

lying mental operations. This view of language helps explain the connection between language and mind which Harman cites in his introduction.

Harman's explanation and defense of this interpretation of Chomsky is admirably clear and persuasive; nonetheless, one feels that while the philosophical wool has been lifted from one's eyes, the ensuing powers of vision are only momentary. If Harman is correct, and his account is so plausible that it is difficult to imagine that he is not, one wonders why so much emphasis has been placed on the ideational character of these innate ideas which are alleged to govern language and language learning. If one takes Chomsky literally, Nagel's points are extremely powerful and suffice to show that Chomsky is not concerned with innate ideas in any traditional sense. If Harman is correct and Chomsky is not to be taken literally, one wonders why the issue is presented in such misleading terms. I am inclined to feel that Nagel's criticisms are correct, if taken as directed at Chomsky's initial position. The position which Harman defends represents a shift in ground on Chomsky's part; however, the shift is a welcome one since the end result is a plausible view of the general nature of language acquisition and linguistic competence.

Overall, this collection is one which anyone who is interested in philosophy of language will be interested in owning. Of the papers, I find the ones by Harman, Nagel and Putnam—the latter of which I have not discussed here—to be the most valuable; but I do not intend this evaluation to belittle the importance of the other contributions.

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RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ed. *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1974. Pp. xv, 416. \$4.95, paperbound. (Modern Studies in Philosophy Series.)

This collection (twenty-one essays; thirteen previously unpublished) is by far the

best philosophical anthology on Freud to appear to date. The competition has been slight—twentieth-century philosophy has, as the editor points out, "by and large gone on as if Freud were a figure of only peripheral significance"—but that makes the book all the more welcome as a hopeful early step in rectifying the neglect. Those who have been distressed by the lack of understanding reflected in most of the philosophical work on psychoanalysis that *has* appeared, may find the refreshment of what they encounter here at least equalled by the sense of relief they will get because of what the editor has had the good judgment to exclude. The reader is spared two recently prominent and annoying varieties of Freud criticism.

First, one does not have to put up with any narrowly verificationist/falsificationist assaults on Freudian theory. Three essays bear directly on the validation issue; the two that have been previously published ("Psychoanalytic Theory and Evidence" by Wesley Salmon and J. O. Wisdom's "Testing an Interpretation within a Session") by now sound a bit dated, but both are sensible commentaries on the general problem. The original article (Clark Glymour's "Freud, Kepler, and the Clinical Evidence") is of more interest. Glymour argues effectively that there are "rational strategies" for testing parts of psychoanalysis which are not unlike those used in testing theories in physical science. He distinguishes usefully, although not entirely unproblematically, between "clinical hypotheses" and "metapsychological hypotheses." "All dreams are hallucinated wish-fulfillments" and "Anxiety is transformed libido" would, I *think*, exemplify the latter, whereas "Obsessional neurotics are sexually precocious" would seem to illustrate the former. Glymour argues (against H.J. Eysenck and others) that clinical hypotheses are testable "on the couch." It is contended that in the Rat Man (Paul Lorenz) case, for example, Freud's hypothesis about the aetiological role of sexual traumatic *events* undergoes the beginnings of a radical revision; the causal significance of sexual *fantasies*

comes in for serious consideration because Freud was unable to verify his theory-laden hunches about the character of an early "trauma" (a beating Lorenz had received as a young boy at the hands of his father). Was it really punishment for a sexual offense; was it indeed a castration threat? Freud cannot find out even after checking independent sources, so the emphasis in this and subsequent work shifts to the *patient's perception* of "traumatic" incidents. This revision closely resembles Freud's famous rejection of the "seduction theory," of course, and those who are familiar with the history of psychoanalysis and therefore realize that it is replete with revisions and refinements of this sort may well wonder how one could seriously question the testability of at least some clinical hypotheses. But many have raised just this question (mainly philosophers and "experimental" psychologists), and so Glymour's detailed defense of Freud on the issue serves a useful purpose.

