I. Introduction

In a particularly memorable passage of the *Nouveaux Essais*, Leibniz draws attention to the importance of ancient learning not only in order to gain a more profound understanding of the Holy Scriptures, but also because Roman Law, still widely employed throughout Europe, often required consultation of rabbinical and patristic texts as well as of secular histories. Alongside these riches there was the wealth of practical knowledge contained in ancient writings which had been handed down, in everything from empirical medicine to observations of the natural world. Without exception, he tells us, these resources are to be drawn upon:

“When the day arrives that the Romans, Greeks, the Hebrews, and the Arabs have been exhausted, the Chinese will come to the fore with their ancient books […] not to speak of the various old books of the Persians, Armenians, Copts, and Brahmins […] And when there are no more ancient books to examine, their place will be taken by languages, mankind’s most ancient monuments.”¹

Leibniz himself drew on these rich traditions in learning in all aspects of his work from mathematics to metaphysics, from law to natural science. This reflects his conviction that all human thought and investigation through the ages would contribute to a greater understanding of nature and of our place in the world around us. The philological and scriptural heritage of mankind constituted a crucially important part of the historical resources for the profound knowledge to which he aspired.

II. Hebrew and Greek tradition

Language and ancient texts are central themes in the articles collected in *Leibniz und das Judentum*, which draws together the results of a conference organized principally by Hartmut Rudolph and held in Potsdam in March 2004. Nowhere is this philological and historical combination better exemplified than in Patrick Riley’s masterful analysis of Leibniz’s 1714 Vienna lecture on the Greeks as the founders of sacred philosophy (*‘Leibniz, Platonism, and Judaism: the 1714 Vienna Lecture’*).


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Vienna Lecture on the Greeks as the Founders of a Sacred Philosophy’). In the lecture, of which Riley provides the reader with an excellent edition according to the principles of the Akademie-Ausgabe (pp. 111-13), Leibniz acknowledges his fundamental debt to Platonism. He also concedes his reliance on both Plato (429-347) and Aristotle (384-322) in developing the concept of substance which he hoped would remedy the defects of materialism and mechanism, and enable him to explain the immortality of the soul naturally (p. 97). As Riley points out, Plato is treated by Leibniz as an ancient philosopher who through his thought approached Christianity. Although Leibniz suggests that the mystery of the Holy Trinity was already known to the Hebrews before it found its way into the teachings of Plato, and later Plotinus (204/5-270), it was in his view the Greeks who handed down the crucial sacred philosophy (p. 102). The concept of natural immortality as the condition of universal justice was for Leibniz of Greek, not of Jewish or even Christian origin (p. 108).

In early modern thought ancient Hebrew and Greek tradition met decisively in the Cabbala, interest in which had been promoted by humanist and Renaissance scholars such as Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) and Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522). The Jewish doctrine of emanation of the various spheres of the Sephirot particularly fascinated Christian Platonists. Knorr von Rosenroth’s (1636-89) Kabbala denudata, the most important contemporary book of the Christian Cabbala was well known to Leibniz, although he was careful to distinguish modern representations from the true ancient Cabbala.

Unlike Knorr von Rosenroth, Leibniz could not profess any profound knowledge of Hebrew. Moreover, he showed no particular interest in the language and even conflated it with Arabic. Yet this was a time when, especially in Protestant Europe, oriental studies in general and Hebrew studies in particular were flourishing. However, whereas the study of Arabic could be justified not only because of its application to Scripture, but also on account of the transmission of a large body of Greek literature and scientific writings through its medium, not to mention original contributions to mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy, the study of Hebrew could only be validated by its supportive role to Christian theology. Rabbinical texts had for early modern thinkers no intrinsic value apart from their usefulness in interpreting the Old Testament, perhaps allowing a more accurate account of the birth of Christianity. Among Protestant scholars in the seventeenth century we find the belief that Christians had to return to God’s word directly, as this is expressed in the Old Testament, and that in doing so they should aim, if possible,
to understand the literal meaning of the text. Many scholars also argued that the Greek of the New Testament could only be understood correctly by recognizing the Hebraic idiom behind it. For those of Leibniz’s contemporaries who pursued chiliastic goals, there was an additional reason: knowledge of Hebrew was essential to defending Christianity and to pave the way for the conversion of the Jews by demonstrating that the Hebrew Bible revealed the coming of Christ. As Dan Cook points out in his insightful contribution (‘Leibniz: The Hebrew Bible, Hebraism and Rationalism’), the need to understand the real nature of Jewish belief in the context of millenarianism is one of the reasons why Latin translations of authors such as Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and Isaac ben Judah Abrabanel (1437-1508) began to appear in the early modern era (p.139).

