER BEHAVIOR → OUGHT thesis - can succeed in making their case only if they find a plausible account of the on balance value of a person's behavior somewhere in between the too restrictive account in terms of causality, or the insufficiently restrictive account in terms of the contents of possible worlds. The prospects of success in that enterprise are at best dim. No wonder that the Believers' many efforts have not been successful. So what are they to do instead?

Here's what I think is a useful way of describing the Believers' situation. They have a host of moral *beliefs* that everyone - including all Consequentialists - agrees are intuitively plausible. For example, the ones about FOOTBRIDGE and FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN. Consequentialists, however, have intuitively plausible moral *theories* that would explain why it's a mistake to harbor those moral beliefs. What the Believers need is an at least as plausible moral theory that explains why, quite to the contrary, their moral beliefs are true.

4. So WHY DOES FOOTBRIDGE CONDUCE TO ITS BEING THE CASE THAT ALFRED OUGHT not kill the heavy man? Because FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred's killing the heavy man would be *unjust*. And while FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN conduces to its being the case that the repairman's killing the five workmen would be at least as unjust, Alex's not killing the heavy man doesn't inherit injustice from the repairman's killing the five - it isn't marked as unjust because the repairman's killing the five would be unjust. Disvalue (whatever exactly it is) is one thing, and broadly inheritable; injustice is quite another, and far more narrowly inheritable.

But what is injustice? A violation of a right. So what I suggest is that the theory the Believers need to appeal to explain their moral beliefs is the theory of rights.

It is disputed what exactly such a theory should say, and what exactly should be thought to make it true. Here, anyway, are three theses that I think are intuitively plausible. If true, they would explain why FOOTBRIDGE conduces to its being the case that Alfred ought not kill the heavy man.

First, rights theorists believe that unless they have waived or forfeited them, people have certain rights against others just by virtue of being human beings - those are said to be 'natural rights'. Among them is the right one person has against another to not be killed by the other. Thus:

(FIRST RIGHTS THESIS) Whoever A and X may be, X has a natural right against A that A not kill him, unless X has waived or forfeited that right.

A rights theorist also believes that people have 'social rights,' as for example, the rights given by promise or contract or gift, and by government action, and those rights are very important for the Believer's purposes, so I'll return to them shortly. Meanwhile, two more theses about rights, these about rights generally.

(SECOND RIGHTS THESIS) If X has a right against A that A not ϕ , then A ought not ϕ unless: markedly more harm would come about if A didn't ϕ than if he did, or Y has a more stringent right against A that A ϕ than X's right against A that A not ϕ .

How much more harm is s 'markedly more harm'? There's no saying exactly how much. There's no precision in the offing here. Examples of the contrast are easy enough to come by, however, and we'll come by some shortly. And what about relative stringency? Here's a third thesis:

(THIRD RIGHTS THESIS) Y's right against A that A ϕ is more stringent than X's right against A that A not ϕ just in case the 'harm differential' required for A to infringe Y's right permissibly is greater than the 'harm differential' required for A to infringe X's right permissibly.

We'll see some examples of differing harm differentials shortly — and later, a reason for thinking that this third thesis needs revising.

I should say, as I'm sure is obvious to you, that these theses don't tell us what having a right *is*.

Having a right is having a certain moral status, and I suspect that there isn't any way of saying what that status is other than by saying that it's the status the features of which are described by the theory of rights as a whole. I'll have to bypass that issue now, however.

5. TO BEGIN WITH THE FIRST RIGHTS THESIS. THE RIGHTS THEORIST'S IDEA THAT people have natural rights has itself put many people off rights theory altogether. Bentham notoriously called the idea that people have natural rights not just nonsense, but "nonsense on stilts". He said that the doctrine that people have

natural rights “is from beginning to end so much flat assertion: it lays down as a fundamental and inviolable principle whatever is in dispute.” Works by rights theorists certainly contain a lot of assertions, but they also contain a lot of arguments for a lot of those assertions. So I suspect that what bothers a Consequentialist is in large part that the author doesn’t even try to show that his or her assertions follow from, or anyway are justified by appeal to, betterness and worseness. Well, of course they don’t. Rights theorists aren’t Consequentialists.

I said “in large part” because there has to be something else that bothers a Consequentialist about attributions of natural rights, for it was the doctrine that people have *natural* rights that Bentham called nonsense on stilts.

