Introduction

The latest Berlin-Academy volume of Leibniz’ “General Political and Historical Correspondence (A I, 20),” covering the period June 1701-March 1702, and consisting of no fewer than 495 items, throws great illumination (as ever) on Leibniz’ political, moral, jurisprudential, religious, cultural, and historical thought. Since, however, a treatment of all 495 pieces is out of the question, it seems reasonable to concentrate attention on three especially important groups of representative letters: those between Leibniz and Queen Sophie-Charlotte of Prussia (the former philosophy-pupil of the great Hannoverian); those between Leibniz and François Pinsson of the Parlement of Paris (sustaining Leibniz’ French philosophical-political connection established in the 1670s and sustaining especially Leibniz’ rapport with Pierre Bayle); and those between Leibniz and the Scottish nobleman Thomas Burnett of Kemney, the relative of Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury (who was the greatest Anglican defender of the 1688 “Glorious Revolution,” as well as an extravagant admirer of Leibniz’ genius).

With some brief consideration of a few lesser pieces (such as Leibniz’ by-now-faltering irenical correspondence with Bossuet concerning the charitable restoration of “Christendom”), a fairly rounded picture of Leibniz’ astonishingly multi-faceted achievements—not least his celebrated jurisprudence universelle of “wise charity” and “universal benevolence”—will begin to emerge into the light.

I. Leibniz and Queen Sophie-Charlotte of Prussia

For Leibniz’ theory of knowledge (including especially practical knowledge of “what ought to be”), his letter of March 29 1702 to Queen Sophie-Charlotte of Prussia is crucial: for it announces the very important Platonizing essay, “Letter concerning what is independent of the senses and of matter” which Leibniz was writing and re-writing (and finally preparing to give to the Queen in person in
When your Majesty had me read that nice letter on the senses [perhaps a paper by John Toland]. . . I set myself straight away to commit to writing certain thoughts on this subject, which in my opinion could serve to make up for that which the author had passed over . . . sometimes at the expense of the truth. I then wanted to read to your Majesty what I had written about this . . . since one can better resolve difficulties when one is present at the reading of his work. Nonetheless I shall hazard the sending of this paper . . . [in which] I strive to explain clearly things which are obscure by their nature, since it is true that that which one can neither represent nor paint does not satisfy the imagination.  

That final Plato-echoing complaint about the unreliability of the arts⁴ ("representation/painting/obscurity/imagination") for any recherche de la vérité leads to Leibniz’ broader and deeper Platonism in his full “paper” for Sophie-Charlotte: in his definitive paper for the Queen, indeed, Leibniz, uses Platonism to defeat the Lockean (and even Aristotelian) notion that there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses;⁴ that, for Leibniz, is almost as bad as the “Hobbism” which treats mind as an epiphenomenon of matter (“the mind is none other than a motion of certain parts of the organic body”⁵)—the Hobbism which also treats all “conceptions” (universally) as caused by the “pressure” of “outward objects” (“Hobbes speaks as if it were possible to derive memory, intellect, will and consciousness from [bodily] magnitude, shape and motion alone”⁶). But, Leibniz says tartly in *Quid sit Idea*, “I take it to be certain that the mind is something else than the brain.”⁷

“This thought of ‘I,’” Leibniz urges in his full paper, “who distinguishes himself from sensible objects, and of my own action which results from it, adds something to the objects of the senses”—such as the idea of moral necessity, which the senses will never “see.” And since, he continues, “I conceive that other beings can also have the right to say ‘I’ (or one could say it for them), it is by this that I conceive what is called substance in general”; and it is also “the consideration of myself which furnishes me with other notions of metaphysics, such as cause, effect, action, similitude, etc., and even of logic and of morality.” Thus, Leibniz insists, one can say that “there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or he who understands.”⁸

With that last sentence, which sums up the main thrust of the *Nouveaux Essais* (written only slightly later), Leibniz at once reaffirms an adequate notion of a rational substance—as a being who has the “right” to say “I” (a moral entitlement) and
who does not just passively receive “impressions” in the manner of a plant—and justifies Greek antiquity against English modernity.

“Being itself, and truth, are not entirely learned through the senses,” Leibniz goes on to say. “For it would not be impossible that a creature have long and ordered dreams, resembling our life, such that all that one believed to perceive through the senses would only be pure appearances” (what he elsewhere calls “well-founded phenomena”). It is for this reason that “we need, then, something beyond the senses, which distinguishes the true from the apparent.” But here, Leibniz hopes, “the truth of the demonstrative sciences” such as mathematics, logic, and ethics may “serve to judge the truth of sensible things.” For as “able philosophers both ancient and modern” have correctly remarked, even if “all that I believe that I see should be only a dream,” it would nonetheless “remain always true that ‘I’ who think while dreaming would be something, and would think effectively in many ways, for which there must always be some reason.”

It is for these reasons, Leibniz continues, that “that which the ancient Platonists have remarked, is quite true and very worthy of being considered”—namely, that “the existence of intelligible things and particularly of this ‘I’ who thinks and which is called mind or soul is incomparably more certain than the existence of sensible things,” and that, therefore, “it would not be impossible, speaking with metaphysical rigor, that there should be at bottom only these intelligible substances, and that sensible things are only appearances.” But, Leibniz complains, our “lack of attention” makes us “take sensible things for the only true ones.”

And this is exactly the demi-Platonic language of the New Essays: “The qualities of mind are not less real than those of body. It is true that you do not see justice as you see a horse, but you understand it no less, or rather you understand it better.” Or, as Leibniz says in a letter to Thomas Burnett concerning the Theory of the Ideal and Intelligible World by the Platonizing English Malebranche-follower John Norris (who had also written a Divine Hymn on the Creation which “embroiders pleasantly and devoutly upon the theme of the Timaeus”): “I am almost of the sentiment of M. Norris . . . who maintains that the intellectual world is more certain than the sensible world.”

