TOPICAL OUTLINE OF THE THEODICY
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Since 1951, English-language readers of Leibniz’s *Theodicy* (*Essais de Théodicée*) have been well-served by the elegant and readable translation of E. M. Huggard, published by Routledge & Kegan Paul (1951) and Open Court (1985), and edited by Austin Farrer. However, this edition has some conspicuous failings: it leaves Latin, Greek, and German phrases untranslated; provides a name index only, thus omitting Leibniz’s own useful topical index; and completely omits the interesting and substantial synopsis, *Causa Dei Asserta* (a translation of which can be found in Paul Schrecker, *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*, Bobbs-Merrill [Library of Liberal Arts], 1965). The French paperback edition of the *Essais de Théodicée* published by Garnier-Flammarion (1969) does provide Leibniz’s own topical index to his work, as well as compendious and invaluable notes on the text (589 in number!), but of course, this does not help readers with no French. There exists, then, very little help for the reader wishing to mine the depths of Leibniz’s massive work, and who is thus forced to read it through from end to end to find out what is in it.

The following topical outline is offered to help remedy this situation. I have provided a tag-line indicating the gist of each numbered section of the work, and some indentation to help convey a sense of Leibniz’s architectural (progressive indentations indicating sections, subsections, and further sections of subsections). I hope that the outline may help make visible Leibniz’s overall plan and argument, a forest otherwise invisible for the trees.

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