The Mature Leibniz on Predestination

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Abstract
This essay investigates how Leibniz and Daniel Ernst Jablonski handled the ironing out of intra-Protestant religious differences, notably on predestination in the years ca. 1697-1702. I shall be focusing on the recently published union document between the Lutherans of Hanover and the Calvinists of Brandenburg, entitled the *Unvorgreifliches Bedencken*¹ (hereafter UB) and on the equally recently published and hitherto practically unknown *Meditationes pacatae de praedestinatione et gratia, fato et libero arbitrio* of 1701-ca. 1706 ². This is a series of Leibniz’s annotations on Jablonski’s Latin translation of article 17 (predestination) of the bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert Burnet’s *Exposition of the 39 Articles of the Church of England*. I shall try to show how the issue of predestination is handled in the UB by Leibniz and how his notes on the *Meditationes* complement and modify Jablonski’s Latin edition of the 17th article of Burnet’s Exposition the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. This will enable us to isolate the set of theological problems faced by the Lutheran and Calvinist participants in the *negotium irenicum* of 1697-1702 and to point to the specific nature of the solutions proposed by Leibniz which were philosophical rather than theological. The underlying issue here is that of coexistence of philosophy and theology in Leibniz’s system. Indeed, one of the persistent questions about this philosopher concerns the exact relationship between his metaphysics (including physics and mathematics) and his theological views: which determined which? I hope to take the debate further here by analysing Leibniz’s contribution to the specifically theological issue of predestination, which, it will emerge, has direct bearing on Leibniz’s *Essais de théodicée* of 1710.

I. Introduction

The relationship between Leibniz the theologian and Leibniz the philosopher and mathematician has been the object of some interrogation in recent Leibniz research, with some scholars arguing that Leibniz’s theological views acted as a spur to his philosophy and others arguing the opposite³. This essay aims to take the debate further by focusing on a specific theological problem of predestination as handled by Leibniz in the years 1697-1701 and by comparing his view of


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In the autumn of 1699 Gilbert Burnet bishop of Salisbury published An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. The Exposition could be considered the extension of Burnet’s discourse on the Trinity and it aimed at promoting a latitudinarian view of all the doctrinal articles of the church. One of Burnet’s most important works, it was something that the high-church party could hardly ignore for long. When the Convocation of the Church of England was finally called and allowed to sit in 1701, the high-church dominated lower house proceeded to establish a committee on heretical and scandalous books which produced censures on both John Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1696) and Burnet’s Exposition. The committee found Burnet’s approach subversive.

He thus increasingly lost political power in England especially after the accession of Queen Anne. At the same time, he gained in prestige in Hanover and in Brandenburg where his Exposition received an enthusiastic welcome. As I shall show, the Latin edition by Daniel Ernst Jablonski of the Exposition’s article 17 on predestination was extensively annotated by Leibniz with a view to a new edition. There were two interconnected reasons for this interest in the Exposition and its author. Firstly, since 1697 and until ca. 1704, Hanover was engaged in negotiations for religious union with the Calvinist Brandenburg, negotiations which eventually came to nothing but which gave rise to a document, entitled the Unvorgreifflches Bedencken, which is no doubt the most important piece of Leibniz’s religious writing prior to the Essais de Théodicée of 1710. Secondly, Hanover had its eye on the English throne. A letter from Burnet to Leibniz of 30 June 1701 suggests that the bishop of Salisbury supported these ambitions which he saw as serving his ends. There Burnet informs Leibniz that “the Court of Brunswick is now so entirely united with ours upon Justice which the King and Parliament have done in declaring the right of succession that I hope we shall agree on this as well as on every thing else thus promoting an agreement among all that are Enemies to Popery in order to defend ourselves against the Common Enemy.”

Leibniz’s correspondence with Burnet from 1701 mentions the advisability of using the Church of England as model in the Brandenburg-Hanover negotiations. At the same time, Jablonski, the Brandenburg representative and court chaplain, saw the Exposition as an aid to bringing about the union with Hanover (just as the negotiations, also called the negotium irenicum, were at a very low point) and as a means of resolving internal dissensions on predestination within Brandenburg and Saxony. The third side of the triangle was Burnet who sought to promote his
latitudinarian views so as to bring the largest number of English dissenters back into the Church of England and who saw an opening for promoting himself and his religious position in the event of Sophie of Hanover acceding to the English throne. That being said, there is no doubt that all the protagonists concerned, Leibniz, Burnet and Jablonski desired a religious union between Protestants although their motives and formulae for this differed.

Sophie of Hanover received the original of the second edition of Burnet’s *Exposition* by 6 July 1700 when she wrote to Leibniz:

> My lord the Marquess of Montrose brought me two copies of Mr. Burnet’s books, one of them being for you. It treats of the 39 articles of the faith of the Anglican Church. The book is good for leafing through but not for reading. It will decorate our libraries for it is very nicely bound.  

Leibniz patently did not share this dismissive view. On 8th July 1701 he wrote to the English envoy George Stepney to express his displeasure with those (in England) who criticised Burnet’s book as he found it much to his liking. He drew Stepney’s attention to the Latin translation of article 17 “done in Berlin” and said he had already informed Burnet of this in his letter of thanks for the copy of the original *Exposition*. By 11th April 1701 he had read Jablonski’s translation and had all but finished annotating it.

**II. Jablonski’s translation of Burnet’s *Exposition* and Leibniz’s Annotations on Article 17 (the *Meditationes pacatae de praedestinatione et gratia, fato et libero arbitrio*)**

