

Moore, therefore, was not a professional in the way the Sophists were. Indeed much of what he did he did without pay. Levi in fact develops a striking analogy between Moore and Socrates, pointing out how much Moore's character was the force which shaped philosophy and still does. The trouble is that philosophers are too isolated and insulated from the rest of the isolated and insulated academic world and that world too isolated and insulated from the real world.

Although Levi does little prognosticating and little prescribing, he leaves as a legacy of this book the problem of treatment of the soul of philosophy. Despite its many weaknesses, then, there are many strengths here and reflections of many shadows.

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DICKINSON S. MILLER. *Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare: Selected Essays and Chapters from Six Decades*. Loyd D. Easton, ed. Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, pp. x, 333. \$39.00, hardbound.

The name of Dickinson Miller will be familiar to readers of William James as he was an acknowledged influence in the latter's theory of cognition and a respected critic of pragmatism. Readers of analytical philosophy will know the name of R.E. Hobart, in fact a pseudonym of Miller's, in particular for the 1934 *Mind* article "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It" (reprinted here in a revised version). Dickinson Miller was born in Philadelphia in 1868 and died in 1963. He taught philosophy at Bryn Mawr, Harvard, and at Columbia University (1904-1919); he also taught Christian apologetics at the General Theological Seminary in New York from 1909 to 1924, when he resigned in protest against a pastoral letter from the Bishops of the Episcopalian Church, which condemned symbolical interpretations of the virgin birth as heretical. Miller finally retired from academic work in

1926 and lived in Europe until 1934, returning to America to become ordained in 1935, combining occasional church duties with philosophical writing. While in Europe he was in contact with members of the Vienna Circle, and also with Wittgenstein, C.A. Strong, and Santayana.

Although Miller published a fair number of articles and reviews, this collection, partly of published articles, partly of chapters for a never completed book, is his first complete book in print. It will be of considerable interest not only to those interested in the history of American philosophy, but also to all those concerned with conceptual analysis or analytical philosophy, particularly for Miller's unusual stress upon its potentialities as a philosophy of radical social and religious engagement. The essays collected here, covering a period of almost sixty years, are on issues such as: the relation of *ought* and *is*; free will and determinism; the nature of cognition; the defects of pragmatism; consciousness; religious belief; the relation between intelligence and moral goodness; together with essays on such philosophers as James and Santayana.

Dickinson Miller is, doubtless, not a major philosopher, but he is certainly an intelligent and balanced one, with an intriguing breadth of interest. He had formulated many of the typical principles of Oxford ordinary language philosophy of the 1950's many years before; indeed in his 1925 essay on his mentor, G.S. Fullerton, he describes the latter as dealing with induction, in the 1890's, by that sort of appeal to the ordinary use of the expression "good argument" which appeared an exciting innovation to Oxford philosophers sixty years later. These principles (e.g., the "paradigm case" argument) may look a little faded now, but they are far more refreshing to the human spirit in Miller's formulation than the later ones.

Miller was deeply influenced by James in his theory of consciousness, deployed to good effect in criticisms contained in this volume both of Husserl and Ryle, but he deplored the "will to believe" and pragmatism. He argues, persuasively,

that it is the most basic task of philosophical education, vital for human welfare, to stem the will to believe and train the head to plan for the heart's satisfaction without confusing fact and heart's desire. His is certainly the most balanced discussion of this aspect of James's thought of which I know.

In particular, Miller pours scorn on the notion that one should believe in God because it is morally boosting. Yet he is not altogether easy to follow here, for he also argues that religion is rather concerned with truths of morality expressed in a symbolic way than with the inculcation of unproved metaphysical or theological propositions, and in elaborating this he seems to view the Christian conception of God as a morally enriching subjective personification of our highest values. If this is not James's position, it is to be understood, perhaps, as being close to that of Santayana, to whose views he also approximates in his discussion of Christ, though he accuses Santayana of a lack of fundamental seriousness.

Apart from the frequent misprints, this book can be recommended, not only as providing a picture of an intriguing thinker with a rare combination of intellectual contacts, but also as a worthwhile collection of essays on ethics, religion, philosophy of mind, and, in particular, on the moral importance of philosophical analysis.

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EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, ed. *The Concept of Academic Freedom*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1975, pp. xxiv, 272.

In 1972 the University of Texas held a Conference on the Concept of Academic Freedom at which fourteen academicians, mostly philosophers, conducted a surprisingly fresh discussion of academic freedom. This volume comprises the papers presented there, some of which have been revised for publication, along with commentary and rejoinders. Most conferences are disappointing; even the better ones tend to yield disappointing vol-

umes. The Pincoffs book is a happy exception.

The book is organized around four topics, described in the Introduction as "(1) the nature of the social and political reality presupposed by claims to academic freedom; (2) consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist grounds of the justification of academic freedom claims; (3) special theories deriving academic freedom from a conception of the function of the university vs. general theories in which academic freedom is a branch of civil liberty; and (4) competing conceptions of the academic community." Pincoffs provides a useful and inviting preview of the discussions to follow, although it is not always as clear as it might be when he is describing the debate and when he is participating in it. Further, Pincoffs seems to focus his attention on the notion of the pursuit of truth, and on the correlative research activity in universities, to an extent that inadequately reflects the university's functions in regard to teaching and, in particular, to the teaching of skills, practices, sensitivities, and points of view, in contrast to the teaching of propositional knowledge. But in this respect, Pincoffs accurately reflects the tone of the subsequent essays. Some might argue that this is as it should be—that what is *distinctive* about universities is precisely their commitment to the production of propositional knowledge. But perhaps instead it is the predilections of these academicians that are revealed.

The first of the book's five parts begins with Milton Fisk's unconvincing defense of the radical claim that "the base of the right to academic freedom in our society is the tendency of the class to which academics belong to serve the capitalist class. . . ." Apart from its reliance on the fuzzy notion of class "tendencies," the essay presents a highly selective—one is tempted to say plainly distorted—view of the events of the last decade, the behavior of faculty members and universities in regard to them, and the behavior of the philosophical profession in particular. The essay provides useful grist for the critical mill, but it is an unfortunate choice for the first position. The reader, anticipating efforts to clarify the concept