Alongside the importance of drawing on rabbinical sources, seventeenth-century scholars also recognized the need to apply new standards of textual criticism to Biblical exegesis such as those bequeathed by Lorenzo Valla (1406-57) and Desiderius Erasmus (1466/9-1536). Moreover, publications by the French Calvinist Louis Cappel (1585-1658) questioned the antiquity of vowel points and accents in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, lending weight to those who claimed that the Greek text of the Septuagint was more reliable. Soon after the appearance of Cappel’s Critica sacra, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in Leviathan attacked the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.

III. Genealogy of Nations

Not least because of his lack of knowledge of Hebrew, Leibniz almost exclusively employs the Septuagint or the Latin Vulgate when referring to the Old Testament. In fact, he frequently complained that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament was considerably more obscure than the Greek version, and indeed virtually dismissed the importance of the Hebrew Bible for resolving controversies in Christian thought (p. 143). At the same time, as Stephan Waldhoff (‘Leibniz und der Plausibilitätsverlust der biblischen Völkergenealogie’) makes clear, Leibniz rejects the view, widely held at the time among Protestant scholars, that rabbis had deliberately distorted the Hebrew text in order to exclude Jesus as the true messiah (p. 175). However, a particular reason which Leibniz had for preferring the Septuagint was provided by the question of biblical chronology. Isaac la Peyrère’s (1596-1676) Prae-Adamitae had had enormous impact on this topic, suggesting that the heathens had existed before the creation of Adam, while Archbishop James
Ussher’s (1581-1656) *Annales veteris et novi Testamenti* had given dates for the Creation, the Flood, and the building of the Tower of Babel which were at odds with Chinese chronology. By adopting the chronology of the Septuagint, Leibniz was able to reconcile the Christian genealogy of nations with handed-down accounts of Chinese descent; in particular, the whole of Chinese history could be placed temporally after the Flood (p. 177).

The topic of Christian and Chinese chronology is also taken up in Wenchao Li’s illuminating contribution to *Leibniz und das Judentum* (‘Leibniz, der Chronologiestreit und die Juden in China’). He points out that Leibniz agreed with Yves Pezron (1639-1706) that preference should be given to the Septuagint when calculating Christian chronology, though he rejected the Cistercian abbot’s claim that the Jews had intentionally falsified the chronology in the Hebrew text in order to harm the Christians (pp. 197, 199). The importance which Leibniz attached to the reconciliation of the two chronologies is a measure of his estimation of Chinese intellectual and religious heritage. Moreover, Leibniz’s interest in this topic was strengthened on hearing of the existence of an ancient Jewish community in China. He hoped that it might be possible to discover a different version of the Old Testament used by that community and to compare it with the Hebrew text used in Europe (p. 203).

### IV. Ancient theology and universal language

Other scholars thought that an ancient theology (prisca theologia) contained the kernel of divine revelation before the Patriarchs and that it even pre-dated the Cabbala. The latter was, however, seen as containing the key to understanding the New Testament and as thus representing a suitable tool for the conversion of the Jews. An example of this view is provided by the eminent theologian Johann Franz Budde (1667-1729), on whom Rüdiger Otto’s informative article (‘Johann Franz Buddes Verständnis der Kabbala’) focuses. Budde, who was apparently inspired by Knorr von Rosenroth, effectively demolished arguments against the antiquity of the Jewish Cabbala, such as those put forward by Johann Buxtorf the elder (1564-1629), and claimed that its basis was properly divine revelation (p. 231). He also rejected claims that the Cabbala was incomprehensible or atheistic by seeking to show its presence in the New Testament, while at the same time distinguishing, like Leibniz, between the true ancient Cabbala and the false modern texts going under the same name. Budde’s views were subjected to fierce criticism by the failed
university professor Johann Georg Wachter (1673-1757), who in Der Spinozismus im Jüdenthumb sought to identify the cabbalistic roots of Baruch de Spinoza (1632-77) and therefore implicitly accused contemporary Judaism of being atheistically inclined. Wachter, who later modified his own position somewhat, responded to Budde by himself claiming that the latter’s true Cabbala was not to be found in any book and that only the barest traces had survived (p. 238).