It was with a view to reducing the number of distinctions between different confessional groups that Leibniz annotated Jablonski’s translation of article 17. Just as he had hoped that all Catholics become Protestants and all Protestants Catholics, - a hope he had expressed in a letter to Madame de Brinon of September 1693 - so he hoped that the diverse Protestant groups would merge into one by subscribing to the overarching framework of his metaphysical system. The four annotated sets of Jablonski’s printed translation of *De praedestinatione et gratia*, available in the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover under the manuscript number LH 1, XVIII show clearly that what Leibniz intended was a second joint edition of article 17 without the translator’s or the annotator’s name. These four sets represent different stages of annotations from the most preliminary to the definitive. As the points of Burnet’s article 17 are numbered in the translation, Leibniz had
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all the four copies interleaved and inscribed the annotations on the facing blank pages following Jablonski’s numbering and inserting a small a, b, etc. next to each word or sentence he annotated. Some of the annotations are in a secretary’s hand with changes by Leibniz, others by Leibniz himself. Only the fourth, definitive, version is in a secretary’s hand only. The first version is obviously just a draft and is very largely in Leibniz’s own hand with multiple revisions and crossings out. The Annotator’s preface which Leibniz added to the translator’s preface, which I shall discuss below, was inserted from the second version onward. Jablonski had entitled his anonymous translation *De praedestinatione et gratia tractatus autore reverendissimo et celeberrimo viro Gilberto Burneto S.S. theol. D. episco po Sarasburensi. Ex eiusdem Expositione XXXIX Articulorum Ecclesiae anglicanae excerptus et ad promovendam piam hoc in Articulo animorum moderationem latine versus*, Berolini, 1701. In all four annotated versions the title has been amended in a secretary’s hand to read, with only minor changes in word order from version to version:; *Meditationes pacatae de praedestinatione et gratia, fato et libero arbitrio. Autore reverendissimo et celeberrimo viro Gilberto Burneto S.S. theol. D. episcopo Sarasburensi. Ex eiusdem Expositione XXXIX Articulorum Ecclesiae anglicanae dissertatio excerpta, qua utriusque partis momenta exhibentur ad promovendam piam hoc in Articulo animorum moderationem latine versa. Hac secunda editione accessere annotationes quibus fundamenta utriusque partis conciliantur et pravae consequentiae clarissimis rerum expositionibus eliduntur.* The original place and date of publication are struck out thus showing that no new date or place for the projected “second edition” had been set by the time the annotations were completed. The changes in the title reveal the change of orientation. The reader is no longer to expect “*A treatise on predestination and grace by the very reverend ...Gilbert Burnet, excerpted from his Exposition of the 39 Articles of the Church of England and translated into Latin so as to encourage pious moderation of opinions as regards this article.*” The new title promises “*Peaceful meditations on predestination and grace, fate and free will. A dissertation on predestination and grace excerpted and translated into Latin from ...Gilbert Burnet’s Exposition...in which the main arguments of both parties are set out to encourage pious moderation of opinions on this article. This second edition has been augmented by annotations reconciling the basic position of both parties and avoiding untoward consequences by the clearest possible exposition.*” The title of the projected second edition thus echoed Leibniz’s idea of fundamental reconciliation.
We need to be clear about the diversity of theological positions on this issue. The Lutheran churches espoused the view that men were predestined to salvation only and that God did not predestine any section of humankind to damnation, which implied the damned being responsible for their own damnation, although the Lutheran normative document on this, the *Book of Concord* of 1577 (http://bookofconcord.org/historical-20.php), did not really propose any solution to the question of damnation. Thus while there was no dissent in the Lutheran Church on predestination, the German and European Calvinist and Roman Catholic churches espoused a variety of mutually conflicting positions. On the Calvinist (Reformed) side, this variety was due partly to Calvin’s lack of explicitness on the issue which allowed for diverse interpretations and partly to later individual or local theological and /or political proclivities.\(^1\) Fundamentally, Calvin argued in different works either that God elected some men to be saved but no one to be actually damned or that God foresaw who would truly believe and elected all those to salvation while condemning the others to damnation. This was the so-called doctrine of double predestination. Calvin’s Genevan successor Theodore Beza (1519-1605) sharpened up Calvin’s teaching more by postulating in the 1550s the doctrine of God’s eternal decree whereby the Almighty simply decreed from all eternity that some would be saved while others would be damned. Even in Beza’s more sharply defined terms, the doctrine was still open-ended enough to be adaptable to a variety of positions and circumstances.

By the late 17\(^{th}\) century several groupings\(^2\) could be identified among those who believed that man’s salvation was determined solely by God’s given grace and that man’s own initiative (in the form of good works, aided by grace) was ineffectual. Particularists were those Calvinist theologians who believed that God would save only those whom he had elected to salvation, regardless of how salvation-worthy the others showed themselves to be in moral terms. Universalists were those who believed that God wanted the salvation of all humans and that Christ died for all. The fact that some were nonetheless damned was simply a matter of human refusal to live in accord with God’s precepts. The most extreme form of Calvinist Universalism was promulgated by the Arminians who, not unlike Lutherans albeit emphasising human free will more strongly than the Lutherans, insisted that God offered saving grace to all but that this grace could be resisted by those humans who persisted in
sinful attitudes so that they finally condemned themselves. Supralapsarians were those among the Particularists who believed that grace was irresistible and that God had promulgated his eternal decree on the salvation of some and the damnation of others before the Fall. Infralapsarians, also known as Sublapsarians, basically shared the total determinism of the Supralapsarians with the difference that they believed that God’s double decree on predestination to salvation of some and damnation of others was issued subsequently to the Fall. The Dutch national Synod of Dordrecht (Dort) of 1618-19 had condemned the Supralapsarian and Arminian viewpoints while supporting and approving the Infralapsarian position on God’s absolute decree issued after the Fall, electing some to be saved and others to be damned. The Synod, however, although it attracted a number of foreign delegations, did not have sufficient weight to enforce its ruling outside the Netherlands, and so different positions continued to proliferate among the so-called Reformed.

This labyrinth of predestination issues was further complicated by the parallel quarrels on grace in the Roman Catholic church initiated by the supporters of Luis Molina (the Jesuits) who argued from the 1590s onwards that God did not predestine anyone but that he had “middle knowledge” of how each man would behave in relation to the prospect of salvation or damnation. This view met with violent opposition of the Dominican supporters of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas who did not postulate absolute predestination in the way that Calvin or the Dordrecht Synod did but made a distinction between habitual or sanctifying grace transmitted by the sacraments (gift of God inherent in the soul by which men are enabled to perform good actions), actual grace (a motion of the soul bestowed by God ad hoc for bringing about a particular good action) and prevenient grace which is entirely unmerited and which sanctifies men even before reception of the sacrament. The latter corresponded more or less to the general Protestant concept of grace and made man fundamentally dependent on God while underplaying the idea that man could somehow help save himself by cooperating with divine grace and performing good works. Finally the rise of Jansenism with its espousal of the late Augustine’s view that without special grace from God it is impossible for man to perform his commandments added to the complications. All those positions, Reformed and Roman Catholic alike were of course well-known to Leibniz and his theologian contemporaries. Although, as we shall see, there was no fundamental disagreement on the issue between the Lutheran Hanover and the Calvinist Brandenburg, the latter having espoused a version of Universalism since 1631, the date of the partly successful Leipzig Colloquy on the Calvinist-Lutheran Concord, there was
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in Leibniz’s time increasing concern with the fragmenting of dogma and growing schisms between the Reformed and the Lutheran churches elsewhere on the one hand, and between the different Calvinist churches on the other hand. Two solutions offered themselves to the more eirenically minded Lutherans and Calvinists, the two being either toleration of diverse positions or reunion of different positions under a common one. Burnet and Jablonski were exponents of toleration while Leibniz argued for an overarching metaphysical framework that would unite not just all Lutherans and Calvinists but also all Roman Catholics under one umbrella.\textsuperscript{16}

IV. The Brandenburg Position on Predestination

To return to Jablonski’s preface to Burnet, it appears to be a statement of the Brandenburg Calvinist Universalist doctrine of predestination and grace as voiced initially by Johann Bergius (a predecessor to Jablonski as Brandenburg court chaplain) in the 1630s.\textsuperscript{17}

Bergius had sketched out his view in question 18 of his treatise originally written in the 1630s and translated into English in 1655 under the title: \textit{The Pearle of Peace & Concord. Or a Treatise of Pacification betwixt the dissenting Churches of Christ}.\textsuperscript{18} There he argues that the Brandenburg Calvinists hold that God is ultimately all-good and cannot want the damnation of any individual but, on the contrary, he wants all to convert and be saved. However, God does not want this salvation necessarily but only by his antecedent will, in other words, he wants all men to be saved \textit{caeteris paribus} but this does not mean that he wants the salvation of a sinner such as a murderer because wanting the damnation of a sinner is compatible with God’s goodness and justice. Bergius more than implies, however, that God grants universal, objective (sufficient) and subjective (efficacious) grace. In other words, God offers the potential to believe and be saved to all those to whom the word of God and Jesus Christ is preached and he actualises this potential through the subjective or efficacious grace in all those whom he brings to faith by the work of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, Bergius’ report on the Leipzig Colloquy of 1631 states that the Calvinist and Lutheran theologians present agreed that Jesus died for all men and with his death expiated the sins of the entire world fully and sufficiently and that he truly wanted all men to believe in him and be saved through faith, which means that no-one is excluded from the power of his satisfaction unless he excludes himself by not believing.\textsuperscript{19} The corollary to this question: whether all who receive the word of God are those whom God had foreseen as believers or whether grace
is *ipso facto* extended to all those who are instructed by God’s word, is not raised.

