Why Shouldn’t Leibniz Have Studied Spinoza?
The Rise of the Claim of Continuity in Leibniz’ Philosophy
out of the Ideological Rejection of Spinoza’s Impact on Leibniz

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Dedicated to Ludwig Stein, the first historian
of Leibniz’ philosophical development

Abstract

In light of the growing interest in the relation between Leibniz and Spinoza in recent years, I would like to draw attention to earlier discussions of this topic in Germany and France during the 19th century. Stein and Erdmann argued that Spinoza had an impact on Leibniz. According to their critics Guhrauer, Trendelenburg and Gerhardt in Germany, as well as Foucher de Careil in France, Leibniz studied Spinoza only after the main points of his system were already developed. I will show that the well known thesis about the amazing continuity in Leibniz’ thinking is due to this claim of a general chronological impossibility of any impact of Spinoza on Leibniz. This thesis was then canonized in Mahnke’s book about the young Leibniz and has determined the view of Leibniz since the end of the 19th century. It has only in recent years come to be increasingly challenged.

It is well known that Spinoza’s philosophy was the most provocative challenge in the early modern era. He had to endure hundreds of hostile refutations from 1670 to the middle of the 18th century before seeming to be justified by German Idealism and being accepted in academic history of philosophy since then. However, it is striking that the aggressive attitude of highly emotional refutations found an odd revival within the academic field of history of philosophy in the end of the 19th century. Various historians of philosophy came under comparably aggressive though less damaging attacks by highly respected Leibniz scholars. They had dared to discuss Spinoza’s significance for Leibniz. Such an influence of Spinoza on Leibniz was claimed for the first time within academic research in 1840 by Johann Eduard Erdmann. It was immediately refuted by the well-known biographer and editor of Leibniz, Gottschalk Eduard Guhrauer as well as by an Aristotle scholar and leading member of the Berlin University and of the Prussian...
A similar attack against any claim of a Spinozistic influence on Leibniz was launched in France by Foucher de Careil. He was not simply a Leibniz scholar but saw Leibniz’ philosophy as a way to protect France from the dangerous influence of Hegelianism and Pantheism – an influence that had already infected the German intellectual world.

The next challenge to the Leibniz scholars came from Ludwig Stein, at first with his two essays on the basis of unedited Leibniz texts, and then with his book *Leibniz und Spinoza* which appeared in 1890. He was soon attacked by the well-known Leibniz editor and scholar Carl Immanuel Gerhardt and others. The controversy was ended by their “definite proofs” about the impossibility of any such influence. The books of Willy Kabitz and Ernst Cassirer from the beginning 20th century confirmed this victory against Stein. And although Georges Friedmann dedicated a book in 1945 explicitly to the topic *Leibniz et Spinoza* and presented an amazing number of all then-known passages of Leibniz on Spinoza, he too held onto this “canonical” position and criticized Stein for having claimed that Leibniz had been temporarily a Spinozist.

However, it appears that the discussion had not yet come to an end and we have even recently experienced a small revival within the US Leibniz community. Unfortunately this has arisen with almost no awareness of the former discussion of this topic in Old Europe. However, after a long time during which Stein had been seen negatively and viewed as largely overcome, it now seems as if at least his cause will be vindicated, albeit quite late. It is increasingly acknowledged, as a matter of fact, given the material of the Akademieausgabe, that Stein was quite right in his main thesis about a particular period of an intense interest in Spinoza on Leibniz’ part, from the end of 1675 until the early 1680s. That is of course due to the progress of the edition of Leibniz’ writings and letters which gives us a great advantage over Stein as well as over his adversaries. But above all it is a result of a much more open-minded approach nowadays to the complicated relation between Leibniz and Spinoza.

I want my paper to be an homage to Ludwig Stein, who was so often criticized for something he had never claimed, and was even slandered as an unserious scholar. His tough critics, among them the well recognized Leibniz scholars of that time as Guhrauer, Gerhardt, and Foucher de Careil (and besides them Trendelenburg and Zimmermann), were quite aggressive in their “refutations” of him. But actually they did not refute claims he had made but rather argued against one which he never asserted – that Leibniz was a Spinozist. That is, they constructed a straw
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man out of some of Stein’s formulations in order to make it easier to reject his well-argued recommendation that we look for the meaning of Leibniz’ obvious and intense interest in Spinoza during a particular period. Stein was certainly not right in every detail and sometimes he is too confident about his views. However, he also introduced for the first time a historical approach into the Leibniz research, seeing Leibniz in his philosophical development.\(^{18}\) I think that he was also absolutely right in his view that Leibniz’ mature philosophy came as a result of his successful overcoming of Spinoza in the early 1680s. But this is another story. That Stein reached these insights even though he lacked many of the texts available to us is in my eyes a great achievement and, looking back, deserved respect and admiration as well as a critical and serious discussion. Instead of this, he was treated by the Leibniz scholars in Germany as well as in France as a naïve partisan of Spinoza without any understanding of Leibniz – as someone who simply wanted to make a Spinozist out of their hero Leibniz.

But what was so terrible about the idea that Leibniz could have studied Spinoza (though never becoming a Spinozist) before he developed his own system? I do not raise this question as a matter of mere historical interest. I want rather to make the claim that the answer to this question offers an explanation for a longstanding thesis about a thoroughgoing continuity of Leibniz’ philosophical development, starting in his time in Leipzig and ending with his death. This continuity thesis was introduced at exactly the same time and by the very same authors who so aggressively attacked the thesis of Stein. Unfortunately, this traditional view of Leibniz and his continuous development, as it was raised against Stein in the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, is still present in the most recent books about the young Leibniz – books which look for the early seeds of the monads already in his earliest writings. (Stein is not even mentioned anymore.\(^{19}\))

I see this claim of continuity as an obstacle for our understanding of Leibniz’ decision to do metaphysics at all after being an established lawyer. The emphasis of continuity also makes it difficult to explain or even to acknowledge the changes in his thinking and his reasons for such changes. But given the rich material of Leibniz texts we know today – even dated to a large extent – such changes and breaks in Leibniz’ philosophical development can no longer be ignored (as it was still possible in the late 19\(^{th}\) century).

But the continuity claim is not merely wrong. It misled Leibniz researchers for more than 100 years due to their ideological eagerness to make Stein’s view untenable. The thesis of Leibniz’ continuity is simply the answer to the question:
How can any possible impact of Spinoza on Leibniz be excluded? By showing that Leibniz had already developed his own philosophical system in his earliest youth to such a degree that his first acquaintance with Spinoza could no longer have influenced him, the danger seemed to be avoided. Therefore, Leibniz had to have developed the seeds of his mature philosophical system already in Leipzig, when he had not yet studied Spinoza at all.

In the following I will at first give a short resumé of Stein’s real argument – one which has been almost forgotten in the polemics against him during the last hundred years. I will then present some of the arguments by which the highly regarded Leibniz scholars Guhrauer, Foucher de Careil and Gerhardt – and besides them Trendelenburg – “proved” that “that which should not be cannot be”. In a third section I will give a little bit of the Zeitgeist and the personal background of the main figures. Presenting, in a fourth section the way in which this approach was defended and perpetuated during the last decades, I will show how this hostility against Stein and the prejudice against Leibniz’ possible interest in Spinoza shaped the way in which we still customarily think of the young Leibniz’ development as continuous. I will end with the suggestion that we should finally start to learn from the often decried Stein – and take up his developmental approach to Leibniz’ philosophy.