What about the doctrine that people have *social* rights? Attributions of social rights are no better justified by appeal to betterness and worseness than attributions of natural rights are. Indeed, a Consequentialist ought to regard the doctrine that people have social rights - understood in accord with the Second and Third Rights Theses - as itself nonsense, even though perhaps not nonsense *on stilts*.

For let’s look at a sample social right. Suppose Alice has a cold, and gives Bert ten dollars, in exchange for which Bert promises Alice that he will buy the five dollar cough medicine that Alice needs, and bring it back to her straightway. It’s very plausible to think that Alice now has a social right against Bert that Bert will buy the medicine and bring it back straightway. It’s also very plausible to think, as the Second Rights Thesis tells us, that Bert therefore ought to buy that medicine and bring it back straightway unless either markedly more harm would come about if he didn’t than if he did, or someone else has a more stringent right that he not do it. What would count as markedly more harm here? Well suppose that on his way back, Bert learns that five people will die unless they each get a fifth of that cough medicine straightway. That, I think you’ll agree, would count as markedly more harm for present purposes - the projected deaths of five people would make it permissible for Bert to not bring the medicine back to Alice straightway. Suppose, by contrast, that what Bert learns on his way back is that five people each need a fifth of that cough medicine because they have colds just like Alice’s. This, I think you’ll agree, wouldn’t count as markedly more harm for present purposes - it wouldn’t justify Bert’s giving the five the medicine he bought for Alice. Five deaths are one thing, five colds are quite another.

Moreover, what counts as markedly more harm is relative to the right. Some rights are more stringent than others, and as the THIRD RIGHTS THESIS says, the ‘harm differential’ required to make it permissible for A to not do what Y has a right against him that he will do is greater in their case. Suppose Alice needs the medicine that Bert has promised to buy for her not for a cold, but for a life-threatening ailment - thus she’ll die if Bert doesn’t bring it back straightway. *Here* the fact that five other people each need a fifth of it for life doesn’t count as markedly more harm: if Alice had needed the medicine for a cold, then five deaths in the offing would justify Bert’s not bringing the medicine back, but given that Alice needs the medicine for life, then five deaths in the offing don’t justify Bert’s not bringing the medicine back.

As I said, a Consequentialist ought to regard the doctrine that people such as Alice have social rights, understood in accord with the Second and Third

Rights Theses, as unacceptable. A Consequentialist must surely grant that the moral assertions that I have been making about Alice and Bert are intuitively very plausible. What the Consequentialist appeals to is that his theory yields that, and explains why, they're nevertheless false.

Rights theorists, of course, disagree, and there's a deep and important fact that they can point to make their case against Consequentialists.

The custom of promising and promise-keeping, contracting and contract-keeping, and so on is entirely familiar to, and participated in by, all of us, and is essential to the existence of satisfying private life and productive communal life. What is essential is precisely that we be able to confer on others the very moral status that having a right consists in, and rely on those who have conferred it on us to behave as it requires. It wouldn't be enough for our purposes that people be able to bind themselves to giving us a weaker moral status than that one. When you order goods from a shop or a manufacturer, it isn't enough for your purposes that the shop-owner or manufacturer be bound to send you the goods unless a slightly better purpose would be served by not sending them to you. What matters for your purposes is that you be able to rely on their sending you the goods you ordered - unless something that would count as relatively dreadful would ensue if they sent them. Needy creatures that we are, planning requires a custom of giving and according social rights, and social rights are essential to the existence of satisfying private life and productive communal life because they're essential to planning.

6. SO WHY DO NATURAL RIGHTS SEEM SO MUCH MORE SUSPECT THAN SOCIAL RIGHTS? I should think the answer's pretty clear. We make each other have the moral status that having a social right consists in our having, and we do so by visible, audible means, whereas what (putatively) makes us have the moral status that having a natural right consists in is the fact that we are human beings - and how is that fact to be thought to make us have that moral status? Let's look at how we make each other have the moral status that having a social right consists in our having. We do so by performing certain speech-acts - promising, contracting, gift-giving, and so on. The role of those speech-acts is to serve as *invitations to rely*. You give a person a social right by inviting him or her to rely on your behaving in one or another way.