Leibniz in contrast to many if not most of his contemporaries rejects the idea that Hebrew was the Adamic language or lingua primitiva. While others sought to reduce all languages to Hebrew, Leibniz felt that it did not evince the necessary linguistic harmony and that it had in any case become very corrupted over the ages, precluding any exact investigation. Likewise he rejected the view, held for example by Francis Mercurius van Helmont (1614-99), that Hebrew was not only the language of creation, but also that it was a natural language in which words both express and represent the essential natures of things. Contemporary discussions on the origin of Hebrew thus inform his own ideas on the concept of Lingua universalis or Ars characteristica. However, as Cook shows, Leibniz did not believe that Hebrew possessed ‘real characters’ of the kind contemporary thinkers like John Wilkins (1614-72) and George Dalgarno (1626?-87) had postulated, or that it was linguistically or logically primitive, and he consequentially denied that Hebrew could serve as a possible candidate for a universal language. A much more plausible model for an Ars characteristica was in his view to be found in Chinese (p. 138).

V. Changing social status of Jews in Europe

Even in learned circles in seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century Europe there was an ambivalent attitude towards Jews. While appreciating the importance of handed-down Jewish texts and commentaries, Leibniz’s contemporaries often harbored deep-rooted prejudices toward members of the Jewish communities themselves. The Peace of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years War in 1648, granted religious tolerance to Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans in the new European order, but Jews were generally not tolerated and had to be invited to settle in any city or town by the ruling prince or king. This led to the emergence of a social type called the court Jew, who in return for providing a service, most commonly as a banker, was entitled to settle with his extended family nearby, and also to have a synagogue and a rabbi. Thus most Jewish communities were
tolerated for the financial benefits they provided; such Jews would receive letters of protection from their ruler, which protection, however, did little to endear them to their Christian neighbors.

Brigitte Saouma in her fine article (‘Les origines médiévales de la pensée de Leibniz sur les juifs et le judaïsme’) argues that Leibniz’s attitude towards the Jews and Judaism was largely shaped through his knowledge of medieval theology. Looking at St Augustine (354-430), she finds that the church father’s polemics against the Jews in *Tractatus adversus Judaeos* set the tone for much of the Middle Ages. St Augustine sought to demonstrate the decrepitude of Jewish law and effectively establish that the conversion of the Jews was a fundamental prerequisite for the survival of Christianity (p. 118). Such doctrines provided the pretext for many a massacre, but they also suggested the need for protecting Jewish communities – such protection came, however, at a substantial financial cost. Jews were for hundreds of years not considered as guardians of divine law, but rather as sworn opponents of that law. Indeed, this only changed in the early modern era, when Christian theologians discovered rabbinical literature (pp. 119-20).

Leibniz, as Saouma points out, subscribes to medieval tradition when he reiterates the need for princes to protect their Jews. Thus, in a letter to Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels (1623-93) of 4/14 March 1685, he states that he is in complete agreement that the Jews be treated “with great gentleness”, and adds that “there is no race more noble than that of the Jews, since the messiah descended from them, not to speak of the Patriarchs and the Apostles”. Leibniz never accuses the Jews of the murder of Christ, as St Augustine did, nor does he evoke the need for their conversion, but nevertheless he refrains from placing Judaism on an equal level with Christianity. For him one of the principal aims of returning to the Jewish sources of the Christian faith was to re-establish the unity of Christianity itself (p. 124).

