rhetoric, and logic as the arts of “reading, writing, and thinking” (156). And in his section on human experience (161-166), he makes no use of the vast array of material in classical and contemporary literature and philosophy to illuminate the concept of humanity and the significant aspects of human awareness. Instead, he stays with the airy abstractions of Cicero and Dilthey, with a little help from Vico and Toulmin. The upshot is a philosophy of the humanities which can indeed sustain the ecumenical spirit Bird advocates, but which does so by verging on circularity. Concern for the human is surely a mark of the humanities, but it cannot be the core of a definition.

Philosophical readers will notice a further difficulty: Throughout the text, Bird gives very cavalier treatment to the distinction between kinds of knowledge, as results achieved, and ways of acquiring knowledge, as methods employed. Occasionally he even seems unaware of the distinction, using such locutions as “kind or way of knowledge” (2) and “kinds and ways of knowing” (182) appositionally. But more generally, he writes as though this matter were of no more than peripheral importance to his subject. (See, e.g., pp. 45, 75, 96-7, 116, 124-6, 129, 131.) Yet surely the distinction is crucial. Bird has clearly shown that we play the fool dangerously if we dismiss or suppress modes of inquiry a priori or on dogmatic grounds. But it seems equally important not to allow open-mindedness to degenerate into a shallow relativism. Only by persistently asking “What do you know?” and “How do you know it?” (and by keeping these questions distinct) can we avoid the latter pitfall.

Despite these philosophical flaws, Cultures in Conflict is a valuable work. Philosophers of education will find it a useful survey of permanently important themes and will applaud its bibliography. Academics of all stripes should heed the warning in Bird’s comments on territorialism and the organization of our universities. And students of the history of ideas will find a wealth of information about the intellectual forces which have shaped our culture.
p. 14 he speaks of "the defining notions of substances" without saying what he means by "defining notions," and he talks on p. 25 of virtual identicals without explaining what a virtual identical is. Sometimes he confuses the reader by being inattentive to what he has said earlier. For example, on p. 58 he uses relational properties in explaining Leibniz's notion of incom- possibility, but this comes just after he has discussed Leibniz's rejection of relational properties. You and I may not be troubled by the juxtaposition, but I fear that a student would. Sometimes Rescher is just not careful, as when he says that Leibniz had three objections to the Cartesian notion of physical substance as pure extension, and goes on to list four. Other times he leaves his discussion incomplete, as when he says (71) that each monad perceives all other monads and that each monad perceives the whole universe from a point of view. It would have been good to discuss the relation between these purportedly distinct claims, but Rescher does not do so.

In evaluating Leibniz as a teaching text it is necessary to look at the available alternatives, and after that comparison, Rescher's work is probably still the text of choice. For all its faults the discussion is still rich, broad, and well-informed. On those grounds it is to be preferred over other wide-ranging introductory works like H. W. Carr's, Ruth Saw's, C. A. Van Peursen's, and C. D. Broad's. Some think Broad offers a better introduction, but I think it is less well organized and less extensive, and in some places it is internally incoherent. There are other books in English (Parkinson, Yost, Dewey, Russell, Ishiguro, McRae, and Joseph), some of which are excellent, but they are not sufficiently comprehensive to be used as an introductory text. Since they have a better developed ability to detect and compensate for faults in a text, graduate students will still benefit considerably from Rescher's new book. Unfortunately, for undergraduates, it would have been better had the earlier book been reprinted.

I would like to thank Jeffrey Tlumak for a helpful discussion of Leibniz, though I am responsible for the present assessment.

Philosophy and Economic Theory,
Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds.
Oxford, 1979, 177 pages, $5.95 pbk.

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This anthology is welcome because there is practically nothing else to serve as a text in the philosophy of economics, but it is not perfect. Some obvious topics are not covered, some of the papers are amateurish, and others are rather technical. I shall discuss the papers according to the topics they cover: scientific method and idealization, rationality, and justice.

A course in the philosophy of economics is really a course in the philosophy of science, and some background in the philosophy of science is essential. Two papers in the collection deal with such general issues and both are poor. First is Milton Friedman's marvelous "The Methodology of Positive Economics." Friedman defends free market and other varieties of economics from the charge that their assumptions are false by use of a naive positivism: Axioms of a theory are really neither true nor false but confirmed or disconfirmed indirectly by their predictive power. But Friedman's sketch of positivism is very murky. Problems of spelling out what confirmation is, of explaining the differences between theoretical and observational vocabulary and of their link, and of analyzing exactly what is an idealized science are all ignored. Next is a paper by Lionel Robbins which is really more about rationality than scientific method, though he does assert without any clarification that economics "approximates" reality. The only other general paper consists of reflections by Martin Hollis and Edward Nell on Friedman's and Robbins' notions of economics as an