Moreover, those speech-acts don't merely make the hearer have a social right: they fix which social right the hearer acquires. The promisor invites the promisee to rely on his behaving in a quite particular way, and the social right given to the promisee is the right to rely on the promisor's behaving in that way. There's no *deep* question which social rights a person has.

None of that is available to friends of the doctrine of natural rights, since by definition, nobody gives us any natural rights. So there remains for friends of the doctrine of natural rights the two connected problems of justifying that we have any, and saying which we have.

I suggest, however, that the situation isn't really hopeless for friends of the doctrine of natural rights. What I suggest is a good reason for believing that we do have them - and supplies a route to figuring out which we have and how stringent they are - is the very battery of intuitively plausible moral

beliefs that natural rights are supposed to explain. Consider FOOTBRIDGE and FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN, for example. It is intuitively very plausible (as Believers say) that those stories conduce to its being the case that the agents ought not kill their heavy men - just as Alice's having a social right against Bert that Bert not give the cold medicine he bought to five other people who have colds just like Alice's.

Moreover, there being constraints on behavior due to our having natural rights would play a role in our private and communal lives very like the role played in our private and communal lives by the constraints on behavior due to our having social rights.

So I suggest that we should say:

(PROPOSAL ONE) The rights' theorists' doctrine of social rights is a very plausible explanation of beliefs about what people who promise, contract, give gifts, and so on, ought to do,

and

(PROPOSAL TWO) Beliefs such as the Believers' beliefs about FOOTBRIDGE and FOOTBRIDGE-WITH-ANGRY-REPAIRMAN can be explained by taking the rights' theorists' doctrine of rights to include natural as well as social rights.

I suggest, in any case, that it is in this way that the Believers would do well to try to make their case.

7. I DON'T FOR A MOMENT SUGGEST THAT THE REST IS EASY. THERE ARE *LOTS* OF difficulties ahead. Let us look at one of them - it is a first cousin of the one we have been looking at.

I have talked throughout as if there were no interesting moral differences *among* killings, but only between killing and not preventing death. Of course there are. What I'll call commission-killings differ morally from what I'll call omission-killings. Or so, anyway, the Believers believe.

First, what's the difference between commission-killings and omission-killings? Following Jonathan Bennett, many people think there just is no way of distinguishing between commissions and omissions. That is a mistake, I think. I suggest that they can be distinguished by use of the locution "A φ -ed by ψ -ing". Thus suppose that A killed X. We can say that A's killing of X was a commission-killing of X just in case A killed X by making some or other bodily movement. For example, Alfred might kill the heavy man by pushing him in such a way as to make him fall over the railing. If Alfred does this, then his killing of the heavy man is a commission-killing.

Since Alfred doesn't kill the workmen if he doesn't kill the heavy man, his not killing the workmen is neither a commission-killing nor an omission-killing. It is perhaps worth stress that you don't omission-kill a person just in virtue of not having prevented his death, though you could have prevented it. You have to have had an appropriate link with the death other than just that you didn't prevent it, and could have prevented it, if you're to have caused it, and thus if

you're to have killed the person whose death it was.

Here's a story in which the not-preventer of the death would have an appropriate link with the death - and moreover, in which the agent must choose between commission-killing and omission-killing. Anna is the nurse charged with injecting Smith this afternoon with a dose of the medicine he needs for life. Call the medicine MEDICINE. MEDICINE happens to be very tasty, however, and Anna couldn't resist it; she drank it! Only one other dose of MEDICINE is now available, and another nurse is charged with injecting Jones in the next bed with it. Since Jones also needs MEDICINE for life, Anna's options are these. She can steal the dose of MEDICINE the other nurse is charged with injecting Jones with, and inject it in Smith. If she does, she commission-kills Jones - she commission-kills Jones in that she kills Jones by stealing the MEDICINE, and she steals the MEDICINE by making certain bodily movements. If she doesn't steal the dose of MEDICINE, she omission-kills Smith - for she kills Smith by not injecting him with the dose of MEDICINE she was charged with injecting him with, and it is an omission-killing in that she doesn't *not*-inject Smith by making a bodily movement.

Call that story HOSPITAL. Consequentialists say HOSPITAL conduces to its being the case that it's even steven, one life for one, so it makes no moral difference which Anna does, and she might as well flip a coin. Believers can be expected to say that HOSPITAL conduces to its being the case that Anna ought not commission-kill Jones, even though that means she has to omission-kill Smith. I hope you agree! — anyway, I'll assume that you do.