1. Ludwig Stein’s Approach in 1888 and 1890

Against the simplified view that Leibniz’ comments on the notorious philosopher were almost always very critical, Stein rightly recommended that we look at the specific years of such criticism:

However, one had forgotten to take a closer look at the years in which Leibniz made his statements about Spinoza. If one takes note of this it is striking that almost all of the statements from the years 1676 till 1686 are remarkably mild and forbearing whereas the sharply critical ones stem entirely from a later period.  

On the basis of his newly edited documents, published in 1888, he wanted to show that Leibniz, during the years 1676 to 1680, not only did not reject and oppose Spinoza, but often agreed with him and approved of him. Indeed, in the writings from these years Leibniz is, for the most part, moving within the sphere of Spinoza’s ideas.
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This statement can still be said to be right in general and gets more and more confirmed today. Thus it is all the more striking that Stein was attacked so aggressively for that claim.

But I want especially to argue for a vindication of Stein concerning the main objection against him. As already mentioned, he was above all accused of having claimed that Leibniz was a Spinozist. And whenever thereafter somebody was needed who had made that claim (in order to be rejected as totally wrong) – it was Stein who had to serve as the general author of that certainly wrong claim. But in fact – he had never made this claim. He even said explicitly that Leibniz was never a Spinozist: „However, I would not call this period a Spinozistic one but would rather call it a Spinoza-friendly period.” Stein repeats this more than once throughout his book:

That does not mean that he has to be a Spinozist in the literal meaning of the word – as little as he was a Cartesian, Platonist, Aristotelian, or Scholastic in this narrower sense. And thus, despite the many instances of resonance with pantheistic doctrines, he never was a Spinozist in the narrow meaning of the word.

If one reads the book with attention it becomes clear that Stein is not at all interested in making Leibniz a Spinozist. He rather criticized the traditional approach of Ideengeschichte – an approach that sought to reduce the investigation of Leibniz’ relation to Spinoza to a simple decision about his Spinozism: „But the methodological error is already there in the way the question is posed.” Moreover, Stein demands a new approach to understanding the relation of Leibniz to Spinoza and draws our attention to the very reasons for Leibniz’ obvious interest in Spinoza. Having said that, the question arises, Why was he so aggressively attacked and misunderstood?

Although he might have overestimated the significance of Spinoza in respect to Leibniz’ overcoming of Descartes, Stein made an interesting attempt to understand Leibniz’ undeniable interest and intense study of Spinoza during the mentioned period:

The brusque way in which Spinoza mockingly rejected all teleological views of the world and threw them into the junkroom of left-behind and shelved concepts offended Leibniz’ aesthetic as well as his religious feelings. Thus the study of Spinoza gave him the first impulse to form his own system, based on teleology, intended to serve as a powerful bulwark against the philosophical naturalism of Spinoza and Hobbes – a naturalism which was making a forcible
That means Stein saw in Spinoza rather the theoretical challenge for Leibniz, provoking him to look for a new approach in order to overcome it, rather than taking it as a model to be followed. In addition to this productive suggestion, I think that Stein was certainly right in his view that Spinoza remained for Leibniz during his whole life the touchstone by which he always tested his newly developed philosophical conceptions. According to Stein, Leibniz saw his system to be the appropriate (probably the only effective) means … to escape the fatal consequences of naturalism. … During the period when Leibniz was conceiving and giving shape to his own doctrine, Spinoza was and remained for him a kind of negative philosophical pole by which he occasionally tested and measured the validity and justification of his specific philosophical claims.

It is this theoretical approach which focuses on Leibniz’ own philosophical problems which makes Stein’s book in my eyes still much more interesting than those of his critics up to our own time. They do not only fall short in their vain attempts to show that Leibniz was never a Spinozist – although that was never claimed at all, except by Leibniz’ contemporary enemies. By wasting their energy in this refutation Stein’s critics miss the more interesting question – the question of the reason for Leibniz’ undeniable interest in Spinoza.

The book of Friedmann is a striking example of a work that provides a presentation of all the passages of Leibniz that concern Spinoza known at the time. It is also free of aggressive attacks against Stein, though it is not uncritical. However, the main outcome of Friedmann’s work was again the weak result – that Leibniz was no Spinozist. As if that had not been clear before. Although Friedmann gave us all the evidence needed regarding how much Leibniz was concerned with Spinoza, he does not explain where Leibniz’ interest in this notorious philosopher came from.

What is totally neglected in all the discussions of Stein’s book is his claim of another important influence on Leibniz during his later years – i.e. the influence of Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas. I mention that here only to be complete in my attempt to draw attention back to this interesting book and because it is the aim of some more recent books on the young Leibniz to show just such an impact on him.
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2. Stein’s Critics

The academic controversy about Leibniz’ alleged Spinozism was at first caused in 1840, by the introduction of Johann Eduard Erdmann to his edition of Leibniz’ *Opera philosophica*. In his introduction, he claimed to have seen some ideas as being quite similar to those of Spinoza, particularly in Leibniz’ writing *De vita beata*. Gottschalk Eduard Guhrauer reacted immediately with a sharp criticism of Erdmann; he was soon joined by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. In his biography of Leibniz, Guhrauer argued again against Erdmann. After having emphasized that Leibniz was never a Spinozist he argued that Leibniz had long ago burst the shackles of Cartesianism in his way, in such a decisive way – a way precisely opposed to Spinoza. He had so laid the ground for his own system that when he actually spoke with Spinoza in person he already stood decidedly in opposition to him (though he may not have been conscious of the fact). That is, Leibniz did not study Spinoza until he had developed the ground for his own system. However, Guhrauer does not tell us why Leibniz wanted so urgently to talk with Spinoza.

Erdmann accepted Guhrauer’s criticism to some extent but defended his argument against some unjustified objections and insisted above all on his opinion that Leibniz’ first letter to Arnauld, written in 1671, does not yet display his mature philosophy. From this he concluded that Leibniz had not yet developed his own philosophical system in 1671. There is no question that Erdmann was right to this extent. After this first exchange, Guhrauer was able to show that the greater part of the controversial writing of Leibniz was simply an excerpt from Descartes. Therefore Erdmann was seen as completely refuted although his position did not rely on this particular text alone and although he had made a more general claim about the young Leibniz’ closeness to Descartes and Spinoza. However, Leibniz was now seen as again free of any infection from the Jewish philosopher.

Reflecting on the encounter of the Anti-Hegelian Trendelenburg and the Hegelian Erdmann, I find the argument of Trendelenburg, at this time the official historian of philosophy at the Prussian Academy, particularly puzzling. He claims that there was simply no time in Leibniz’ biography when he was able to be in close relation to Spinoza:

If one takes into account Leibniz’ rapid development, there hardly remains any time period into which his alleged Spinozism could be fit at all. We just


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recently got a new witness to his early intellectual maturity in the appendix
to the correspondence with Arnauld. Leibniz had written the first letter to
Arnauld in 1671. He was hardly 25 years old and the seeds of his characteristic
thoughts are already there. He clearly rejects the just published tractatus
theologico-politicus though mentioning it only indirectly. And yet this would
be, historically speaking, the first source from which Leibniz could have taken
Spinozism. The actual system of Spinoza, his Ethics, appeared only 6 years
later.\(^{38}\)