In the second place, Wollheim is good enough to protect the reader from philosophers who would "save" Freud from the charge of scientific unrespectability by creating some form of "separate domain thesis." Such theses endorse rigid distinctions between reason and cause, action and movement, description and explanation, purpose and mechanism. Some theorists of this persuasion allege that psychoanalysis has business only with the first notion in each of the paired concepts; this takes it out of the domain of "science," but it can be respectable because its "analogies," "re-descriptions," and "myths" are often "brilliant." Others argue that in so far as psychoanalysis provides causal explanations, the behavior explained is not really action, and so it follows that psychoanalysis is not concerned with purposive, rational, rule-following behavior. As Michael Sherwood has shown (*The Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis*) such views (roughly the views of A.C. MacIntyre and R.S. Peters) distort Freud's theories beyond recognition. And it could be added that separate domain theses lead to hopelessly counterintuitive conclusions about the scope

of action and responsibility. Fortunately, the dichotomies upon which such theses are based have fallen out in favor in recent years. Remnants of this rigid methodological dualism do occur in the volume in essays by Peter Alexander, David Pears, Stewart Hampshire, and Irving Thalberg, but in most instances the view is subdued and, more often than not, does not seriously get in the way of an understanding of what Freud is doing.

Despite the fact that Wittgenstein is in some sense a main source of the view I am objecting to, the short selection (Conversations with Rush Rhees on Freud) from Wittgenstein contains some interesting insights. The main point of Wittgenstein's remarks has to do with Freud's method of dream interpretation and the latter's use of the notion of "free association." Wittgenstein is surely right in claiming that Freud's use of "association" in the interpretation of dreams is queer and misleading. It is in another essay, however (Fredric Weiss's "Meaning and Dream Interpretation"), that Wittgenstein's suggestions are developed in enough detail to show with some clarity the nature of a problem that is without question a major fault in Freud's theory of dreams.

The problem is: How we are to know whether an interpretation is accurate; how can we tell whether the "latent content" that is arrived at through associations is really *the meaning* of the dream (the dream-report)? Weiss shows that Freud fails to recognize the ramifications of a distinction between the "meaning-for" the subject (the subject's "associations" about the dream-report), and the "meaning-of" (an "objective" meaning-of) the dream-report. In practice it doesn't make much difference whether a series of "associations" (Weiss justifiably puts the term in scare quotes throughout the essay) can be closely tied to the dream-report or not. In the therapeutic setting, neither patient or therapist really care whether they are "still" talking about or "analyzing" the dream-report or talking about "something else." Trains of "associations" are "pursued for the sake of whatever they may be leading to, providing that what they are leading to is or reveals something

about the subject . . . (p. 58).” But in theory Weiss rightly claims, Freud makes the question central: he makes his claim to be establishing a meaning, which can tell him something about a patient, dependent on the equivalence of the meaning established through “associations” with the meaning-of the “manifest dream”; and he legislates the legitimacy of this equation by taking away the role of “associations,” giving it to “latent dream thoughts,” and from them reconfering it on the “associations.” He is having his cake and eating it too. This is all very well—except that it is confusing, obscures what he is doing in dream interpretation, and invites skepticism, or credulous faith (p. 69).

Since the problem may be even worse than this, let us try to explicate it in somewhat different terms. Freud always claimed that he was carrying out scientific investigations. Given his view of science, he felt that *explaining* dreams (*qua* experiences) entailed showing what the causes of such experiences were. He rightly insisted that these causes had to be real occurrences (the paradigm Freud seemed to have always in mind was the articially simple case of a person acting on cue according to post-hypnotic suggestibility; one acted for “unconscious reasons” which were *at the same time active but nonconscious*), and that the explanation had to be given in *psychological* terms, in terms of the language of motives. This is defensible as long as it is not assumed that these psychological “causes” are identical with the “underlying” physical “causes” in the nervous system. But Freud’s metapsychology coupled with the nature of clinical procedures encourage exactly this view. The unconscious “dream thoughts” (the “latent content”) are in a confused way taken to be at the same time psychological events—which through “associations” can range over an entire case history¹—and events of the nervous system that presumably occur just when the manifest dream occurs. The source of the confusion here is that Freud failed to see clearly that there is no way to translate psychological accounts of a dream or explanations of symptoms into neurological terms; the former have to do with meaning and thus cannot be taken (simply) as events in the nervous system. Freud says (again and again) that he

knows that such translations or reductions are impossible, but the neurological model of the mind that he created very early in his career (as a psychologist) turns out to be persistent and pervasive in his thinking to the end; he never escapes the idea that psychology can be reduced to neurology. As a result of this confusion, the latent dream thoughts play an impossible double role: they are *all that a dream can mean for the dreamer* and *the underlying physical cause of the dream experience*. Thus, the latent content can be a minute long and, at the same time, be somehow spread out over a whole case history. Obviously, Freud cannot have it both ways.