As the variety of positions had increased by the end of the 17th century, Jablonski in his preface does not refer to Bergius but cites extensively from an excerpt of the Six Articles which the Frankfurt a/O theologians, Gregor Frank, Tobias Magirus, Gottlieb Pelargus and Friederich Reichel sent to the Bremen preacher Herman Hildebrandt in 1640.\(^{20}\) The Six Articles are less ambivalent than Bergius’ statements as they proclaim unequivocally that Christ’s sacrifice provided all men with the means of acceding to salvation and that those who refused to believe and persisted in their sinful state were condemned by their own fault. The text also states that this is consonant with God’s goodness and justice as it would not be a good to admit persistent sinners to salvation. Jablonski considers this to be the position that best safeguards God’s attributes of goodness, wisdom, glory, mercy, truthfulness, as it defends the efficacy of divine grace while leaving the sinner without any excuses. It is the teaching least offensive to the Lutherans. It is also congenial to the Anglican theologians who denied at the Synod of Dordrecht that it is legitimate to say that Christ died for the elect only.\(^{21}\)

The Six Articles no doubt also appealed to Jablonski because they bore out his conviction that there were two subcategories of universal grace: sufficient which was available to all, and efficacious, which was dispensed to all those who hear God’s word and not only to those whom God had foreseen to be believers from eternity. The variety of different positions on Universalism and Particularism is outlined by Jablonski in the same preface. He notes that Burnet in his work considers only Lutherans and Remonstrants or Arminians to be true Universalists and that he pigeonholes Remonstrants and Orthodox Sublapsarian Protestants as those who add particular to universal grace. Jablonski adds that some of the Reformed Universalists represent an intermediate position between strict Particularists and Remonstrants, as they grant that while sufficient (objective) grace is available to all, efficacious (subjective) grace is available to the elect only. As he puts it, “some teach only the objective [grace] whereby Christ in accord with the pleasure of his father wanted to die for the sins of all the world so that his death in its perfection was not just possible but also actual for the sins of the whole world; in virtue of it, all are hypothetically eligible to be saved if they believe but God does not give nor wants to give the capacity to believe to all but only to the elect. This is taught by some French and Swiss theologians. Others recognise not just the objective (sufficient) but also the subjective (efficacious) universal grace of God whereby God offers the capacity to embrace the Saviour by faith to all those to whom he


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offers the Saviour by his word and to whom he dispenses at the same time his Spirit which accompanies the preached word.”

This, concludes Jablonski, is the doctrine of many French and Polish theologians and of most, if not all, German Universalists. It is also his own position.

The UB and Jablonski’s translation of Burnet were thus both written against a complex and varied background of positions on predestination and grace and must be read in this context as must Leibniz’s thought on this. I should like to argue, however, that the reason why Leibniz’s proposal for a general religious union was not more successful was that this proposal was based on metaphysical presuppositions that, despite the philosopher’s use of approved theological terms, did not take the theological context into account in a way that his theologian partners might find convincing.

Still in his preface to Burnet, Jablonski gives long extracts in Latin translation from the bishop of Salisbury’s text, all of which underline that the latter advocates the maximum of tolerance of divergent opinions on predestination and grace so as to bring about an agreement among all confessions. The sole binding condition is that all parties respect the basic tenets of faith which state that God is the supreme Ruler of the universe and governs everything with his all-knowing, irresistible providence. He is holy, just, truthful, trustworthy, merciful and good in all his ways. According to the bishop of Salisbury, all who agree on these basic points have no right and no just cause to disagree with one another. Similarly, if they agree that all that is good comes from God and all that is evil from themselves and if they recognise the need for humility and mistrust of their own (as opposed to God’s) powers and their need to seek God’s help, they are fundamentally united even though they have not found a common way of formulating all these beliefs as one doctrine. Burnet also adverts to the parallel quarrel in the Roman Catholic Church between “disciples of Augustine” (by which he could mean either the Dominicans or the Jansenists) and Molinists. Finally he praises his own Church which tolerates different opinions while remaining united by bonds not just of outward observance but also of love and friendship. As long as excessively rigorous Lutherans, he continues, persist in attacking Calvinists because of the doctrine of the Calvinist adherence to the doctrine of absolute decree, which they (the Lutherans) interpret as making God the author of evil and as long as the Dutch, the Swiss and the Reformed Genevans combat the partisans of the conditional decree (that is the divine decree of God to save all on condition that all believed), the much wished for Concord cannot be achieved.
Leibniz could not be totally satisfied with the Burnet-Jablonski proposal for minimal concord and the toleration of diverse positions precisely because of Jablonski’s and Burnet’s insistence on the toleration principle. For his part he was convinced, as I said, that the only true union could be metaphysical and not one based on a minimal agreement which suited the largest number of splinter groups within the church and which would result in mutual toleration. However, he did not intend his annotations as a refutation but more as a qualification of Jablonski’s and Burnet’s view, which is no doubt why he barely annotated Jablonski’s preface, other than systematically altering “Lutherani” to “fratres evangelici.”

Leibniz annotates this as follows:

Concerning paragraph 7 of the preface. It is very true that much can be done to reconcile the dissenting opinions if it can be shown that the adversaries rely on highly commendable or praiseworthy (plausibilius) arguments. For it follows from this that we should view their opinions and personalities in a far less negative light. However, this will not be altogether enough to persuade to toleration those who believe that contrary opinions are highly dangerous, however much they are reinforced by praiseworthy and convincing arguments. Thus, although the method founded on this is useful for the peace of the Church, it would be much more useful to adopt the method of lessened division (imminuti elenchi) which would show that the disagreements themselves are not as great as they are thought to be. This is what the Annotator wanted to attempt and he will achieve his aim if each party decides to speak its mind exactly as he proposes. For he proposes it not as one prescribing anything to the learned theologians of both parties but as one keen to offer an opportunity for putting forward or approving the most moderate explanations, in so far as this is acceptable. These notes are therefore published not in the spirit of settling anything but in the spirit of a desire to learn and a wish to elicit fuller instruction from men in authority.
Leibniz is very careful to avoid giving his work anything resembling the stamp of theological authority such as might be claimed by Burnet or Jablonski. He does not wish to be viewed as a theologian, but presents himself as an anonymous and well-meaning annotator eager to learn from reactions to his proposal. Considerations of rhetorical modesty apart, this supports the hypothesis that Leibniz’s view of predestination is not a theological one.

This is further supported by the “Annotator’s preface” which figures in Leibniz’s annotations from the second draft onwards which also throws light on the title “Meditationes pacatae de praedestinatione et gratia, fato et libero arbitrio.” Hiding behind the anonymous “Annotator”, Leibniz explains in his preface that the antique quarrel on freedom and fate received a specifically Christian complement in the shape of the problem of grace and predestination. He thus situates the basic confessional disagreement in a general historico-philosophical context. The sequel to the preface is equally non-theological as he notes that the basic problem was misunderstood so that it troubled life’s practices as if what was fatal or predestined was absolutely certain to come about whatever we did or did not do. This gave rise either to complete apathy or unrestrained liberty in our expectations of the future which could not be under our control. This Leibniz considers inappropriate as, in his view, events only assume a certainty from their causes of which we are ourselves a large part. He is making the point (that he will develop in T 65 and T 300 particularly) that each substance acts spontaneously as there is no intersubstantial connexion and this means that each soul has within it the principle of all its actions and passions. The only external impulse is the cooperation of God who orders everything for the best and this best includes a certain number of sins committed freely and spontaneously by intelligent substances. God can offer reasons to the human mind which incline it to the good but the world is by its very nature such that sin must still take place. This opening to the preface shows that Leibniz integrates predestination disputes and the Brandenburg position into his monadological and theodicen framework, which is intended to provide the “most moderate explanations” he adverted to in his note on Jablonski’s preface.