Leibniz then goes on, in his letter to Sophie-Charlotte, to stress the centrality of Plato’s Meno in understanding “ideas” (as he had already done in Discourse on Metaphysics XXVI); both geometrical and moral necessity, equally, … show that there is a light born within us. For since the senses and inductions

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could never teach us truths which are thoroughly universal, nor that which is absolutely necessary, but only that which is, and that which is found in particular examples; and since we nevertheless know necessary and universal truths of the sciences, a privilege we have above the brutes; it follows that we have derived these truths in part from what is within us. Thus we may lead a child to these by simple interrogations, after the manner of Socrates, without telling him anything, and without making him experiment at all upon the truth of what is asked of him. And this could very easily be practiced in numbers and other similar matters [e.g. ethics].

Very radically, Leibniz goes on to assert that one need not even be awake to see that the “English” view of knowledge (including moral knowledge) and of learning cannot be right: it is a *philosophie trop materielle* that is “directement opposé à la philosophie Platonicienne” (in the words of the *Nouveaux Essais*).

It is also good to notice that if I found some demonstrative truth, mathematical or otherwise, while dreaming (as can indeed happen), it would be just as certain as if I were awake. Which makes it clear how much intelligible truth is independent of the truth or existence of sensible and material things outside of us.

Leibniz then, having stressed the necessity of mathematics, insists that the necessity of morality is “seen” through extra-sensory *lumière naturelle*: “for example, one can say that there are charitable people who are not just, which happens when charity is not sufficiently regulated . . . . For in justice is comprised at the same time charity and the rule of reason. It is by *lumière naturelle* also that one recognizes the axioms of mathematics.” (That “also” is revelatory.) “Necessary truths,” Leibniz urges, are known only by *lumière naturelle*: “for the senses can very well make known, in some sort, what is, but they can not make known what ought to be, or could not be otherwise.” As usual, Leibniz as demi-Platonist uses, back to back, moral and mathematical examples of what rational “substances” know— *à priori*, though not indeed pre-natally—through “natural light,” independently of sense impressions. The Plato of *Meno* and *Phaedo* is largely supported, Locke broadly criticized. (Hence Leibniz could only agree with his correspondent Père Joachim Bouvet when the Jesuit China-expert insisted that “the ancient philosophy of China” was “legitimate and solid” precisely because it was “*si conforme à la philosophie du divin Platon*” [A I, 20, No. 329]. And this in turn reminds us that in Leibniz’ *Novissima Sinica* the only important philosophical work discussed at all is Plato’s *Meno*.)


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In the end Locke is subjected, in the 1702 letter to Sophie-Charlotte, to a weaker version of the criticism which Leibniz had leveled against Hobbes: that British “empiricism,” with its passive notion of a material substance which is only receptive, cannot account for (a) the *conceivability* of moral ideas (“what ought to be”); (b) the notion of a self with the “right to say ‘I’”; (c) the self-determining monadic activity (going beyond passive receptivity) of a self-so-conceived. This shows again (if further proof were needed) that for Leibniz an adequately conceived substance or monad is the *substratum* of all further reasoning about morality, justice and religion.\(^{18}\) Thus the “monadology” is the foundation of *ius in caritas sapientis*: only a rational substance can know the “idea” of “what ought to be” through *lumière naturelle*, and then strive to bring it about.

The sheer range and “reach” of *lumière naturelle* is astonishing in Leibniz: as he says in the crucial *Unvorgreiflliche Gedancken*, which he re-worked three times between 1697 and 1712,

> Natural philosophy, which lies in the knowledge of God, of the soul, of minds, comes from natural light: it does not show itself therefore only in revealed theology, but serves as the unshakable base of the immense edifice of jurisprudence [*Rechtslehre*], of natural right, of the law of nations, of public law, of politics—in a word of the laws of all countries.\(^{19}\)

Leibniz’ reliance on extra-sensory *lumière naturelle* and (especially) on Platonic geometrizing “eternity” and “necessity” in sorting out “what ought to be” (in the realm of *justice universelle*)—while simultaneously rejecting any Hobbesian notion of “natural dominion” grounded in “irresistible power” (*Leviathan* ch. 31)—has been best understood by Ernst Cassirer in his magnificent *Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1932). For Cassirer saw Leibniz as Leibniz saw himself (in the *Méditation* on justice): as Plato *contra* Thrasymachus-Hobbes, as right *contra* might:

> The thinkers of this [Enlightenment] era are never satisfied with the consideration of conventional historical law; they go back rather to “the laws we were born with.” But in the justification and defense of this type of law they return to our most ancient legal heritage, to Plato’s radical formulation . . . of the relationship between right and might. . . . After more than two thousand years the eighteenth century established direct contact with the thinking of antiquity . . . . The two fundamental theses represented in Plato’s *Republic* by Socrates and Thrasymachus oppose each other again.\(^{20}\)

Leibniz the jurisconsult, for Cassirer, inherited jurisprudential Platonism (as found


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in Gorgias and Republic) from the “classical humanism” of Hugo Grotius’ De Iure belli ac Pacis (1625), and conveyed that (slightly chastened) Platonic “light” into the German Enlightenment (Lumières, Aufklärung)—where, in a still more chastened “critical” version, it also did much to shape Kant’s practical thought (Critique of Pure Reason A 314/B 371, on Plato’s Republic). Leibniz, Cassirer urges, …was merely drawing a clear and definite conclusion from an idea stemming from [Plato and] Grotius when he declared that jurisprudence belongs to those disciplines which do not depend on experience, but on definitions, not on facts, but on strictly logical proof. For experience could never reveal what law and justice are in themselves. Both concepts involve the concept of a correspondence, a harmony and proportion, which would remain valid even if it were never realized in a single concrete instance, if there were no one to exercise justice and no one toward whom it could be extended. Law is in this respect like pure arithmetic; for the teachings of arithmetic concerning the nature of numbers and their relations imply an eternal and necessary truth which would not be affected, even if the whole empirical world were destroyed and there were no one to count with numbers and no objects to be counted. In the preface to his masterpiece Grotius’ argument centers around the same comparison and analogy.21