Beside the fact that Leibniz was exactly 25 years old when he wrote the
mentioned letter to Arnauld, it is well known that this letter is the only one in
this correspondence which stems from this early period. But only the remainder
of Leibniz’ letters to Arnauld from the 1680’s can be acknowledged as mature
philosophy and Trendelenburg’s conjecture looks suspiciously unfounded. The
argument concerning Leibniz’ rejection of Spinoza’s \textit{Tractatus theologico-politicus}
is likewise unconvincing because rejecting this book in its general tendency does
not necessarily mean it was of no interest to Leibniz. But what I find particularly
striking is Trendelenburg’s chronological argument against the possibility of
Leibniz’ having studied Spinoza: „That Leibniz should ever have been a Spinozist
is already chronologically impossible; Leibniz was in his 31\(^{st}\) year when Spinoza’s
Ethics came out.”\(^{39}\)

As mentioned above, the relation of Leibniz to Spinoza was also discussed in
France. In 1842, the Spinoza scholar Amand Saintes had asserted a closeness of
Leibniz to Spinoza: “If one calls the system of Spinoza pantheism Leibniz can well
be called a Spinozist too.”\(^{40}\) In opposition to that Foucher de Careil sought to refute
in detail any possible influence of Spinoza on Leibniz and to exclude any possible
convergence. It is quite obvious in his introduction and even in the title of his
\textit{Refutation de Spinoza inédite} that his argument was not simply an objective critique
of a possible scholarly mistake of a colleague but was motivated by a very personal
and emotional intention to keep Leibniz clean from any poisoning by the Jewish
and atheist philosopher. This aggressive publication of course provoked further
objections, if only because of his offensive polemics and exaggerations.\(^{41}\) However,
in his second edition of the \textit{Refutation inédite} he concludes, as Trendelenburg did,
with a chronological argument:

Such an assertion, void of proof, falls before this very simple fact. The Ethics
were published in 1677. Now, in 1672, Leibnitz broke from Descartes on
the fundamental idea of substance. He is ready to contend with Spinoza, and
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assuredly has not shaken off the yoke of the master to bear the yoke of a disciple inferior to the master. In 1673 we see him entertaining another fundamental idea, that from which the Theodicaea subsequently sprang. He teaches a God free in his will, at the time when Spinoza was teaching a God subject to necessity. Lastly, the Ethics appeared in 1677: Leibnitz obtains the book, and reads it. What does he write to Hugens on the 1st of December 1679? ‘I should like to know if you have read attentively the book of the late Spinoza. It appears to me that his pretended proofs are not very exact, as for instance, when he says that God alone is a substance, and that all other things are modes of the divine nature. He seems to me not to explain what substance is.’

Having asserted this series of “chronological facts”, Foucher de Careil concludes that Leibniz, having already finished his own system, could no longer be affected by any study of Spinoza but rather was already beginning to criticize him.

It is precisely this chronological argument, brought up by Trendelenburg, Guhrauer and Foucher de Careil, which is then disputed by Stein – at first in two essays in 1888 on the basis of some newly found texts of Leibniz, but based also on letters between Tschirnhaus and Spinoza. He develops his argument more explicitly in his book that followed in 1890. Whereas he argued on the basis of the new texts that Leibniz was interested in Spinoza’s ideas, he concluded from the letters that Leibniz must have written more than the one letter to Spinoza we know from the Opera posthuma. Moreover, he even claimed on the basis of these letters that at least one of them dealt with the Theologico-political Treatise, and even in a respectful way.

But the rejection of Stein’s challenging claims began immediatly, at first by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, but also by other authors. The main argument was again the irrelevant proof that Leibniz was never a Spinozist. However, Gerhardt goes further and attempts to show by the mere fact of the publication of one single letter of Leibniz in Spinoza’s Opera posthuma that this was definitely the only letter he ever wrote to Spinoza. Gerhardt takes it for granted that Leibniz did not continue the correspondence in November 1671 because he was simply too busy:

when he received the letter from Spinoza in November 1671, he was eagerly working to add a second part to the political memorandum he had written in August 1670 entitled Bedenken welchergestalt securitas publica interna et externa und status praesens im Reich jetzigen Umständen nach auf festen Fuß zu stellen.
In addition, he was preparing his trip to Paris and still had to complete his *Egyptian Plan*. Therefore, he had not had a minute to write an answer to the letter of Spinoza before his departure in March 1672 for Paris. Again, it is the chronological argument which serves to preclude any possible knowledge about Spinoza which could have influenced Leibniz.

The simple fact that Spinoza mentions letters to Leibniz (in the plural) in a letter to Schuller/Tschirnhaus by which he had made the acquaintance of Leibniz, is to be understood according to Gerhardt as either an error of Spinoza or – even more likely – as referring to other letters, e.g. of Leibniz to Oldenburg, which Spinoza could have had in mind. To make this more likely (in the absence of any real evidence concerning this thesis), Gerhardt even invents a very close friendship between Spinoza and Oldenburg.49 Anything seemed to be more likely for Gerhardt than admitting the literal and obvious meaning of Tschirnhaus’ and Spinoza’s letters – namely that Leibniz had written letters to Spinoza and at least one of them about the TTP. That is, in order to avoid a closer contact of Leibniz to Spinoza Gerhardt makes completely arbitrary claims without giving any evidence. So much for the serious attitude of Leibniz scholars when it came to Spinoza!

This strict denial of any more intense Spinoza studies by Leibniz before 1678 served the purpose of showing that Leibniz did not have any serious knowledge about Spinoza’s philosophy before he had developed his own philosophical system – and thus that he was unable to be influenced by Spinoza’s ideas. A possible reading of Spinoza’s earlier-published *Theologico-political Treatise* was seen as being of no importance because that work allegedly did not include the philosophical system. And looking at the letters – the only one letter we know off concerned a special optical problem.50 (As if Leibniz had written to Spinoza just as the expert in optics!) All these efforts are intended to get these two dates – the rise of Leibniz’ own philosophical system and his first philosophical acquaintance with Spinoza – as far apart as possible.

### 3. Biographical Remarks

Given the absurdity of the arguments and the aggressive reactions of Guhrauer, Trendelenburg, Foucher de Careil and Gerhardt against Erdmann and above all Stein, I want to provide some biographical information shedding some light on the background of the attacks. Erdmann, Guhrauer, and Trendelenburg were all three professors in Prussia, personally installed by the Prussian minister of education
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Freiherr Stein von Altenstein, to whom one of the first books of Guhrauer is dedicated.  

Erdmann, after a short career as a pastor, had then studied Hegelian philosophy in Berlin and had become a Hegelian, an Alt-Hegelian to be specific. However, he shared with Hegel the high respect and admiration for the Dutch philosopher and did not see a temporary closeness of Leibniz to Spinoza as compromising to the German philosopher. He was a professor of philosophy from 1839 onwards at the Prussian University at Halle and tried – in the spirit of Hegel – to reconcile faith and reason as well as philosophy and the Prussian state.

Guhrauer had studied philosophy and philology in Breslau and Berlin. A few months before he defended his doctoral thesis on Leibniz in 1835 he converted to Christianity. This was obviously due to the fact that he could not expect to get a job in the public service of Prussia as a Jew, not to mention in the universities. It did not help him much though. In spite of all his pioneering editorial and biographical publications on Leibniz between 1839 and 1842 he became a custodian of the State Library at Breslau in 1839 and a professor of literary history (!) in 1843. However, he tried very hard to be a good German patriot and to get the acknowledgement of Trendelenburg. We can learn about this from his preface to his rare book about Kur-Mainz in der Epoche von 1672 (1839). I quote:

one has to pay attention to the political-historical questions of the past which recur again in the nineteenth century: on the one hand the hegemony of a great Christian Power threatening the balance of Europe, on the other hand the Oriental question and particularly the relation of Egypt to the Mohammedan rulership and of the latter to the civilized Christian world. Which of these different interests was to be chosen as a perspective unifying and dominating the others? I held on to strictly historical interest of the German patriotic history in the age of Louis XIV, related to time and place, in the form that it had taken through the drafts and negotiations at the court and in the cabinet of the Great Archbishop of Mainz in the period of 1672.  

