significance for human society. It is worth examining Lipshires' charge, since it is precisely the kind of objection one is likely to meet in the classroom, and its appearance here demonstrates the kind of unsophisticated acceptance of anything which masquerades as science that one often finds in students. The importance of ethological research for utopian thinking is this: the utopian argues that forms of anti-social behavior are the result of specific modes of social organization, so that alterations of these organizations could theoretically eliminate this behavior. As against this, certain people argue that there exist human instincts which necessitate anti-social behavior whatever the social forms, and hence repressive institutions are inevitable and desirable. Since it is difficult to appeal to human societies for evidence either way, the argument often moves to animal behavior as manifesting the "natural" presence of these instincts independent of social forms. Unfortunately, there is both an interpretive and a methodological problem involved in such reasoning. The interpretive problem is this: even if we could demonstrate the presence of certain "instincts" in people, very little about human *behavior* would follow. No one supposes that the human instincts are well-formed behavioral instincts. Rather, they are supposed merely to produce tendencies to achieve certain ends. "Survival" as an instinct can lead to a wide repertoire of behaviors depending on circumstances. Even "agression" does not define any specific behavior but manifests itself in different ways depending on the situation. Thus, it is still possible for the utopian to accept the presence of "instincts" but to argue that social forms can guarantee their manifestation in benign forms (e.g., "survival through cooperation," "aggression against disease, poverty, etc."). Methodologically the problem is more profound: the behavior of animals tells us about their "instincts" to engage in specific forms of behavior. To label these forms "aggressive" or to use any other intentional predicate is to engage in an unjustified form of anthropomorphism. To then proceed to generalize from the instinct to perform the behavior to the instinct to manifest that intention *generally* is even less justified. And finally, to apply this to persons has no foundation at all. (Consider: animals "fight" over territory instinctively, a "fact" justified by observation—as long as "fight" is not intentional; therefore they are manifesting aggression, a so far harmless bit of anthropomorphism; therefore there exists in them an aggressive instinct, an unjustified generalization; therefore people are necessarily aggressive, an even less justified generalization.) The more responsible ethologists stay away from such implications, but there are strong ideological pressures to move in that direction, and some have yielded. Finally, Marcuse himself recognizes and is critical of the role of "empiricism" in the defense of the status quo, and one ought at least to speak to his criticism of empiricism before using "empirical evidence" against him.

What all this suggests is that Lipshires' approach, while quite critical of Marcuse, seems entirely uncritical of anything else. For this reason, it would probably be better to use, in addition to Marcuse's works themselves, something like Alasdair MacIntyre's critique: *Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic* to introduce students to Marcuse. Lipshires' book has but one advantage: the author has interviewed Marcuse and several of his associates and hence provides us with some information not available elsewhere.

—*Michael Goldman*
Miami University

GILBERT HARMAN, ed. *On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974, pp. 345. $4.95, paperbound.

This volume contains fifteen papers. There are contributions from philosophers: John Searle, Hilary Putnam, W.V. Quine, Gilbert Harman, Thomas Nagel, Jerrold Katz, Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Dennis Stampe; from linguists: Robert Lees, John R. Ross, and Barbara Hall Partee; from psychologists: Thomas G. Bever, James R. Lackner, and Robert Kirk;

and from an anthropologist: Dell Humes. With the exception of the papers by Bever and Ross, all of these have appeared elsewhere and, by and large, are familiar to most readers interested in the relation between philosophy and linguistics. Professor Harman's introduction is rather brief and sketchy, but the anthology does have an index (a feature which more editors would do well to incorporate into their collections), which is of great benefit to the reader who is interested in correlating what is said on a particular topic by different authors.

The appearance of this volume is both welcome and, perhaps, somewhat ironic: welcome because it contains several philosophically interesting and profitable papers (especially those by Putnam, Quine, Harman, and Nagel), as well as the clear overview of the Chomskian revolution in linguistics given by Searle; it is ironic because it appears at a time when the seemingly admirable tendency toward the interdisciplinary co-operation of linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists appears to be waning. As linguistics has matured as a science, linguists are becoming less closely affiliated with philosophers. The inevitable result of the increased sophistication of linguistics is the growing complexity of work in linguistics and the accompanying incomprehensibility of such work for the theorist interested mainly in philosophy. Interdisciplinary collections like the one being reviewed seem to require three (or perhaps four) reviewers, one for each discipline. I shall address my remarks primarily to the philosopher.