In Philosophy of the Enlightenment Cassirer was thinking of (and paraphrasing) Leibniz’ very early (1669-70) Elementa Iuris Naturalis, in which the 23-year-old author of New Method of Teaching and Learning Jurisprudence Platonizingly insisted that:

The doctrine of right belongs to those sciences that are not built on experiments but on definitions, not on the senses but on demonstrations according to reason; it deals with questions, as we say, of law and not of fact [juris non facti]. Since justice consists in a certain harmony and proportion, its meaning remains independent of whether anybody actually does justice to others, or conversely is treated justly. The same holds for numerical relationships …. Hence it is not surprising that the propositions of these sciences possess eternal truth.22 And these mathematical and jurisprudential “sciences,” he adds, “also do not take their point of departure from the senses, but from a clear and distinct intuition or, as Plato called it, Idea, a word which itself signifies discernment or definition.”

Leibniz, of course, was still making roughly this same point to the Queen of Prussia in 1702—as he was also making it a year later to her philosophical mother Electress Sophie in the Méditation on justice, in which Leibniz identifies himself

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with Plato in the opening lines, then reduces Hobbes once again to Thrasymachus within three paragraphs.\textsuperscript{23} And this shows that Leibniz’ “global Platonism” (in the apt words of René Sève\textsuperscript{24}) was not merely or mainly early: indeed there is an “accelerating Platonism” in the older Leibniz, culminating in the 1702 letter, in \textit{Nouveaux Essais} of 1704 (“Plato” contra Locke, sooner than Hobbes), and in the 1714 Vienna lecture, “On the Greeks.”

Cassirer defended Leibniz and “right” against “the Leviathan state” and “might”: and it is no accident that Cassirer wrote the Preface to \textit{Enlightenment} (October 1932) when he thought that a new Thrasymachus (or Callicles) was about to march up Unter den Linden to destroy the “enlightened” but doomed left-Kantian Weimar Republic. (And, indeed, Cassirer, Kant and Leibniz would join together in the “Weimar” sentiments of Thomas Mann’s \textit{Goethe} novel, in which the sister of Schopenhauer is made to say that “enthusiasm is beautiful, but only with the Enlightenment [\textit{Aufklärung}] which reins in evil passions.”)\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{II. Leibniz and Pierre Bayle}

Of great interest is a letter to Leibniz (A I, 20, No. 135) from the Parisian \textit{Parlement}-advocate and all-round \textit{littérateur} François Pinsson (c.1645 - c.1707)—a letter which reveals the range and depth of Leibniz’ French and Francophile connections. (“I am exchanging letters with Herr Pinsson, a learned lawyer in the \textit{Parlement} [of Paris], who also has extensive correspondence with other learned people.”\textsuperscript{26}). Pinsson knew what would catch Leibniz’ attention: one part of his letter says that he gives Leibniz’ compliments “incessantly” to the Abbé Nicaise, with whom Leibniz had an invaluable correspondence over the nature of “pure love” and over the Bossuet-Fénelon “quietism” controversy in 1697-98\textsuperscript{27} (a discussion central to Leibniz’ celebrated definition of justice as \textit{caritas sapientis}); another part of the same letter praises Jean Domat’s \textit{Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel}, which Leibniz admired and annotated at length (saying that Roman law is nothing less than \textit{la raison écrite}).\textsuperscript{28}

But of greatest significance is Pinsson’s claim—while sending new French philosophy journals to Leibniz—that the \textit{philosophie nouvelle} of Pierre Bayle contains “matters [which are] to your taste.”\textsuperscript{29} (Pinsson had a regular correspondence with Bayle.) In his reply to Pinsson (A I, 20, No. 162) Leibniz discusses Locke, Stillingfleet, Descartes, Lami, and St Anselm, but—very noticeably—\textit{not} Pierre Bayle. And this may be because Leibniz did not want to discuss—especially since
No. 162 was to be published in Paris—his quite complicated (and only partly favorable) view of Bayle’s “new philosophy” (a view which was to become still more complicated when he wrote the Théodicée). Still, given Leibniz’ substantial admiration for Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), which he called “le plus beau des dictionnaires” in the Nouveaux Essais, and given that Bayle’s skeptical worries provided the occasion (if not the deepest inspiration) for the writing of the Théodicée, it is appropriate to consider the Bayle-Leibniz rapport more closely.

If Bayle, in the second edition of the Dictionnaire, called Leibniz “l’un des plus grands esprits de l’Europe,” Leibniz himself had flattering things to say about the philosophe de Rotterdam—praising his Dictionary as “one of the finest and most useful of enterprises: opus Herculeum,” and urging that

I have not been able to keep myself from renewing the pleasure, which I had in earlier times, of reading with particular attention several articles from his excellent and rich Dictionary—among others those which concern philosophy, such as the articles on the Paulicians, Origen, Pereira, Rorarius, Spinoza, [and] Zeno. Never did an ancient Academician, without excepting Carneades, make the difficulties [of rationalist philosophy] more deeply felt.