In contrast to the German states, already during Leibniz’s lifetime Jews in the Low Countries enjoyed full civil and religious rights. Hiltrud Wallenborn in her article (‘Hugo Grotius und die Lage der Juden in den Niederlanden’) charts the development of this enlightened state of affairs from the beginnings of the seventeenth century, when Sephardic Jews, streaming into Holland from Germany and elsewhere, were attacked by Dutch Calvinists and Catholics alike. Under these circumstances, the Amsterdam Burgomeister and pensionary Adriaan Pauw (1581-1653) and the Rotterdam lawyer and pensionary Hugo de Groot (1583-1645) were asked to draw up new Jewish legislation. Grotius sought to place the co-existence of Christians and Jews on a new foundation, but he was nevertheless
not averse to citing traditional anti-Jewish prejudices in the process. In a passage from his *Remonstrantie*, which Wallenborn unhelpfully quotes only in the original Dutch, Grotius claims that the Jews in general “have had a custom to torture and to crucify to death a Christian man or child, not only to satisfy their hatred, but also to mock therewith the Christian faith”. Wallenborn points out that such remarks indicate how far traditional anti-Jewish sentiments were relevant to Grotius, but she fails to reconcile this adequately with the great Dutch lawyer’s wider aims of achieving peace between the Christian and Jewish communities. Grotius’s proposals were never enacted in word, but the General States eventually enforced a policy towards the Jews along similar lines to those set out by him. The success of this, she suggests, is no more evidently demonstrated than through the completion of the Portuguese synagogue in Amsterdam in 1675 (p. 87).

A portrait of the situation of Jews in Hanover in Leibniz’s time is painted by Rotraud Ries (‘Die Residenzstadt Hannover als Kommunikationszentrum für Juden und Christen um 1700’). The community there could claim continuity over many generations, but it was by no means large: she suggests that it at most comprised ten to twelve households. Their rights were heavily restricted, but they were certainly not subjected to the repressive regime which could, for instance, be found in Dresden at that time (p. 57). Thus Jews were not permitted to settle in the old town of Hanover, but could take up residence and conduct business in the adjoining new town. Nor did they fail to leave their mark. Indeed, some went on to achieve considerable influence, such as the court Jew Leffmann Behrens (1634-1714), who rose to become the most important banker in Hanover (p. 63).

**VI. Leibniz, Levi and Spinoza**

The contrasting nature of Jewish life in the Low Countries and Germany is in part reflected in the contributions by Ursula Goldenbaum and Christoph Schulte, on Spinoza and Raphael Levi (1685-1779) respectively. Goldenbaum in her lucid article (‘Judaeus Amstelodami?’) points out that Judaism never played a central role in Leibniz’s dealings with the author of the *Ethics*. Spinoza saw himself primarily as an enlightened philosopher rather than as a Jewish author. And when Leibniz read his Commentary on Descartes’ *Principia philosophiae*, and similarly Spinoza’s anonymously-published *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, he did not suspect that the author might be Jewish. As far as the *Tractatus* was concerned, Leibniz was impressed by the clear methodological approach as well as by the sound knowledge.
of biblical writings and commentaries it displayed (p. 23). Spinoza’s emphasis on grasping the original sense of ancient texts was very much to Leibniz’s mind.

Spinoza was convinced of the divine nature of Holy Scripture, as particularly expressed in the doctrine of brotherly love, and he suggested that ignorance of Hebrew was the cause of fundamental difficulties in interpretation. This could scarcely count as controversial. In contrast, Spinoza’s attacks on the biblical miracles were anathema to Leibniz. Goldenbaum reminds us that Leibniz in his *Commentatiuncula* opposed Spinoza precisely on the point of Christian mysteries. These were, he suggested, conveyed to men as fundamentally incomprehensible secrets, in which they were obliged to believe. Nor was this to be considered as blind belief. Not only were the mysteries directly relevant to salvation, men could not, as Leibniz recognized, form clear judgments on things which they did not understand – this is the reason why he was so keen to provide possible proofs of the Christian mysteries. But this raises the question of what is to be done, when the original text is unclear due to the ambiguity of Hebrew. Leibniz is reserved in his criticism of Spinoza, Goldenbaum proposes, precisely because of the deficits in his own understanding of the original biblical language. In fact, together with Johann Christian von Boineburg (1622-72), he sought to find suitable Hebrew scholars in order to produce a thorough refutation of Spinoza’s *Tractatus*, which he saw as constituting an immanent threat to Christianity (p. 29).

Interestingly, even with this in mind, Leibniz avoided the use of Spinoza’s name in public – he refers to him in his correspondence with others simply to the author of the “Libellus de libertate philosophandi”. Goldenbaum suggests that in adopting this course, Leibniz consciously sought to prevent endangering the Dutch philosopher (p. 33).