Even though the „German patriotic point of view,” is absolutely anachronistic in its application to Leibniz’ time (where a German patria did not yet exist), it is mentioned in the book as the leading principle of his historical investigation.

Trendelenburg got his PhD in 1826 in Berlin, afterwards serving as a tutor for the nephew of the Prussian minister von Altenstein. Having completed this work, he immediately became an extraordinary professor at the University at Berlin in 1833 and an ordinary professor in 1837. He was a member of the senate of the examining
commission of all candidates (including Guhrauer and Gerhardt) in the humanities from 1835-66. Having become a member of the Prussian Academy in 1846, he became the secretary of the Philosophical-Historical Class till 1871. Working particularly on Plato and Aristotle, Trendelenburg was personally concerned about the loss of final causes in science and the rise of Democritian philosophies in his own times. Democritian philosophies, including Spinozism, would leave us with an antagonism of mechanical and materialistic explanations in opposition to organic life, allegedly without any way of dealing with ethical problems.

Gerhardt studied philosophy and mathematics at the university at Berlin and got his PhD in 1837. His two editions of Leibniz’ philosophical and mathematical writings as well as his editions on Leibniz’ correspondences with Wolff and with mathematicians made him a major figure in Leibniz scholarship although the editions are already or will soon be replaced by the progress of the Akademieausgabe. But he also published on the origin of Leibniz’ calculus. He worked his entire life as a teacher at a few Gymnasiums in two small cities in Prussia, as well as three years in Berlin. He was married to a daughter of a Prussian officer and his own daughter married again a Prussian officer. He became a corresponding member of the Prussian Academy only in 1861, after having published on the discovery of Leibniz’ calculus.

Foucher de Careil was not a professor at all but a duke owning great estates and acting as a politician and diplomat in the later part of his life. Nevertheless he became a very productive author and was particularly active in editing, translating and propagating Leibniz’ texts as an antidote against the growing materialism, determinism and atheism in France. He saw Germany as already deeply under the dangerous influence of Spinoza, as a consequence of German idealism, particularly Hegelianism, and made the greatest efforts to stop its influence in France. He was obsessed by this mission and wanted to save the Christian character of philosophy.

These biographical notes do not offer any surprises – although they might explain the reasons for the emotional reactions toward Erdmann and Stein. The biography of Stein, on the other hand, is quite exciting. He is usually known to Leibniz scholars simply as the author of the notoriously wrong book on Leibniz and Spinoza, but there is much more to say about him as I myself recently learned from an article by Jacob Habermann.

Born in Hungary in 1859 as the son of a rabbi, Stein grew up in the Netherlands and Austria, being taught Hebrew and religious studies and attending the local
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“gymnasium.” Studying at the Rabbiner Seminar at Berlin with Rabbi Hildesheimer, he was ordained in 1880. In the very same year he also got his PhD at the Prussian University at Halle and at the University of Berlin and then became a protégé of Eduard Zeller – an open-minded and moderate Hegelian who had replaced Trendelenburg at the university as well as in the Prussian Academy in 1872. He was obviously interested in the project of investigating the historical development of Leibniz’ philosophy. This can be seen by the Preisaufgabe which was posed by the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin on August 3rd, 1882 – to present a history of the development of Leibniz’ Monadology till 1695. One of his students, Sigmund Auerbach, got the Royal Prize for his thesis in 1885, although being Jewish, another, Emil Wendt, was rewarded an “honorable mention”. With the support of Eduard Zeller, Stein founded the still extant journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1888, editing it in a high-quality way until his death in 1930. Having published on free will in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy in 1882, he then wrote his habilitation thesis on the psychology of the Stoa, which was published in 1886. The same year, he was hired at the Eidgenössisches Polytechnikum at Zürich as a lecturer and then, in 1889 as a full professor. In 1890 he became a professor of philosophy and sociology (!) at the University at Bern, one of the earliest professorships in this discipline in Europe. He published on class-related social problems in 1897, about his theory of social optimism in 1905 and about co-operatives. (Later on, in 1926, he wrote also about the theory of evolution.) He was a very well regarded teacher. Among his students were many Jews and also women who were not admitted to the Russian universities, as well as political Russian immigrants. One of his students was Anna Tumarkin who got her PhD with her book on Spinoza.

But in 1910 Stein gave up his position and lived since then in Berlin until his death in 1930. He became a political observer and the editor of a journal of International Politics Nord und Süd, i.e. North and South. He was a pacifist, even against the mainstream before and during the First World War. During the Weimar Republic he became a diplomat and an adjunct professor of economics at the University in Berlin. In 1923-1924 he visited the US on the invitation of John Dewey, Horace Kallen, Mary Calkins and Felix Adler and traveled, lecturing at more than twenty universities, including Chicago, Columbia, NYU, Wellesley, Yale, and Harvard. He also met the American President John Calvin Coolidge Jr. and was asked by him about his former students Lenin, Trotzki, and Radek, and his judgment about the future development of Soviet Russia. It seems evident that the negative reception

of his book *Leibniz and Spinoza* among the German Leibniz scholars did not really bother him. However, Spinoza remained obviously important to him in respect to his own approach to Jewish identity and to his liberal interpretation of religion – in agreement with his philosophical independence and his liberal and moderately socialist opinions.

It is hard to imagine the encounter of this self-confident, smart liberal Jew in his twenties, obviously strikingly intelligent and well educated, with the Prussian Leibniz expert and highly conservative Gymnasium professor Carl I. Gerhardt who was in his mid-70s when they first met at the Leibniz archive in Hannover in the mid 1880s. It was a given for Gerhardt that it was chronologically impossible for Leibniz to have been involved in any deeper contact with Spinoza’s philosophy – this had been “proved” during the controversy in the 1840s by his arch-conservative teacher Trendelenburg and his German-patriotic fellow student Guhrauer. The young scholar would go on to pull down the whole “German patriotical view” of Leibniz.

### 4. The Continuity of the Rejection of Spinoza’s Impact on Leibniz in the 20th Century

However, things did not change very quickly. As mentioned above, this view of an extremely early fixation of Leibniz’ philosophical system and the emphasis upon the great inner continuity of Leibniz’ philosophical development in general, became canonized in the German and French Leibniz community and has remained so in general since the beginning of the 20th century. It is usually combined with the rejection of the influence of Spinoza.

It was confirmed by the influential Leibniz book of Ernst Cassirer, which included a small chapter on the young Leibniz. But the most influential book in that respect which is still seen as a “pace breaking study” today was the small booklet of Willy Kabitz in 1908 *Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des jungen Leibniz. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Systems*. He embraces the thesis of Leibniz’ philosophical continuity completely. In his critical comments on Kuno Fischer’s presentation of the relation of Leibniz to Spinoza, he argues explicitly against the “erroneous views of L. Stein”. Paul Wiedeburg, writing in the 1960s follows this conception without any critique. The emphasis of Leibniz’ philosophical continuity is still widely embraced within Leibniz scholarship as well as the unjustified critique of Stein’s alleged claim of Leibniz’ Spinozism (although...
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Stein is hardly mentioned anymore). This can be seen by the 3 volumes published by Konrad Moll and by Hubertus Busche’s book, which appeared most recently on the young Leibniz.