To be sure, that last sentence distances Plato-inheriting, Augustine-loving Leibniz from Bayle’s demi-skeptical and quasi-Manichean doubts (since Leibniz embraces Cicero’s rejection of Carneades’ Epicurean theory of non-natural justice in the Codex Iuris Gentium of 1693; and one cannot honestly say that Leibniz would have relished every detail of Bayle’s political utterances, even if the two thinkers were (almost) as one in their acceptance of pluralistic diversity and in their wisely charitable rejection of intolerance and religious persecution. But Leibniz made caritas sapientis itself the heart of his jurisprudence universelle (“justice is the charity of the wise, that is, universal benevolence”), and urged that people find their pleasure or felicity in the “perfections” of others, while Bayle’s political psychology was too darkly Hobbesian for the Leibniz who could (and did) equate Hobbes with Thrasymachus in the Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice. Bayle, after all, had claimed in his Nouvelles de la république des letters (May 1685), in an essay well-known by Leibniz, that

...that which brought men to form societies was nothing else than fear. It is commonly imagined that there is a natural inclination for society in the soul of man, and that it is from this inclination, based on the friendship which men mutually bear one another, that commonwealths arise. But one must
know the heart of man very little not to see that he loves independence above all things...from which it follows that he would never have entered into the obligation to do a thousand disagreeable things...if he had not foreseen that this was necessary in order to avoid a greater evil, namely the danger of being pillaged and murdered.\textsuperscript{34}

Leibniz could certainly understand Bayle’s “Hobbesian” viewpoint, saying in a letter to Kettwig (November 1695) that “I recognize that men are constrained by reciprocal fear and by necessity to found and constitute a guardian power for society, to preserve that society”—but he immediately adds that “the source of this [guardianship] is love sooner than fear \textit{sed praeter metum amor}.\textsuperscript{35} (The insistence on “guardianship” and on “love” is as pro-Platonic as it is anti-Hobbesian.) For Hobbes was “not aware” (Leibniz complains in the \textit{Nouveaux Éssais}) that “the best men, free of all malice, would unite the better to attain their end, as birds flock together to travel in company.” And the reason that Hobbes was not aware of this truth is clear: “His initial step was false, namely to seek the origins of justice in the fear of evil rather than in concern for the good, as if men had to be wicked in order to be just.”\textsuperscript{36} (And Bayle himself builds upon “nothing else than fear.”) Rejecting the Hobbesian notion that what we “know” of God is simply that part of Scripture which an authorized civil sovereign has artificially \textit{made} legally “canonical” (to obviate religious war), Leibniz insists that “by the existence of God is suspended every state of nature which is rough \textit{[statum naturas rudis]} and bestial, of man left to himself, as well as the right of all against all; and the wise man can thus give free exercise to charity with safety, and bear witness to a good which is a refuge against evils.”\textsuperscript{37}

When Bayle, then, speaks in his \textit{Dictionary}-article on “King David” of “that fearfully confused state of nature, in which one recognizes only the law of the strongest,” Leibniz’ Platonic-Augustinian rejection of Hobbes’ “Thrasymachean” equation of rightful dominion with “irresistible power” (\textit{Leviathan} chapter 31) would \textit{separate} him from Bayle. But, \textit{en revanche}, Leibniz’ virtually proto-Kantian “religion within the limits of reason alone” (in the ecumenically rationalist Preliminary Dissertation of the \textit{Théodicée}) would tie him warmly to Bayle’s insistence (again in “David”) that

the deep respect that we have for this great king and prophet should not prevent us from condemning the flaws [e.g. the killings of Uriah and of Nabal] that are to be found in his life. Otherwise we should give cause to secular people to reproach us by saying that for an action to be just, it is enough for it to be

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performed by people whom we venerate. Nothing could be more damaging
to Christian morals than that. It is important for the true religion that the lives
of the orthodox are judged by general ideas of rectitude and order.  

Even if Bayle and Leibniz did not share absolutely identical notions of la droiture
and of l’ordre (thought with respect to “order” they both owe something to the
Dialogue on Metaphysics of Malebranche⁹), they argue equally for the primacy
of timeless lumière naturelle—as against Bossuet’s fawning insistence in Politics
from Scripture that “David was filled only with great things, with God and the public
good,” so that “all the actions and all the words of David breathed forth something
so great, and in consequence so royal, that one need only read his life and hear his
speeches to have an idea of magnanimity.”⁴⁰ No more than Bayle did Leibniz favor
a Bossuetian politique tirée des propres paroles de Écriture sainte, in which Louis
XIV is the anointed “heir” of Saul, David and Solomon. For Leibniz, Louis XIV
was not Rex but Mars Christianissimus (“I can approve of his conduct neither as a
German nor as citoyen de l’univers”⁴¹); and the Bayle who had been chased out of
France by Louis’ revocation of the Edict of Nantes would have joined Leibniz in
finding grotesquely, horrifically funny Bossuet’s insistence that Huguenot-crushing
Louis was “the new Constantine-Theodosius.”⁴² (On this point, Bayle’s wonderfully
effective La France toute Catholique should be consulted.)

If Leibniz would have approved of most of Bayle’s “David” (its “Hobbism”
apart), he would also have cherished Bayle’s praise (in the article “Navarre”) of the
charitable magnanimity of Marguerite de Valois, sister of François Premier, who
did so much to protect Huguenots (and other religious “deviants”) from François’
erocious anti-Protestant persecutions; he would have approved Bayle’s calling
Michel de l’Hopital, Chancellor of France from 1560 to 1568, a “new Cicero” for
his heroic but failed effort to avert the religious wars which led to the massacre
of St. Bartholomew’s Day and finally to the assassination of Henri IV; he would
have seconded, above all, Bayle’s generously moderate treatment of Socinianism/
unitarianism—agreeing with Bayle that while Socinianism was technically a heresy,
nonetheless its insistence on God’s moral attributes was not merely misplaced.
In the Dictionary-article “Socinus,” Bayle had insisted that God’s “sovereign
goodness” matters more than sovereignty tout court, that

