The third part of the book sketches the duality of man, his 'masking' of his real self, his sociability, his historicity, and the relation of intentionality and meaning. Throughout there are interesting individual insights; but since each section is developed in the light of previous discussions and concepts, each suffers from the defects of the previous parts.

Despite its defects Romero’s attempt at a philosophical synthesis is impressive; and there is ample vital philosophical thought to justify both its having been translated and its being carefully read. The work also serves to demonstrate, however, the necessity for careful analysis without which any grand synthesis tends to become arbitrary, confused, and irrelevant to the problems of man and his place in the universe.


Royce, one of America's few idealist philosophers, is known in some circles more through Gabriel Marcel's exposition of his metaphysics than through his own writings. Yet the book under review here is sound testimony that Royce deserves to be better known. In this first full-length treatment in English of Royce's moral philosophy, Fuss presents, develops and sympathetically defends Royce's ethical theory, which he draws together both from Royce's published and unpublished writings. The book is divided into three parts: the first summarizes Royce's early ethical theory, the second sketches the psychological and epistemological presuppositions of his later ethical theory, and the third develops this theory.

Part of Fuss's thesis is that Royce's ethics does not presuppose acceptance of his metaphysical absolutism—a thesis which he indirectly defends throughout the book by giving plausible, naturalistic interpretations of Royce's position. He concentrates on the ethical aspects of freedom and of the self, touching only lightly on their metaphysical aspects and implications. Whether Royce did in fact give up the metaphysical position for which he is best known remains an open question, though for present purposes a peripheral one.

Royce's ethical theory is pertinent to contemporary discussions for his attempts to resolve two major conflicts: the controversy between ethical realists and ethical idealists concerning moral objectivity, and the dispute between the individualists and the collectivists concerning the relation of man and society. The failure of philosophers to solve the first problem, Royce suggests, has led to moral skepticism. His solution lies in a version of self-realization. He preserves moral autonomy by making morality subjectively dependent on an individual's adherence to his own chosen ultimate purpose or life plan, while he finds the basis for moral objectivity in the actual demands of an individual's higher self considered in its social context. Royce's solution is not completely satisfactory. One difficulty which he never adequately overcame lies in trying to state clearly the nature of this 'higher self' and the means by which its demands can be known. Another appears in the dubious enterprise of
trying to show that individuals become moral agents by choosing a ‘life plan’. But Royce’s approach is suggestive.

Royce’s resolution of the individualism (social pluralism)—collectivism (social monism) controversy rests on the general development of loyalty to a genuine community. But his discussions of loyalty and of community suffer from lack of precision and remain too vague to resolve the question of whether the value of the individual or of society should have primacy where the two conflict. To give society a priori primacy seems to contradict Royce’s dictum that a person should always be treated as an end in himself. Yet how this can be avoided if the principle of harmony reigns supreme is an unsolved riddle. Loyalty to the community, moreover, does not seem to be the guide men actually use to distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad; nor is it clear how one could use it to decide between conflicting systems, nor to answer many of the practical questions relating to social justice or to freedom and aggression, war and peace. In a world where evil and irrational actions are facts to be contended with, Royce’s development of an ideal community throws too little light on how to decide among competing disharmonious values, or how to balance present harmony against contingent future disharmony. But here again, though his answer to the problem remains vague, his approach seems promising. Royce points to possible ways out of old dilemmas, ways which have not been sufficiently investigated and which deserve further research and creative thought. Fuss’s systematic presentation of Royce’s ethics helps clear the path for the fuller discussion which it merits but has thus far failed to receive.

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How does one write the biography of a minor literary figure? One way would be to write an article for professional historians and critics; another is to write a book. But the book would need both to be relatively brief and to make a serious attempt to use its subject as a case-study, to illuminate an age by showing its impact on one individual. Marcantonio Flaminio is such a minor literary figure; and Dr Carol Maddison has written, more or less, that kind of book. It is in fact the third biography of Flaminio, but the first in English. (One of its predecessors, the biography by P M Rossi, is, oddly, not cited in the bibliography.)

Flaminio’s life was not an eventful one, though he lived in eventful times; nor was his personality a striking one. And so it is perhaps a pity that Dr Maddison chose a chronological rather than an analytic framework for the book, all the more because her approach tends to be a little pedestrian. To engage the attention of the twentieth-century reader, Flaminio needs to be studied (as the subtitle suggests) as a typical or untypical poet, humanist and reformer.

Dr Maddison, a professor of classics, is at her best when writing about the first of these three aspects of Flaminio—the neo-Latin poet—and when translating him. She shows him changing from a composer of