In the UB 1 and 2 he has already provided by 1701 a physical analogy to this collaboration between external workings of God and the free workings of the human mind using the example of a current which drives equal-sized ships with equal force and speed. However, despite this external impulse (analogous to God’s objective or sufficient grace available to all on condition that they show themselves to be true believers) the ships do not advance at the same rate because of their own limitations.
(on an analogy with this some people resist the call of objective grace and are slow at mending their sinful ways and so their potential to be saved is not actualised): although they are of the same size and shape and are propelled at the same rate, those that bear a heavier cargo (or a stronger resistance to subjective grace) advance more slowly than the others.\footnote{In T 30 he will give a more rigorous version of the same example, viewing it this time as an exact analogy with predestination: Let us compare now the force that the current exerts on the ships and communicates to them with the action of God who produces and preserves all that is positive in creatures giving them perfection, being and force; let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with natural imperfection of creatures and the slowness of a loaded ship with the defects in its qualities and its actions and we shall find that this comparison is most apt. The current is the cause of movement of the ship but not of its slowness; God is the cause of perfection in the nature and in the actions of a creature but the latter’s limited receptivity is the cause of its defective action.} In T 30 he will give a more rigorous version of the same example, viewing it this time as an exact analogy with predestination:

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The above explanation of predestination and necessity rests firmly on Leibniz’s theodicean presupposition that God made the best of all possible worlds and this best of all possible worlds must involve some evil actions committed freely by
man. As he had already said in his annotations on the letter from Mark Gualter to Simon Episcopius, which, according to Grua, date from about 1691-95:

God whose primary decree it is to act most perfectly, chooses unfailingly in accordance with his immense wisdom the most perfect series of things and events whereby the ruin of many men is compensated by the great excess of much better things. And God cannot act otherwise while safeguarding the rules of wisdom, which is why God does not want bad things but allows them. (He wants the most perfect series or order of the universe which includes bad things but He does not want bad things, only the plenitude of good). He wants maximum perfection, and allows only the evil without which that perfection cannot be attained. Bad things are not instruments but conditions. Therefore, the schemas that are drawn up regarding Adam, the repentant Peter and Judas are not very helpful. And we must not think that God decrees specially that a particular man should be influenced to perform bad actions but He decreed this order of the universe which contains among many other things the existence of this particular man and his actions. Prior to the decree that this man should exist, it was already established that he would sin. Therefore God did not decree Peter’s fall and his repentance or Judas’s fall and desperation nor did he decree that Peter should receive more divine help and Judas less. But in this universe, already when God viewed it as possible, there existed a certain measure of divine help for each, that is, that universe already contained Peter who would sin, Peter who was deprived of a certain amount of help while he sinned and Peter helped by grace once he reconverted. It also contained a Judas who would sin, Judas deprived of grace and Judas who would despair. Thus we should not think that God decided on what help is to be granted particularly to Peter or particularly to Judas but whether he wanted to bring about this possible Peter and this possible Judas with the attendant series of help and circumstances that existed already in God’s complete notion of them.

This in turn raises further questions about Leibniz’s view of freedom and determinism. If God ordained that this world should contain a Judas who would sin and despair, prior to actualising it, how can Judas sin by his own free will? Leibniz’s usual reply here is that God indeed had this universe in his mind quoad essentiam complete with men’s evil and virtuous actions before he brought it into being as “the best of all possible worlds” in comparison with all the other worlds he envisaged. However, Judas did not know God’s plan or the reason for it and his decision to sin was quite spontaneous. But, Leibniz stresses, there was no divine
decree denying grace to Judas and similar sinners; God decided to create Judas who would sin and despair only because the best possible world could not stand without this. Leibniz gives the clearest explanation of this not in UB (where the issue of essence and existence is not mentioned) but in the *Discours de la métaphysique* where he says:

For God foresees from all eternity that there will be a certain Judas, and in the concept or idea of him which God has, is contained this future free act. The only question therefore which remains is *why* this Judas, the traitor, who is possible only because of the idea of God, actually exists. To this question, however, we can expect no answer here on earth except to say in general that it is because God has found it good that he should exist, notwithstanding that sin which he foresaw. This evil will be more than counterbalanced. God will derive a greater good from it and it will finally turn out that this series of events in which the existence of this sinner is included, is the most perfect among all the possible series of events.

Leibniz adds here that the proclivity to sin was present in the divine conception of humans even before the Fall which leads him to conclude that there is no more difficulty “in the Supralapsarian view than there is in other views of sin.” Leibniz makes a similar point in his *De libertate creaturae et electione divina* which Grua dates tentatively at February 1697, which would make it almost contemporary with the Brandenburg-Hanover *negotium irenicum*. There he notes explicitly that God built all sorts of sins into humans, man being conceived by God as a weak creature prone to sin irrespective of Adam’s Fall. This conception of the world and God’s decision to actualise it as being the best possible world already included the Judas who would sin and despair and here too Leibniz, without referring explicitly to the Supralapsarian view of sin, thinks that while all sins are built into humanity by God *quoad essentiam* prior to this universe being actualised, nonetheless it is men who sin once they are actualised or *quoad existenitiam*. Thus from man’s point of view, any decision to sin is spontaneous as he is unaware of the overall picture and the nature and reasons of God’s decree of creation. But, concludes Leibniz, it can never be totally free or spontaneous as this would make man independent of God, an option which he views as impossible. This dependence of man on God, however, does not make God responsible for evil as he does and decrees everything with a view to the highest Good, so that the sin of this or that individual, including Judas, will be more than compensated for by the amount of good it will ultimately issue in. Much ink has been spilt recently by philosophers over the reality of the
distinction between essence and existence in Leibniz and some recent studies have pointed to the unclear nature of this distinction.\textsuperscript{40} Be that as it may, the distinction assumes a certain importance in the context of the inter-confessional discussions on predestination because it enables Leibniz to strike a blow not just at the Calvinist advocates of double predestination but also at Occasionalism, as he makes clear in T 32.\textsuperscript{41}

We note, however, that Leibniz in UB does not advert to the \textit{quoad essentiam} and \textit{quoad existentiam} distinction in his discussion of the creation decree, which he underlines, is the sole divine decree. Secondly, Leibniz in the same work does not admit for one moment that Supralapsarianism could be viewed as a plausible doctrine given God’s decision to actualise the universe peopled with potentially sinful men prior to the Fall. On the contrary, the UB contains several refutations of the Supralapsarian viewpoint. Before going any further, it is useful to go back to Leibniz’s insistence on the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, with some things such as mathematical or logical propositions being true in all possible worlds and others being true only in this world as being contingent on a set of reasons and circumstances that are particular to it. God’s foreknowledge being an instance of the latter: Judas need not have sinned absolutely but he did so freely and contingently in this world. Already in a preliminary document to the UB, entitled \textit{Beym Eingang}, which is in fact Leibniz’s first reaction to Jablonski’s union document, the \textit{Kurtze Vorstellung},\textsuperscript{42} Leibniz does his utmost to tone down the Reformed link between necessity and predestination, by referring to the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Indeed, this distinction comes to the fore very prominently in all the documents related to the union talks with Brandenburg and not just in \textit{Beym Eingang} which contains probably the clearest statement of it:

According to the philosophical definition only that is necessary, the opposite of which implies impossibility or a contradiction (e.g. such as: x is and is not B). However, Judas’ choice is not necessary in this way when he decides to betray the Lord. Although God had foreseen this and decided to permit it according to the counsel of his highest wisdom, it is still true that God could have done otherwise and one cannot say that a contradiction would obtain had he not decided this […]. And if one goes further and says that future contingents of determined truth… are not just a matter of foreknowledge but also a matter of causes which influence this foreknowledge, consisting partly in divine decrees and partly in the series things and dispositions which God conceived for this
universe and if one adds to this also that nothing happens without a cause and
the cause that determines the choice is so situated in the circumstances that if
it were different the outcome would not be the same, despite this it remains
ture that the choice is not finally necessary even in the present circumstances
and does not follow from its causes as a necessary consequence. In other words, God’s necessary decision was to create the best of all possible
worlds. Judas’ decision to sin by betraying Christ was not something that was built
into him necessarily by God in the sense that the sum of 2+2=4 is built into the order
of things both actual and possible. Judas was no more than inclined to sin in the
way he did, in virtue of God’s decision to make this the best of all possible worlds
and also in virtue of the set of circumstances and causes particular to Judas and his
environment. This brings us again to the point that God conceives sin as part of
the highest good quoad essentiam but it is man quoad existentiam who gives it its
particular form and nature when he decides to sin. This part of Leibniz’s argument
echoes the Discours to some extent but, as noted, no mention is made throughout
the UB, of God’s decision to create man as a creature prone to sin and thus pulling
the Supralapsarians into the concord.

The reasons for this are no doubt due to overall, theological strategy of the UB
which, in cases of important dogmas such as the real presence of Christ in the
eucharist and predestination consists in either excluding certain “enemies” as too
extreme for both camps and / or in finding a common guarantor that both parties
could find to correspond sufficiently to their own position. The theologians to
exclude from any agreement on the eucharist were, on the one hand, Zwingli and his
followers with their conception of the eucharist as a simple memorial of Christ, and,
on the other hand, the so-called Lutheran “Ubiquitarians” who argued that Christ’s
body could be found physically in the eucharist and anywhere else he wanted. As for
a guarantor around whose thought the Brandenburgers and the Hanoverians could
agree, Leibniz put forward Calvin whose doctrine of Christ’s spiritual presence
could be made to correspond to the Lutheran consubstantiation and to a version
of the Reformed doctrine of Christ’s presence. Significantly, however, the most
important feature of Calvin’s doctrine for Leibniz was its adaptability to Leibniz’s
anti-Cartesian concept of substance as force not to be defined by its extension in
space. Leibniz was not similarly fortunate with finding “common enemies” and
guarantors for the predestination dogma. Clearly, however, Supralapsarianism, a
doctrine rejected by the Synod of Dordrecht and thoroughly incompatible with both
the Reformed Universalist and the Lutheran idea of predestination could be made
to stand for the common enemy. However, there was still no theological figure comparable to Calvin that was likely to unite the two parties, Calvin’s own doctrine of double predestination (to salvation and to damnation) being unsatisfactory for both the Hanoverians and the Brandenburgers. The only recourse left to Leibniz was to use his own metaphysical framework with no theological counterpart as a common basis. This was not without drawbacks and involved a certain amount of glossing over difficulties as shown by the ship example and the absence of any distinction there between physical and moral necessity. However, by and large, it proved easy enough to assimilate the Calvinist Universalist view and the Lutheran view of predestination to the metaphysical framework of Leibniz’s theodicy and to reconcile the philosophical notion of God as the all-good and all-wise creator of the best of all possible worlds which involved a certain number of sins with the theological doctrine that God wanted the salvation of all mankind but did not actualise it because he did not predetermine humans in the same way as he did ships, and left them free to oppose divine inclination.

To show exactly how this was done, we need to return to the Annotator’s preface in the *Meditationes pacatae* and a sample of his annotations. How then does Leibniz proceed to bring out the common truth that underlies all the three positions (Anglican, Lutheran and Calvinist) on predestination? Here I shall examine only a sample of the notes focusing on Burnet’s initial definition of the quarrel and referring to the manuscript. In a short foreword to his article 17 Burnet defines predestination and its importance for Christian life. He follows this with a statement on the entire question which he then subdivides into three main questions and states the main opinions, which are those of the “Supralapsarians, Sublapsarians, Remonstrants, Arminians or Universalists” and the Socinians. Burnet includes neither the Lutherans nor the Brandenburg Universalists in this subdivision. His definition of predestination cited here in Jablonski’s translation opens:

\[
\text{Praedestinatio ad vitam est aeternum Dei propositum quo ante jacta mundi fundamenta, suo consilio, nobis quidem occulto constanter decrevit eos quos in Christo eligat ex hominum genere a maledicto et exitio liberare atque ut vasa in honorem efficta per Christum ad aeternam salutem adducere.}^{45}
\]

“Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his Counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting salvation as vessels made to honour.”

Leibniz annotated a) *vitam*, b) *occulto* and c) *in Christo* and *per Christum*.\(^{46}\) Herewith
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the text of the final formulation of the first annotation as it figures in full in the third and fourth version of the *Meditationes*:

Consulto praedestinatio ad vitam dicitur, nequis eam ab Ecclesia anglicana extendi putet ad mortem seu ad damnationem. Sane damnandos esse praefatos non praedestinatos formae sanorum verborum convenire theologi prudentes et pii semper iudicaverunt. 47

“It is called advisedly ‘predestination to life’ lest anyone from the Church of England should think that it can extend to death or damnation. Indeed wise and pious theologians have always judged that those who were to be damned were more aptly called ‘foretold’ than ‘predestined.’”

But the previous version of the annotation in the second version of the *Meditationes* read:

Predestination is deliberately judged to be predestination to life and salvation and does not apply to death or damnation. And pious and prudent theologians have always judged that it was more appropriate to call the damned “the foreknown” rather than “the predestined.” As Augustine says, the cause of predestination can be sought but is not found but the cause of reprobation, when sought, is found. Therefore we must praise the circumspection of those who drew up the articles of the Anglican Church. For predestination is an external addition to the mind in virtue of good or bad actions of the predestined individual, this is why it applies more to the elect whose good actions, whereby these men are led to salvation, are owed fully to divine grace and purpose. But reprobation is founded in man’s depravity so that he who is reprobate should more correctly be called “post-destined.” Nevertheless, we should say that Augustine took the term (reprobation) as applying more broadly to those things that God will do himself in *De praed. sanct.* Ch. 10 (1, 19) where he says that it is God himself who condemns. In *civ. Dei* 21. 24 he talks about predestination to eternal death. And it is not our job to litigate about words so long as we admit that reprobation does not precede the consideration of sin. 48

This early, longer version of the note is important as one of the very rare passages where Leibniz goes beyond the *Unvorgreifliches Bedencken* in his notes and defines predestination as an extra added to the human mind inclining man to perform good actions. Reprobation on the other hand is founded on human wickedness only, and is a divinely imposed consequence of man’s own evil actions. In other words, God intervenes in predestination to salvation but there is no predestination to damnation: God simply leaves those men who will be damned to perform their

bad actions. Leibniz’s appellation of the reprobate “post-destined” as opposes to the saved “pre-destined” emphasises that reprobation only takes place as a result of man’s actions and not in God’s anticipation or predetermination of them. He is more exact than any theologian of the time, including Arminius and Molina, in both the terminology he uses and in his psychological description of predestination as that something extra that God adds to the human mind that disposes man to act well. Leibniz does not take up Molina’s notion of middle knowledge, which he disproves in UB as leading either to an infinite regress of graces or as attributing too much to human powers. Be that as it may, the small sample of notes I have examined bears out Leibniz’s desire for a true union of the three Confessions, founded not on the toleration of the maximum number of positions but on their reduction to the common underlying metaphysical position, which amounted to saying that God did include evil in his scheme of this best of all possible worlds but that he entrusted to man, a weak and fallible creature from the outset, the actual putting of this evil into practice. Taken in this context, Leibniz’s doctrine on *quoad essentiam* and *quoad ad existentiam* assumes its full importance.