If the notion of God’s goodness is to be properly used, it must be accompanied
by the notion of greatness. And what is it, I pray you, if it is not magnanimity,
generosity, munificence, or the effusion of good? … In the Scriptures there
reigns, if I dare express myself so, a perpetual attempt to raise the goodness
of God above his other attributes. Doing good work and showing mercy is, according to the Scriptures, the daily and preferred work of God.\textsuperscript{43}

To be sure, Bayle could not see how this divine \emph{bonté} was reconcilable with evil (moral, physical and metaphysical) in the existing world; hence his flirtation with Manicheanism, which makes God good and just, but impotent. He could not accept the Leibnizian view that God justly permits the admission of evil as the \emph{conditio sine qua non} of the “best” possible world. (Why Leibniz’ \textit{ens perfectissimum} would create a world which is, at best, “best”, remains a grave problem in Leibnizian theodicy [“the justice of God”].)\textsuperscript{44} But Bayle and Leibniz clung, differently but equally, to that divine \emph{bonté}—Bayle through demi-Pascalian fideism, Leibniz through Platonic-Augustinian rationalism. And this will be even clearer, in Leibniz’ case, when the magisterial \textit{Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken} of 1698-1704 (which build on Plato’s \textit{Euthyphro}) are finally fully published—in \textit{Politische Schriften} vol. 7, c. 2010-2011.\textsuperscript{45}

Whatever his differences with Bayle, Leibniz could nonetheless write to the \textit{philosophe de Rotterdam} himself in 1702 (forthcoming in A I, 21) that “your immense factual researches [in the \textit{Dictionnaire}], which are with great justification admired, have in no way injured your beautiful reflections on the profounder parts of philosophy.”\textsuperscript{46} And Leibniz’ agreement/disagreement with Bayle continued through (and throughout) the \textit{Theodicée}, which finds Bayle at least half-right half of the time, and by no means as dangerous as Hobbes or certain hyper-Calvinist devotees of supralapsarian “tyranny” (such as Rutherford).

But Leibniz could not have included all the complexities of his very mixed view of Bayle in a mere response to Pinsson: hence the best of all possible replies was \textit{silence}. (That silence concerning Bayle would soon be broken, on a massive scale, by the \textit{Théodicée}—“the justice of God.”)

\textbf{III. Intimations of Theodicy}

Of special importance for Leibniz’ theory of \textit{Théodicée, theos-dike}, “the justice of God,” is his letter of January 1702 to Queen Sophie-Charlotte of Prussia [AI, 20, No. 414]; here Leibniz speaks of \textit{la justice du ciel}, “the justice of heaven” (a variant of \textit{theos-dike}) saying that

One must always be persuaded that God does everything for the best, although it is not possible for us—in the condition we find ourselves, and in which we see only a small part of things—to judge what is best suited to the universal
harmony. And this confidence in God which makes us content, and which
makes us believe that he makes everything succeed for the greatest well-being
of the good, is properly what could be called the faith of natural religion (which
goes as far beyond what one can see as does revealed [religion]).

To be sure, this characteristic 1702 letter echoes a much more familiar piece
(on which Leibniz was surely drawing), the great essay from 1697 called Radical
Origination of Things, in which Leibniz urges that “the world … is the best
respublica, through which as much happiness or joy is brought to souls as is
possible…[with] regard for justice.”

But, Leibniz continues, an objector to “justice” and bestness
…will say [that] we experience the contrary in this world, for often good
people are very unhappy, and not only innocent brutes but also innocent men
are afflicted and even put to death with torture; finally, the world, if you regard
especially the government of the human race, resembles a sort of confused
chaos rather than the well ordered work of a supreme wisdom…

Leibniz then, remembering his profession as a jurisconsult (“intimate counselor
of justice”), as a defender of Roman law as “written reason,” and as a definer of
moral theology as “divine jurisprudence,” goes on to say that
… in truth, as the [Roman] jurisconsults say, it is not proper to judge before
having examined the whole law. We know only a very small part of eternity
which extends into immensity; for the memory of the few thousands of years
which history transmits to us is indeed a very little thing. And yet from an
experience so short we dare to judge of the immense and of the eternal, like
men who, born and brought up in a prison… think that there is no other light
in the world than the lamp whose feeble gleam hardly suffices to direct their
steps.

With that deliberate echo of the “myth of the cave” in Republic Book VII, in
which darkness and illusion must yield to lumière naturelle (in the “ascent” towards
the sun), Leibniz goes on to urge that our limited “perspective” keeps us from
acknowledging the “bestness” and the justice of the world (a claim repeated in the
letter to the Queen of Prussia):

Let us look at a very beautiful picture, and let us cover it in such a way as to
see only a very small part of it, what else will appear in it…except a certain
confused mass of colors without choice and without art? And yet when we
remove the covering and regard it from the proper point of view we will see
that what appeared thrown on the canvas haphazardly has been executed with
It is Leibniz’ use of aesthetic similes and analogies in De Rerum Originatione radicali, and his insistence on “faith”, “confidence” and “belief” in his 1702 letter to Queen Sophie-Charlotte, which leads John Rawls to say, in his splendid Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, that Leibniz is “the great conservative (in a good sense)” after Thomas Aquinas—conservative in the sense that he doesn’t always strive to demonstrate “geometrically” the truth of Christianity, but often contents himself with showing that the “standard” objections to that ethos (e.g. those of Bayle) are not decisively ruinous.

But Leibniz, of course, rarely contents himself with mere “faith” and “confidence” in justice and “bestness”—and even in De Rerum Originatione radicali (if not in his letter to the Queen) he insists that the “ultimate origination” of things “must be in something which is metaphysically necessary”; that “there must exist some one Being metaphysically necessary, or whose essence is existence”; that “from eternal or essential or metaphysical truths, temporary, contingent on physical truths arise”; that “from the very fact that something exists rather than nothing” (cf. Principes de la nature de la grace, 1714, prop. 7), there must be an ens perfectissimum “in itself” whose essence entails existence.