In France after the Second World War there appeared a completely new book about the relation of Leibniz to Spinoza by George Friedmann. Although the book Leibniz et Spinoza was even dedicated to a Spinozist (Jean Cavaillès who died as a member of the French Resistance against the Nazis), it was written in order to refute Stein’s alleged claim about the Spinozism of Leibniz. Friedmann of course had available a much richer collection of Leibniz texts – writings as well as letters – than Stein did. Moreover, he could also use many new works on Leibniz, among others the books of Couturat, Russell, Cassirer, and Kabitz. His extended and systematic presentation of all then-known Leibniz passages mentioning Spinoza confirms actually the real claim of Stein – that there was one particular period in Leibniz’ life when he was quite interested in the notorious philosopher although he realized his philosophical conclusions were shocking. Including the whole lifetime of Leibniz in his presentation and focusing on his relation to Spinoza, Friedmann shows as well – although not by intention – the correctness of Stein’s other claim – that the Leibniz’ more hostile remarks about Spinoza occur after 1688.

However, in spite of this factual result of the book, it is frustrating to see how Friedmann again ends up at the anemic conclusion that – Leibniz was never a Spinozist. Most interesting for my argument, however, is the fact that Friedmann claims again that Leibniz’ philosophy during his time in Mainz already included all its later developments in embryonic form, not allowing for any serious influence of any other philosopher. Although he certainly did not argue from an anti-Judaic background anymore, he ends up nevertheless again at the argument of Trendelenburg and his followers.

The only new position of Friedmann in comparison with the earlier Leibniz research, despite his considerably expanded material, is his argument about Leibniz’ earlier acquaintance with Spinoza via the Theologico-Political Treatise (1670). Friedmann rightly argued that Leibniz writes with great compassion and respect about this book in his letters. Thus he concluded that this could not have happened without a serious reading of the book. He also refers to the letters (in plural) of Leibniz to Spinoza as mentioned by Tschirnhaus, the argument made already by Stein, although “refuted” by Gerhardt. However, Leibniz’ interest in the TTP was not seen as meaningful for his philosophical development.

Precisely this claim of Friedmann was then rejected by the English Leibniz
schor and logician G. H. R. Parkinson in 1976.\textsuperscript{71} Emphasizing his agreement with Friedmann on all other points – and thus with the whole tradition of Leibniz research since Guhrauer and Trendelenburg –, he disputed the claim that Leibniz had read the *Tractatus theologicopoliticus* „with care“ before 1675. According to Parkinson he did study the *Tractatus* but only in Paris in 1675. His astonishing proof for such a decisive claim is the existence of a Leibnizian excerpt of the *Tractatus* of 1675 which has come down to us. Thus the mere fact of the existence of this extended excerpt from 1675 is seen as an argument to show that Leibniz did not own this book at this time and moreover that he never had read this book before “with care”. Otherwise it would not have been necessary for him to make an excerpt of the book in 1675.\textsuperscript{72} The logic of this argument is all the more puzzling as it contradicts many of Leibniz’ clear statements during his years in Mainz. Thus Leibniz had written to Graevius in April 1671 that he had read the book already.\textsuperscript{73} In his well known letter to Arnauld from November 1671 he says this again.\textsuperscript{74} In addition he speaks about his reading of this book in letters to Spizel, van Holten and Thomasius.\textsuperscript{75} Parkinson, however, did not take these statements as proving any serious or careful reading of Spinoza’s book because of this excerpt.

At the same time he argued that this excerpt from 1675 was to be taken as Leibniz’ first serious encounter with Spinoza, Parkinson also argued that Leibniz’ interest was only due to Spinoza’s critique of the Bible – to „the way in which it treats the bible as history“\textsuperscript{76} –, but not at all to his philosophy. That is, Parkinson argues, just as did the Leibniz scholars mentioned above, that not even this late reading of Spinoza’s *Theologico-Political Treatise* in 1675 could have any relevance for Leibniz’ own philosophical development. Although the *Tractatus* clearly enough includes the main topics of the *Ethics*, and although we know now about Leibniz’ talks with Tschirnhaus about Spinoza’s *Ethics*, according to Parkinson the only way for Leibniz to have learned of and to be influenced by Spinoza’s philosophy was the availability of Spinoza’s *Ethics* in the beginning of 1678. Therefore – Parkinson concludes – Leibniz could not have been influenced in his philosophical development by Spinoza at any earlier time than in 1678, by which time he had allegedly developed his own philosophical system. That is exactly the position of Guhrauer, Trendelenburg, Foucher de Careil and Gerhardt, and it presupposes a comparable ignorance of well-known (after Friedmann’s book) facts.\textsuperscript{77}

However, as I have shown in 1997,\textsuperscript{78} on the basis of the discovery of Leibniz’ marginalia in a copy of the *Theologico-Political Treatise* in the library of Baron von Boineburg, the extremely busy Leibniz did indeed find enough time to read
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and study Spinoza’s book with great care already in 1670 or early 1671, i.e. soon after its publication. I could also give evidence that the *Commentatiuncula de judice controversiarum* were critical discussions of Spinoza. However, although Leibniz did not agree with Spinoza his intense struggling with Spinoza’s position produced a new theoretical concept in Leibniz’ philosophical tool box – the idea *clara et confusa* as meaningful knowledge and usable to defend the Christian mysteries as true. That is, he developed an epistemological concept within his critical discussion of the TTP.

Moreover, he even found the time to organize a large campaign together with Boineburg to gather experts in Oriental languages in order to urge them to work on a serious and well founded refutation of Spinoza’s *Tractatus*. He wanted this refutation to be as solid and educated as he thought Spinoza’s argument was. We can already see in these letters that Leibniz’ position toward Spinoza was ambivalent indeed – his obvious respect for the clarity and the learned argument as well as the alarmed awareness of the danger of this book for Christian religion. His respect can also be seen in his marginalia and underlining in Spinoza’s book which clearly show his acknowledgement of Spinoza’s historical-critical method.

5. Leibniz as a Monad without Windows

I come now to the widespread agreement among Leibniz scholars about a remarkable continuity in his philosophical development from his earliest manuscripts to his mature philosophy. Whereas other philosophers experience turning points in their career, go through early and late periods, enter a critical period or even experience a “Kehre”, Leibniz is not expected to change his mind but to go straight from the early seeds in his remarkable mature mind to his fully developed philosophical system, by simply unfolding the seeds more and more until they become monads. According to this view, Leibniz followed his own nature just as a monad without windows is supposed to do.

However, on the basis of the Akademieausgabe, we do know very well the succession of Leibniz’ different positions in a timely order, at least till the end of the 1680s and it is evident enough that there are clear discontinuities among them. Speaking of discontinuities does not mean total breaks where no idea of one period has anything to do with ideas of the other. ‘Discontinuity’ rather serves to describe essential changes in Leibniz’ thinking. These changes have their roots of course in the prior intellectual development, but they are turning points caused
by the unsatisfactory character of earlier approaches to a problem or by a new understanding of the problem itself.