Nearly half of the anthology concerns critically important problems in the understanding of Freudian psychology,—the problems of agency and division of the self. At least eight essays (by Thomas Nagel, R.C. Solomon, Sartre, H. Fingarette, Pears, Thalberg, Brian O’Shaughnessy, and Margaret Boden) deal directly with the whodunnit (or whatdunnit) problem and the attendant moral worries about who (or what) is responsible for a person’s actions, accidents, memory lapses, hysterical conversions, tics, and twitches. The cries of Contradiction and Bad Faith by Sartre are too well known and too widely discussed to call for comment here. Fingarette’s “Self-Deception and the ‘Splitting of the Ego’” (selected passages taken from his *Self-Deception*), though less than famous, has received enough attention to justify our passing it over. Two articles which appear in print for the first time (O’Shaughnessy’s “The Id and the Thinking Processes” and Boden’s “Freudian Mechanisms of Defense: A Programming Perspective”) find no paradoxes in undirected yet purposive thought, no moral or logical horrors in divisions of the self. They are completely justified in this attitude, and both present extremely useful descriptions (from quite different perspectives) of how nonconscious and “unwillful” creative and intelligent thought processes might be systematically understood.

But most philosophers do find at least the seeds of contradiction in Freud’s no-

tions of “defense,” “resistance,” “unconscious censorship,” etc., and so discussion of the alleged difficulties is required. Thalberg’s essay (“Freud’s Anatomies of the Self”) is useful here because of the mistakes it makes. Thalberg scurries through the Standard Edition of the *Complete Psychological Works* at a frenzied pace; the reader is treated to around 120 quotes and references. All manner of mechanistic and homuncular statements are gathered and categorized. Thalberg defends the strategy by saying that he wants “readers to be able to judge for themselves what his [Freud’s] words could mean.” This reader suspects that an important part of the motive is that Thalberg isn’t really confident—despite the rather blustering style—about what to say himself. His conclusions (if that is what they are to be called given the relative absence of argument) are heavily spiced with the ultimate verbal weaponry of a bygone antimetaphysical metaphysics. Freud’s talk about censors, sleeping and vigilant super-egos, his toxicological, political, botanical metaphors, his various divisions of self and the resulting mini-agency; the machinery imagery of the metapsychology all tend to be “incoherent,” “unintelligible,” “nonsensical,” “meaningless.” These broadsides are so diffuse that it is hard to know what to say about them, but if there is an identifiable point here it seems to be that one can’t explain agency by postulating mechanisms nor by postulating homunculi.

Now, if Freud were trying to explain (say) unconscious resistance to therapy by announcing that a little man in the man is seeing to it ever so cleverly that dangerous material never reaches awareness in undisguised form, it is true that nothing would be explained. But Freud is, with all the mini-agency talk, not talking about a conscious agent within the agent. He is talking about *mechanisms*, and he is doing so because it is the only sensible way of construing repression (and all the other defensive “mental” maneuvers). Repression is an *ego defense mechanism*. It has an intelligent character about it as it defends against the experiencing of painful affect, yet it goes into operation

mechanically, and at a distance from the light of consciousness. Thus it tends to fall far short of any full sense of rational functioning. So, it is *as if* mini-agents were hard at work; of course they aren’t mini-agents; they are *mechanisms* which operate purposefully in the short-range interests of the organisms.

Let me try to illustrate this by dealing with the following question: How does Freud’s Little Hans (“Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy”) repress the potentially overwhelming fear of his father and substitute for it the more manageable fear of horses? For Thalberg, this presumably would be a very great “enigma,” and he would no doubt criticize Freud for invoking talk about unconscious agency in an attempt to understand it metapsychologically. But I would submit that there is no mystery here. We are all quite familiar with various forms of “unwilled intelligence.” (Complex behavior that has become absolutely habitual, immediate responses to perceived dangers, and allowing one’s conscious thoughts to unfold, according to their own life and order seem to be obvious examples.) These and similar phenomena happen all the time, and so in this critical sense there is no mystery. It can be argued, then, that it is a *basic* fact about the human organism and so a basic fact about Little Hans as such an organism that it (this organism, this person) defends itself from experiencing anxiety without *conscious* direction or manipulation of what are often extremely complex “maneuvers.” Freud’s employment of both agency talk and mechanistic talk is not confusion, much less “nonsense”; it merely reflects the character of a significant portion of the thought and behavior of human beings.