In contrast to Spinoza, the name of Raphael Levi is scarcely known, even among Leibniz scholars. Yet he was a close associate of the Hanoverian mathematician and philosopher in the final years of his life and can justly be regarded as Leibniz’s disciple, even though he went on to produce work of an independent nature which does not fit into a narrow Leibnizian mould. Above all, there is probably no other Jew apart from Levi who enjoyed close contact to Leibniz on a regular basis. It is also said, but cannot be proven, as Schulte sets out in his contribution (‘Leibniz und sein “Schüler” Raphael Levi’), that Levi was present when Leibniz’s body was carried to his grave on the night of 15 November 1716 – an event almost completely ignored both by the city authorities and the Hanoverian court alike (p. 36).

Already as a young man Levi taught himself subjects such as physics and mathematics, as well as Latin and French. On recommendation, Leibniz employed
him for six years, possibly as a secretary or amanuensis. Leibniz for his part gave Levi private instruction, probably in mathematics. Furthermore, it is likely that Levi lived in Leibniz’s house in the Schmiedestrasse during this time, although this would have contravened regulations prohibiting Jews to live in the old town of Hanover. It is unclear what Leibniz would have stood to gain from this relationship. Schulte speculates, not unreasonably, that Leibniz might have sought to acquire more insight into Jewish life and the Jewish intellectual tradition (p. 40). Without doubt, Levi, who called upon fellow Jews to follow his example in the pursuit of knowledge of mathematics and the natural sciences, gained Leibniz’s respect and friendship. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than through the fact that he eventually presented him with his now well-known portrait by Andreas Scheits (c.1655-1735).

VII. Changing attitudes toward Jews in Lutheranism

Philosemitism was rare among Leibniz’s contemporaries. An exception to the rule is Johann Christoph Wagenseil (1635-1705), who, as we learn from Peter Blastenbrei (‘Pionier zwischen Theologie und früher Aufklärung: Johann Christoph Wagenseil (1633-1705)’) had a lifelong interest in all facets of Jewish life and also translated substantial parts of the Talmud. Wagenseil was sometime professor of oriental languages at the University of Altdorf, which can be seen as the center of Hebrew studies in Germany at the time. Not only did he enjoy the friendship of many Jewish scholars, he also turned away from the often-discussed Cabbala and instead focused on the Talmud, which he sought to defend against the charge of blasphemy (p. 254). Furthermore, Wagenseil sought consciously to promote the co-existence of Christians and Jews by rejecting the legend of Jewish ritual murders. Interestingly, he was attacked precisely for this reason by the editor of the Leipzig journal *Monathliche Unterredungen*, Ernst Wilhelm Tentzel (1659-1707), who lacking knowledge of the Jewish tradition and the Hebrew language asked Leibniz to assist him in the ensuing controversy, Leibniz however declined, saying it would be better for Tentzel to seek a peaceful resolution (p.257).

An essential part of the background to this and other controversies concerning Judaism is to be found in the work of Martin Luther (1483-1546). As Johannes Wallmann makes clear in his article (‘Das Luthertum und die Juden in der Leibnizzeit’), Luther’s early writings were conspicuously friendly toward the Jews. Indeed, his confessional writings contrast remarkably with those of Jean
Calvin (1509-64), which contain passages condemning Judaism. However, Luther’s attitude changed in the course of his life; his later writings are decidedly antisemitic. Instead of a program of tolerance, he now advocated that Christian states should not admit Jews at all (p. 263). In the second half of the sixteenth century Lutheran theologians still quoted the later Luther with corresponding consequences. Things began to change in the seventeenth century, when the intensive study of rabbinical literature began. Spiritual renewal of Lutheranism in the form of Pietism eventually encouraged a more sympathetic attitude toward the Jews, even if Pietists never lost sight of the goal of bringing about the conversion of the Jews. Eventually, the Lutheran theologian Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705) would propose ascribing to Jews rights of residence and worship alongside their Christian neighbors on the basis of Pietist principles (p. 275).