**VI. Conclusion**

How close is Leibniz’s position to the Brandenburg Universalism on the one hand and to Lutheranism on the other? If we compare his position to Bergius’ in the *Pearl of Peace*, it appears that Leibniz’s view of predestination was to some extent inspired by Bergius and other early 17th century Brandenburg Universalists, but there are also some differences. In the *Pearl of Peace* Bergius says:

*Non tamen necessitate*; but not that he will save them all unavoidably, and necessarily; but that he will also manifest his just anger against sin in many, despite his goodness and grace, in their condemnation. Which some also call *Consequent* will of God; not that his *Antecedent* will is thereby changed, or is contrary to this consequent will, but because he has ordered this after the works of men, and for the sake of them, by the will of his just judgment, Rom. 2:5, 9, 22, 23, and 11:20 and 22, and Acts 13:46. Some indeed are of the opinion, as also Augustine *Enchir.* c. 95. 103, that the other [i.e. the antecedent will of God] only is properly called the will of God, which he will infallibly fulfill, because it seems something absurd, that God should will something and yet it should not be done; as if the will of God could be hindered by the will of man, or did depend upon it. *But that yet it is also the true earnest inward will of God,*
what he wills that men out of due Obedience should do, although withal he leaves them in free power and liberty that they may omit it out of disobedience, is many ways taught in Scripture. For all the Precepts, Promises, Threats, Warnings, Exhortations of God, are all testimonies of this will, and signify a very serious inward desire of God towards men; also all the punishments and rewards, and all the judgments of God are effects of this will, seeing God even therefore is so vehemently angry and punishes the wicked, because they have not done what they should do; even as contrarily he so richly rewards the godly for this that they have done his will. And yet it follows not that the will of God properly depends upon the will of man, or is hindered by it, but only that God wills some works of men should depend on man’s will, so that they might omit the good which God wills and loves, and do the evil which God wills not but hates. Whereby yet he hinders not the will of God, but only his own Salvation, which God wills not absolutè and simpliciter, not simply and absolutely, or that all must therefore necessarily be saved, but only so, that man may lose it by disobedience, when he will not do the gracious will of God concerning his Salvation, and must therefore suffer the judicial will of God to his condemnation; *Ut hoc ipso quod contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, de ipsis fiat voluntatem Dei*. Aug. Enchir. c. 100.80

The phrases in italics above show the similarity of vocabulary used by Bergius and Leibniz. Both talk about God’s antecedent and consequent will, both note that reprobation is not the result of predestination but of man’s own evil actions, both emphasise that God by his antecedent will wanted all to be saved but left man free to act against it. Bergius’ treatise in fact shows that several concepts used by Leibniz were common currency already among the early 17th century Brandenburg Calvinist eirenics. Where Leibniz diverges from Bergius is linking God’s antecedent and consequent will with the notion of necessity and above all in establishing a clear connexion between reprobation or “postdestination” and God’s decree of creating this best of all possible worlds as including a certain number of sins. This is fully in keeping with Leibniz’s rejection of Occasionalism and also with his insistence against Descartes and others that God was not a voluntarist but that his decrees were consonant with the principle of sufficient reason which meant that God could not a priori arbitrarily decide to predestine a certain number of humans to salvation and a certain number to damnation as this would make him into a capricious tyrant, responsible for sin and evil. What God did was “pre-incline” humans to do the best but leave them a margin to act against this “pre-inclination.” There had to
be a reason congruous with the general principles of divinity as all good, all wise etc. as to why God predestined humans to salvation and why effective salvation concerned some individuals and not others. In fact, what this amounts to is that God predetermined the best possible world as one containing a certain amount of evil. This, however, did not stop him from wanting the salvation of all humankind so long as all followed God’s pre-inclination of them to do good. However, they did not have to do this in the same sense that less heavily loaded ships had to move faster than heavily loaded ones. What God predetermined was the order of this world as a whole; he did not predetermine humans, he merely pre-inclined them. This point of view was deterministic but it was not really germane to the theological issue of predestination which focused on God’s relationship to human individuals. All in all, the sections on predestination in the UB and the entire Meditationes pacatae show how Leibniz functioned in the theological context of his era. Posing no new theological questions and relying on approved vocabulary, he tried to blend as much as possible with the contextual background while proposing a new, metaphysical solution to the inter-confessional struggles of his era. We note that several of the arguments first used in the UB were subsequently taken up in T in a more overtly philosophical context. However, the very fact that Leibniz argued as a philosopher made his union project unacceptable. What Calvinist, Lutheran and Anglican theologians wanted was mutual toleration and not a union of their respective theological systems under a common metaphysical denominator. To accept Leibniz’s solution would have meant foregoing confessionalisation and so foregoing their respective identities, painfully acquired since the Reformation.

Received 31 May 2012

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Notes

1 There are two versions of this document usually referred to as UB 1 and 2. The latter is the final version. (cf. A IV, 7, pp. 415-648). Neither version was published in Leibniz’s lifetime. See Patrick Riley, “G. W. Leibniz, Academy Edition, Reihe IV, Politische Schriften, Band 7 (1697-1699), The Leibniz Review 21 (December 2011), 119-152.

2 See footnote 13 below.


5 There were various reasons for this. See Greig, ibid.


8 A I, 19, no. 288, pp. 553-554: Leibniz to Burnet, March/ April 1701: “Mais il seroit à souhaiter qu’il y eût moins de ces distinctions, ou au moins, qu’elles fussent moins poussées et qu’on imitat la moderation Angloise sur ce point, et j’ay trouvé dans les remains de Jean Hales des lettres des Theologiens Anglois qui assistoient au Synode de Dort par lesquelles on voit clairement que quelques uns de ces Theologiens estoient assez pour les Universalistes, et qu’on y dispute aussi du sens de l’article de l’Eglise Anglicane.”