All of the essays not yet specifically referred to are worthy of the reader’s attention. Three of these strike me as being particularly instructive and original,—Solomon’s “Freud’s Neurological Theory of Mind,” Ronald de Sousa’s “Norms and the Normal,” and Jerome Neu’s “Genetic Explanation in *Totem and Taboo*.”

Everything considered, Wollheim has done a first-rate job of editing, and serious

students of Freud will be indebted to him for some time to come.

1. “. . . to relate [the explanation of a single symptom] in detail would occupy the whole period of this lecture. Its chain of associations always has more than two links; and the traumatic scenes do not form a simple row, like a string of pearls, but ramify and are interconnected like genealogical trees, so that in any new experience two or more earlier ones come into operation as memories. In short, giving an account of the resolution of a single symptom would in fact amount to the task of relating an entire case history.” (“The Aetiology of Hysteria,” 1896, Standard Edition, *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 3, 196-197.)

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ALBERT WM. LEVI. *Philosophy as Social Expression*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. vii, 318, bibliography and index. \$12.50 hardbound.

This is an important and troubling work. It is humanistic and philosophic but in a way that is not currently the fashion. For this reason it is sometimes deeply disappointing in that it ignores questions and treatments which are expected, yet sometimes it is very helpful.

There are two major aspects of Levi's enterprise: (I) An introductory, polemical discussion concerning methods of doing history of ideas and assessing cultural factors which enter the genesis of a philosopher's work. Cultural information is held to be necessary for the proper appreciation of a philosopher's effort in later ages. (II) Application of these convictions by way of four (or five) philosophers, i.e., Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, and Moore (by way of a mini-essay on Kant). (The concluding chapter should likely be read first for it is an excellent summary of most of these ideas.)

In the Preface, Levi avows that the book is not a text but is intended to be more scholarly; yet not surprisingly he thinks that it could be a text and hopes that it will be used in courses in conjunction with appropriate primary sources. But his hope about course employment is I believe vain. The book (in hardback as it

is) is too expensive. It is also too chatty or in-groupy-professional in tone. There is unnecessary name-dropping—name-dropping because Levi is (perhaps not improperly) cultivating a new genre. He hardly ever gives citations but he reflects at length and with great technicality about what “scholars” have debated (cf. p. 49). He system-drops, too, e.g., discussing Marx and Hegel and Sartre (cf. p. 63). He occasionally seems to lapse into abstruse and unconvincing editorializing; e.g., commenting on Cairns' introduction to *The Collected Dialogues* (Pantheon Books, 1961), he writes, “This argument is itself both disingenuous and biased—and it is false. For to say that Plato's system is ‘an implication of the system of nature’ so that Plato ‘is aristocratic only as nature is herself aristocratic’ is to succumb to the worst excess of an untenable doctrine of natural law” (p. 64). Lots of intuitive risk-taking in terms of psycho- or socio-analyzing the dead (in Plato's case a man who has been dead for well over two thousand years) occurs. For all these reasons, I do not encourage Levi in his hope for employment of this book in courses. But since I appreciate many of the risks and learn from them I do encourage instructors to read the appropriate chapters for courses which include the philosophers or contemporaries of the philosophers whom Levi discusses.

The discussion of Moore, the professional, the philosopher's philosopher, is poignant and useful (especially concerning ethics), but not well enough developed. A study of the spread of professionalism in every pursuit is obviously missing. The principal point seems to be that professionalism, spearheaded by Kant, is a reaction to dilettantism which was the decayed version of Descartes' philosophy of the gentleman. Moore is a caricature of the professional in philosophy in that he just wanted clarity for its own sake. His is the triumph of method because he has no product, no content (p. 295). There is a whiff of decadence about this. After a lifetime of scrutiny Moore could decide almost nothing. He could publish very little. In his case, the society expressing itself through philosophy is just a narrow range of inbred specialists.