This restriction indicates that I do view philosophy and linguistics as separate fields which have little substantive effect on one another. In the future, one can expect to see linguistics treated less like a branch of philosophy of language, and more as a discipline whose philosophical interest is displayed in philosophy of linguistics and philosophy of science. As an illustration of my contention, consider Katz's contribution to the present volume, his well-known "The Relevance of Linguistics to Philosophy." In attempting to meet Quine's challenge in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Katz proposes the following definition: "a sentence is analytic if there is a reading assigned to it that is derived from a reading for its subject and a reading for its verb phrase such that the latter contains no semantic markers not already in the former" (239). He then claims that this definition, and others which he offers, can be empirically evaluated by "verifying the predictions to which they lead about semantic properties and relations of sentences from natural languages" (240). This treatment is alleged to be immune to the criticism which Quine levels against Carnap, viz., that Carnap explicates a family of concepts in terms of one another without giving an independent definition of any of them; according to Katz, his own definitions "cannot be criticized on the grounds of such circularity" (240-41). Unfortunately, the circularity to which Katz' own theory is victim is far more serious. Since the predictions on which the empirical evaluation rest must surely concern such properties as analyticity, contradiction, synonymy, and so forth, it is clear that Katz assumes an independent criterion for the identification of these properties, and thus begs the question.

This aside, Professor Harman does not perceive the interdisciplinary trend as losing importance. In his introduction, he tells the reader that "nothing has had a greater impact on contemporary philosophy than Chomsky's theory of language," (vii) and "Chomsky has let us see that there is a single subject of language and mind which crosses departmental boundaries" (vii). As should be evident from my earlier remarks, I find these claims somewhat overstated and, at best, questionable; nonetheless, despite his exaggerated sense of the importance of the connection between philosophy and linguistics, Professor Harman's selection of topics for this collection is quite good. He treats three of the most important and interesting areas of philosophical dis-

cussion: methodology, grammar, and logical analysis, and the rationalist-empiricist dispute over the issue of tacit knowledge.

Before considering the rationalist-empiricist controversy, I wish to make a comment on the section dealing with methodology. The papers addressing the issue of methodology are primarily standard philosophical fare. In this case, the standard contributions are far more profitable than the exotic additions. What, for example, can Bever really be telling us about methodology when, in "The Psychology of Language and Structuralist Investigations of Nativism," he makes the following claim?

> Experiments that demonstrate the "psychological reality" of inner forms of sentences have concentrated on three problems: memory, segmentation, and ambiguity. The methodology closest to linguistic investigation is to demonstrate that relations among sentences which share an inner syntactic form are responded to by subjects in actual "experiments" as more similar than sentences which do not share an inner form (152).

Bever's talk of "psychological reality" seems unlikely to be of any help in solving philosophical problems—indeed, the notion would appear to generate philosophical problems of its own. Ross's paper, "Excerpts from *Constraints on Variables of Syntax,*" provides a good example of the kind of work done by linguists; however, its relevance to philosophical issues is far from clear. The other contributions in this area, especially Putnam's "Some Issues in the Theory of Grammar," are well worth careful study by philosophers.

The papers dealing with the rationalist-empiricist controversy are excellent and greatly clarify the nature of the dispute. I shall discuss only the papers by Harman and Nagel, "Review of *Language and Mind*" and "Linguistics and Epistemology," respectively.

Harman and Nagel seem to agree in their interpretation of Chomsky's views on tacit knowledge/innate ideas: Chomsky's "Cartesian revolution" postulates a system of innate propensities or dispositions to verbal behavior. As both Harman and Nagel note, this is not incompatible with the empiricist's view: "Finally, there is the question whether C's theory of innateness is incompatible with contemporary philosophical empiricism, as represented, e.g., by Quine. Despite what Chomsky says in this connection, I see no conflict whatever, once misunderstanding on all sides is cleared away" (Harman: 217). "But what Chomsky offers us is a system of innate propensities that we are conveniently stuck with. It is perfectly imaginable that we should be differently constituted, but we are not. A mere innate tendency to believe certain things or perform in certain ways, no matter how universal, is not *a priori* knowledge. . . . To point out the natural phenomenon of human agreement, innately determined, is simply to turn aside the epistemological demand that motivates the search for *a priori* knowledge" (Nagel: 227).