It is particularly in his early development that we find such significant and essential turns. He was clearly an atomist, in the sense of Gassendi, when he was still a student at the University of Leipzig in the early 1660s, and he decided to give up on Aristotelian substantial forms, as we know from various self depictions. This did not last long, as we know from his letters to Thomasius and other writings from the end of the 1660s. The most obvious change seems to me the change between Leibniz’ early denial of sensations to animals or plants (until 1670, as evidenced in his introduction to Nizolius and in a draft of his Elementa Juris naturalis), and his later understanding of the substantial forms of animals and even plants as soul-like. In his letter to Tschirnhaus from 1684 he quotes the jokes of Dutch people about the quite Cartesian position that he held in his youth according to which the whimpering of a beaten dog was nothing but the sound of a beaten bagpipe. Another essential change was caused by his turn to real science and mathematics in the summer of 1669, which not only started his career in mathematics, but also a serious study of Hobbes’ philosophical materialism (he had already studied Hobbes’ logic and political philosophy in Leipzig). It is well known that Leibniz kept at least Hobbes’ concept of conatus from that time. Even his foundation of Natural Law – his definition of love as the pleasure at the pleasure of the beloved –, is developed in reaction to Hobbes and found only in 1671. This result had of course roots in his earlier thinking but was celebrated by Leibniz himself as a new finding and was initiated by the influences of his contemporaries.

In the late 1670s and early 1680s, having already invented the calculus, we can see him struggle with Spinoza’s philosophical system – embodied in his correspondence as well as his development of the concept of an infinity of possible worlds from which God chose only the best, i.e. our own. This is definitely in opposition to his early rather deterministic views, as he himself admitted. There is nowadays agreement about the time when his philosophical system reached maturity – about the mid 1680s, as expressed in the Discourse on Metaphysics and his correspondence with Arnauld. However, even then we have to consider his critical discussion of Newton’s Principia and the development of his own dynamics providing an alternative foundation of physics which had roots but no metaphysical model in his earlier work. His dynamics and his intense discussion of it with the Bernoullis and other contemporaries must be explored more deeply; they could even shed some light on the Monadology and the Discourse on Nature and Grace from the
same period. The recent discussion about the status of the body within Leibniz’ metaphysics likewise raises doubts about the alleged continuity of it. 88

On the other hand, when it comes to the question of what constitutes the widely claimed continuity of Leibniz’ philosophical development, it turns out to be a few very general ideas. The weakness of the continuity thesis was already clear enough in Kabitz’s book. He enumerated five general ideas which he claimed to be central ideas of Leibniz’ philosophy during his whole life: 1. a panlogism, consisting in the idea of rationality of the universe or of its logical regularity, 2. the idea of the significance of the individual, 3. the idea of a perfect harmony of all things, 4. the idea of the quantitative and qualitative infinity of the universe and 5. the mechanical hypothesis. 89 Aside from the ironic fact that all these ideas can easily be attributed to Spinoza as well, it seems to me quite unsatisfactory that Kabitz claims on the one hand, “how unusually early the view of the world and life was strongly pronounced in him – a whole series of basic ideas with which he will then step up as a mature man, extending, deepening and enriching them continuously”, but on the other hand Kabitz has to concede that even in these central ideas of Leibniz’ early philosophy we can find “not much independent content characteristic of Leibniz alone.”90 Because of this he sees the originality of the young Leibniz’ philosophy rather in the way in which he connects these ideas.91

Above all, by means of this approach we do not get further than comparing various similar statements of Leibniz. We neither explain his changing interests in various philosophers at different times nor his own changes of his own ideas over time. Therefore it seems to me helpful to look for the provocation which stirred Leibniz’ mind to start to develop his own metaphysics. That is, it seems more productive to follow the advice of Stein and try to understand the reasons for Leibniz’ changes rather than to look simply for the agreements of his later ideas with those of his youth – agreements which do not mean anything in themselves.

6. Conclusion

The whole debate about Leibniz’ alleged Spinozism is related to a mere fiction because neither Erdmann nor certainly Stein (nor Adams or Kulstad) had ever claimed that Leibniz was a Spinozist. Moreover, Stein had explicitly declared that he did not see Leibniz as a Spinozist, not even in that particular period where he was interested in Spinoza. However, what Stein did – and what I think he was the first within the field of Leibniz scholarship to do – is to develop a historical approach
to the intellectual biography of Leibniz. He did not simply look for similarities in formulations or terminology, for quotations or for the mentioning of names in order to draw lines of possible influence. He rather raised the more important question of why, after all, Leibniz in fact did study Spinoza in this period although not being a Spinozist. That is, besides the fact that nobody ever claimed Leibniz was a Spinozist except his contemporary enemies, the whole still-ongoing refutation of Leibniz’ Spinozism just misses the point. If Leibniz had been a Spinozist his intense study of Spinoza could be easily understood. The question arises just because Leibniz was no Spinozist. None of the eager critics of Stein was able to explain the obvious fact of intense Spinoza-studies on Leibniz’ part, particularly during the period Stein had focused on. Therefore, I think that Stein asked exactly the right question and was the founder of a developmental approach to the understanding of the emergence of Leibniz’ metaphysical system.

In addition to this rehabilitation of Ludwig Stein, I hope to have convincingly shown how the claim about the alleged unique continuity of Leibniz’ philosophical development was developed simply in order to avoid any possible influence of Spinoza on Leibniz. The idea was to stretch the chronological distance between the finishing of his mature philosophy and his first intellectual acquaintance with Spinoza, especially with his *Ethics*. Unfortunately, this strategy was absolutely successful. Up to Friedmann, Stein was still refuted for something he had not said, i.e. that Leibniz was a Spinozist. In our day, however, his reputation as a scholar has decreased to such an extent that he is not even mentioned when recent authors argue against the superfluous assumption of a Spinozist influence on Leibniz. Even worse, the thesis about the overwhelming continuity of Leibniz’ thinking is still widely accepted, independently of any discussion of Spinoza.

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Notes

1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the conference on Leibniz et Spinoza, organized by Pierre-François Moreau and Mogens Laerke at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Lyon in March 2007 in connection with the conference on Leibniz and Spinoza, organized by Daniel Garber and Mark Kulstad at Princeton University in September 2007. I should like to thank Thomas Cook as well as Glenn Hartz for their improvement of my English and the referee for some helpful advice.


3 However, a serious discussion of Spinoza – beyond hostile refutations – started long before the Pantheismusstreit in Germany. Christian Wolff discussed Spinoza’s Ethics in his Theologia naturalis (Frankfurt, Leipzig 1736), the Ethics was translated into German by Johann Lorenz Schmidt in 1744 (Spinoza’s Sittenlehre. Frankfurt, Leipzig 1744), and Moses Mendelssohn presented Spinoza as a serious philosopher and interpreted Leibniz pre-established harmony as a result of his critical discussion of Spinoza’s parallelism (Philosophische Gespräche. Berlin 1755). In addition, the Tractatus theologico-politicus was well known to the leading Lutheran theologians as Reimarus, Mosheim, and S. J. Baumgarten as is evident by the printed catalogues of their libraries. The writings of Spinoza and their translations were also reviewed in German journals during the first half of the 18th century. On the Pantheismusstreit cf. Frederick Beiser: The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Harvard University Press 1987; for a look from Mendelssohn’s perspective cf. Goldenbaum: Mendelssohn’s Schwierigkeiten mit Spinoza. In: Spinoza im Deutschland des achzehnten Jahrhunderts. Ed. by Eva Schürmann, Norbert Waszek and Frank Weinreich. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2002, pp. 265-317.


7 Cf. A. Trendelenburg: Ist Leibniz in seiner Entwicklung einmal Spinozist oder Cartesianer gewesen und was bedeutet dafür die Schrift „de vita beata“? In: Monatsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1847, pp. 372-386.