This of course refers to St. Anselm’s “ontological proof of God”; and if by the early 1700s Leibniz often gave preference to an Augustinian “proof of God from the eternal verities”—necessary truths require a necessary Being, as in Nouveaux Essais IV, xi, 13, (“ces vérités nécessaires doivent être fondées dans l’existence d’une substance nécessaire”)—he nonetheless offered one of his most vigorous and subtle versions of Anselmian “ontological necessity” in one of his 1701 letters to François Pinsson: a letter (A I, 20 No. 162) on which he lavished special care, since it was to appear in Paris in the Mémoires pour l’histoire des sciences et des beaux arts (the so-called Mémoires de Trévoux).

In No. 162 Leibniz argues—in the manner of his 1684 essay, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis (Acta Eruditorum, Leipzig), which insisted that the Anselmian ontological proof is truly “demonstrative” only if “God’s possibility is already proven”—that Anselm’s proof is indeed “a demonstration,” since the possibility of an ens perfectissimum isn’t like the (impossible) “possibility” of “the greatest number” or “the swiftest motion.” With that divine possibility established, “one could say that the existence of God would be geometrically demonstrated à priori” from perfection alone.

But (Leibniz goes on in No. 162), for those who continue to fear that the derivation...
of divine existence from the idea of perfection alone might be “a sophism,”

... one could formulate a still simpler demonstration, by not speaking of
perfections at all ... [but] by saying only that God is Being-in-himself or
primary being (Ens a se), that is to say that he exists by his essence .... If
the necessary Being is possible, he exists. For the necessary Being and the
Being-by-his-essence are only one single thing.52

This view, for Leibniz, cannot be wrong: “for if the Ens a se is impossible, all
other beings are also impossible, since they exist finally only through the Ens a se.
Quod est Absurdum. .... If the necessary Being is not, there is no possible being at
all.”53 But this would involve the overthrow, not just of a justifiable “best” world,
but of any world at all; a justice universelle of caritas sapientis and benevolentia
universalis would not exist for God or man—because neither of them would be
“there.” And therefore if Leibniz wanted to say, in the final part (No. 90) of the
Monadologie (the summa of his thought) that the best world has a just “perfect
government,” he had first to establish (Monadologie No. 45) that “God alone (or
the necessary being) ... must exist if he is possible.” (But “perfect” government
requires caritas, which in turn is a sentiment de perfection; and “perfection”
derpins Leibniz’ entire philosophy.)

IV. Leibniz’ Letter to Thomas Burnett

The new vol. 20 of Leibniz’ “General Political and Historical Correspondence”
contains his most important purely “political” letter (to Thomas Burnett, 1701) which
is also valuable for its revelation of Leibniz’ devotion to a proto-Montesqueuenean
(or perhaps Ciceronian) moderation and reasonability in politics.

The end of political science with regard to the doctrine of forms of
commonwealths [républiques] must be to make the empire of reason flourish.
The end of monarchy is to make a hero of eminent wisdom and virtue reign...
The end of aristocracy is to give the government to the most wise and the most
expert. The end of democracy, or polity, is to make the people themselves
agree to what is good for them. And if one could have all three at once: a great
hero, very wise senators, and very reasonable citizens, that would constitute a
mixture of the three forms. Arbitrary power is what is directly opposed to the
empire of reason. But one must realize that this arbitrary power is found not
only in kings, but also in assemblies.... Thus one must think in this world of
laws which can serve to restrain not only kings, but also the deputies of the
people and judges.\textsuperscript{54}

What one notices immediately is the width of the gap between the opening sentence of this quotation and the rest of the passage. The paragraph begins with “Platonizing” radicalism: the “empire of reason,” taken literally, would require rule by the reason of the “wise few” ("golden" beings) who know “eternal moral verity” with geometrical certainty, and who rightfully control the “appetitive” many who would gladly subordinate “reason” to “brutish appetite” (\textit{Republic} IV, 443 a-e). But by the second sentence Leibniz retreats from his opening radicalism and settles for a Ciceronian “mixed government” (\textit{De Republica} Bk. III), in which monarchical, aristocratic and popular elements balance and counter-act each other—so that there is not so much “reason’s empire” as the (much more modest) avoiding of the “arbitrary” (as in Montesquieu’s “constitutionalism” in \textit{De l’esprit des lois}).\textsuperscript{55} (And in an earlier Platonizing letter to Burnett Leibniz had argued against Hobbesian natural equality in a “state of nature” by paraphrasing the \textit{Gorgias} [511-512]: “if several men found themselves in a single ship on the open sea, it would not be in the least conformable either to reason or nature, that those who understand nothing of sea-going claim to be pilots: such that, following natural reason, government belongs to the wisest.”)\textsuperscript{56}

In any case, arbitrary power was wholly rejected by Leibniz; liberty was as important to him as equality was problematical. But this love of liberty never led him to republicanism—though he was certainly aware of republicanism’s attractions, and of the fear it produced in monarchs: “all republics are odious in the eyes of kings … republics usually cause their neighbors to wish for comparable liberty; they tolerate all kinds of religions; the common good is the first object in their catechisms; they scarcely know corruption; they are the true seedbeds of men of genius.”\textsuperscript{57} Despite that encomium, he nonetheless insisted in the same 1701 letter to Burnett that “when one loves true liberty one is not a republican on that account, since one can find a more certain reasonable liberty when the king and the assemblies are linked by good laws, than when arbitrary power is in the king or in the multitude.” If one had to choose, however, between absolutism and popular “license,” Leibniz reluctantly but clearly preferred the former; “it is certain … that the absolute power of kings is more tolerable than the license of individuals, and that nothing is more certain to bring about tyranny than anarchy.”\textsuperscript{58}