9 A I, 18, no. 100, p. 144: “My Lord marquis de Montros m’a aporté deux exemplaires des livres de Mr Bornet dont l’un est un exemp[laire] pour vous[.].] il trette de 39 articles de fo[y] de l’eseglise anglicane, cet un livre bon à feullieter mais non pas à lire, il parrera nos biblioteques car il est for bien relié.”
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10 A I, 19, no.166, p. 254-255.
13 For a modern edition see Michael Murray, ed. and transl., G. W. Leibniz, Dissertation on predestination and grace, (The Yale Leibniz) (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011). Although the edition is only partial (the editor takes into account only the final version and does not transcribe or translate it correctly and leaves much to be desired in accuracy, it has the merit of drawing the reader’s attention to the four manuscript versions of the work which are held in the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover (signature: LH 1, XVIII). That being said, it should be used with extreme caution pending a new edition.
15 While there are many more or less confessionally biased studies on the differences between Arminians and Sub- and Supralapsarian Particularists on the one hand and the Dominican - Jesuit quarrels on grace on the other hand, there is to this day no general, impartial study of all the 17th century positions on predestination and universality / particularity of God’s grace. For partial studies see Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Labyrinth Press, 1988). Also by the same author, God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius. Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy ( Grand Rapids: Mi., Eerdmans, 1991). On the intra-Roman Catholic controversies see the more impartial and philosophical William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 1988); Thomas Flint, Divine Providence. A Molinist Account (London: Cornell University Press, 1998); F. Hildesheimer, Le jansénisme (Paris: Publisud, 1991), Jean Orcibal, Jansenius d’Ypres (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Augustiniennes, 1989).

Neither the preface nor Leibniz’s notes on it are reproduced by Murray.

(London. Printed by T.C. For John Rothwell, at the Fountain and Bear in Cheapside; and John Wright, at the Kings Head in the Old Bayly 1655, pp. 51-55).

Johann Bergius, *Colloquium Lipsia cum anno 1631. Da die anwesenden Reformirten und Lutherische Theologi eine Liquidation angestellt, wie weit sie einig und nicht einig seym.* [Actum Leipzig...im Monat Martio, Anno 1631], [p. 19]: “…dass Christus der Herr und Heyland für alle Menschen gestorben und mit seinem Tod für die Sünden der gantzen Welt völlig vollkömlich und in sich kraftiglich gnug gethan habe: Dass es auch nicht nur ein Schein-Wille waere, sondern, dass es sein eigentlicher ernster Wille und Befehlich, dass alle Menschen an ihn solten glauben und durch den Glauben selig warden: Also, dass keener von der Krafft der Gnungthung Christi aussgeschlossen sey, als der sich selbst durch den Unglauben ausschliesse.”


Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol. a3r.-b1r.

Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol.a 6r.

Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol a 6r.


Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol. a4r.

Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol. a4r. : “Et vero donec Lutherani a rigore suo quo Calvini sequacium opiniones tanquam Deum omnibus illis blasphemiis e dogmate Absoluti Decreti, ut ipsis quidem videtur, manantibus consequentiis onerantes aversantur; pariter atque Batavi, Helvetae et Genevenses Reformati a sua illos pro hostibus gratiae Dei et reis Consectariorum quae Doctrinam Decreti Conditionati sequi putant, accusandi severitate remittant, illa tantopere exoptata concordia perfici nequaquam potest.”

Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, fol. b5r. LH 1, XVIII: Leibniz annotated on the facing page immediately following the Ms. Heading “Ad praefationem”: “Ubicunque Lutheranorum mentio fit, Evangelici fratres aut aliquid tale sub-
stituimus eam appellationem alias Reformatis (licet etiam Evangelicis) usurpatam, convenientiorem judicantes, quam quae sectam sapit.”

28 Jablonski, *Burnet’s Expositio*, 1701, point VII, fol. a4v.-a5r.

29 Jablonski, *Burnet's Expositio*, 1701, fol. b5r. LH 1, XVIII: “Ad praefationis § vii. Verissimum est multum ad conciliationem animorum inter Dissentientes facere posse si ostendatur adversarios argumentis valde plausibilibus niti: inde enim consequens est ut de eorum animo et personis minus male sentiamus. Idem tamen ad tolerationem sententiarum persuadendum non omnino sufficit apud eos qui credunt contrarias opiniones argumentis quantumvis plausilibus firmatas, esse valde periculosas. Itaque etsi praedicta a plausibilitate methodus sit utilis ad pacem ecclesiae, multo tamen utilior foret methodus imminuti elenchi quae ostenderet ipsos dissensus non esse tantos quanti putantur. Atque hoc tentare voluit Annotator ostenturus utique suum scopum si utraque pars fateretur mentem suam ita ut ipse proposuit recte exponi. Proposuit autem non utique eruditis utriusque partis theologis quicum prae Scribens sed occasionem moderatiissimarum (qua fas est) explicationum proferendarum vel approbandarum praebere studens. Itaque haec non tam decidendi animo quam discendi et pleniora virorum in auctoritate positorum documenta eliciendi emittuntur.”


31 Cf. UB (1 and 2), IV, 7, pp. 512-513 : “Diese corpora dafern sie in einem gleichen begriff, oder in eadem superficie, damit sie vom strohm gefasset werden , gleich schwer und in ansehen der übrigen zum schwimmen gehörigen umbständen ein ander gleich wären ; müssten vom strohm, oder sonst sich ergiessendem Bach oder Wasserfluth allesamt mit gleicher geschwindigkeit forgetrieben warden. Wenn aber die Schiffe zwar an grösse und form ein ander gleich, aber, eines schwierer als andere beladen, so würden auch die andere geschwinder, dieses aber langsamer daherfliessen, und weit zurückbleiben. Die krafft oder das positivum motus, so allen schiffen auf gewisse Masse gemein ist, rühret hehr vom strohm, das privatium aber[,]nehmlich die langsamkeit oder mehr beschrenckte bewegung des schwerer beladenes schiffes, in dem es dem Wasser ja andern schiffen nicht genugsam folgen kan, sondern dem trieb gleichsam wiederstehet; rühret hehr ab ineptitudine massae. Auff diese art köndte man durch die krafft und den Bewegungs-trieb einiger massen das positivum, die guthe und Vollkommenheit, die den creatures von gott gegeben wird; durch die schwere aber und ineptitudinem massae corporeae das privatium oder der dinge unvollkommenheit vorstellen, dadurch sie wiederstehen, und verhindert werden, dem guthen Trieb Vollkömlich zu folgen . Weilen aber
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die ähnlichkeit hier sich nicht im allen findet, zwar auch nur in einem gewissen tertio erfordert wird; will man sich dieses gleichnisses nicht zu einer vermeinten völligen erklärung eines so hohen und shwehren Puncts, sondern nur zu einer nicht unfüglichen adumbration, dadurch unsern concepten nicht wenig geholfen wird, bedient haben [. ] Gnug, dass soviel Uns wissend, unter den Reformirten iezo keener zu finden, der Gott zur ursach der Sünde mache, wie ehemahlen Calvino, Bezae, Piscatorii und andern hat vorgeworffen warden woollen, davon auch bereits bey den Attributis Divinis gehandelt worden. (“These bodies are of the same weight in so far as /513/ they are seized by the current in the same grasp and are on the same surface and would be considered as identical to one another from other points of view such as their capacity to float. They must therefore be driven with the same speed by the current or by the flow that it gives rise to. However, when all ships are identical to one another but one of them is laden more heavily than the others, the former float faster than the remaining ship which would be slower and remain far behind. The force or the positive movement which is common to all the ships comes from the current, the privative element, however, that is to say the slow speed or the more limited movement of the heavily laden ship, makes for its inability to follow the current and the other ships with sufficient speed but resist the driving force, comes from the deficient quality of its mass.

In the same way God gives his creatures through his force and impact the positive element, that is goodness and perfection on the one hand; on the other hand the privative element or the imperfection of things is represented whereby they resist and are prevented from following the good force fully. Because the similarity is not total and indeed is required only in about a third of this comparison (“ in einem gewissen tertio”), we use this idea not to give a full explanation of such a lofty and difficult point, but only to sketch it out in what is not an inappropriate similitude. It is enough that to the best of our knowledge there is no one among the Reformed who makes God to be the cause of sin, as Calvin, Beza and Piscator were once reproached; we have discussed this already in the section on divine attributes.”)