If this agreement is genuine, Harman's claim to have misunderstood Chomsky's revolution in an earlier work ("Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax," *Journal of Philosophy,* 1967) and his defense of Chomsky's arguments for the "revolution" are puzzling. How could one defend any version of the innateness hypothesis and agree with Nagel? The puzzle is resolved, by Harman, along the following lines: the so-called "Cartesian revolution" in linguistics is not, as many philosophers have mistakenly held, concerned with unassailable foundations of knowledge. The real thrust of Chomsky's claim deals with the innovation which the Cartesians initiated by their rejection of physicalistic accounts of language. This change was fostered by a recognition of what Chomsky calls "the creative aspect of language" and the further recognition that no physical explanation was capable of handling this phenomenon. The important difference lies in the psychological account of language, with its accompanying theory of under-

lying mental operations. This view of language helps explain the connection between language and mind which Harman cites in his introduction.

Harman's explanation and defense of this interpretation of Chomsky is admirably clear and persuasive; nonetheless, one feels that while the philosophical wool has been lifted from one's eyes, the ensuing powers of vision are only momentary. If Harman is correct, and his account is so plausible that it is difficult to imagine that he is not, one wonders why so much emphasis has been placed on the ideational character of these innate ideas which are alleged to govern language and language learning. If one takes Chomsky literally, Nagel's points are extremely powerful and suffice to show that Chomsky is not concerned with innate ideas in any traditional sense. If Harman is correct and Chomsky is not to be taken literally, one wonders why the issue is presented in such misleading terms. I am inclined to feel that Nagel's criticisms are correct, if taken as directed at Chomsky's initial position. The position which Harman defends represents a shift in ground on Chomsky's part; however, the shift is a welcome one since the end result is a plausible view of the general nature of language acquisition and linguistic competence.

Overall, this collection is one which anyone who is interested in philosophy of language will be interested in owning. Of the papers, I find the ones by Harman, Nagel and Putnam—the latter of which I have not discussed here—to be the most valuable; but I do not intend this evaluation to belittle the importance of the other contributions.

—*Patricia Johnston*
University of Utah

RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ed. *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1974. Pp. xv, 416. $4.95, paperbound. (Modern Studies in Philosophy Series.)

This collection (twenty-one essays; thirteen previously unpublished) is by far the best philosophical anthology on Freud to appear to date. The competition has been slight—twentieth-century philosophy has, as the editor points out, "by and large gone on as if Freud were a figure of only peripheral significance"—but that makes the book all the more welcome as a hopeful early step in rectifying the neglect. Those who have been distressed by the lack of understanding reflected in most of the philosophical work on psychoanalysis that *has* appeared, may find the refreshment of what they encounter here at least equalled by the sense of relief they will get because of what the editor has had the good judgment to exclude. The reader is spared two recently prominent and annoying varieties of Freud criticism.

First, one does not have to put up with any narrowly verificationist/falsificationist assaults on Freudian theory. Three essays bear directly on the validation issue; the two that have been previously published ("Psychoanalytic Theory and Evidence" by Wesley Salmon and J. O. Wisdom's "Testing an Interpretation within a Session") by now sound a bit dated, but both are sensible commentaries on the general problem. The original article (Clark Glymour's "Freud, Kepler, and the Clinical Evidence") is of more interest. Glymour argues effectively that there are "rational strategies" for testing parts of psychoanalysis which are not unlike those used in testing theories in physical science. He distinguishes usefully, although not entirely unproblematically, between "clinical hypotheses" and "metapsychological hypotheses." "All dreams are hallucinated wish-fulfilments" and "Anxiety is transformed libido" would, I *think*, exemplify the latter, whereas "Obsessional neurotics are sexually precocious" would seem to illustrate the former. Glymour argues (against H.J. Eysenck and others) that clinical hypotheses are testable "on the couch." It is contended that in the Rat Man (Paul Lorenz) case, for example, Freud's hypothesis about the aetiological role of sexual traumatic *events* undergoes the beginnings of a radical revision; the causal significance of sexual *fantasies*