Even if Leibniz preferred absolutism over anarchy—when those extremes are the only possibilities, when “the center cannot hold”\textsuperscript{59}—it remains true that he did not like to concentrate on power as the main attribute of rulers. In an important but
neglected work, the *Grundriss eines Bedenckens von Aufrichtung einer Societät in Deutschland* (*Foundation for a Proposal for the Establishment of a Society in Germany*), he drew his customary sharp distinction between reason and power, and observed that a harmony of mind and power is the foundation not only of beauty and of justice, but of true statesmanship: “if power is greater than reason, he who possesses it is either a lamb who cannot use it at all, or a wolf and a tyrant who cannot use it well.” On the other hand, the man in whom reason is greater than the power to use it is “overpowered.” Accordingly, Leibniz urged, “those to whom God has given reason without power … have the right to be counselors,” while those who have power alone “must listen patiently, and not throw good counsels to the winds.” What is ideal, however, is a union of power and reason within a single person: “Those to whom God has given at once reason and power in a high degree are heroes created by God to be the promoters of his will, as principal instruments.” Of the three ways of honoring God—through good words, good thoughts, and good actions—the last is best, and is accomplished (if ever) by moralists and statesmen; as “governors of the public welfare” they “strive not only to discover the brilliance of the beauty of God in nature,” but to imitate it. “To praises, to thoughts, to words, and to ideas, they add good works. They do not merely contemplate what he has done well, but offer and sacrifice themselves as instruments, the better to contribute to the general good and to that of men in particular.”¹⁶⁰ (This *Grundriss* is much more characteristic of Leibniz than the 1701 letter to Burnett: it privileges neither “absolutism” nor “anarchy,” but “good works” and the “general good” as matters of wisely loving justice.)

V. Conclusion: Leibniz and the Two Bishops

Vanishing time and contracting space permit only a brief consideration of Leibniz’ correspondence with two bishops: the one Catholic, French and eventually anti-Leibnizian (Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux), the other Anglican, Anglo-Scottish, and extravagantly pro-Leibnizian (Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury).

By 1701/2 Leibniz’ long-running irenical correspondence with M. de Meaux was in fact running down: Bossuet was old and increasingly uncompromising (finally calling Leibniz not just “opinionated” but a “heretic”); and the “Act of Settlement” conferring the English Crown on the House of Hannover (1701), however welcome, set back Leibniz’ life-long efforts at the charitable re-unification of “Christendom” — given that England had lately had a “Glorious Revolution” to

escape the restoration of Catholicism (in the person of James II) and now feared Catholic “universal monarchy” following Louis XIV’s swallowing up of Spain—a prospect that greatly agitated Leibniz himself, and led him to write a well-known *Manifesto* for Hapsburg rights in Iberia (1703).^61^ If Leibniz had once had great hopes that Bossuet would accommodate Protestants (and suspend doctrinal differences) to yield unity and peace grounded in *caritas*, by 1701/2 the Leibniz-Bossuet *Briefwechsel* had declined mainly into a quarrel over the “canonical” and authentic parts of Scripture. Bossuet had urged not merely that the *Book of Esther* might be apocryphal, but that the *Book of Daniel* probably was as well; in his letter to M. de Meaux of February 5, 1702 [A I, 20, No. 379] Leibniz complained that “those who have made difficulty over *Esther*” should back off and recognize that *Daniel* is “bien plus recommandable … que le livre d’Esther”—probably because *Daniel* contains a passage concerning justice which Leibniz cherished (as Dante had also cherished it in *Paradiso*). *Daniel* had urged that “those who love” justice will “shine like the stars”; and that exact combination of *caritas*, *iustitia* and science (also found in Leibniz’ memorial poem for Christiaan Huygens) mattered too much for Leibniz’ distinctive concept of *iustitia universalis* for him to let Bossuet exclude *Daniel* from the Canon—merely because (as Leibniz says) “a small fragment of *Daniel*…is not found in the Hebrew [text].”^62^ Here, as usual, Leibniz privileges *lumière naturelle* over Scriptural literalism: the ethical doctrine of *Daniel* is right, and that is what matters. (At this point, and on this point, Leibniz and Pierre Bayle overlap completely.) It is not surprising, then, that Leibniz could write to the dowager Duchess of Braunschweig-Lüneburg (February 1702) that “M. l’Éveque de Meaux … does not show the best disposition in the world for peace,” and that discussion with him should continue only so that “others will take the trouble to do better.”^63^ Much happier and much more satisfying was Leibniz’ correspondence with Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury: partly because Leibniz and Burnet were in basic theological and political agreement—Burnet had urged the English envoy Lord Macclesfield to cultivate and honor Leibniz while bringing the “Act of Settlement” to Hannover—but above all because Leibniz could not fail to be charmed and gratified by the praise of a very prominent English public figure just when his relations with the Newtonians and the Royal Society were about to take an unhappy turn. Bishop Burnet wrote to Leibniz in June/July 1701 that I know I cannot do the Earle of Macclesfield a more usefull as well as a more acceptable service than to introduce him into the acquaintance of one who is
now the Glory of not only the Court of Brunswick but of the whole German
Empire. Men who are very Eminent in any one great thing may justly reckon
that they may well neglect all other things. But it is very Extraordinary and may
be justly reckoned among the wonderfull Phenomena of the Age that one man
should excel in all sciences. Mathematicks[,] Philosophy[,] Law[,] History and
Politicks do not exhaust a Genius that seems born to let the world see to what
one man can attain. And yet after all this you seem to have studied Theology
as if you had minded nothing else. When I tell you so freely what justice all
the world does you will easily believe that it gave me no small satisfaction to
find that my book which I took the liberty to send you was so well liked by so
great a man and so true a Judge. I am glad to find that it is like to be of some
use in order to the softening the sharpness that is among your [Lutheran and
Calvinist] Divines particularly in the matters of Predestination. The Court of
Brunswick is now so entirely united to ours upon the Justice which the King
and Parliament have done in declaring the right of succession that I hope we
shall agree in this as well as in every thing else to promote an agreement among
all that are Enemies to Popery in order to the defending ourselves against the
Common Enemy [France].