VIII. Conclusion

*Leibniz und das Judentum* contains much to recommend it, as the foregoing comments should indicate. The articles cover a wide range of topics, documenting the many different aspects of Leibniz’s relation not only to Jews but also to Jewish intellectual and religious tradition. A large number of the contemporary figures discussed is rarely mentioned elsewhere in the secondary literature on Leibniz – for example the orientalist Hermann von der Hardt (1660-1746), with whom Hartmut Rudolph’s article (‘Hinweise in Leibniz’ Korrespondenz mit Hermann von der Hardt’) is concerned. Regrettably, though, the quality of the contributions is somewhat uneven and the relevance of their content to Leibniz is occasionally restricted to no more than a few perfunctory remarks. For example, Ries, after giving no more than an adequate account of learned Jews in Hanover, tells us that Leibniz was a learned Christian who happened to know Gerhard Molanus (?-1710), the abbot of Loccum, who in turn possessed Christian and Hebrew writings in his library (pp. 66-7). A more substantial relation between the learned Jews of Hanover and that city’s famous philosopher and mathematician is not established. Likewise, Wallenborn seeks to incorporate Leibniz into her article on Grotius by suggesting that he might have used his stay in Amsterdam on the way back from London in 1676 to do some sightseeing, perhaps taking in the new Portuguese synagogue. Neither of these attempts to establish a Leibnizian connection to Jews and Judaism is particularly convincing. As if such deficiencies were not enough, important opportunities to provide real insight into Leibniz’s reception of Jewish...
intellectual and religious tradition are missed. For example, although Otto provides an informative account of Budde and Wachter, which contains a wealth of often very long footnotes (one covers almost two entire pages of the book), he does not mention, and indeed does not seem to be aware, that Leibniz wrote a refutation of Wachter’s *Elucidarius cabalisticus*, to which Foucher de Careil unfortunately gave the title *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza*. In fact, this particular work of Leibniz, which some modern-day scholars would regard as one of his more important writings on a Jewish theme – of which there are incidentally very few – is not mentioned anywhere in *Leibniz und das Judentum*. The reviewer will not be alone in finding this omission hard to comprehend.

Annoyingly, the editors speak somewhat cryptically in their Introduction (written in English) of “our conference”, but neglect to inform the reader of its date, location or indeed its precise theme. They also refer to a “controversial public discussion” at that conference, but again provide no insight into what might have occasioned this controversy or what it concerned (p. 17) – as if *Leibniz und das Judentum* were only intended for those who had actually been there. The reviewer also noted a large number of typographical errors and mistakes in typesetting. For example, only two of the many titles of publications cited by Riley are set in italics, and a number of larger quotations set apart from the main body of the text contain editorial interventions which either should not be there at all or at least suitably marked as such (e.g. pp. 79, 204, 219). Also, the Cambridge Hebraist and biblical scholar John Lightfoot (1602-75) is incorrectly referred to a number of times as “Lightfood” (pp. 215, 216, 281).

But no book ever leaves the press in a perfect state. The errors mentioned are minor and in no way detract from what must be seen as a useful contribution to current-day Leibniz scholarship. *Leibniz und das Judentum* contains a wealth of information on a topic which has been scarcely investigated up to now. The reviewer comes away feeling enriched and enlightened, and the editors are to be warmly congratulated on this achievement.

Philip Beeley
University of Oxford
Centre for Linguistics and Philology
Walton Street
Oxford OX1 2HG
philip.beeley@linacre.ox.ac.uk


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Notes

1 *Nouveaux Essais* III, 9, §10, GP V, 316f.: “Quand les Latins, les Grecs, les Hebreux et les Arabes seront epuisés un jour, les Chinois, pourveus encor d’anciens livres, se mettront sur les rangs et fourniront de la matiere à la curiosité de nos Critiques. Sans parler de quelques vieux livres des Persans, des Armeniens, des Coptes et des Bramines, qu’on deterrera avec le temps, pour negliger aucune lumiere que l’antiquité pourroit donner par la tradition des doctrines et par l’histoire des faits. Et quand il n’y auroit plus de livre ancien à examiner, les langues tiendront lieu de livres et ce sont les plus anciens monumens du Genre humain.”

2 See for example Leibniz to Burnet, 22 November 1695, GP III, 165.

3 See Leibniz to the Landgraf Ernst, 4/14 March 1685, A I, 4, 358: “Je suis tout à fait d’accord sur ce point et croy qu’on doit traiter les Juifs avec beaucoup de douceur, et même quelquefois je me suis estonné du dereglement de nostre goust en fait d’estime. Il n’y a point de race plus noble que celle des Juifs puisque le Messie en est issu, sans parler des Patriarches et Apostres”.