32 T 30: “Comparons maintenant la force que le courant exerce sur les bateaux et qu’il leur communique, avec l’action de Dieu qui produit et conserve ce qu’il y a de positif dans les créatures, et leur donne de la perfection, de l’être et de la force ; comparons, dis-je, l’inertie de la matière avec l’imperfection naturelle des créatures et la lenteur du bateau chargé avec le défaut qui se trouve dans les qualités et dans l’action de la créature, et nous trouverons qu’il n’y a rien de si juste que cette comparaison. Le courant est la cause du mouvement du bateau mais non pas
de son retardement ; Dieu est la cause de la perfection dans la nature et dans les actions de la créature mais la limitation de la réceptivité de la créature est la cause des défauts qu’il y a dans son action. »

34 Grua 1, p. 338, no. 19.
35 Grua 1, p. 342-343.
36 Grua 1, p. 343.
38 See Leibniz, Discourse, p.51.
41 This explanation is added by Leibniz immediately after the ship example he cites in T 30 and T 31: “Cette considération servira aussi pour satisfaire à quelques philosophes modernes qui vont jusqu’à dire que Dieu est le seul acteur. Il est vrai que Dieu est le seul dont l’action est pure et sans mélange de ce qu’on appelle pâtir ; mais cela n’empêche pas que la créature n’ait part aux actions aussi puisque l’action de la créature est une modification de la substance qui en coule naturellement et qui renferme non seulement dans les perfections que Dieu a communiquées à la créature mais encore dans les limitations qu’elle apporte d’elle-même, pour être ce qu’elle est.” For Leibniz and Occasionalism see the short, very clear account by Laurence Carlin “Leibniz on Causation” in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/leib-cau/ - consulted on 11th April 2012) and also Robert C. Sleigh, “Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality” in Jan Cover and Mark Kulstad, eds. Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett,1990), pp. 161-194.

Beym Eingang, A IV, 7, p. 341: “Denn nach der eigentlichen philosophischen Definition ist nur dasjenige notwendig, deßen Gegenteil eine Unmöglichkeit oder Contradiction impliciret. Auff solche Weise aber wird die Wahl nicht notwendig, wenn Judas sich entschließet den Herrn zu verrathen, ob gleich Gott solches vorher gesehen, und nach dem Rath seiner Höchsten Weisheit zu zulassen entschlossen. Es bleibt doch wahr daß ers unterlassen können, [...] Und ob man gleich weiter geht, und sagt, daß die futura contingentia, determinatae veritatis seyen nicht nur ex futuritione vel praesicientia, sondern auch ex causis in futuritionem influentibus, consistentibusque partim in decrets divinis, partim in serie rerum et dispositione circumstantiarum und auch in der that nicht ohne, daß nichts ohne Ursach geschicht, und die Ursach worumb die Wahl also fället, der maßen in den umbständen beruhet, daß sonst wenn solche auf gewisse Maße anders gewesen, sie auch wohl anders gefallen seyn würden. So bleibt dennoch wahrs, daß die Wahl auch bey gegenwartigen umbständen dennoch nicht eigentlich notwendig wird, und aus den causis antegressis per necessarium consequentiam nicht folget[.]”

On this see Irena Backus, “Leibniz’s Concept of Substance and his Reception of Calvin’s Doctrine of the Eucharist”, British Journal of the History of Philosophy 19/5 (September 2011), pp. 917-934.

Cf. Jablonski, Burnet’s Expositio, 1701, fol. A1 r. For the English original see also Murray (2011), p. 3: (“Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his Counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting salvation as vessels made for honour.”)

These annotations are not included in Murray’s (2011) edition.

Cf. Jablonski, Burnet’s Expositio, 1701, fol. A1 r.: “It is called advisedly ‘predestination to life’ lest anyone from the Church of England should think that it can extend to death or damnation. Indeed wise and pious theologians have always judged that those who were to be damned were more aptly called ‘foretold’ than ‘predestined.’”

LH 1, XVIII, version 2 (B) notes facing fol. A1 r.: “Consulto praedestinatio ad vitam seu salutem facta iudicatur neque applicatur ad mortem sive damnationem. Et damnatos potius praescitos quam praedestinatos dici forma sanorum verborum magis convenire theologi pii et prudentes iudicarunt. Extat Augustini dictum
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« praedestinationis causa quaeritur nec invenitur, reprobationis vero causa quaeritur et invenitur. » Itaque laudanda est eorum circumspecctio qui ecclesiae anglicanae articulos condidere. Nam praedestinatio inserit animo aliquid exterius consideratione actus boni malive eius qui praedestinatur, ideo electis melius applicatur quorum ipsi boni actus quibus ad salutem perduisti sunt sane divinae gratiae atque destinationi debentur. Reprobatio vero in hominis pravitate funditur ut magis postea destinatus dici mereatur. Interim fatendum est Augustinum latius accipere vocabulum, de iis scilicet quae Deus ipse est facturus, De praeed. sanctorum, c. 10 quin vero utique ipse est qui damnat. De praedestinatione ad aeternam mortem loquitur. De civ. Dei xxi, 24 neque nostrum est litigare de verbis modo concedatur reprobationem non praecedere considerationem culpae.”

UB (1 and 2), A IV, 7, pp. 526-529: “Weil auch dergestalt in Gott eine doppelte scientia gesetzt wird: simplicis intelligentiae pro possibilius et scientia visionis pro actualibus; so haben einige eine scientiam mediam inter has duas in gott finden woollen, nempe non purorum actualium sed conditionalium qua Deus scit quid esset futurum, si aliquid poneretur in actu. Wodurch sie ein mittel zu ersinnen vermeinet, den nodum praedestinationis auff zulösen und eine bewegende Ursach der Gnaden Wahl zu erfinden. Nemblich das Gott wisse, wie ein jeder dem er die Gnade gibt oder auch dem er sie nicht giebt, solche Gnade dafern sie gegeben warden sollte, bey so oder so bewandten umbständen aff nehmen würde…Inmassen sich in der anbringung desselben grosse schwührigkeiten hervor tun, denn wann man sagt, Gott gebe majora auxilia gratiae vel externa vel interna dem jenigen, von welchem er vorher siehet, dass er solche gnade nicht so sehr , als etwa andere wenn sie solche auch bekämen von (sich) stossen würde: so ist weiter die frage, ob zu solcher wie wohl conditional-vorsehung die blosse guthe natürliche beschaffenheit des menschen und seines freyen willens bey gott allein in betrachtung komme, ohne einige dazu gehörige gnaden hülfte; also dass gott dem allein die gnade zu geben sich entschliesse , von dem er vorher siehet, dass er auss eignen natürlichen kräfften sich deren am bestengebrauchen werde: oder ob solche natürliche kräffte nicht allein, sondern mit einer ihnen helfenenden gnad conditionaliter vorher gesehen, das fundament der wahl seyn müssen…Sagt man das letzte tunc redit difficultas prior de motivo concedendae etiam huius gratiae conditionaliter praeviseae, quae libre arbitrio ad bene utendum gratia absolute decernanda foret. Und ware entweder diese secunda conditionaliter praevisa gratia bloss aus ansehung menschlicher kräffte zu verleihen oder man müsste wieder kommen auff gratiam tertiam pro secunda et quartam pro tertia et sic in infinitum.”


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IRENA BACKUS

50 Bergius, *Pearl of Peace*, p. 54-55.