Then how are Believers to make their case? There's no future for them in trying to justify the claim that commission-killing is worse than omission-killing. That would land them in the arms of Bare Consequentialists again.

Suppose they instead appeal to the theory of rights. Since an omission-killing is a killing, a theorist of rights would say that we have natural rights against being omission-killed just as we have commission-rights against being commission-killed. Smith's heirs can as plausibly accuse Anna of injustice if she causes Smith's death, as Jones's heirs can accuse her of injustice if she causes Jones's. So far so good.

Can our moral belief that HOSPITAL conduces to its being the case that Anna ought not commission-kill Jones be explained by its being the case that the right to not be commission-killed is more stringent than the right to not be omission-killed? But is it? Is the harm differential required to justify a commission-killing greater than the harm differential required to justify an omission-killing? I'm not in the least sure that it is. You can't permissibly commission-kill one person just on the ground that five deaths will be prevented if you do. But similarly: you can't permissibly omission-kill one person just on the ground that five deaths will be prevented if you do. What about ten deaths? Or twenty-five? A hundred? I don't see a difference turning up as we travel along that route, for whether you commission-kill or omission-kill a person, you all the same kill the person. If so, then if we are to have that Jones's right against Anna is more stringent than Smith's right against Anna, a revision of the THIRD RIGHTS THESIS is called for.

Suppose we try to revise the THIRD RIGHTS THESIS. What other than a larger harm differential required for permissibly infringing the right, would make the right to not be commission-killed more stringent than the right to not be

omission-killed? What I suggest we do is to focus on the structure of commission-killings and omission-killings. I said that you don't omission-kill a person unless you have an appropriate link to his death. I gave an example of a link that would be appropriate in HOSPITAL. Here's another, simpler, example. Adam gave Bert poison. Adam has an antidote, and can give it to Bert. If he doesn't give Bert the antidote, Bert will die of the poison, and Adam will therefore have omission-killed him. Lots of us might also have an antidote, and if we don't give it to Bert, we won't prevent his death. But we won't have omission-killed him. Why Adam and not us? If Adam doesn't give Bert the antidote he will have had an appropriate link with Bert's death, namely: he will have caused it.

Indeed, unlike us, Adam will have killed Bert. For he will have killed Bert by making the bodily movements by the making of which he gave Bert the poison.

So in that Adam has already given Bert the poison, if he doesn't now give Bert the antidote, he will omission-kill Bert *and* he will also have commission-killed Bert. So will there then be two killings of Bert, a commission-killing of him and an omission-killing of him? Yes, one by performing a bodily movement, the other not. But they will be intimately related: Adam will have commission-killed Bert both by giving him the poison, and by omission-killing Bert after giving him the poison. (It is tempting to say, more strongly, that the omission-killing was literally a part of the commission-killing, but the metaphysics of omissions is disputed, and I bypass it.)

We would now be able to explain why a person's right to not be commission-killed is more stringent than a person's right to not be omission-killed if we could say two things. First, that all omission-killings are like Adam's omission-killing of Bert in the following respect: A's omission-killing of X is always such that he commission-kills X by omission-killing X. In short, A doesn't now omission-kill X unless a bodily-performing of A's in the past will cause X's death— and A will therefore have commission-killed X — if A doesn't prevent X's death. That is a strong claim; whether a successful case can be made for it turns on how seriously we take the difference between omission-killing a person and merely not preventing a person's death. In particular, it turns on whether we can take it that you don't acquire a duty to prevent a death except by virtue of some commission on your part, if only the commission that consisted in your taking on the responsibility of preventing the death.

And second, that if A's omission-killing of X is always such that he commission-kills X by omission-killing X, then it follows that X's right to not be commission-killed by A is more stringent than X's right to not be omission-killed by A. This would explain why Anna must now refrain from commission-killing Jones. If this is to be true, we must of course revise the THIRD RIGHTS THESIS to accommodate it.

I think that there is more to be said for those two claims than may appear. But I have to leave the matter now. I add that this is only one of many complexities that the Believers have to deal with, and it is probable that the best way to deal with any one of them is the way that would be best for getting all of them consistently dealt with.