If the ecumenical Leibniz who spent years writing Catholic Demonstrations
would have flinched a little at the phrase, “enemies to Popery,” he could only have
been pleased by Gilbert Burnet’s closing assurance that “no man honours, loves
and respects you more than he who is with a most particular esteem…your most
humble and most obedient servant, Gil. Bishop of Sarum.” If Leibniz could have
hoped for a more universal, ecumenical “love” (joined with “wisdom” in the shape
of iustitia caritas sapientis), still the personal love and “respect” of the leading
English churchman of the day must have offset the sting of the increasing harshness
and contempt of Bishop Bossuet.

Leibniz knew moreover that Bossuet, in the opening book of his Politique tirée
des propres paroles de l’Écriture sainte (1679), had urged that any primitive société
générale du genre humain (governed universally by la charité) had given way,
“after the Fall,” to “particular,” post-lapsarian, fear-haunted societies governed by
absolute “divine monarchy” (whether of David, Solomon or Louis XIV). Bossuet,
then, for Leibniz, had abandoned “love” not just in Leibniz’ own personal case,
but “universally,” so that not only Leibniz but countless others became victims of
Bossuet’s failure to see the Pauline truth that “the greatest of these is charity”—or
that, in Leibniz’ faithful and hopeful re-working of I Corinthians xiii, “charity must
prevail over all other considerations in the world.”66

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Notes

2Ibid., No. 493, pp. 857-858.
3Plato, Republic, Books V and VI.
6Leibniz, Apologia Catholicae Veritatis, in Politische Schriften vol. 6, ed. Rudolph and Li, Berlin 2007, pp. 760-761. (For a full commentary on the Apologia, see the reviewer’s review of A IV, 6, in The Leibniz Review vol. 17, pp. 193ff.
7Leibniz, Quid sit Idea, Ger. VII, pp. 263-264.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
13For Leibniz on Cudworth’s “Cambridge Platonism,” see his Notes from 1689 and 1704 in Textes inédits (Grua), vol. 1, pp. 327-328.
14Leibniz, “Lettre touchant ce qui est independant,” op. cit., p. 503.
15Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, A VI, 6, op. cit., p. 49 (from a draft of the Préface).
Leibniz, Preface to Novissima Sinica, in Politische Schriften Vol. 6 (A IV, 6) op. cit., pp. 399-400.

“On the knowledge of substance, and in consequence of the soul, depends the knowledge of virtue and of justice” (Leibniz to Pierre Coste, 1712, in Ger. III, p. 428).


Ibid. Cassirer, to be sure, over-stresses Grotius as the “link” between Plato and Leibniz; for Leibniz was a great Platonist and Plato-scholar in his own right.


For Cassirer’s tendency to view Leibniz as anticipator of Kant, see Leibniz’ System in seinen Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, Marburg 1902, passim. Thomas Mann, Lotte in Weimar, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter, New York 1940, p. 187. Later in the same novel Goethe has a half-awake Leibniz-reverie in which love/eros/caritas (as understood by the Hellenizing art-historian Winckelmann) is the cause of monadic “metamorphosis”: “Winckelmann [for whom ‘the final product of ever-advancing nature is the beautiful human being’] . . . would have rejoiced in the audacity of including the biological pre-history of the beautiful in its final manifestation. He would have liked the idea that the power of love helps make an entelechy of the monad . . . running through the gamut of life’s lovely metamorphoses, finally attaining its highest and finest form.” That love should be not just a sentiment de perfection but the cause of perfecting is (so to speak) a hyper-Leibnizian thought: eros/caritas brings about the “ascent of monads.” (Without the Platonizing of Leibniz and the Graecophilia of Winckelmann, the Hellenization of German Idealism, above all in Schiller and Hegel, is unthinkable; and even Kant begins the Grundlegung with an encomium of Greek philosophia.

Leibniz, A I , 17, No. 118.

See Patrick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the


31 Ger. IV, 566-567 (to Remond, 1715).


33 “La Félicité” (inter alia), Grua II, pp. 579 ff.


35 Grua II, p. 653.

36 NE, p. 479, and letter to Thomas Smith (1695), A I, 12, p. 269.

37 VE, p. 1385.


44 T, “Preliminary Dissertation.”

45 Leibniz’ fullest effort to effect Lutheran-Calvinist *rapprochement* through Platonic “reason” and Pauline “charity”; fragments in Grua, I, pp. 428 ff.


47 Leibniz, A I, 20, op. cit., No. 414, p. 718. (This letter also contains remarkable animadversions against the paradoxes of Tertullian [“les expressions outrées”].)


49 Ibid. (Latta), p. 346.

50 John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, ed. B. Herman,
53 Ibid., p. 248.
54AI, 20, No. 185, p. 284.
55See the “Montesquieu” chapter in Patrick Riley, The Philosophers’ Philosophy of Law, Berlin 2008, ch. 8.
56Leibniz to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 264.
59William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming” (1921): “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.”
60Leibniz, Grundriss, in A I, IV, 1, pp. 530-531.
62Leibniz to Bossuet, A I, 20, No. 441, pp. 756-757.
63Leibniz, 10 February 1702, A I, 20, No. 126, pp. 183-184.
64Gilbert Burnet to Leibniz, A I, 20, No. 170, p. 258.
65Bossuet, Politics from Scripture, ed. Riley, op. cit., chapter 1 (passim).