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16 A quick look at the index of persons in the respective volumes of the Akademieausgabe shows the huge number of references to Spinoza, surpassed only by Aristotle or Plato (who are often authorities to be quoted). See A VI, 1 and 2, as well as II, I and I, I.


18 See the subtitle of Stein’s book, as fn. 9. See fn. 57 below.
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20 Stein (1890), as fn. 9, p. 22.

21 Ibid.

22 “Stein took a dogmatic position which cannot be defended anymore. According to him, Leibniz had passed through a Spinozistic period where he agreed about essential points. … This construction of Stein is based on a fundamental error; not being a still reluctant and uncertain spirit anymore in his 40’s, … Leibniz had fixed in his earliest youth the definitive direction of his project. He will only excavate and collect the treasures and the knowledge and scientific discoveries around his original intuitions and finally order them into a system endowed by a subtle terminology and accomplished in greatest perfection.” (Friedmann, as fn. 13, pp. 21-22) Friedman added a statement on Stein’s wrong understanding of Leibniz’ relation to Spinoza as an appendix to his book. See pp. 345-47.

23 Stein (1890), as fn. 9, p. 109.

24 Ibid., p. 26. Thus Stein would completely agree with Mercer’s argument (made against Adams and Kulstad): “I see no reason to believe that he was either a Spinozist, occasionalist, atomist, sceptic” (Mercer (2001), see fn. 15, p. 458). But neither Stein nor Kulstad and Adams conclude from this fact that Leibniz did not learn from his Spinoza studies.

25 Stein (1890), as fn. 9, p. 21.

26 Ibid., p. 110.


28 Bartuschat argued in a very clear paper again (as did Stein in his book) that „Leibniz’ theory of the monad was essentially developed as an implicit discussion with Spinoza.” (W. Bartuschat: Spinoza in der Philosophie von Leibniz. In: Spinozas Ethik und ihre frühe Wirkung. Ed. by K. Cramer, W. G. Jakobs and W. Schmidt-Biggemann. Wolfenbüttel 1981, pp. 51-66, esp. p. 52) Whereas Friedmann presents the whole sizable number of Spinoza references by Leibniz and comments on them, Bartuschat starts with a look on the problems Leibniz struggled with during his intense Spinoza studies. As a result, Bartuschat sees a period friendly to Spinoza between 1675 and 1680, as did Stein, and shows at a few points how Leibniz had to be still more cautious in keeping a sufficient distance from Spinoza’s concepts. Also, Bartuschat explains the rude polemics of Leibniz against Spinoza during the
later years by reference to Leibniz’ doubts whether he succeeded in his attempt to found the relation between the many finite substances and the one divine substance in distinction from Spinoza. (Ibid., p. 65) Brandon Look, taking a fascinating détour via Goedel’s proof of God after the model of Leibniz, presented the great difficulties in keeping Leibniz’ position distanced from Spinoza’s by showing how easily Goedel was still about to fail and to fall – against his intention – into Spinoza’s position. Cf. Look: Some Remarks on the Ontological Arguments of Leibniz and Gödel. In: Einheit in der Vielheit: Akten des VIII. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses. Hannover 2006, pp. 510-17.

29 Stein (1890), as fn. 9, p. 233.
30 Mercer (2001), see fn. 15, ch. 5; Patrick Riley: Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the Wise. Cambridge-London 1996, throughout. However, on p. 30, Riley asks himself if making Leibniz a Platonist does not turn him into a mere footnote in the history of Platonism; then he gladly takes Leibniz’ connection of Platonism with Christian ideas as his original perspective.
31 See Erdmann, as fn. 9, p. XI.
34 Cf. E. Guhrauer: Leibniz’s animadversiones ad Cartesii principia philosophiae aus einer noch ungedruckten Handschrift. Bonn: Marcus, 1844, p. 1ff, including the related footnotes.
35 Ibid.
36 Trendelenburg, as fn. 7, pp. 372-386.
37 Ibid., p. 385.
40 Cf. Stein (1888a), as fn. 9, pp. 615-627.
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Ibid., pp. 553-565.
45 Leibniz’ opening of this correspondence shows that he had already heard about other skills of Spinoza: „Among the other praises of you which fame has bruited abroad, I understand, is your great skill in optics.” (The Correspondence of Spinoza. Tr. and intr. By A. Wolf. Cass 1966. Letter XLV, Oct. 5, 1671, p. 261). Cf. also Letters LXX on Nov. 14, 1675, pp. 336-39 and LXXII on Nov. 18, 1675, pp. 340-342.

46 Cf. Gerhardt (1889), as fn. 10, pp. 1075-1080.
47 Cf. Zimmermann (1890), as fn. 11, pp. 1-64, esp. pp. 48-49.
48 Gerhardt (1889), as fn. 10, p. 1075.
49 „..., with whom Spinoza was a very close friend”. (Ibid., p. 1076)
52 Ibid., p. IX.
53 GM (1849-1863); GP (1875-1890); Leibniz’ Briefwechsel mit Christian Wolff (1860); Leibniz’ Briefwechsel mit Mathematikern (1899); Die Entdeckung der Differentialrechnung durch Leibniz (1848).
54 Cf. fn. above.
55 Jacob Habermann: Ludwig Stein: Rabbi, Professor, Publicist, and Philosopher of Evolutionary Optimism. In: The Jewish Quaterly Review. LXXXVI, Nos. 1-2 (July-October, 1995), pp. 91-125.
56 A theologian by profession, Zeller had to switch to the philosophy faculty at the University at Marburg, having had lots of troubles with conservative theologians in the past. In Berlin, where he was appointed on the recommendation of the physicist Helmholtz, he replaced the conservative Trendelenburg at the university as well as in the Prussian Academy. Zeller was well acquainted with Leibniz’ philosophy. Cf. E. Zeller: Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz. München 1873.
57 His view of Spinoza can be seen on pp. 62-66. Seeing the distance between the two philosophers very clearly he still acknowledges Leibniz’ interest in Spinoza, cf. pp. 102 and 146.
1885. Facing these works in addition to Stein’s publications from 1888 and 1890, Kabitz’ book, although certainly very learned and solid, was in no way a ground-breaking work anymore. But it was his book which became canonized, emphasizing the continuity of Leibniz’ development and ignoring Spinoza’ impact.  


Although not denying the possibility of more letters between Leibniz and Spinoza Cassirer nonetheless downplayed their significance (in contrast to Stein), on the basis of our allegedly certain knowledge about this period and – of course – because Leibniz had allegedly been an independent thinker with his own system when he opened his correspondence with Spinoza. See E. Cassirer, as fn. 12, pp. 519-520.

So again recently by Busche (as fn. 19, p. XX, see also p. XXI-XXII), although he very well knows the other writings initiated by the Preisfrage of the Philosophical Faculty (see fn. 57). However, he does not even mention Stein’s writings.

Kabitz (1909), as fn. 12. Although Kabitz does not at all discuss the question of Leibniz’ reading of Spinoza here he mentions though explicitly Leibniz’ negative judgment about the Theologico-political Treatise in his letter to Thomasius on September 23/October 3, 1670 (p. 112). However, his main thesis claims the thoroughgoing continuity of Leibniz’ development from the earliest time.


Busche asserts (without mentioning Stein anymore): “This early and independent doctrine of ideas shows already how unnecessary it is to assume a literary dependence of Leibniz on Spinoza.” (Busche, as fn. 19, pp. 295) Concerning the letters Stein had pointed to Busche keeps the opinion of Gerhardt that Leibniz had sent only one letter concerning mere optics (p. 450).

„Speaking of Spinozism in Leibniz is not justified in terms of scholarship. “
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And he continues: „Leibniz was never ever profoundly and deeply influenced by Spinoza, never a disciple of Spinoza and not a Spinozist either.” (Friedmann, as fn. 13, p. 294).

67 „Thus the philosophy of the young Leibniz contained already the whole development of his mature doctrine as seeds. One can find already the same organizing nucleus, the same principles, the same problems considered to be connected under the point of view of the same concerns for these were essential to his Genius. Within ten years of his youth, up to 1671, Leibniz had already put together the material and the leading line of his whole work. The stay at Paris will still give more richness and assurance to his thinking but without modifying it seriously. It is important to keep in mind that Leibniz had fully reached this intellectual education already by the time when he, at the age of 25 years, first made the acquaintance of Spinoza. This has to be taken into account in order to understand his reaction: the ideas of his great contemporary, the only living philosopher who was comparable to him besides Malebranche, did not fall on a still reluctant, plastic spirit, still looking for his way but on one already rich and solidly armed.” (Friedmann, see fn. 13, pp. 85-86. - My emphasis - U.G.)

68 Cf. Friedmann, see fn. 13, pp. 345-347: Note sur le livre de Ludwig Stein. Friedmann then quotes confirmingly the sarcastic but little objective criticism of Lucien Herr on Ludwig Stein in 1892: „it is not shown that Leibniz was a Spinozist in 1677 and it is shown that he was none in February 1678”. (Revue Critique d’Histoire et de Littérature, 25.1.1894, pp. 71-74).

69 „That might be the only generalisation which can justify this series of comments on the Theologico-Political Treatise: Leibniz shows that he knows the qualities of the book he had doubtless read in 1671 and that he knows the author quite well.” (Ibid., p. 97) Friedmann also mentions Leibniz’ respectful mention of the book although he considered it as dangerous and to be refuted.

70 Ibid., pp. 92-93.


72 Ibid., pp. 74-75 and pp. 78-79.

73 „I read Spinoza’s book.” (Leibniz to Graevius on May 5, 1671. In: A I, 1, No. 84, p. 148)

74 Leibniz to Arnauld in November 1671. In: A II, 1, No. 87, p. 176.

75 Leibniz to Spizel on February 27/March 28, 1672. In: A I, 1, No. 127, p. 193;

76 Parkinson, as fn. 71, p. 78.
77 I discussed this paper of Parkinson already earlier in Goldenbaum (1999) and would not have insisted on my critique if his approach were not so paradigmatic for my case. Also, I do not have any idea about a possible reason for such a resistance except perhaps the aversion of analytical philosophy against Spinoza.
78 Cf. Goldenbaum (1999), see fn. 14, especially the appendix with the first edition of Leibniz’ marginalia in Spinoza’s TTP and their transcription.
79 A, VI, 1, No. 22, pp. 548-559.
81 Leibniz to Graevius on May 5, 1671. In: A I, 1, No. 84, p. 148; A. van Holten to Leibniz on Nov. 18./28, 1671. In: A II, 1, No. 92, p. 193; Leibniz to van Holten on Feb. 17./27, 1672. In: A II, 1, No. 102, p. 208; Leibniz to Spizel on Feb. 27/March 8, 1672. In: A I, 1, No. 127, p. 193; Th. Craanen for Friedrich Walter. In: A I, 1, No. 131 (Beilage of No. 130: Walter to Leibniz on April 3./13, 1672). In 1710, the German theological journal Unschuldige Nachrichten von Alten und Neuen Theologischen Sachen published a Letter of Boineburg on Spinoza, to the Tutor of his Son who was studying at Strassburg (pp. 386-388) which includes literally Leibniz’ argument as I found it written by himself into Boineburg’s copy of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. The son, Philipp Wilhelm von Boineburg, stayed only for half a year at the University Straßburg, arriving on Dec. 1st, 1671. That is, the letter must be written in the first half of 1672. This letter of Boineburg uses Leibniz’ „argumentum contra Spinozam” from his copy of the TTP again to make an urgent call to the Protestant theologian at Straßburg and professor of his son, Balthasar Bebel, to begin immediately to work on a refutation of the TTP. In addition, the letter includes a list of other refutations, still in work (!) or just published, among them those of Rappolt, Perrizon, Mansfelt, Calov, Henry More and Saubert. For a more detailed presentation of this campaign of Boinebug and Leibniz for a solid refutation of the TTP cf. Goldenbaum (1999) as in fn. 14.
82 This ambivalence of Leibniz, being fascinated and impressed on the one hand but alarmed on the other hand is discussed in detail in: Goldenbaum (2001) as in fn. 14.
83 A II, 1 (2006), No. 59, p. 179; Elementa Juris naturalis, A VI, 1, No. 124, p. 465. See the careful and learned comment of Busche, as fn. 19, p. 256-60. Cf. also


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85 Cf. Elementa juris naturalis (1670-71 (?)), in: A VI, 1, Nr. 124, p. 464-65, and Leibniz’ letter to van Velthuysen from May 5, 1671 (A II, 1 (2006), No. 56a, p. 164). This definition was published by him at first in the preface to the Codex juris gentium diplomaticus in 1693 (A IV, 5, No. 7, pp. 60-63).

86 See Kulstad (1999), as fn. 15; Thomas Cook gave a paper at the Leibniz conference at Rice University in Spring 2003 where he discussed the topic of Leibniz’ struggle with Spinoza’s determinism and his outcome with the infinity of possible worlds in greater detail (not claiming at all that Leibniz had been a Spinozist ever). An excellent discussion of such a struggling of Leibniz with Spinoza in this period and his productive outcome for the development of his own new positions in the early 1680s was recently presented by Richard Arthur (in his part of the article presented with Peter Loptson): Leibniz’ Body Realism: Two Interpretations. In: The Leibniz Review. Vol. 16 (2006), pp. 1-42, here pp. 21-42.


89 Kabitz, as fn. 12, p. 127.

90 Ibid., p. 127.

91 Ibid.

92 However, as is well known, Leibniz had two other occasions of struggling with Spinoza’s arguments. One was his encounter with John Toland at the courts in Hannover and Berlin (or rather Lietzenburg), in the presence of Sophie and/or Sophie Charlotte; the other was the publication of Wachter’s Elucidarius Cabalisticus in 1706. Both encounters caused Leibniz to write particular critical
essays developing his own alternative view.

93 Although the index of persons in Moll’s 3rd vol. gives six references to Stein only one of them means the person (Moll as fn. 19, II, p. 122) and not simply a stone. It mentions another author’s reference to Stein’s emphasis of Platonic influences in Leibniz. Mercer and Busche do not refer to Stein anymore when they reject the impact of Spinoza as a completely unnecessary assumption. For Mercer see her book (2001), see fn. 15, p. 19 and more often. For Busche see fn. 65 above.

94 “This enlightened principle, confident of progress, according to which the activity of the original monad God … and the human beings … is directed to the emerging of harmony in nature and history, that is to the continuous development of the existing, determined the Leibnizian philosophy in its later periods as well.” (Moll, see fn. 19, III, 233) As if Leibniz had had monads in the earlier period! “Although Leibniz will continue to revise his theory of substance, he does not alter the general structure of the conception for the rest of his philosophical career.” (Mercer (2001), see fn. 15, p.132)